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ABSTRACT
The broad objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of economic development on 
white-collar women by exploring gender relations at work in modem Korean chaebol 
offices, and also to assess the extent to which the cultural legacy of traditional 
(particularly Confucian) ideology has influenced contemporary corporate culture and 
women’s status and roles in it. For this purpose two hypotheses are tested: first, that 
national development, having generated women’s increased participation in paid work, 
has failed to integrate them fully into the process; second, that the national culture, with 
its strong Confucian tradition, has been a major obstacle to full integration by 
‘legitimising’ and sustaining gender inequality.
The structure employs both a macro and a micro perspective: the former offers an 
appreciation of the country’s cultural and socio-economic environment as it affects 
women in society and at work, while the latter encompasses a case study of 
employment policies and practices within chaebol offices in the late 1990s to probe the 
extent of sexual discrimination at work and to identify cultural influences on their 
gender relations. The theoretical framework for this research was initially based on 
Tiano’s theses of integration, marginalisation, and exploitation that were developed in 
relation to factory-working women in the development process.
The research shows that while gendered employment practices and the male-centred 
work culture have clearly been assisted by the deep-rooted Confucian tradition, national 
development process and the growing influences of global economy do not necessarily 
suggest any apparent improvement in delivering gender equality. In addition, the onset 
of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 (one year into the research) was an opportunity to 
observe the ever-changing dynamics of the socio-cultural ideology and the fluctuating 
needs and practices of big business in a global market, as well as to test further theories 
on women’s labour participation, such as those relating to a ‘reserve army of the 
labour’. The study concluded that Korean women’s participation in chaebol white-collar 
employment most closely fits a marginalisation thesis, yet to be ‘modified’ to take 
account of the complexity of the country’s development process.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: ‘Flowers o f the Office’?
1.1 Introduction
This study is an enquiry into the labour participation of female white-collar workers 
in large companies (chaebol1) in South Korea (hereafter Korea) in the context of the 
socio-economic development of the country. Using a case study of white-collar 
employees working in chaebol offices, this thesis examines their employment 
policies and practices towards female staff in the late 1990s - which throws light on 
the current status of working women in Korean society and gender relations at work.
As a background study (chapters 2 to 4), I undertook a review of literature on 
‘gender and development’ and ‘women in white-collar work’ to help understand 
Korean women’s position in their national development and the growing importance 
of their participation in white-collar work. In addition, the socio-economic 
development of the country is also examined historically, together with a discussion 
of its traditional culture and its influences on contemporary Korea. For the case 
study itself (chapters 5 to 8), an understanding of chaebol as the specific context is 
established by reviewing existing literature, complemented by interviews.' This is 
followed by a close examination of their employment policies and practices, a 
discussion and analysis of work practices, administrative culture, and employees 
experiences including gender relations -  largely based on interview outcomes. 64 
interviews of chaebol employees (28 females and 23 males) and others (12 females 
and one male - see later for details) were conducted using face-to-face, semi- 
structured interviews held in Seoul mostly during the main research in 1999 
(following preliminary field studies in 1996 and 1997).
The Asian crisis, which peaked in November 1997, crucially affected my 
research - not only by delaying the main fieldwork originally planned for 1998 
owing to the subject chaebol’s reluctance to grant access, but also by requiring a
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reassessment of the original hypotheses developed before the crisis when a mood of 
optimism prevailed. In effect, what emerged from post-crisis Korea has made a 
crucial contribution to the analysis and findings - in the sense that the recent socio­
economic changes have made the circumstances surrounding female employment 
more complex and multi-dimensional, and the predicament of working women more 
precarious. This has brought a new insight to women’s labour participation and 
gender relations in the changing national and global economy.
1.2 ‘Flowers o f the Office’
The title of this introductory chapter has a particular significance for this study since 
it was this expression that first aroused my interest in the subject, and which 
eventually led to this research. While growing up in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, 
my initial impression of female white-collar office workers was captured by this 
phrase, which was often used casually by men to extol the presence of female 
colleagues in their office yet implying a vague but somewhat demeaning hint of 
inferiority. The phrase insinuated that women were regarded as inferior, submissive 
and 'decorative' in the eyes of other people (mostly men), and had the effect of 
deterring me from even considering employment in a Korean company as a career 
option. There is little doubt that I was not the only Korean girl affected in this way.
Traditionally, women who work in Korean offices have been known as ‘yeo- 
sawon’ (female staff), and have often been referred to as ‘flowers of the office’ 
{samoosil-ui-kkotf (Park and Kang 1994; Woorisahoe yeongoo hakhoe 1998:179). 
While lyeo-sawon ’ clearly distinguishes female staff from male ‘sa-won ’ 
(staff/employee), the words ‘flowers of the office’ encapsulated the perceived role 
of female staff in Korean companies. As 'flowers’ they served to brighten up the 
otherwise harsh, masculine atmosphere of the office; for work they were offered a 
limited range of tasks commanding low status and poor remuneration. Their role in 
the office resembled that of ‘office ladies’ (OLs) in Japan, where an OL denotes a 
woman working regularly in an office engaged in simple, repetitive clerical work 
(such as photocopying, answering telephones, serving tea, and acting as an assistant
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to ‘career-track’ male employees) without expert knowledge or management 
responsibility (Carter and Dilatush 1976; Iwao 1993; Ogasawara 1998, 2001). 
Female office workers, until the mid 1980s almost always high-school leavers, were 
supposed to carry out relatively simple and fragmented tasks under orders from a 
male superior or colleague (usually a graduate), in addition to other trivial duties 
traditionally regarded as ‘women's work’ - such as cleaning, decorating the office 
and making tea for male colleagues and visitors (Park and Kang 1994).
The phrase ‘flowers of the office’, when applied to Korean female office 
employees, suggests an image controversial in itself and carrying a complex, 
somewhat contradictory, insinuation for women in white-collar employment in 
modem Korea. While the word ‘office’ may imply modernisation and development 
(of companies or country), for women the floral association connotes a traditional, 
patriarchal, gendered ideology. Although Korea and its social institutions have 
endured relentless development and modernisation, the cultural climate appears to 
remain deeply traditional and conservative - revealing a sharp dichotomy between 
modem business practice and traditional ideology, as will be shown clearly in later 
chapters. This particularly affects Korean women, whose labour participation has 
been critical to the successful development and modernisation of the country, and 
yet who in their everyday working lives frequently face disadvantages and obstacles 
arising from the strong traditional culture.
Korea is a developing country that has demonstrated rapid economic progress 
over the past several decades. With limited natural resources the nation has, 
particularly since the early 1970s, focused on export-oriented manufacturing to 
drive its development, and has achieved dramatic industrial and economic growth to 
become one of the ’newly industrialised countries' (NICs) (Hsiao 1988; Schive 
1990; Edwards 1992). Since 1950 its growth rate in total output was more than 
twice that of other less-developed countries, and in manufacturing output about 
three times as fast (Edwards 1992). This gathering pace of economic development 
and industrialisation in the post-war period, and particularly over the last few 
decades, has affected the lives and work of Korean women as much as it has the 
culture of society. During this period women have progressively participated in the
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labour force3, and have vitally contributed to national development (Yoon SY.4 
1977; Koo H. 1987; Bello and Rosenfeld 1990; Park KA. 1994). Female labour 
participation in Korea during the post-war period will be considered in more detail 
in Chapter 3.
However, it is questionable whether this contribution by women to national 
development has been properly appreciated, and whether improvements in their 
status have fairly reflected national progress. For example, according to the UNDP 
Human Development Report in 1995 Korea, while ranking 28th in GDP per capita, 
stood 37th (of 130 countries) in the Gender-related Development Index5 and 90th 
(of 116 countries) in the Gender Empowerment Measure6. Among other factors, the 
frequently-quoted, disproportionate wage differential between men and women in 
Korea (Kim HG. 1980; Park HK. & Park SI. 1982; Kim MJ. 1994; Park SJ. 1994) is 
one example of widespread gender inequality. In 1980, female remuneration in 
manufacturing was on average just 44.5 percent that of men; this 55.5 percent wage 
gap exceeded that of any other country for which data were available from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO 1981, cited in Amsden 1989:203). 
Although there has been some improvement since that time - in 1993 female hourly 
wage rates were, on average, 52.2 percent of those for men (ILO 1995) - progress
•7
has clearly been disappointing .
Apart from obvious, and measurable (e.g. with data or statistics), gender 
discrimination in conditions of employment, working women also experience less- 
visible, subjective discrimination at the workplace. This may take the form of a 
gender-discriminative working environment, where the attitudes and customary 
behaviour of employers and male colleagues are manifest in gendered practices and 
with a male-centred corporate culture serving to restrict and discourage women 
from full, active participation. Referring casually to female staff as ‘flowers of the 
office’, or specifying physical criteria for female job applicants (see the discussion 
of Korean female white-collar employment in Chapter 3), are just two examples of 
many. Further, ideas and concepts that are widely accepted as ‘customary’ and 
‘established practice’ may often hinder female participation in employment and 
discourage them from positively pursuing their careers.
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Recognising the controversial status of working women in Korea has led me to 
become interested in elucidating whether economic development has succeeded, or 
failed, in integrating them into the human (and gender) development process; and if 
failing, for what main reasons. The issue is concerned with whether Korean 
development, and especially female labour participation in it, has brought women 
liberation and proper integration into the process, or whether they have merely been 
exploited and marginalised while the nation pursues its capitalist economic interests. 
Any such failure to liberate women and integrate them into the process would be 
related to issues of culture and traditional ideology, which have played such a vital 
role in shaping the social structure and particular form of gender relations in Korean 
society today.
The importance of culture in the gender relations of a society, and the fact that 
gender is ‘culture specific’, has been widely noted (e.g. Beneria and Sen 1981; 
Moore 1988; Afshar and Agarwal 1989; Brydon and Chant 1989; Lim 1990; Brett 
1991; Dawit and Busia 1995). For example, Beneria and Sen (1981:288) pointed out 
the importance of social and cultural structures, as well as economic structures, in 
gender relations and argued that the roots of women's oppression must be sought not 
only within the sphere of production but also reproduction, and not only in 
economic structures but also in social and cultural structures.
In considering Korean culture, Confucianism is often regarded as one of the most 
important traditional sources of the country’s character and the principles guiding its 
institutions8 (Foster-Carter 1985; Kim KD. 1988 & 1994; Eckert et al. 1990; 
Edwards 1992; Janelli 1993; SaKong 1993; McKay and Missen 1995; Lew SC. 
1997; Hahm CB. 1997; Helgesen 1998; Compton, Jr. 2000; Deuchler 2003). Even 
though Korea is currently a nation of mixed religions with a variety of non- 
traditional influences (e.g. Christianity, Western modernisation, globalisation etc.), 
the impact of Confucianism on Korean society and the structure of its organisations 
has clearly been too great to ignore. Not only have many academics acknowledged 
and studied the distinctive influence of Confucian tradition on modem Korean 
society (e.g. linkage between Korea's recent economic achievements and its 
Confucian tradition - see Chapter 4), but also ordinary Koreans still feel the strong
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influence of this historical culture in their everyday life - as was frequently 
confirmed by my interviewees. For example, when referring to work culture, one 
female interviewee stated, “the major influence on Korean customs and culture is 
Confucianism; Korean work culture can be well understood and explained by 
Confucianism” (fg619), while another asserted, “Korean culture means Confucian 
tradition” (mu2610).
In examining the status and conditions under which women live and work in 
contemporary Korea, an understanding of the country’s culture and the persisting 
influence of traditional Confucianism is clearly crucial. Although Confucian 
tradition is important in many Asian countries11 (Kim BW. 1992; O’Harrow 1995; 
Rowley and Lewis 1996; Song BN. 1997; Zhang 1999; Compton Jr.2000; Roces 
and Edwards 2000; Brinton 2001; Warner 2003), Korea has long been popularly 
viewed as the nation that adheres most faithfully and strictly to its Confucian 
heritage (Palley 1992; Janelli 1993). Korea is a developing country that, during the 
past few decades, has achieved rapid industrial success within the global capitalist 
system while maintaining its strong cultural tradition. Its culture has been strongly 
influenced by Confucian philosophy, widely known for strict gender segregation 
and its tradition of male superiority. In speaking of Korean traditional culture, the 
importance accorded to ordering vertical relationships between superiors and 
subordinates based on Confucian morality and the conservatism of the patriarchal 
family is widely recognised (see Chapter 4 for detailed discussion). For these 
reasons, therefore, a discussion of women’s status and gender relations in Korea 
would not be complete without considering its strong Confucian heritage.
Among many who blame Confucianism and its values (which venerate men over 
women) for gender inequality in Korea, Yoon SY. (1977) specifically attributes the 
genesis of the under-privileged status of women to the cultural traditions of Korean 
society. Choi E. (1994) also claims that Confucian belief has prolonged the 
prevailing, negative discrimination against women. Even though the strict norms 
and practices of Confucian tradition have largely faded the core beliefs, with their 
oppressive, sex-discriminative traits, still influence contemporary society and the 
lives of Korean people. The deep-rooted Confucian ideals and practices of male
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superiority and gender inequality still persist as a major influence on the lives of 
Korean women.
What then is this culture like? The Confucian law of nature portrays manual 
workers, minors and women as inferiors (Cho H. 1992) and its philosophy stresses a 
rigid hierarchical order of human relationships based on age, sex, and inherited 
social status. This has not surprisingly led Confucianism to be criticised for its less- 
desirable characteristics, such as “embodying authoritarianism, nepotism, 
conservatism, and male chauvinism” (Edwards 1992). Traditional Korean society 
(before the development and modernisation of the second half of the 20th century) 
strictly adhered to Confucian principles that were oppressive to women, who were 
thereby constrained by their role as daughter, wife or mother and confined relatively 
freedom-less within the home (see Chapter 4 for examples). It might easily be 
assumed that the economic progress of recent decades has liberated women and that 
their status and living conditions in modem society have consequently changed 
dramatically for the better. Women in contemporary Korea now have the 
opportunity to be educated in universities and freely to enter paid employment as 
workers in offices alongside male colleagues. Unlike their predecessors of half-a- 
century ago, Korean women now have better access to national resources (such as 
education) to improve their circumstances, and more freedom to chose their 
lifestyle. However, in spite of all this it is hard to escape the impression that 
essentially women’s status remains secondary, decorative as ‘flowers of the office’, 
and that injustices and gendered practices are still common at the workplace and in 
society.
In this regard the Confucian tradition can be considered relevant to the capitalist 
development of modem Korean society, as it not only provides a sympathetic, and 
ordered cultural climate (see Chapters 4 and 5), but also encourages traditionally 
exploitative human relationships and gender roles. If so, is there a connection 
between the strong Confucian tradition, successful national development, and the 
exploitation of women in the pursuit of capitalist interests - legitimised by the 
repressive, gender-biased culture?
7
Chapter One
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study
The prime objective of this study is to examine to what extent Korean women have 
been integrated into, or exploited by, the process of development as a result of their 
involvement in paid employment. It seeks to establish whether gender 
discrimination at work exists today and, if so, to suggest its causes. While the broad 
aim is to examine the impact of socio-economic development on women and their 
labour participation, and whether or not this has been a means of integrating women 
into the development process, it is also to explain the importance of culture in 
influencing gender relations in socio-economic organisations.
Overall, Korea would appear to provide a good test-bed for examining the impact 
of economic development on women and their employment, and exploring whether 
or not this has been a means of integrating them into the development process. 
Further, in light of the fact that Korean culture has traditionally been oppressive to 
women, it would seem to provide a good opportunity to examine whether the 
development process has served to improve their relative status; or whether it has 
merely sustained existing gender inequality, albeit different in form. If the latter, it 
would prompt an evaluation of the extent to which Korean socio-economic 
organisations, such as large industrial corporations, operate primarily to serve the 
chief goal of generating profit by exploiting women in their particular cultural 
environment.
In summary, the objectives of this study are:
i) to form an appreciation of existing gender relations at work in contemporary 
Korea.
ii) to examine the impact of economic development on women, especially their 
status and conditions of employment, and judge whether they have been 
integrated equitably into national development or exploited by it; and, 
further, to consider whether or not the process of economic development and 
modernisation has contributed to improving women’s status in employment 
and in society.
8
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iii) to assess the extent to which traditional, particularly Confucian, ideology has 
influenced contemporary culture and gender relations at the workplace.
iv) to appraise the extent of gender inequality at work, identify its causes and 
understand how it has been created and maintained, and thereby to suggest 
ways further to promote equality at the workplace and in Korean society.
To achieve these objectives I intend to test the following hypotheses during this 
research:
First, that national development, which has generated an increased participation by 
Korean women in paid work, has failed to integrate them fully into the process.
It had been expected that participation in the process of economic development 
would bring to Korean women gender equality in society and equal status at work. 
However, it was my impression that their participation in the development process 
has not correspondingly brought women the gender equality and improved working 
conditions that their contribution deserved. The implication of this is that there has 
been no true 'integration of women' into Korean development, but that they may 
merely have been providing cheap and easily expendable labour - in other words, 
that Korean development is simply a continuation of the exploitation of women.
Second, that it is ‘the use o f the culture ’, with its strong Confucian tradition, by 
social actors and institutions that has been the major obstacle to full integration o f 
women into the Korean development process -  because it has ‘legitimised’ and 
sustained gender inequality and sexual discrimination at work and in society.
If the first hypothesis is valid, it is my further contention that the prime reason for 
the persistent gender inequality in Korean society and at work is the continuing and 
pervasive influence of traditional culture, particularly that of Confucian origin. This 
implies that Confucian values remain embedded in everyday social mores and 
working relationships and are used to maintain and legitimise gender discrimination.
To test these hypotheses, I have chosen to carry out a case study of white-collar 
office workers in Korean chaebol. Office workers were chosen as subjects because 
white-collar employment is an increasingly important sector in the expanding 
national economy, and one which for Korean women is among the most popular and
9
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accessible of all employment opportunities. Women working in offices have in 
recent years increased dramatically in number, and now comprise a significant 
proportion (13.4 percent) of all employed women.12 However, female white-collar 
employment in Korea, as in other developing countries, has so far received 
relatively little attention; it is a comparatively under-researched topic and there are 
few empirical, up-to-date studies on this subject. In contrast, most studies on 
working Korean women have concentrated on production workers (e.g. Lee HC. 
1985; RAS 1988; Cho SK. 1987; Koo H. 1987; Pearson 1992a; Lee OJ. 1993), as 
part of the relatively wide academic attention over the last few decades that has been 
focused on Third World women in export-oriented manufacturing industries. This 
relative paucity of academic focus on office workers in Korea raises the issue of the 
corresponding lack of gender perspective on the subject, and suggests that perhaps 
such a study is timely. This is discussed later in this chapter, when the significance 
of the study is addressed, and also in Chapter 3.
Chaebol were selected as host organisations for the study for a number of 
different reasons. First, among the many different types of organisation employing 
female white-collar workers, they command special national status and play a 
critically important role in the country's economy and its labour markets. Their 
historically close relationship with government (see Chapter 3 and 5), which has 
supported them with benevolent dissemination of licences, permits and loans on 
favourable terms, has allowed chaebol to grow at rates far surpassing that of the 
overall economy (Soh BH. 1997). Kang MH. (1996:128) argues that in Korea the 
government usually sets policies and businessmen follow. This means, among other 
things, that the employment policies and practices of chaebol are considered closely 
to reflect governmental policy and guidance (Kim YT. 1998)13. Second, apart from 
their important contribution to the labour market, chaebol have long been 
considered the leading model for employment policies and practices in Korean 
firms. This implies that they embody, indeed pioneer, current and future trends in 
national employment strategy. Third, chaebol are generally regarded as better 
employers, in terms of wages, conditions of work and general organisation, than 
other Korean companies, and as such are usually favoured by job seekers (see
10
Chapter One
Chapter 5). This probably also applies in the case of female employees: it is often 
speculated that chaebol are 'better' employers for Korean women than small and 
medium-sized companies because their employment policies and practices14 appear 
to be less discriminatory and more likely to promote gender equality15. Fourth, even 
though they are Korean, chaebol are effectively transnational corporations (TNCs) -  
a feature which is relevant to this study in the sense that TNCs can act as agents not 
only of economic modernisation (Lim 1985:97) but also cultural modernisation (and 
globalisation) in a developing country like Korea. Chaebol may be considered a 
bridge between modem (global) and more traditional domestic market enterprises16: 
while firmly based in domestic society, they have more international contacts, are 
more likely to be influenced by non-Korean culture, and consciously seek to present 
a 'modem' image by adopting sophisticated, ‘Western’ forms of organisation. In 
addition, as previously mentioned, they appear to be influenced and encouraged by 
the government to become involved in the global economy and its industrial 
politics. Therefore, even for gender relations and equality at work, they can provide 
good examples of an environment where new changes can easily be introduced and 
recognised. Chaebol offices may be seen as a place where modem organisation and 
traditional Korean culture meet and intertwine to produce an environment that is 
particularly relevant for a study of gender relations at work. Chaebol, therefore, 
seem ideally suited for my research on female employment as they provide a social 
context where two contrasting influences, traditional and modem (global), coexist 
and interact with each other to produce a particular work culture and office 
discourses affecting gender relations.
Since the particular aim of the research is to examine current female white-collar 
employment and gender relations in the offices of chaebol, I intend to explore the 
following research questions by examining and analysing their current employment 
policies and practices:
i) are current employment policies and practices in chaebol gendered - and if 
so, to what degree?
ii) to what extent are elements of traditional culture (and other cultural 
influences) manifest in the office, particularly in relation to gender relations?
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iii) how far does current gender ideology, revealed in work culture and customs, 
play a role in generating and sustaining gender inequality and sexual 
discrimination at work?
iv) to what degree have changes in socio-economic conditions influenced current 
female employment and the status of women working in chaebol?
v) what factors, if any, could help improve gender equality and the status of 
women at work?
In order to explore these questions, a total of 64 in-depth, face-to-face interviews 
were carried out with office employees and a small number of other relevant 
subjects; the majority of these (51) were working in the offices of eight different 
chaebol located in Seoul.17 In addition, I attended group presentations by 11 
chaebol managers and staff representatives. The details and profile of the 
interviewees are reported in Appendix One (Tables 1.1,1.2 and 1.3).
This study of office employment in chaebol focuses on female employees, of 
which there are broadly two categories, both of which are relevant and important to 
this thesis: high-school leavers and university graduates. High-school leavers, who 
are usually recruited for lower-grade administrative jobs, comprise the 
overwhelming majority of these female employees to date (see Chapter 3). Their 
experiences are particularly pertinent in that their existence and roles in Korean 
offices reflect a more ‘traditional’ approach towards female employment by chaebol 
(and other Korean firms) since these are the women who have been customarily 
hired as female office staff. The graduates, on the other hand, are relatively few in 
number (see Chapters 3 and 6) and as a group are new to chaebol office work; they 
have been employed for an ‘executive’ career path and may reflect a modem, more- 
progressive trend in female employment. Their separate experiences at work, and 
the gender discrimination encountered by these two distinctive groups, exhibit some 
elements that are common to both and some that are distinct. A consideration of 
both these groups of women is necessary for a thorough understanding of female 
employment in chaebol. Therefore, I intend to discuss the historical development of 
these two groups and then compare and contrast (throughout the study, whenever 
possible) their different recruitment processes, the nature of their tasks, their
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working conditions, expected roles in the office and their employers' attitude 
towards them. In order to provide a fair and comparative evaluation, almost half (45 
percent) of the chaebol employees interviewed were male (mostly graduate) staff 
(see Appendix 2.1); clearly they compare most closely with female graduates, yet 
their views on, and working relationships with, high-school leavers are also 
particularly instructive and relevant to this study.
To show that employment practices are gendered, and therefore sexual- 
discriminatory to women, I will use both an objective and a subjective approach in 
identifying and investigating the types of unequal treatment. The former focuses on 
an objective examination of general employment policies and practices from a 
gender perspective (see Chapter 6), while the latter considers actual gender relations 
in the office by examining real, informal, attitudes and practices of both employers 
and employees from a subjective viewpoint (see Chapter 7 and 8).
The more formal, objective approach reviews the key elements of human 
resource management in four sections: i) ‘recruitment’, ii) ‘development’, iii) 
‘rewards’, and iv) ‘termination’. The ‘recruitment’ section covers general 
recruitment methods, the availability and access of information for open 
recruitment, procedures and selection criteria, and the allocation of recruits to 
departments and jobs. In ‘development’, staff training, task assignment, job rotation 
and transfers are considered. ‘Rewards’ discusses performance evaluation, 
promotion and remuneration issues, while the final ‘termination’ section examines 
the topics of retirement, resignation and dismissal.
The subjective approach, exploring how common beliefs, office discourses and 
customary practices are gendered, and how they relate to Confucian tradition, 
probes questions such as: i) Is there gender bias or prejudice in the attitudes of 
(male) employees and managers? If so, how is it justified?; ii) What are the 
customary gendered discourses on women’s traits and roles?; iii) Do these influence 
women’s behaviour and ways of thinking, and adversely affect the evaluation of 
their performance?; and iv) How are they related to Confucian influences, and 
exhibited in the workplace?
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1.4 Background and Rationale o f the Field Work
My interest in female white-collar employment in Korea as a research project 
developed in the mid 1990s at a time when major changes in female employment in 
Korean enterprises were taking place. While large Korean companies, especially 
chaebol, had long been popular among graduate job seekers as preferred employers, 
until the mid 1980s this only really applied to male graduate candidates (see Chapter 
3 for details). A few female graduates might have been employed in secretarial 
positions, but this was usually as a result of personal introduction, rather than 
through ‘open competition’ (kong-chae) as was used for male graduate candidates. 
Until this time, female school leavers who were recommended by their (usually, 
commercial) high schools were hired for simple administrative work, bookkeeping 
and other tasks of an assisting nature. In 1985, however, this recruitment system 
underwent major change when one prominent chaebol, the Daewoo group, for the 
first time included female graduates as applicants for core white-collar jobs -  which 
had previously been reserved only for male graduates (.Minwoohoe 1997:1). 
Subsequently, other chaebol began to follow this lead by allowing women to 
participate in their open recruitment process (this is considered in more detail in 
Chapter 3).
When I visited Korea in the summer of 1996 for preliminary field research, the 
prospects for women seeking employment in large conglomerates appeared bright in 
a country where the general atmosphere was prosperous and self-confident. 
Moreover, the movement towards 'globalisation', that then headed the public 
industrial policy agenda and was actively being promoted by the government of 
Kim Young-Sam,18 also incorporated gender equality at work as an integral 
component. As a result, 'women's rights' issues were much in evidence nationally as 
the government was strongly advocating the 'globalisation' of both business and 
culture. In spite of the fact that Korean society was still deeply discriminatory 
against women, the country and leading employers appeared to be making genuine 
and positive efforts to improve gender equality both in society and at work.
14
Chapter One
These changes led me to wonder why they were happening; was this the 
beginning of liberation for long-suffering Korean women and a ‘natural’ 
consequence of the country’s progress towards fully developed status?; would 
economic development and modernisation (and globalisation) in themselves serve to 
redress existing gender inequality? It seemed to me at the time that the most 
effective way to improve the status of Korean women was perhaps to allow the 
country, with its closed society and strong Confucian tradition, quickly to open up 
to outside influences and encourage further inter-communication with the 
comparatively less-gendered developed world and its modem culture. During this 
visit, therefore, I began to form a hypothesis that, as long as Korea maintained its 
economic progress and accessibility, the accompanying modernisation and 
globalisation would of itself help alleviate sexual prejudice and gender 
discrimination, and thereby lead to an improvement in the status of Korean women.
However, when I returned for the second visit in July 1997, the mood of the 
country had changed perceptibly. There was a national feeling of unease, the 
business climate was less optimistic, and both companies and employees appeared 
less confident about the immediate future (an account of the country’s economic 
condition at that time is given in the first part of Chapter 3). As a result, and in 
contrast to the first visit, many signs favourable to the promotion of gender equality 
had disappeared. Gender issues had become less important, women seemed to be 
losing jobs (often being asked to leave before their male colleagues), and 
'globalisation' now seemed to most business people merely to mean “more 
competitive in the global market”, rather than a means of improving the conditions 
under which women worked to a 'global' standard. What struck me this time were 
doubts as to whether the previous advances for women in the labour market were 
genuine and permanent - or even still existed. I began to question whether the recent 
enthusiastic encouragement of companies to employ female graduates for white- 
collar work might have been more a temporary market response to the demands of 
industrial growth and the economic needs of employers, rather than a more 
sustained voluntary and egalitarian recognition of the needs and rights of women. 
While this was one of the major issues to be explored in my study, the economic
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crisis in 1997 clearly introduced, however temporarily, a reluctance to discuss 
gender issues and a lack of interest in promoting gender equality. The economic 
difficulties of the country and chaebol were serious to the extent that the main field 
research, originally planned for 1998, had to be delayed for at least a year because 
of the discouraging and evasive responses from companies to my requests to carry 
out interviews bearing on issues of gender equality. They were clearly distracted in 
attempting to cope with the economic crisis that was, perhaps, even threatening their 
own survival. This experience led me to re-examine some of my previous ideas, and 
to modify the hypotheses and research questions. The main field research was 
eventually carried out in the summer of 1999, when economic pressures on Korean 
companies had become less intense after the initial panic, and the situation had 
ameliorated.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
In examining female white-collar employment in Korea, and investigating whether 
its effects on the women employed can be considered to be in the nature of 
integration or exploitation, the overall framework of the thesis is based primarily on 
the feminist paradigm outlined by Tiano. In her review of the literature on women in 
industrial development in Latin America, Tiano (1986) subsumed current 
viewpoints within three competing perspectives which employ contrasting 
assumptions about patriarchy19 and its relationship to capitalist development: these 
are the theses of ‘integration’, ‘marginalisation’, and ‘exploitation\  According to 
Tiano, the 'integration thesis' holds that industrialisation leads to female liberation 
and sexual equality by involving women more centrally in economic and political 
development (Tiano 1994:37). In the 'marginalisation thesis', capitalist development 
makes women peripheral to socially-valued roles and resources; it maintains that 
capitalist industrialisation excludes women from productive roles and confines them 
to the household or to the informal sector. Finally, the 'exploitation thesis' claims 
that capitalistic industrialisation creates a female proletariat supplying low-wage 
labour for the purpose of accumulating capital at minimal cost (ibid.). These theses
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will be discussed further in more detail in the succeeding chapter, when a general 
literature review on women in development is presented.
These theses outlined by Tiano are a good starting point for building a 
framework for my study of Korean female white-collar workers - even though they 
were formed primarily in the context of female manufacturing workers. This is 
because they can be useful in viewing, not only the outcome of women's work 
involvement in the export processing zones of developing countries but also, in a 
broader sense, the effect of development on Third World women. My assumption is 
that the experiences of Korean women as paid employees in the development 
process may share elements in common with those of working women in other parts 
of the developing world. At the same time, this study also provides an opportunity 
to assess whether Tiano’s framework is suitable for explaining the experiences of 
female white-collar employment in the developing world.
While the general theoretical framework for this case study of Korean women in 
development is largely derived from Tiano’s theses, the overall structure of the 
study of female white-collar employment in chaebol employs both a macro and a 
micro perspective. From a macro perspective, a general understanding of the socio­
economic background (including labour market conditions for women) and cultural 
environment in the country will help properly to appreciate the position of Korean 
women in society and at work. Although this study particularly concerns the 
situation of women in the labour market and their role and status in work 
organisations, their position in society at large and general attitudes towards 
working women should first be appreciated. This is because the status of female 
workers in the labour market is both directly and indirectly influenced not only by 
labour market conditions, but also by the country’s general social structure, 
including its traditional patriarchal system.
The macro perspective is used from two angles: first, socio-economic factors are 
considered by examining historically the country’s economic and social changes 
during the post-war period (1953-1990s) that influenced current female employment 
policies and practices. This will include an introduction to the current Korean labour 
market for female workers and, more specifically, that for white-collar employees
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(Chapter 3). Second, cultural factors that have directly and indirectly influenced the 
status of Korean women in society and gender relations at work are examined and 
discussed (Chapter 4).
The micro perspective, on the other hand, involved research within the offices of 
selected chaebol in order to explore the extent to which sexual discrimination and 
gender inequality still persist. While research from a macro perspective comprised 
primarily an examination of existing literature and data sources, and constituted the 
background for more focused and specific empirical research, the micro perspective 
focused on relevant employment policies and practices in chaebol offices and the 
experiences of chaebol employees.
1) Macro-perspective
Socio-economic Factors
These factors influence the changing demand for labour at particular historical 
junctures, and the ways in which this demand has been met. It is, therefore, 
important to examine whether, and to what extent, the development process in 
Korea has attracted women from the private sphere into the public domain of paid 
employment, and how certain patterns of female employment have evolved over 
time in response to varying demands from the nation's development process. 
Further, it is particularly useful to explore how female employment has developed 
and changed as a result of employers’ demands and the influence of government 
policy. For this purpose, an historical examination of the development of the Korean 
economy, and its demands for labour to meet its needs, is considered appropriate. It 
will also be helpful to consider national policies towards economic development, 
and other related issues such as the recent movement toward globalisation, the role 
of chaebol in the economy and the labour market - particularly in relation to female 
employment. Most importantly, the nature of the labour market for women, both 
white-collar and production employees, as it has developed over recent decades, is 
examined; this will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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Cultural Factors
Gender identity is a social construction with a rationale related to the biological 
difference between the sexes. Gender inequality and sexual discrimination, which 
have existed in most societies throughout history, reflect basic assumptions and 
traditions about the different nature of men and women, and the presumed roles they 
can and should play within a society. These assumptions and traditions exhibit great 
variability across different cultures and societies, as do the respective roles of men 
and women and their consequent gender relations.
In contemporary Korea, although a nation with mixed religions and beliefs, 
Confucianism retains a strong presence. A discussion of Korean society would be 
incomplete without some understanding of the ideology and moral code associated 
with Confucian tradition - as well as other cultural influences. An understanding of 
the changing roles and status of women in Korea requires analyses, not only of this 
traditional culture but also other more recent influences arising from modernisation. 
The relevance of Korea’s traditional culture to contemporary society (encompassing 
family, household and social organisations), and its impact on modem women who 
face the dilemma of identifying variously with traditional and modem roles, is 
crucial. Korean culture and gender relations will be discussed in Chapter 4.
2) Micro-perspective
This approach specifically involves an examination of work practices and gender 
relations in contemporary chaebol offices. The research explores the employment 
policies and practices of chaebol, the perceptions of employers towards, and 
treatment of, female employees compared with their male staff, and the experiences 
and attitudes of female (and male) employees bearing particularly on gender 
relations at work.
The status of women and the conditions under which they work are influenced by 
a variety of factors, including those relating to culture and ideology manifest at the 
workplace, the domestic role and responsibilities of female employees, and the 
attitudes and actions of employers and the government toward female employment; 
it is important that they should all be considered. It is at the micro level of the
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workplace that these different factors are distilled and displayed in the complex 
interactions among and between employers and employees.
1.6 Methodology
This part describes the methodology followed in the empirical investigation into 
employment policies and practices for female white-collar employees and gender 
relations in chaebol. To explore the situation of Korean women in paid work, and 
how traditional Confucian culture has contributed to their present condition and 
role, I have particularly chosen (female) white-collar office workers in chaebol to be 
the subjects of my case study.
a) Research Strategy 
Qualitative Approach
To collect and analyse the primary data for this study, I have chosen a qualitative, 
rather than a quantitative, research approach. This was because the theme of my 
investigation and the nature of the research questions called for a closer, more 
detailed examination from the perspective of the subjects than is usually satisfied by 
a quantitative approach. For example, I was interested in examining diverse working 
conditions experienced by employees, interactions between them in the light of 
gender relations and administrative culture, and their attitudes towards various 
issues including work ethics, culture and gender roles. The research, therefore, 
focussed on exploring beliefs, experiences and behaviour of the respondents in 
relation to gender relations and cultural influences at the workplace, and identifying 
patterns of direct and indirect sexual discrimination. For this reason, it was 
particularly important that the research truly reflected the perspective of the 
participants.
A research challenge of this nature can usually best be undertaken by a 
qualitative approach, as many suggest (e.g. Allan and Skinner 1991; Judd et al. 
1991; Kvale 1996; Flick 1998). Allan (1991:178) asserts that satisfactory
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explanations of social activities require a substantial appreciation of the 
perspectives, culture and ‘world-views’ of the actors involved, which is a core 
feature of qualitative research. Further, as Judd et al. (1991:231) observe, “questions 
about beliefs and attitudes are particularly difficult to explore” since they are often 
complex and multi-dimensional. While recognising qualitative research as 
specifically relevant to the study of social relations, due to the pluralisation of life 
worlds, Flick (1998) argues that this pluralisation requires a new sensitivity to the 
empirical study of issues. A source of knowledge in this context is gradually to take 
an insider’s perspective -  to understand the individual’s viewpoint or the 
organisational principles of social groups from a member’s perspective (ibid.).
Further, qualitative approaches to human interaction are important within 
feminist research:
“ feminist approaches have in common a focus on the everyday world of
women, work with methods appropriate for understanding the very lives and 
situations of women, and understanding is a means for changing the 
conditions studied” (Kvale 1996:72).
Qualitative research is sensitive to the human situation, it involves an empathic 
dialogue with the subjects studied, and it may contribute to their emancipation and 
empowerment (Kvale 1996:70). Although in Korea there are a number of studies on 
sexual discrimination in white-collar employment (typically surveys undertaken by 
organisations, such as women’s pressure groups promoting gender equality, with a 
more quantitative approach) and various academic works assessing the influence of 
Confucian culture on women in society, few studies satisfactorily focus in depth on 
the experiences of women in white-collar jobs and how they are affected by gender 
relations and discrimination derived from Confucian ideology. Therefore, even 
though some aspects of the research could have been assisted by a quantitative 
approach (such as those involving some factual information about the employees as 
respondents), I was more interested in developing qualitative data that would show 
the various adaptive responses of female interviewees to their experiences, the 
different justifications for gender discrimination offered by male respondents, and 
finally how the work culture of chaebol is still subject to ideological influences.
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Research Methods
As the main method for executing this qualitative research, I employed semi- 
structured interviews with open-ended questions. My selection of this method 
derived from “the expectation that the interviewed subjects’ viewpoints are more 
likely to be expressed in a relatively openly-designed interview situation than in a 
standardised interview or a questionnaire” (Flick 1998:76). To allow respondents to 
answer in a relatively unconstrained way and to convey subtleties of attitude to their 
own satisfaction, open-ended questions can be ideal, especially when the full range 
of their “attitude positions” is not known (Judd et al. 1991:239). Consequently, 
establishing a close rapport with interviewees to encourage them to reveal their 
personal opinions and express themselves freely on sensitive issues was considered 
important. I also sought to conduct interviews in a relaxed and informal manner so 
that feelings and opinions could be expressed as candidly as possible. This was 
particularly important when dealing with the subtleties of sexual discrimination (or, 
in some cases, sexual harassment) in the perception of respondents.
An interview guide, containing an outline of topics to be covered and a sequence 
of carefully worded questions was used. Because the interviews were arranged 
through personal introductions, and the feeling that I was being ‘controversial’, 
questions were designed to appear less ‘provocative and contentious’ yet hiding 
nuances of meaning, especially when involving male respondents. Even though I 
followed the guide as closely as possible, occasionally a particular interview 
situation or interviewee required a modified sequence or wording of questions. 
Throughout, I sought to employ non-directive, conversational questioning and avoid 
making early appraisals. For example, in exploring the influence of traditional 
(Confucian) culture at the workplace (Question No. 21 -  see Appendix 3), by first 
asking Question No.20 (“Are there any aspects of the work culture with which you 
are not happy? Which aspects of the work culture do you consider are hindering the 
efficiency of the workplace?”) I would allow the respondents voluntarily to 
introduce the issue of traditional Confucian culture -  which they often did.
For my own convenience the interview guide was grouped into topic areas: on 
personal background, current employment experiences, beliefs and cultural
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influences, and gender relations. In putting together interview questions, it was 
intended to leave sensitive and more complex issues towards the end of the 
interview - until rapport and trust had been established. Further, in finalising the 
interview guide, a pilot study of test interviews was carried out prior to the main 
research (see below) to reflect upon the questions being asked and to amend them if 
necessary. The interview guide was modified several times, especially after pilot 
interviews with female office workers in 1997.
The questions (see Appendix 3) were broadly arranged into four sections 
according to their subject content:
a) general information about the respondent, including educational and other 
qualifications;
b) experience of the respondent with the present employer, including length of 
service, job description and nature of work, job satisfaction, personal career 
plans, degree of satisfaction with salary and working conditions;
c) beliefs, experiences and behaviour of the respondent in relation to cultural 
influences at the workplace and its administrative ethos.
d) attitudes, behaviour and the shop-floor discourse on issues of gender 
relations and equal opportunity, such as gender relationships with male 
colleagues and superiors, any persisting sexual division of labour, direct and 
indirect sexual discrimination etc.
It was intended that these interviews, which often concluded with an open-ended 
discussion, should also cover other important issues relevant to gender relations at 
work - such as cultural ideology unfavourable to working women, new influences 
originating from modernisation and recent globalisation, women's domestic 
responsibilities and their roles at home, and currently-popular discourses on women 
in society. Apart from the semi-structured interviews, a few other methods of 
gathering information were used to complement the primary data collected: these 
included personal observations and written material and data provided by the 
subject chaebol.
Groundwork and Securing Access
Collection o f secondary data
Initially, extensive secondary data and literature was assembled both in Korea and 
the U.K. relating to: Korean economic development over the last few decades,
23
Chapter One
recent changes in the socio-economic environment, gender relations in general, and 
female employment in factory and white-collar office work. Additional literature, 
available in the U.K., was also gathered on women in the developing world and 
female white-collar work in general. For the case study of chaebol, research 
literature and published materials and data were collected (both in Korea and the 
U.K.) to help understand their role in the Korean economy and labour market, their 
interaction with government, and their work culture -  in order to ascertain and 
clarify the recent changes and current status of their employment policies and 
practices. However, it proved difficult to acquire information about their actual 
work policies since little printed matter was available. In order to complement the 
interviews, the relevant literature used is primarily derived from the sources 
mentioned above and articles in recruitment magazines and newspapers.
Selection o f chaebol and interviewees
Gaining research access to chaebol and interview subjects was expected to present 
problems and was a major concern in selecting chaebol and interviewees. For an 
outsider to approach a chaebol, particularly to interview their female employees 
about gender issues, was challenging from the outset owing to their traditional 
privacy and reticence; in the present economic circumstances with many chaebol 
facing acute financial threat (see Chapter 5, where the recent economic crisis is 
discussed), it was particularly problematic. Negotiating this access took 
considerable time and required introductions from influential intermediaries. As a 
result, the chaebol studied and the employees interviewed were selected largely on 
the basis of convenience samples.
From my initial contacts with chaebol business executives in 1996,1 formed the 
impression then that it would be very difficult to persuade even one chaebol to allow 
me to carry out an extensive case study over a fairly long period entirely within one 
organisation (which could have been a research option). However, I did make 
progress on an alternative plan: through a personal contact, I became acquainted 
with an influential intermediary (a former president of a major affiliate of chaebol 
SI, currently working as a business consultant to chaebol generally) who introduced
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me to a few large chaebol. He did this indirectly, through very senior executives in 
subsidiary affiliate companies where I was ultimately given permission to conduct 
interviews with employees chosen and arranged by an executive manager. Other 
interviews were arranged through private introductions from working colleagues 
and friends.
Even though the chaebol covered in the research were primarily selected by 
availability of access, in the event I was able to interview employees working in 
between one and three affiliated companies within each of the five leading chaebol - 
although the number of interviews in each chaebol varied. The largest number of 
interviews (21) was conducted in chaebol SI, often considered the foremost large 
chaebol (especially in relation to its management of human resources and 
administrative structure - a fact confirmed by many interviewees, both those 
working within the group and in other chaebol). Among the many affiliated 
companies of chaebol SI, used as the core case study, I specifically chose one 
particular company operating in the textile and fashion industry - known as a 
‘female-friendly’ sector and therefore ‘allowed’ to employ more female staff than 
other sister affiliates, such as those in engineering sectors. Interviewing subjects in 
prominent chaebol well regarded for their progressive policies towards women, and 
many in a ‘female-friendly’ affiliate, might seem to introduce an element of bias in 
the sample. Yet this fact probably makes my findings of continuing gender 
discrimination even more striking.
In total I interviewed 14 staff from this one company; for comparison purposes a 
smaller number from two other companies within the same chaebol were also 
interviewed. Apart from these, I also interviewed 8 employees from chaebol HI, 4 
from D l, 4 from S2, and 3 from L (all members of the top five chaebol at the time). 
In addition, interviews within chaebol H2 (6), P (4), and the smaller D2 (1) were 
added (see the Appendix Table 2.1). Employees (and sometimes managers) from 
each company participated in in-depth interviews using the semi-structured 
interview guide. Care was taken in the selection of interviewees to ensure, as far as 
practicable, that a representative balance between men and women (55% were 
women), ages, educational backgrounds (67.9% of the women were university
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graduates, the remainder were high-school leavers) and status was achieved. 
Further, selected interviewees were chosen from a variety of job occupations, in 
different industries and at different office locations. At the outset I had intended to 
pay particular regard to female graduates, as representing the most ‘modernised and 
perhaps least gendered’ employment sector. Their apparently small number in the 
sample is indicative of their position in the chaebol -  very few female graduates are 
still working, a circumstance that was undoubtedly accentuated by the recession. In 
total, 51 interviews were carried out with employees of chaebol (see below for 
further discussion on additional interviews outside chaebol).
b) Data Collection
Field Visits
The bulk of the data was collected during the main field research that was conducted 
in the vicinity of Seoul in 1999; this followed two earlier periods of fieldwork in 
1996 and 1997. These two preliminary visits were planned to build the hypotheses, 
and establish contacts that could facilitate access to research sites for interviewing. 
In addition, they enabled me to conduct pilot studies to test the preliminary question 
guide, and undertake some valuable interviews with less directly-apposite people 
such as local academics working in related fields, female university students seeking 
jobs, female white-collar employees working in various organisations, senior 
executives and personnel managers of chaebol, and representatives from women's 
pressure groups.
During the first visit (12 July -  20 August 1996), preliminary personal contacts 
were established, leading later to further introductions and meetings with 
intermediaries for access to potential interviewees. Further, to gather useful 
information on related subjects, visits were made to a small number of academics in 
sociology and gender studies, a women’s white-collar employment organisation 
(e.g. Minwoohoe), and an important journal specialising in graduate recruitment 
(e.g. Sisa Journal). Some of the pilot interviews were carried out with the 
respondents (mu38m, fu46, fg60, fF57, fg61, fw63, mb64 - all of whom were re­
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interviewed in 1997 and 1999), while some of these (mu38m, fu46, fg60, mb64) 
subsequently acted as intermediaries introducing new subjects during the 
subsequent field visits (see Appendix 1.1 and 1.2 for codes and profiles of 
interviewees).
During the second visit (28 July -  8 Oct 1997), the contacts previously 
established in 1996 were pursued and new introductions for gaining access to 
chaebol and interviewees developed. Some further pilot interviews were undertaken 
(with mu38m, fu46, ff57, ff58, ff59, fg60, fg61, fw63, mb64 - all re-interviewed in 
1999) while the main interviews began with a few chaebol employees (i.e. fu20, 
fu21, mu38m, fu46, fu50) and some job candidates (i.e. fs52, fs53, fs54). Some 
other non-chaebol subjects were also interviewed (i.e. ff57, fF58, ff59, fg60, fg61, 
fw63 - all re-interviewed in 1999) in an informal and less-structured fashion - the 
main aim being to establish contact for the main interviews to follow. Some 
interviews (e.g. with ff59, fg60) unexpectedly suggested introductions to new 
interview subjects for the following visit in 1999. I also attended five different 
recruitment seminars for female graduate job candidates given by four major 
chaebol, presented by a total of 11 people (cs65~cs75; see Appendix 1.3 for 
presenters at chaebol recruitment seminars). In addition, further meetings were 
arranged with appropriate people in pursuit of access to chaebol -  with little 
success. Academics (about 10) in related fields, such as sociology and gender 
studies, were contacted and met for brief meetings or discussions: this provided me 
with some useful ideas for research planning and methodology but offered little to 
the main body of research - none were included in my interviewee list. Visits to 
Korean women’s organisations (e.g. Minwoohoe, KWDI) yielded some interviews 
and the collection of published materials on gender issues.
The final, principal, field visit was in 1999 (from 1 May to 1 Sept). The early 
months were devoted to securing access to chaebol and interviewees and making 
frequent contacts with potential intermediary-interviewees (e.g. mulm, mul5m, 
fh23, mu25m, mu30m, mu38m, fu46, ff59, fg60, mb64; plus some others who chose 
not participate). By the end of the visit these contacts had led to further 
introductions which enabled me to complete the remainder of the interviews. Thus,
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the majority of the interviews (all except fu20, fu21, mu38m, fu46, fu50, fs52, fs53, 
fs54 -  which were conducted in 1997) was completed during this time allowing me 
to finalise the field research by the end of August 1999. Meanwhile, recent 
secondary data and literature were gathered (including that from women’s 
organisations) to support and complement my empirical research.
Together, these field studies yielded a total of 64 interviews, including 51 
interviews with employees from 11 companies in 8 different chaebol. Because of 
the lack of U.K. data and literature on Korea and its female workers, and the paucity 
of literature and research on female white-collar work even in Korea, it was 
necessary to conduct pilot interviews in a manner designed to elucidate information 
about contemporary female employment and any relevant research, as well as 
soliciting the personal experiences and opinions of interviewees. The two earlier 
visits provided the background that enabled me to appreciate and focus on more 
recent, important issues, and were valuable in developing the study hypotheses and 
question guide. The interviews, most of which were tape-recorded for later 
transcription and analysis, lasted usually between one and two hours. As agreed 
with the companies and interviewees, to maintain anonymity references to both in 
the body of this study are indicated by code initials.
Interviews
Interview subjects, who were located as explained through a variety of sources 
including personal contacts and referrals, were interviewed using a semi-structured 
question guide with an open-ended, 'informal' discussion of key issues. Most of the 
interviews were conducted face-to-face, either in the offices of the subjects or at a 
tearoom near where they worked, and lasted from 45 minutes to two hours - the time 
depending on how much they could spare. Even though the main focus of the study 
is female employment, it was decided also to include male employees to compare 
and contrast their status and conditions of employment with those of female 
colleagues, and to elucidate their views about female staff and provide a more 
complete evaluation of female experiences.
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As already discussed, the interviews were to cover a broad range of topics, 
including personal background, individual experiences in the current job, 
perceptions and attitudes towards work and corporate culture, and gender relations 
in the office. In interviews with managers, topics would also include the company’s 
recruitment policies and practices, their evaluation of work performance and attitude 
of both female and male employees, matters relating to the general administrative 
culture of the chaebol, including decision-making and authority patterns, attitudes to 
female employees, and sexual discrimination. In addition, their views were solicited 
on recent national socio-economic developments (such as modernisation, 
globalisation, the current economic crisis etc.) and whether they affected their 
company and had any impact on its everyday working life and gender relations.
Some additional interviews with female subjects who were not chaebol 
employees were included to provide further comparison and contrast: they 
comprised five employees of foreign companies in Seoul, three government 
employees, three job candidates and one housewife; one male chaebol specialist was 
also interviewed (see Appendix Table 1.2). Finally, presentations by 11 chaebol 
managers and employee representatives during chaebol recruitment seminars that I 
attended are also included with an individual code name for each presenter 
(Appendix Table 1.3).
c) Discussions and Limitations and Constraints 
Sample Size
A core sample of 64, of which 51 were employees of chaebol, may be considered 
too big or too small -  depending on the perspective and the approach taken. To the 
question, “How many interview subjects do I need?” in research, Kvale (1996:101) 
simply answers: “Interview as many subjects as necessary to find out what you need 
to know.” In current interview studies with a qualitative approach, the number of 
interviews tend to be around 15±10 (Kvale 1996:102); this number may derive from 
the time and resources available and the law of diminishing returns - where further 
interviews would yield little new knowledge. In this vein, the size of my sample
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may be regarded too large: as Kvale (1996:102) points out, “if the number of 
subjects is too large, then it is not possible to make penetrating interpretations of the 
interviews”. On the other hand, the size of this sample might also be regarded as 
small and ‘unrepresentative’ - if the study appears “to be designed on a quantitative 
presupposition - the more interviews, the more scientific” (Kvale 1996:103). Even 
in qualitative interview studies, if the number of subjects is too small it is not 
possible to make statistical generalisations or to test hypotheses of differences 
among groups (ibid. p i02). Therefore, selection of sample size is a delicate yet 
critical matter. It may be assumed that the necessary number of subjects depends on 
the study’s purpose and feasibility. ‘Feasibility’ implies “not simply whether a 
project is feasible in principle, but also whether it is feasible within the constraints 
of time and resources available” (Clark and Causer 1991:170).
Bearing in mind that my research is essentially qualitative, principles of 
qualitative approach were used - while some elements of quantitative research were 
also incorporated. As already explained, the feasibility of gaining repeated access 
and ample time for satisfactory ‘in-depth’ interviews was a major constraint, and 
some adjustment to the research approach was made as the fieldwork progressed.
Although access to all interviewees was gained through personal contacts, it was 
without official sanction or ‘powerful’ connections. Access typically resulted from a 
single kindness or ‘favour’ (sometimes a token gesture to save the face of an 
intermediary) - although many female respondents seemed to enjoy being 
interviewed and expressing their opinions. Apart from those few who became 
‘friends’, with whom I established a certain rapport during the first meeting and 
could feel comfortable enough to invite later for tea and an out-of-working-hours 
‘chat’, it was almost impossible to arrange a second interview. Further, as most of 
interviews took place during working hours, the time they could spare was often 
limited. In some cases, the intermediaries who helped with arranging interviews had 
already set a timetable for them. Therefore, it was unrealistic with most chaebol 
respondents to conduct to my satisfaction ‘in-depth’ interviews that may require 
lengthy or repeated meetings. As these constraints prevented me from pursuing
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proper in-depth interviews for all, I decided to select a sample larger in size and 
variety to achieve an improved validity.
Overall, therefore, there is an element of empirical quantitative approach in my 
selection of the size and nature of the interview sample; I sought to cover a number 
of variables, such as different sizes of company (including the then-top five 
chaebol), various industries, both sexes and diverse educational qualifications of 
interviewees etc. While not a controlled representative sample, it was considered to 
provide an appropriate social spectrum of responses. Including more chaebol or 
more interviewees might, arguably, have been useful in establishing differences of 
detail between them, yet would contribute little further to exploring the existence of 
sexual discrimination in chaebol offices and the cultural influence of Confucianism. 
Indeed, such a sample would not necessarily be more statistically representative. In 
a sense, differences between chaebol are not a central issue here, although it was 
interesting to explore variations in work culture, the pattern of gender relations and 
degree of sexual discrimination. Ultimately, in designing the research methodology 
and carrying out the fieldwork, I considered that the most important issue was to 
achieve, within the constraints faced, a practical balance between the depth of 
interviews and the spread of interviews.
Sensitive Topics
Apart from the constraints set by the issues of access and time, there were some 
other limitations faced during the interview research. Particularly relevant here is 
the issue of talking about sensitive topics. For example, although the discussion of 
sexual harassment frequently come up during the interviews, it mainly related to 
unequal, gendered treatment (seong-cha-byeol, ‘gender differentiation’) rather than 
harassment in a more sexually explicit sense (,seong-hee-rong, ‘sexual harassment’). 
If women were asked during a face-to-face interview whether they had ever been 
subject to sexual harassment {seong-hee-rong) at work, most would say “No”. This 
would be particularly so if the introduction was through their male superiors and the 
interview took place at work, which was often the case. To be subject to sexual 
harassment (especially in Korean society) and talk about it to a stranger can be
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regarded a degrading experience, and I did not have sufficient confidence to pursue 
these matters in depth. Further, clarifying the various definitions of ‘sexual 
harassment’ with respondents, and attempting to ask non-directive questions about 
these sensitive issues, was considered less urgent than pursuing other issues more 
relevant to my study. A separate study directed towards understanding sexual 
harassment, and women’s reactions to it, may be worthwhile: however, it may need 
to employ large-scale survey techniques involving the use of relatively highly- 
structured questionnaires to deal with such sensitive issues -  or, if  a qualitative 
interview study, having special access (e.g. through women’s organisations or 
unions etc.) where respondents feel comfortable and secure enough to talk candidly 
about their experiences.
For similar reasons, discussing the salary of respondents in a face-to-face 
interview was constrained by their uneasiness in revealing their remuneration: when 
asked in the pilot interviews the response was intentionally vague, “I earn as much 
as others at the same level in the company”. Therefore, even though salary itself was 
a crucial element in evaluating ‘rewards’ (see Chapter 6), direct questions could not 
be asked. However, considering the present remuneration system in most Korean 
companies (where a person’s salary has largely been based on length of 
employment, and related to the seniority level - see Chapter 6), gendered features 
for investigation in this research were less concerned with actual salary but more 
related to promotion opportunities and security of employment. For this reason, the 
lack of open discussion on salaries may not be considered crucial.
In summary, the aim of my qualitative research was achieved by focusing on 
people’s everyday experiences and office discourses, and elucidating their personal 
feelings and attitudes. Even though there could be benefits from a larger (and better 
controlled) sample, the data and findings of this study clearly showed how gender 
discrimination and cultural influences operate at the office floor level. Further, the 
impact of changes in the business climate amplified the need for this type of data. 
Halfway through my field research there was a sudden, dramatic economic 
recession (see Chapter 5) which produced no simple, uniform response at any level 
of society - thus making insights of a qualitative nature, focusing on subtle changes
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occurring at a micro-perspective level, more appropriate. In the future, findings 
from this initial qualitative research could be used as a pedestal for an appropriate 
quantitative survey on a larger scale.
1.7 Significance of the Study
There are a number of reasons why this study of female white-collar workers in 
chaebol is considered to be of significance:
a) Examination of female white-collar labour in developing nations has to date been 
somewhat limited, and the experiences of these workers relatively little documented. 
As far as working women in developing countries are concerned, most academic 
attention has been directed towards low-income employees, such as production 
workers in manufacturing, petty traders in informal sectors, and subsistence 
agricultural workers. The experiences of female factory workers in developing 
countries, and their association with the development process, has been extensively 
covered by international academics and writers - and will be considered briefly in 
Chapter 2. This attention is perhaps not surprising since it is women on low-incomes 
that are often placed at the margins of economic activity, where a gendered 
(therefore unbalanced) distribution of wealth and resources can affect women more 
seriously than higher-income or more-privileged women. The relative lack of 
interest in white-collar workers may be explained by the fact that, until recently, the 
proportion of women working in offices in developing countries has been low and 
of relatively little importance. Nevertheless, female office workers do exist in such 
countries and, even if working under comparatively better conditions than their 
counterparts in factories, they may also face sexual discrimination and exploitation.
It appears that the relative importance of women in offices is greatest in more 
developed countries, where secretarial work is almost a completely feminised 
occupation, while they “comprise a much lower proportion of office workers in 
developing countries” (Joekes 1987:108). The growing number of white-collar (both 
absolutely and in comparison with blue-collar) occupations in Korea would appear
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therefore to carry significance as an indicator of the country's stage of economic 
development. It is widely believed that developing countries, including Korea and 
other Asian NICs, which have grown quickly and have undergone rapid economic 
and social change during the last few decades, no longer really belong to the 
developing world where the importance of female white-collar workers remains 
minor20. As these countries develop, the number of female white-collar workers 
increases and their role, domestically and internationally, becomes more important. 
The number of women working in white-collar office jobs in Korea has expanded 
dramatically, and this trend is likely to continue as the nation develops further. Yet 
so far these developments have attracted relatively little academic attention and 
there is to date limited literature covering the recent changes, the current 
employment market and the gender relations within it. Perhaps it is now timely and 
appropriate to bring a little more attention to this relatively ignored group of 
working women - white-collar employees.
b) In the light of current interest in the field of development and the on-going search 
for human (and gender) development indicators, the study attempts conceptually to 
identify non-economic indicators that could help clarify the process of development 
at the micro level, particularly as it affects women. This is important because 
investigating the theoretical background to the study may also help fill gaps in the 
gender and development literature relating to female employment in the developing 
world, particularly that in Southeast and Far East Asia.
c) The study is also intended to contribute to the literature on female white-collar 
employment in general - both in the developed and developing world - by analysing 
how this research in its particular context differs from others, especially those 
relating to the developed world. Most existing literature on female white-collar 
workers relates to developed countries, written by their own academics and perhaps 
reflecting the viewpoints and experiences of the developed West. (e.g. Kanter 1977; 
McNally 1979; Crompton and Reid 1982; Crompton and Jones 1984; Murolo 1987; 
Anderson (ed.) 1988; Rogers and Henson 1997; Davies-Netzley 1998; Baxter and
34
Chapter One
Wright 2000; Wallace 2001). Mohanty (1991) argues that Western feminist
scholarship often misleadingly generalises on the basis of a limited perspective, and
21ignores women's voices from different social groups and regions (see also 
Momsen and Kinnaird (1993). In spite of common features shared by all women 
worldwide, gender relations are currently fragmented by race, class, historical and 
cultural particularity, and individual differences. In this sense, no single explanation 
or solution can apply to all women everywhere. Instead, it may be more productive 
to focus on the differences and diversity of women's needs and experiences across 
disparate cultures, regions and classes when seeking constructive and beneficial 
insights that would apply to each case in its own special context.
d) This empirical study on Korean female white-collar workers also provides an 
opportunity to look at the complex matrix of social change in economy and culture 
as it effects gender relations. It also allows an examination of how and to what 
extent socio-economic organisations (e.g. chaebol) operate to serve capitalist goals 
by making use of women, who find themselves caught between two contrasting 
ideologies - a strongly sex-discriminative Confucian tradition and the less-gendered 
(or more egalitarian) non-Korean ideology derived from transnational 
modernisation. This study also provides an opportunity to assess the relevance of 
traditional culture to such modem socio-economic organisations and the people 
working in them.
e) Further, the research findings may be able to assist leaders in chaebol and other 
Korean firms, policy makers in government and non-governmental organisations, 
and women themselves, to appreciate the reality facing working women by 
illuminating the problems and challenges they face, and thereby suggest how equal 
opportunity and a reduction in gender discrimination might be achieved.
f) Finally, although not a primary purpose, the study also attempts to make a 
contribution to the debate and literature on research methodology for gender studies 
- which can be sensitive and are in most circumstances difficult to conduct,
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especially in a society with little gender awareness or where gender issues are still 
controversial and discussion of them can be met with hostility.
1.8 Thesis Organisation
Chapter 2 presents an overview of literature on women in the developing world and 
the impact of their labour participation on the development process in order to 
provide a theoretical background for the study of female white-collar employment 
in Korea. A basic understanding of women’s general participation in development, 
as well as their role in white-collar work, is considered essential in forming a proper 
appreciation of female white-collar employment. Chapter 3 is divided broadly into 
two parts, covering the country’s economy and national development, and Korean 
women’s labour participation in the development process. Without doubt, the 
gathering pace of economic industrialisation and modernisation in the post-war 
period, and particularly during the last few decades, has affected women’s life and 
work. To understand female employment characteristics and patterns it is important 
not only to consider socio-economic factors but also cultural factors covered in 
Chapter 4, which explores the country’s cultural background in order to elucidate 
the status of contemporary Korean women and gender relations in society. 
Development and modernisation, most intensively during the last few decades, has 
transformed both the economic and social life of Korean people; yet despite the 
onset of industrialisation, modernisation and Westernisation, Confucian influences 
undeniably still persist in the value systems of the country. Accordingly, the manner 
whereby Confucian-influenced culture historically has defined women's status and 
role in society is examined. By considering gender relations in their specific societal 
context, this examination should help to establish the origins of current gender 
discourses and explain how women came to assume their present status in society 
and in the labour force.
The next four chapters focus on chaebol as employers of white-collar labour, and 
their employees, particularly women. Chapter 5 presents a descriptive and historical 
overview of chaebol and encompasses their role in the Korean economy, their
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relationship with government and their importance to the national labour force. The 
chapter also describes the administrative culture that characterises office 
employment in chaebol, and explains why they were selected as the context of this 
case study of female employment. Chapter 6 considers the employment policies 
and practices of chaebol by examining their general characteristics and features 
from a gender perspective; the purpose is to explore the manner in which their 
employment practices are gendered, and to assess the degree to which unequal 
employment practices and gendered hierarchies are still maintained. In Chapter 7, 
where gender relations at work are considered within the context of work culture, 
the main factors influencing the perpetuation of gender inequality in the workplace 
are identified, and the degree to which they are sustained by the existing work 
culture in chaebol offices is assessed. Apart from overt gender inequality in 
conditions of employment, subjective gender discrimination also exists and is more 
difficult to evaluate, yet is no less serious and injurious to the women who 
experience it. Chapter 8, therefore, focuses on women’s work experiences and 
reactions to perceived discrimination by exploring different outcomes offered by 
female interviewees as to how they adapt and plan their careers and lives. This 
chapter also attempts an overall evaluation as to whether white-collar employment 
has served to integrate women into development, or whether it has exacerbated the 
exploitation of their labour for capitalist ends. The concluding Chapter 9 presents an 
overall summary of the enquiry and adjudges, in the light of the research, whether 
Korean women can be regarded as a fully-equal human resource - whether there 
appears to be a genuine movement towards gender equality or merely that women 
are exploited or marginalised as secondary labour supporting employers and the 
state. In this chapter, I will offer an assessment of the limitations and obstacles 
hindering equality in employment for women in Korea, and present some 
suggestions as to how improvements may be introduced.
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Endnotes
1 The term, ‘chaebol’, comes from two Chinese characters, meaning “wealthy extended family.” 
(Kim W. 1994:83). Chaebol are generally very large conglomerates, owned and managed by a single 
family and composed of several firms operating in a wide array of often-unrelated industries (Janelli, 
1993:81). See Chapter 5 for further details.
2 The implication of ‘flowers of the office’ is also well described by Iwao (1993:156) as "pretty to 
look at and decorative, but insubstantial and transient", referring to female office workers in Japan 
which bear similarity in this context to female Korean office employees.
3 The proportion of females in the labour force rose from 28.6 percent in 1960 to 40.4 percent in 
1990. Source: EPB, Population and Housing Census Report, 1960 EPB, Annual Report on the 
Economically Active Population Survey, 1990. Cited in Chang S. et al. (1991)
4 Korean authors are designated by using the surname followed by the initial of the given name 
because of the frequency of relatively few surnames in the country.
5 GDI (Gender-related Development Index) measures achievement in the same basic capabilities as 
the HDI (the Human Development Index) but takes note of inequality in achievement between 
women and men (UNDP 1995). It is measured by share of earned income, life expectancy, adult 
literacy and combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment in education.
6 GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) assesses the extent to which women and men are able 
actively to participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making. While the GDI 
focuses on expansion of capabilities, the GEM is concerned with the use of those capabilities to take 
advantage of the opportunities of life (UNDP 1995). It is measured by the percentage of women in 
parliamentary seats, as administrators and managers, professional and technical workers, and also 
their share of earned income.
7 According to some other Korean sources, the figures differ somewhat from those quoted by the 
ILO, indicating a worse outcome: for example, the wage gap was reported as 46.7% in 1985, 58.1% 
in 1995, and 62.8% in 1999, showing a deteriorating wage differential (Ministry of Labour, Survey 
Report on Wage Structure 1986, 1996; Ministry of labour, Survey Report on Wage Structure 2000, 
cited in KWDI (2000) Annual Statistical Report on Women, Seoul).
8 Confucianism is sometimes viewed as a religion but it is more accurately considered a philosophy, 
social ethic and political ideology. It exists alongside the organised religions such as Islam, 
Christianity, Shintoism, Taoism and Buddhism. It spread to all East Asian countries with the 
influence of Chinese culture, but nowhere was it more powerful than in Korea during the Yi dynasty. 
From the 15th century the Yi aristocracy (yangban) defined itself as the carrier of Confucian values, 
and the penetration of court politics by Confucianism was unprecedented (Edwards 1992:101).
9 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates occupation (s - student, f  
- foreign company employee, g - government employee, w - housewife, and b - own business); a 
number identifies a non-chaebol interviewee (from 52 to 64). See Appendix 1.2 for the codes and 
profile of non-chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for working 
women than for men).
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10 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment 
on joining: h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the chaebol 
interviewee (from 1 to 51); a final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile 
of chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for working 
women than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘fulO*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a 
particular affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
11 According to Foster-Carter (1985:107), in East Asian societies the cultural heritage of 
Confucianism emphasized the subordination of women as one of the several parallel ‘natural’ 
hierarchies: young to old, children to parents, ruled to rulers. He further argues that, although to a 
degree transformed by socialist revolution in some countries and capitalist industrialisation in others, 
such norms persist.
12 In 1999, 13.4 percent of all economically-active women were employed in ‘clerical work’, the 
highest category after ‘sales and service’ (35.1%) and ‘elementary occupations’ (simple labour work) 
(15.1%). Source: National Statistical Office, Annual Report on the Economically Active Population 
Survey, 2000, cited in Moon YK. and Joo JS. (2000).
13 An example of this was the Kim Young-Sam government’s strong promotion of both globalisation 
and gender equality. It had an immediate affect on chaebol’s recruitment of female office workers in 
the mid-1990s: with government encouragement and ‘pressure’ many leading chaebol (whose ‘open- 
recruitment’ was previously intended mainly for male applicants) hired female graduates in 
increasing numbers.
14 For example, while 85 percent of large Korean firms (including chaebol) offered equal 
opportunities for women to apply in open competition without sex-specific recruitment, in smaller 
companies more than 50 percent of firms either exclusively employed men or found new staff 
through personal contacts (Park SJ. 1989).
15 As sometimes claimed in their public image and recruitment literature, chaebol can play an 
important role in improving sexual equality in employment practices. For example, a quotation in a 
study (Berman et al. 1995) on cross-cultural issues at Samsung Corporation (a major chaebol) is 
indicative:
"Samsung is breaking new grounds in Korean society by expanding the roles that women 
play in the workplace. The group welcomes married women to stay at their jobs by giving 
them the chance to move up in the organisation. Effort has also been made in ensuring 
the same remuneration and chances of promotion as male employees enjoy; this 
guarantees loyalty towards Samsung, thus enhancing the quality concern of workers"
(P9)
Although it will be interesting to determine how genuinely Samsung believes in, and implements, 
this practice it is certainly true that chaebol have played a leading role in promoting gender-equality 
practices.
16 There is no direct and simple dichotomy between globality and national origin. The large Korean 
chaebols are likely to be both national companies with foreign connectedness, and at the same time 
decentred global actors who, regardless of national origin, take their mobile resources to the most 
profitable business location. Nationalism (or localism) and globalism coexist and interact with each 
other in many forms (Kim YT. 1998:230).
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17 The qualitative approach was designed to explore the nature of office discourses and gender 
relations from the perspective of the subjects involved. While the size of the sample may be 
considered relatively small, and the chaebol were selected primarily on the basis of access, 
individuals were chosen as far as practicable to provide a balance between sexes, ages, educational 
background and status, and encompassed a range of occupations in different industries and at 
different locations.
18 The Committee for the Promotion of Globalisation was set up by the Kim Young Sam government 
in 1995 (Kang MK. 2000; Shin KY. 2000). See Chapter 3 for more details.
19 According to Lim (1983:76), “Patriarchy is the system of male domination and female 
subordination in economy, society, and culture that has characterised much of human history to the 
present day. In the economic sphere, it is reflected first in the sexual division of labour within the 
family, which makes domestic labour the sole preserve of women. Their involvement in production 
activities outside the home varies with different societies and different stages of development, but is, 
particularly in those countries where capitalist development has penetrated (Boserup 1970), often 
accorded inferior status and reward compared to the activities of men.”
20 For example, as far as clerical occupations in the developing world are concerned, in places like 
India office work is regarded as a 'masculine' occupation and women only fill 6 per cent of all 
clerical positions; in some more-industrialised countries, for example part of Latin America and 
Southeast Asia, 30-40 per cent of the clerical labour force is composed of women (Momsen and 
Townsend 1987).
21 Mohanty (1991:51) states that,
“Any discussion of the intellectual and political construction of ‘third world feminisms’ 
must address itself to two simultaneous projects: the internal critique of hegemonic 
‘western’ feminism, and the formulation of autonomous, geographically, historically, and 
culturally rounded feminist concerns and strategies. The first project is one of 
deconstructing and dismantling; the second, one of building and constructing. While these 
projects appear to be contradictory, the one working negatively and the other positively, 
unless these two tasks are addressed simultaneously, ‘third world’ feminism runs the risk of 
marginalisation or ghettoisation from both mainstream (right and left) and Western feminist 
discourses.”
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
for the Study o f Women in Employment
2.1 Introduction
In examining the situation of women and their work in the developing world, it is 
important first to understand the broad economic, political and social context within 
which these women participate in labour forces to support the industrial growth of 
their countries. Korean women, like most women in developing countries, have 
faced challenges arising from these economic and socio-cultural changes and have 
experienced repercussions affecting their gender roles and status in society. 
Although their situation is to some extent unique, I believe that Korean working 
women share certain experiences with women from other parts of the developing 
world - particularly those engaged in paid employment in countries undergoing 
recent industrial development. While female white-collar employment in Korea is 
the main focus of this study, in order to understand how economic development has 
affected Korean women and their work, and to evaluate the extent to which they 
have been integrated into the development process, this chapter reviews two major, 
relevant bodies of literature by way of background: that bearing on i) female labour 
participation in development, particularly in factory work, and ii) women in white- 
collar employment (chiefly in developed countries).
The first half of the chapter examines literature on women in development and 
their labour participation in developing countries. This primarily involves 
production, rather than white-collar, workers in export-oriented manufacturing 
industries. This is partly because the conditions of production workers seem to 
reflect more clearly the impact of development on 'Third World' women (in the 
sense that it is women on low-incomes, such as production workers, that are usually 
placed at the margins of society where gendered distribution of wealth and resources 
affects them more severely), and partly because they have inspired a wider body of
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relevant literature for women in the developing world. While examining women’s 
labour participation in manufacturing industries, some of the major debates around 
women’s changing roles and their status in development are discussed. This is 
important for developing an appropriate framework to elucidate the roles and 
experiences of Korean working women, not only for production but also white- 
collar workers.
The second half of the chapter focuses on women in white-collar employment. 
This begins with a brief examination of the development of white-collar work in 
selected developed countries traditionally linked with industrialisation and 
economic advancement, together with their influence on the growth of female 
white-collar employment. Some controversial implications of bias against female 
white-collar employment, such as gender-based work allocation and subordinate 
roles bome by women, will be introduced and discussed. This discussion is intended 
to assist an understanding of female white-collar employment in general, before 
addressing female white-collar office employment in Korean chaebol in later 
chapters. Even though the situation of female white-collar employment in Korea 
differs from that in more developed countries (arising from its different stage of 
development and the unique socio-historical context), a general introduction to 
female white-collar employment in other countries can serve as a useful foundation. 
Furthermore, an appreciation of female white-collar employment in Korea also 
requires some basic understanding of female white-collar work in similarly 
developing countries. Therefore, some newly emerging literature on female white- 
collar work in such countries will be also examined. While this literature body may 
not yet be broad enough to offer a systematic comprehension of white-collar 
employment in the developing world, it still provides some useful insights.
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2.2 Women’s Labour Participation in Development 
Women in Development
Orthodox economists and development planners have often assumed that national 
development increases opportunities for women to participate economically, and 
that it naturally advances their social status and promotes gender equality. As a 
result, it was widely accepted that ‘what would benefit one section of society (men) 
would trickle down to the other (women)’ -  an assumption which has been 
increasingly acknowledged and criticised by many academics (e.g. Rogers 1980; 
Jones 1984; Mazza 1987; Brett 1991; Elson 1995; El-Bushra 2000; Nussbaum 2000; 
Molyneux and Razavi 2002).1 This can be clearly seen in a brief review of the 
historical development of the literature on ‘women in development’ (WID).
In the 1950s and 1960s women's issues in development were subsumed under the 
question of human rights , and women were viewed as objects to protect or make 
recommendations for, but not necessarily to consult (Brett 1991). The assumed 
benefits of development for women have, however, begun to be questioned when, 
by the late 1960s, some economists had realised that development was not 
proceeding as smoothly as expected and concerns were raised about the continuing 
poverty and deprivation of Third World women (Parpart 1993). In this climate, the 
study of Boserup in 1970, ‘Women’s Role in Economic Development’, arrived as a 
watershed in thinking about women in development, and called for planners and 
politicians to recognise and consider women’s roles in economic development and 
take the interests of women fully into account when drawing up development plans 
(Whitehead 1991; Parpart 1993; Kabeer 1994).3 In the 1970s, therefore, efforts 
were made to link women’s issues to development for the first time (Beall and 
Davila 1993). According to Kabeer (1994), the initial implication of Boserup's 
critique, reinforced by WID4 advocates and scholars who succeeded her, was to shift 
attention from 'welfare' to 'equality for women' in the development process.5 In the 
1980s, although there was a growing trend towards viewing women as agents and 
beneficiaries in all sectors and at all levels of the development process (Brett 1991), 
women were primarily regarded as agents of social development, whose caring and
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nurturing could substitute for expenditure on health, education and social services 
(Antrobus 1988; Dwyer and Bruce 1988, Elson 1991).6 In brief, not only have 
women often been adversely affected by the development process, but their roles in 
the process have also not been properly addressed by most development planners 
and workers (Moser 1993; Pearson and Jackson 1998; Fenster 1999).
In recent decades, a growing number of researchers and academics progressively 
have recognised that, as development has proceeded in Third World countries, its 
impact on men and women has been different, and that women have not necessarily 
benefited from it as widely as was expected (e.g. Boserup 1970; Joekes 1987; Sen 
1990; Tinker 1990; Elson 1991; Pearson 1992b; Moser 1993; Kabeer 1994; Okin 
1995; Roces and Edwards 2000; Rai 2002). As pointed out by Moser (1993), while 
the so-called 'development industry' had realised that women are essential to the 
success of the total development effort, it did not necessarily follow that 
development improved conditions for women. In this context, Joekes (1987:128) 
also argued,
“Growth has created general employment opportunities from which women 
have benefited. Yet, their greater participation has also played a significant 
causal role in industrialisation, related to their lesser status and rewards in 
industrial production than men’s. In some regions, industrial development 
has added to women’s income-earning opportunities to an extraordinary 
degree, but the terms on which they have found employment have been 
inferior. Therefore, despite the wage income, this new employment for 
women has not been unequivocally beneficial.”
In summary, as Brett (1991) concludes, there is a wide gap between women’s high, 
yet relatively unrecognised, economic participation and their low political and social 
power, and that development strategies have usually taken the needs of the most 
vocal and politically active group as their starting point. Therefore, to understand 
gender relations at work the activities of men and women need to be addressed 
separately, and for the successful incorporation of women into the development 
process their particular needs, status and conditions in society should be considered 
independently.
Not only should women’s concerns and needs in development processes be 
addressed separately, but the diversity of women’s experiences must be
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acknowledged. For example, the wide variation in conditions experienced by female 
export-oriented factory workers in developing countries is determined by many 
different factors, such as “the type and level of economic development in the 
country” (Brydon and Chant 1989:13) and “the local labour market conditions, and 
by the differing needs of employers in different industries” (Lim 1990:108). The 
development process is, as Beall and Davila (1993) pointed out, not homogeneous 
but one that varies considerably from one national context to another, and from one 
decade to the next. Furthermore, this diversity is reflected not only in intra-regional 
and intra-community differences on the basis of religion, culture and political 
ideology, but also in significant variations in the status of women according to their 
position in the class hierarchy (Brydon and Chant 1989; Parpart 1993). For this 
reason, the approach also acknowledges the need to incorporate race and culture, as 
well as class and gender, into feminist analysis of development, as Parpart argues 
(1993:443). For academics and feminists engaged in debate on development, the 
post-modern focus on differences has offered ammunition to women who felt 
excluded - by providing a space (or opening up new spaces) that legitimises the 
search for different voices from different places and experiences.7
Acknowledging women's multiple realities, Parpart (ibid.) suggests that the 
notion of Third World homogeneity, especially for women, can be damaging both to 
understanding and practice (see also Mohanty 1991; Okin 1995). She accordingly 
advocates that the goals and aspirations of Third World women should be 
‘discovered’ rather than assumed, and strategies for improving their lives should be 
constructed on the basis of actual experiences and needs. This clearly recognises the 
relevance and importance of historically and socially-grounded empirical research 
(Moore 1988): the actual experiences and opinions of participating workers can lead 
to a better understanding of the complexities and diversity of circumstances faced 
by them, and used to support, refute or modify academic scholarship and help 
develop strategies for improvement. This post-modernist approach towards gender 
issues in development is relevant to my study: since the conditions of women in 
developing countries are diverse and complex, to understand the situation of women
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in Korea it is important to take into consideration their specific socio-economic and 
cultural environment - which will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Women in Export-oriented Industries in Developing Countries
In the 1970s and early 1980s, studies of “women and development” led to 
exploration of the ways in which an increasingly global economy, and its vast 
movements of capital, labour, and changing technology, posed radical implications 
for third world women (Freeman 2000:37). One of the most popular areas of 
research since the mid-1970s relating to women in development has been that 
bearing on female factory workers in Third World export-oriented industries, 
particularly women employed by multinational corporations. The reason for the 
widespread interest in this subject is, according to Lim (1990), the historical 
coincidence of a growing focus on women's changing roles worldwide combined 
with the expansion of export manufacturing in Third World developing countries.8 
While women in manufacturing employment are only a small proportion of all 
women living in the Third World, theirs is an important case study. This, according 
to Elson and Pearson (1981), is because the provision of jobs for them is often seen 
as an important way of'integrating women into the development process'.9
Export-led industrialisation, as a key component of national development in 
Third World countries, has served to mobilise large numbers of women into 
productive employment. In many of these countries, work in 'world-market 
factories' producing manufactures for export to rich countries has become accessible 
to women as a new type of waged employment since the late 1960s (Elson and 
Pearson 1981). By the 1980s, women constituted about 80 percent of the assembly- 
processing labour force in export zones throughout the world (Mies 1986); in 
particular, East Asian assembly plants alone employed half a million women 
(Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983:16). According to Seager and Olson (1986), high 
numbers of multinational 'world-market factories'10, and a preference for hiring 
female labour (on account of its relatively low cost), meant that the proportion of 
female employment in Southeast Asia was among the highest in the Third World. It 
should also be noted that, where there is a significant amount of export-processing
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manufacture, multinational firms often relocate assembly operations to tariff-free 
production zones - in South East Asia and elsewhere, (see Chapter 3 for a discussion 
on female production workers in Korea).
There are a number of explanations for this rapid rise in female labour 
participation in these manufacturing industries. Generally, manufacturing for export 
has been concentrated in labour-intensive industries, which in all countries tend to 
be female-intensive. This, according to Lim (1990), is because these industries are 
sensitive to wage costs11 and female labour is typically cheaper than equivalent male 
labour. When women become involved in the production process, 'sexual divisions
1*7of labour' and gender differentiation permeate the process and inevitably result in 
gender inequality. An important consequence of this gender differentiation is what 
is generally referred to in the literature as women's 'secondary status' in the labour 
market. Because of their capacity to bear children (Moser 1993) and their relegation 
to household work, the perceived and actual roles of women in production become 
secondary to men’s (Stichter 1990). Stichter claims that men get the better jobs 
because they are men, that the jobs that men do are considered more important than 
those performed by women, and further that there seems to be a general and 
systematic over-valuation of male attributes and a corresponding under-valuation of 
female ones (see also Elson and Pearson 1981 for the discussion on women being 
viewed as ‘the bearers of inferior labour’). This secondary status results in rates of 
pay for women that tend to be lower than those of men doing similar or comparable 
jobs. Lim (1990:102) also argues that the difficulty of combining factory labour 
with rearing children also ensures that a labour force is largely unmarried, and 
therefore young and healthy, with a consequential high turnover and a low average 
wage, but without jeopardising productivity because of the short learning curve.
The job characteristics of these industries also fit well with the needs and 
attributes of female workers. A number of studies (e.g. Elson and Pearson 1981; 
Enloe 1983; Mitter 1986; Stoddard 1987; Lim 1990; Pearson 1998) confirm that 
production factories of TNCs justify their preference for female labour in terms of 
qualities that women are assumed to acquire through gender-role socialisation. A 
tolerance for tedious and monotonous work and manual dexterity (so-called 'nimble
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fingers'13) is considered to suit them for intricate tasks, and a docile nature enables 
them to withstand the pressure of rapidly-paced, closely-supervised production. 
According to Lim (1990:102), these readily learned skills, requiring manual 
dexterity and patience with tedious tasks, that make women appropriate workers 
have been conditioned by culture and extensive experience with sewing, food 
processing, and other household tasks. These attributes, internalised by women over 
years of socialisation within the family, and manifest in docility of behaviour and 
respect for male authority, are a commonly stated reason for employers preferring to 
employ women rather than men in export-oriented manufacture, argues Afshar and 
Agarwal (1989:7).14
However, the involvement of Third World women in export-oriented manual 
work, and particularly their status within it, is subject to some controversy. Much of 
the discussion has centred on the implications of the new job opportunities for 
young women: do they gain greater independence; are they exploited; is their 
traditional patriarchal subordination weakened (e.g. Elson and Pearson 1981, 1989; 
Femandez-Kelly 1983; Lim 1985, 1990; Mitter 1986; Tiano 1986, 1987, 1994; 
Pearson 1998; Afshar and Barrientos 1999)? Academics remain divided about the 
extent to which industrial and economic development assist the integration of 
women into development, or whether it merely exploits them to the ultimate 
continuing advantage of a patriarchal capitalist system.
Thus, when it comes to an overall evaluation, the outcomes of industrial 
development and modernisation for women are neither easy nor simple to elucidate; 
women's position and status is characterised by the simultaneous existence of 
positive and negative, exploitative and liberating, features and consequences of 
capitalist development (Lim 1983). As Elson (1991) suggests, women’s lives may 
be improved or worsened in complex and contradictory ways: the extension to them 
of the employment marketplace brings new opportunities, but also new risks. It is 
clear that involvement in economic development does not of itself guarantee a 
reduction in gender discrimination and an improvement in conditions faced by 
women. For example, in her study of Javanese factory workers, Wolf (1992:256) 
argues that it is simply not possible to reduce the situation to a judgement of either
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“better” or “worse” for women workers, since the situation is paradoxical and 
contradictory and must be understood as such. According to her, Javanese factory 
workers recognise that factory employment is poorly paid, insecure and unfair, yet 
they are also certain that it has brought them both material and personal benefits that 
few would give up. The point, as Sklair (1993: ch. 8) argues, is that the dilemma 
bluntly is whether women are better off inside, rather than outside, factories. 
According to him, it is important to ascertain what alternative work is available to 
these women; where there is dearth of other job opportunities, female assembly 
workers do benefit from their employment - however poor their job satisfaction may
be. In this regard, Pearson (1998:184) also asserts that “although employment
for women in export industries is unstable, often short lived and undertaken in 
exploitative working conditions for lower than subsistence wages, factory work 
because of its collective nature inevitably provides a location for a different kind of 
gendered experience, offering the possibility of alternative versions of gender roles 
and expectations”.
Some academic writers have attempted to postulate an analytical framework to 
help understand women’s roles and their situation in labour participation in 
manufacturing work, and to measure the overall impact of development on women. 
In assessing the outcomes of women’s labour participation in development, Elson 
and Pearson (1981), for example, identify three tendencies in the relationship 
between the emergence of factory work and the subordination of women as a 
gender: a tendency to ‘intensify ’ the existing forms of gender subordination; a 
tendency to ‘decompose' them; and a tendency to ‘recompose ’ new forms of gender 
subordination15. However, they explain that this does not imply that these are 
mutually exclusive tendencies -  as any specific situation might well show signs of 
all three. According to Elson and Pearson, these are not categories which can be 
aggregated to produce a uni-dimensional conclusion that the position of women is 
getting worse or better; rather, they are suggested as ways of analysing particular 
conjunctions of forces shaping women’s lives, in the hope that this will help clarify 
the strategic possibilities facing women in those situations (ibid.). This provides a 
helpful way of observing and categorising the processes and dynamics of the
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relationship between women’s labour participation in factory work and gender 
subordination.
Tiano later offers a slightly different approach: while the analytical categories 
defined by Elson and Pearson focus on the actual process itself and its diverse 
nature, Tiano places greater emphasis on evaluating the outcome of the process by 
looking at the resultant positions of working women in the economy and society. In 
her review of the literature on women’s involvement in industrial development in 
Latin America, Tiano (1986; see also 1987 & 1994:ch.3) subsumed current 
viewpoints on women’s labour participation in development within three contrasting 
perspectives; which are termed the ‘integration’, the ‘marginalisation’, and the 
1 exploitation’ theses. These perspectives employ differing assumptions about the 
impact of industrial development on women and their households, on patriarchy, 
and on its relationship to capitalist development.
Tiano’s 'exploitation thesis' claims that capitalist industrialisation creates a 
female proletariat supplying low-wage labour for accumulating capital at minimum 
cost (Tiano 1986). According to this view, women provide cheap and easily 
expendable labour because discriminatory hiring practices, sex-segregated labour 
markets, and inadequate training weaken their position within the labour market. 
Further, the typically intense competition for scarce jobs keeps wages low and 
workers docile, while they are often powerless to change their circumstances 
because women workers rarely organise effective workers' unions. This perspective 
assumes that Third World women are often central to industrial production but that 
their involvement is, for them, more harmful than beneficial. Good examples of this 
stance are, among many others, the works of Femandez-Kelly (1983)16, Elson and 
Pearson (1981)17, Mitter (1986)18, and Chant and Mcllwaine (1995)19. Proponents of 
this exploitation thesis are usually unsatisfied with a relativist approach (e.g. the 
‘better-than-nothing’ approach of the integration thesis) and prefer to evaluate 
export-processing jobs in terms of absolute standards of human fulfilment and 
economic well-being (Tiano 1986).
While much of the literature describing the nature and consequences of women's 
participation in assembly-processing industries is consistent with the assumptions of
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the 'exploitation thesis', some others would argue that export processing is a 
valuable means whereby women can be integrated into national development by 
incorporating them in modem industry. Advocates of the integration thesis - such as 
Rosen (1982)20 and Lim (1981, 1983, 1985, 1990)21 among others - tend to take a 
'better-than-nothing' approach towards export-processing jobs, and view them as 
superior to other jobs available for women. According to Tiano (1986; see also 
1987, 1994), the 'integration thesis' is based on the belief that industrialisation leads 
to female liberation and sexual equality by involving women more in fundamental 
economic and political development. It also assumes that industrialisation, and its 
attendant cultural and structural changes, involves women more centrally in public 
life.
Tiano’s third category, the 'marginalisation’ thesis, in which capitalist 
development is seen as making women peripheral to socially-valued roles and 
resources, maintains that capitalist industrialisation excludes women from 
productive roles and confines them to the household or to the informal sector (Tiano 
1986; 1987; 1994: ch.3). The underlying assumption of this thesis is that capitalist 
industrialisation isolates women from production and political control and, 
therefore, despite the ideology of egalitarianism, industrialisation has generally 
increased women's economic and social marginality (Tiano 1986:159). Writers such 
as Beneria and Sen (1982)22 and Scott (1986)23 have expressed their strong interest 
in this approach.
These three different perspectives are, however, as Tiano points out, neither 
mutually exclusive nor entirely distinct: the marginalisation and exploitation theses 
share some basic assumptions, and although the integration thesis interprets the data 
differently it describes trends similar to those suggested by the other two 
perspectives. Even if the different portrayal of these theses may reflect the different 
personal stance of each author or researcher, it is also likely that they reveal the 
multiple realities of women's roles and status in the developing world, and the 
importance of its diversity and complexity, as many would recognise (e.g. Brydon 
and Chant 1989; Lim 1990; Tinker 1990; Beall and Davila 1993; Parpart 1993; 
Okin 1995; Pearson and Jackson 1998; Afshar and Barrientos 1999).
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So far this chapter has discussed women in development, particularly production 
workers, in order to illuminate the situation of women in developing countries in 
general as a useful prelude to considering that of Korean women. Further, the 
process will assist the generation of a structural framework for evaluating and 
analysing women’s work and gender relations in Korean development. The 
relevance and applicability of Tiano’s analytical model to Korean women in white- 
collar work will be discussed later in the concluding part of this chapter. The 
remainder of the chapter reviews academic literature on white-collar working 
women in developed countries, and developing countries where the services sectors 
(particularly office work) have been the focus of growing debate about new trends 
in female employment - such as the impact of new technology on women’s work 
(Mitter 1995). This would provide useful literature relevant to the study of female 
white-collar workers in Korean chaebol.
2.3 Women in White-collar Work 
White-collar Work
'White-collar work' is a vague term with a meaning that differs between countries,
and even between individual scholars. Indicative of the confusion surrounding the
term is the large number of synonyms which it has acquired: 'salaried work', 'office
work', 'non-manual work', 'blackcoated work' etc.. However, the definition given by
McNally (1979:22) is useful here. She writes,
"The term may broadly be used to distinguish all non-manual occupations 
from manual ones, connoting differences in working conditions, career 
prospects, methods of payment, and even orientations to work and towards 
trade unions. More narrowly, the term may be used as shorthand for all 
lower and intermediate categories of non-manual work, thus making a 
further distinction between such groups and professional and managerial 
employees. According to this meaning, the terms 'white-collar work' and 
'clerical work' are interchangeable".
My preference is to use (though loosely) the second, narrower definition since it 
embraces the overwhelming bulk of general (female) employees in chaebol offices,
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the prime subject of this study. The research focuses on chaebol staff who are 
university graduates, but also covers employees who joined after leaving high 
school. The high-school leavers (mostly female) are considered lower-grade clerical 
workers, and engage in such menial tasks as typing, filing, running errands etc. The 
graduate staff, whose job titles may appear professional but in reality undertake 
general administrative work, are recruited from university with a general academic 
degree (perhaps involving some business-related subjects) and then trained by the 
chaebol for the particular tasks allocated. For the purposes of this study, these 
graduate employees without special professional qualifications can be regarded as 
an intermediate category of non-manual worker. This definition, therefore, naturally 
excludes professional employees (e.g. qualified lawyers, accountants etc.) that have 
completed specialist training (as distinct from purely academic university studies) 
and whose work is concerned primarily with their professional field. White-collar 
office workers in this study thus comprise junior and intermediate-grade clerical and 
administrative workers in chaebol offices.
The growth of the white-collar labour force is one of the most striking features of 
the economic and social development of the twentieth century (Bain 1970:11). In a 
survey of trends in the United Kingdom labour force during the twentieth century, 
for example, Bain found that between 1911 and 1966 the number of white-collar 
workers24 increased by 176 percent, while over the same period the number of 
manual workers increased by only 5 per cent, having actually decreased in total 
since 1931. Similarly, in the United States there were in 1870 only 91,000 clerical 
workers (most of them males) representing 1 percent of the labour force; by 1880 
there were 186,000, and by 1890 the number had risen to nearly half-a-million. 
Almost a century later, in 1982, there were 18.4 million clerical workers, 18.5 
percent of the employed labour force - four out of five of them women 
(Oppenheimer 1985:117). The importance of white-collar workers in developed 
Western countries is still increasing. This growth is both absolute and relative: not 
only is the total number of white-collar workers increasing, but so also is the 
proportion of these workers in the labour force as a whole. For example, while 
figures vary with definitions used, in the United Kingdom some two-thirds (67.5
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percent) of all employees may be considered ‘white-collar’ by 2002 {Labour Market 
Trends, May 2002). The United States has also reached a point where its white- 
collar employees far outnumber manual workers (74.1 percent in 2000)25. There is 
every likelihood that this trend will continue, and that white-collar workers will 
dominate the labour force of developed countries.
The growth of white-collar employment is generally associated with periods of 
rapid industrialisation and expansion in world commerce. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the growth in the scale of manufacturing and commercial enterprise in 
the second half of the nineteenth century created an enormous demand for workers 
equipped with clerical skills (McNally 1979:23). As Bain (1970:16) pointed out, the 
changing occupational structure of any society can be attributed to two fundamental 
but related causes: technical developments within industries that lead to changes in 
the type of skills required, and differences in the relative growth rates of industries. 
The emergence and growth of large corporations also helped to reinforce the 
increase in size and importance of the white-collar administrative class, as 
exemplified in the United States (Kanter 1977) and elsewhere.
As white-collar workers have become more numerous, they have played an 
increasingly important role in the social, political, and economic life of their 
country. Yet, paradoxically, their value in economic terms and their economic 
position compared with that of manual workers have become less favourable (Bain 
1970:71). In fact, in the social strata of a country the position of white-collar 
workers has been considered as somewhat ambiguous by many commentators, 
especially by those who hold a ‘new-working-class’ view26, such as Mills (1951). 
White-collar workers traditionally have seen themselves as ‘privileged’ in 
comparison with blue-collar workers, and this sense of privilege was often 
considered sufficient reward in itself (Kanter 1993:86). Yet they are often referred to 
as having ‘contradictory status’, because of the failure of this social ‘middle strata’ 
either to develop an independent political philosophy of its own or to align itself 
clearly with the bourgeoisie or the proletariat (Oppenheimer 1985:84). Even for 
Lockwood (1958:14) (who saw the similarities between the clerk and the manual 
wage earner, both divorced from ownership and control of the means of production,
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and considered the former 'proletarian* - using Marxian terminology) the clerk has 
never been strictly 'proletarian' in terms of income, job security and occupational 
mobility. As a group, ‘black-coated’ (i.e. white-collar) workers have, according to 
Lockwood, enjoyed certain material advantages over manual workers27 - even 
though his views may not always be so relevant to present-day conditions.
One of the main adverse characteristics, often discussed in relation to modem 
white-collar work, of employment in capitalist enterprises is that of the 'deskilling' 
process. In his work Labour and Monopoly Capital' (1974), Braverman argued that 
the logic of capitalist production is such as inexorably to 'deskill' the labour process 
- that is, progressively to render most work in capitalist society increasingly routine 
and fragmented, so that it ultimately requires very little skill on the part of the 
worker. Even though much of his discussion concerned the deskilling of manual 
work, he points out that non-manual (particularly clerical) work has also been 
substantially deskilled. This has, according to him, contributed to the 
'proletarianisation' of clerical work - in respect both of the nature of the work and 
the employment terms and conditions under which it is carried out.
However, although the process of deskilling serves to render non-manual labour 
relatively homogeneous, it has not become completely so, as Crompton and Jones 
(1984:2) argue. According to them, the impact of the technical deskilling of clerical 
work has been significantly moderated (particularly for men) by the fact that the 
resulting large bureaucracies are characterised by internal labour markets with clear 
job hierarchies through which individuals with suitable attributes historically have 
made progress. These writers claim that this process has been overlaid by a gender- 
based job allocation process which has tended to group women into particular types, 
and lower levels, of clerical employment. Therefore, unlike Braverman (1974:355) 
who saw office employees as “an immense mass of wage-workers” representing 
“the creation of a large proletariat in a new form”, Crompton and Jones (1984) 
viewed the 'office proletariat' not as a 'mass' but stratified by age, qualifications and 
(most particularly) by gender. They also confirmed in their study that the women in 
their population were concentrated in the lowest clerical grades of non-manual 
employment: in other words, the ranks of the 'white-collar proletariat' may be said to
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be filled largely by women28. In their view, despite technological deskilling a 
bureaucratic career has to date been largely the preserve of men (ibid. :211). They 
also conclude that, in a very real sense, men need women in the office: the male 
career rests on the continuing subordination of non-manual female workers. That is 
because the bulk of the deskilled, routine work in the modem office can be carried 
out by women - most of whom will never receive promotion. As we shall see in 
later chapters, there is substantial evidence of this in Korean chaebol offices -  
especially relating to female high-school leavers (see particularly Chapter 7).
Women in Offices
The progressive introduction of women into the white-collar labour force is one of 
the most noticeable characteristics of labour markets in developed countries. In the 
United Kingdom, where clerical work was once a small, mainly male occupation 
until the close of the nineteenth century (Anderson 1976:2), a large and growing 
number of women today pursue this type of work (see also Anderson 1988). 
Between 1911 and 1961, not only did the number of female clerical workers 
increase dramatically, but the proportion of all white-collar jobs occupied by women 
increased from 29.8 percent to 44.5 percent (Bain 1970:14). According to 
Braverman (1974:296), by the time of the censuses of 1961 in the United Kingdom 
and 1960 in the United States, the percentage of women had risen in both countries 
to about two-thirds. And within only another decade in the United States, three- 
quarters were women. In the United Kingdom, while 45.0 percent of all employees 
are female, they represent 38.6 percent of all managerial and professional jobs and 
79.5 percent of administrative and secretarial employment (Labour Market Trends, 
May 2002). To provide background and some insight into the present situation of 
Korean white-collar working women, a brief selection of representative literature 
relating to female office workers in the United States, United Kingdom and Japan, 
as well as some developing countries, is summarised and presented.
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The United States
In his study of the white-collar working class in the United States, Sobel (1989) 
recognised that the numerical analysis of occupations tended to mask an underlying 
disproportion in roles between men and women -  which seems to confirm the 
earlier argument advanced by Crompton and Jones (1984). According to him, in 
spite of the fact that in 1975 white-collar labour appeared numerically to be split 
exactly 50 percent male and 50 percent female, the upper and lower divisions of 
white-collar work proved to have unequal gender compositions. For example, the 
upper white-collar employees were two-thirds (67.7 percent) male, while the lower 
white-collar workers were almost the same proportion (68.8 percent) female. By 
1980, when women represented 53.2 percent of all white-collar workers, the upper- 
white-collar sector was slightly less male-dominated (63.2 percent), but the lower- 
white-collar sector was even more dominantly female (71.2 percent). Women 
continued to move into low-level clerical jobs, which were 80.1 percent female at 
the time of his research in 1989. Sobel (ibid.:51) concluded by suggesting that a 
proxy for gender relations in offices was to consider ‘upper white-collar’ as 
representing males and ‘lower white-collar’ representing females.
This concentration of women in the lower strata of the labour market can better 
be understood in the context of dual labour market theory which evolved from post- 
Fordist flexible specialisation29 (see Sabel 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984). In a ‘dual 
labour market’ there is a relatively advantaged primary type of employment and a 
correspondingly disadvantaged secondary type of work and employment (see 
Berger and Piore 1980; Piore and Sabel 1984). The primary sector is characterised 
by good working conditions and pay levels, fair treatment and opportunities for 
advancement and, especially, stability of employment. This sector is usually 
occupied by ‘core’ employees (such as skilled workers and managers) who are 
permanently employed, flexible in the work they do and willing to be retrained and 
re-allocated within the internal labour market as required. Secondary sector workers, 
on the other hand, are worse off in all these respects and their employment is 
considered less secure and prone to high turnover. This secondary labour force tends 
to comprise workers who are easily dispensable, possess clearly visible social
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differences, are little interested in training or gaining high economic reward and 
rarely organise themselves collectively. These ‘peripheral’ workers often undertake 
clerical, assembly, junior supervisory or testing jobs requiring skills easily met from 
the external labour market (Watson 1995:348-9; see also Christopherson 1987; 
Hakim 1990). Companies and organisations tend in time to restructure their staff 
into core and peripheral groups, with the former representing the most skilled and 
functionally-flexible labour, while the latter provides some degree of numerical and 
financial flexibility (Atkinson and Meager 1986; Grint 1998:305). The search for 
‘flexibility’ has encouraged the trend towards increasing casualisation of work and 
suggests that the composition of the ‘peripheral’ workforce will be maintained 
(Broadbent 2003:29; see also Piore and Sabel 1984).
Although this development has its root in market forces, the allocation of 
workers into the different sectors is clearly social and cultural. Factors such as 
socially-influenced low expectations, and discrimination against women (as well as 
youths, coloured and immigrant workers) determine that secondary labour 
disproportionately comprises workers in these categories (Piore 1979; Watson 
1995:185-7). Most relevant to this study, women often seem concentrated in the 
secondary, peripheral labour force, and remain marginalised in low paying, low 
status positions. In summary, in the global economy a dual labour market has 
developed that takes advantage of the existing gender hierarchy in society to 
marginalize women for capitalist interests. The following two studies, covering a 
significant time span, clearly illustrate the gendered white-collar job sector, where 
women are concentrated in a peripheral workforce as lower graded clerical workers 
rather than core employees.
Murolo's study (1987) of the Aetna Life Insurance Company’s headquarters 
office in the United States during 1910-1930 provided an insight into the 
rationalising of a labour force accompanied by the feminisation of its lower grades. 
She explained that, like most large clerical employers, Aetna Life hired women to 
fill the routine jobs created when skilled work was separated from simple, repetitive 
operations: jobs requiring the exercise of judgement in decision-making remained 
the province of men. She further argued that the study of changing labour systems at
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her research site showed that it was the managerial drive to minimise labour costs 
(and not that to achieve technological innovation) which provided the engine for 
rationalisation and the concomitant creation of a gender-divided work force. 
According to her, women were still concentrated in the most routine jobs at the time 
of her study, although the titles and content of these jobs had changed with 
computerisation.
A similar argument was also made by Kanter (1977, 1993) when describing a 
case study in a large corporation, Indsco.30 Kanter suggested that, while both men 
and women worked together in such an organisation, their respective experiences 
were shaped by their very different numerical distribution across administrative 
positions. According to her, even though the development of modem administration 
brought women to pre-eminence in the office, it seemed to have excluded them from 
management: in the 1970s, women worked in most corporate offices in one role 
only - as clerical labour. By the 1990s, occupational barriers had been reduced and 
women were represented in nearly every department in the company, even up to 
‘senior officer’. Yet most of the corporation’s white-collar women employees were 
still where they had always been: in the clerical ranks (Kanter 1993:312). Kanter 
(1993) further added that, while management was being defined as a 'masculine' 
pursuit, more of the routine office chores were being 'feminised': office work was 
acceptable, in that women emphasised their femininity rather than their skills and 
saw it as clearly subordinate to the ultimate goal of marriage. She concluded from 
her studies that sex polarisation and sex segregation of occupations was a fact of the 
American work world.
The United Kingdom
The situation in the United Kingdom appears to differ little from that in the United 
States, also displaying the sex stereotyping of office jobs31, a high degree of sex 
segregation and a disproportionate concentration of women in lower levels of the 
organisation (Hakim 1979, 1992; Murgatroyd 1982; Walby 1986, 1989,1990, 1997; 
Bradley 1989; Crompton and Sanderson 1990; Corcoran-Nantes and Roberts 1995; 
Pierce 1995; Crompton 1997; Hatt 1997; McDowell 1997; Mitter 1997). Employers
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are keen to hire more women as cheaper, flexible and easily-manageable labour for 
their lower-grade clerical jobs (Holcombe 1973; Anderson 1976; Hakim 1979; 
Crompton 1997; McDowell 1997; Walby 1997). Walby (1989, 1990) also points out 
two distinct patriarchal strategies operating in paid work: exclusion, aimed at totally 
denying women access to an occupation or paid work, and segregation, involving 
the separation of women’s work from men’s work and grading it differently in terms 
of remuneration and status. In contrast to the considerable hostility among male 
clerks towards the initial introduction of women to clerical jobs in the nineteenth 
century,33 the resistance to women’s employment since World War II has been less 
trenchant and also less effective (Walby 1986). Walby (ibid. :241) explains the 
reasoning: “the patriarchal aspect of union strategy was now, not to demand the total 
exclusion of women from paid work, but instead merely to ensure that men 
continued to retain the higher-graded positions, or rather that men’s work should 
continue to be graded higher than women’s”. Unlike in the nineteenth century when 
clerical work was a male occupation, during the twentieth century it has become 
essentially a female enclave (Hatt 1997). According to Hatt (ibid.:66), whilst the 
content of men’s and women’s jobs has changed, men are usually concentrated in 
the higher paid and higher status jobs while women’s work is usually considered to 
be low skilled and commanding a lower wage rate.
Further, the gender segregation in white-collar jobs has adapted to new 
technology and carried over to the newly-computerised office (Oppenheimer 1985; 
Webster 1990; Cassell 1991; Crompton 1997; Hatt 1997; Mitter 1997). Men 
maintain a monopoly over the better-paid and more skilled computer jobs, just as 
they did over managerial jobs in the old-style office, while women find themselves 
once again locked into lower-level jobs. Oppenheimer (1985:122) argues that sex 
stereotyping at work, which has developed over time, is reinforced by economic 
pressures to keep wages in these relatively labour-intensive fields low. According to 
him, discriminatory practices against women designed to keep their labour cheaper 
than that of men (even in similar or identical jobs) are, therefore, 'functional' to the 
prosperity of a particular firm or agency. Further, these practices not only involve 
personal discrimination but also are institutionalised and relate to longer-term
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structural factors, such as differences in socialisation, education, career training, and 
social expectations (including the possibility of career interruption to bear children) 
(ibid.: 120).
More recently, the situation seems in essence to be little changed. According to 
Corcoran-Nantes and Roberts (1995), while women represented an increased 
proportion of staff in all the five firms studied, those in core occupations tended to 
be doing relatively peripheral jobs, and those having core jobs in core occupations 
tended to be in more junior grades. They further argued that the companies, rather 
than widening their recruitment, were becoming more selective, that upward career 
progression for women was becoming more difficult, and that these trends were 
tending to reinforce rather than break down the peripheralisation of women. Taking 
the British banking sector as an example, Crompton (1997) also shows that the 
nature of employer demand and a history of both indirect and explicit masculine 
exclusionary practices have served to create a labour force that is typically 
gendered: women carry out low-level clerical work, men act in supervisory and 
managerial positions. She further claims that the employment situation of women in 
the British clearing banks has been shaped by the employers’ need for a particular 
kind of labour (low-level clerical work), and maintained by a series of 
organisational rules and practices which served to keep women out of higher-level 
positions (Crompton 1997:111). McDowell’s (1997) study of merchant banks also 
shows a gendered career progression, with women at a disadvantage even when 
more highly qualified -  although there were some ‘exceptional’ women who 
successfully broke through the ‘glass ceiling’ that traps other women. McDowell 
further argues that men and women do not come to work with fixed gender 
attributes but rather conform to or transgress expected patterns of behaviour in a 
particular cultural milieu and physical setting.
As Hakim suggests (1996), reviews of post-war trends repeatedly show an 
intensified segregation of women into lower-grade, low-paid jobs, in spite of an 
enormous growth in their participation in the labour force. Walby (1997) also shares 
a similar view by pointing out that recent waves of industrial restructuring in the 
United Kingdom embody newer forms of patriarchal conditions of employment34 -
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which are less exclusionary, allow women greater access to employment, and have 
led to a major increase in the proportion of top jobs occupied by women - but that 
significant sex segregation in employment still remains. Women’s jobs remain 
concentrated in a limited number of occupational and industrial classifications, 
relatively distinct from those in which men are employed (Hartmann 1976; 
Cockbum 1983; Walby 1988, 1990, 1997; Jill and Collette 1993). The segregation 
of women from men in employment, Walby (1997) concludes, is a major factor that 
potentially limits the significance for gender equality of the increase in women’s 
employment.
In summary, the system of gender relations has been changing, from one which 
was based on women being largely confined to the domestic sphere to one in which 
women are present in the public domain, leading to significantly increased 
opportunities. However, the diversity between women, and the complicated 
development of new forms of inequality, ensures that they are still frequently 
segregated into unequal positions (Walby 1997). There is thus no reason to expect 
any significant social and economic alteration from post-war changes in female 
employment patterns -  from this rise in ‘secondary earners’35 (Hakim 1996). As 
Hakim (ibid.:82) concludes, “the sexual division of labour did not die but was 
simply regenerated in its modem form” .
Japan
Considered as the closest Asian counterpart of Western developed countries, Japan 
further confirms this propensity towards sexual segregation in offices and 
concentration of women in lower-graded jobs, according to the work of many 
academics (e.g. Carter and Dilatush 1976; Lebra 1984; Condon 1985; Shiga 1987; 
Camey and O’Kelly 1990; Saso 1990; Lam 1990, 1992, 1993; Iwao 1993; 
Shinotsuka 1994; Makoto 1996; Ogasawara 1998, 2001; Brinton 2001; Broadbent 
2003). When Japanese think of a working woman in the office, according to Condon 
(1985:211), the first image that springs to mind is that of a young, single, pretty, and 
uniformed ‘OL’ (office lady), a term that was coined in the early 1960s to describe a 
member of that legion of female office workers who answer the phone, greet
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customers and pour tea (for a detailed discussion of OLs, see also Carter and 
Dilatush 1976; Ogasawara 1998, 2001). Carter and Dilatush (1976:76) also 
explained that OLs in the early 1970s were temporary members of a growing work 
force of women who contributed in large numbers to the Japanese economy, and 
whose work allowed them to continue to be 'ladies' (and dutiful daughters and 
suitable wives), and whose cost to their employer was low. According to them, all 
of these OLs had several characteristics in common. First, they received extremely 
low pay in comparison to male office workers, and were denied access to the higher 
supervisory positions open to men. Second, they were expected as part of their work 
to serve tea and perform other 'womanly' duties that made working conditions 
pleasant for their male co-workers. Third, they were providing an important yet 
inexpensive supply of labour for an economy that had been booming (until recently) 
since the end of World War n. Finally, it was made clear to them, both directly and 
indirectly, that while their work was necessary in modem Japan their primary and 
most important role was still, as it always had been, to care for their households, 
husbands and children. Most of these OLs appeared to have accepted this last 
'condition of work' as a fact of life and 'the way it should be' (Carter and Dilatush 
1976:76).
With more women now continuing to work even after marriage, Iwao (1993:160) 
claims that females in Japanese offices today are no longer insignificant, transient 
'flowers of the office’. More women now tend to work in the same company for at 
least ten years,37 and the average age of working women is also rising38. Yet, there 
still remains a large earnings gap between men and women: a comparison of 
monthly salaries of workers in general shows that Japanese women earn only 61 yen 
to each 100 yen for men (in 1990). Further, men occupy more senior jobs than 
women: the proportion of working women in general who are in managerial posts is 
only 5 percent, whereas that of men is 29 percent (ibid.: 190). Iwao further argues 
that, for women who work for an extended period in the same company, promotion 
is definitely a matter of concern. However, due to the close relationship between 
promotion and continuous service in Japanese corporations, those women who drop 
out of the work force temporarily (e.g. to have children) and then return to the same
63
Chapter Two
company, know from their restart that there is little likelihood of attaining 
promotion, and consequently do not expect it (p i91). Broadbent (2003:14) also 
confirms this tendency by pointing out that the emphasis on continuity in ‘lifetime’ 
employment disadvantages women, since employment for many Japanese women 
involves, in some combination, interruptions for marriage, childbirth and child or 
dependant care. She proceeds to argue that ‘lifetime’ employment in Japan is 
predicated on a valorisation of male work patterns: paid jobs performed by men are 
seen as essential and male full-time workers are regarded as the ‘core’ workforce. 
Women, on the other hand, are consistently considered unable to become workers in 
the same way because they remain responsible for providing domestic services 
(ibid.: 12).
Acker (1998) argues that core Japanese organisations have always excluded 
women from lifetime, high-wage, employment, while using them as a flexible 
auxiliary labour force (for the use of women as a flexible, temporary workforce see 
also Shiga 1987; Brinton 2001:31). This tendency is further confirmed by 
Ogasawara’s (1998) recent work which shows that most OLs are excluded from the 
benefits of the internal labour market enjoyed by men and also from the opportunity 
of upward mobility. It is therefore not surprising to find that this results in women 
being less concerned about their performance or the impression they make with their 
bosses, and leaves them largely indifferent to organisational hierarchy and with an 
intention to remain working only until marriage (ibid.). As Broadbent (2003:33) 
summarizes, in Japan women’s labour is used to adjust employment as a 
‘peripheral’ workforce (see Chalmers 1989, for the peripheral workforce in Japan). 
When the separation of roles inherent in the gendered division of labour is 
combined with Japanese employment culture, which emphasises continuity, 
women’s labour is marginalised (ibid.). In brief, Japanese women have been viewed 
by large employers primarily as a ‘reserve army of labour’, not a reservoir of 
managerial potential (Brinton 2001:31).39
While two of these national examples (the United States and the United 
Kingdom) may suggest how work practice operates in developed countries (even 
though they may differ in some respects from other parts of the developed world),
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the example of Japan is particularly pertinent for considering female employment in 
Korea. Although Japan and Korea are in economic terms at different developmental 
stages, and clearly have their own distinctive socio-cultural character, it is also true 
that they are profoundly influenced by each other due to geographic proximity and 
shared cultural heritage -  not the least of which is their China-derived Confucianism 
(Brinton 2001). Furthermore, the Japanese colonisation of Korea for 36 years in the 
early twentieth century (see the following chapter) and the socio-economic 
influences in recent decades have affected Korea in many ways, including aspects of 
its business culture and the way social organisations are structured and 
administered.
Song BN. (1997:189-200) suggests that while the Korean management style 
appears to lie between the Japanese and American approaches, in many ways 
Koreans are closer to Japanese than to Westerners in terms of race, culture, values, 
and social institutions. Examples of this include Korean chaebol (conglomerates) 
which are often compared with Japanese Zaibatsu (see Chapter 5), the tradition of 
‘lifetime’ employment (though weaker in Korea -  see Chapter 5), and strong 
individual loyalty that has long been prevalent in both countries - although in Korea 
it is more to a particular individual, while in Japan it is more to the organisation and 
a commitment to collective goals (see Whitley 1991; and Chapter 5). Another 
example of an organisational practice shared by both countries is their adoption of 
two distinct career paths for white-collar workers: new recruits in chaebol are 
allocated either to a ‘general’ or a ‘clerical’ track - analogous to internal labour 
markets40 and ‘non-career’ tracks in Japan (Lee and Hirata 2001:101). Job 
descriptions for the former include planning and managerial (as well as clerical) 
tasks, whereas the latter is restricted to clerical work and assistant tasks (ibid.). 
Under this practice women (particularly those without a university degree) often 
find themselves in ‘clerical’, ‘non-career’ tracks where they hold junior positions as 
‘flowers of the office’. Although brief, this review would suggest that employment 
practices in Japan can offer useful insights into the experiences of female office 
employees in Korea.
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Developing Countries
Although Third World countries have increasingly become important producers of 
commodity goods and parts in labour intensive industries, the white-collar strata 
(including management and research) of industrial interests have remained largely 
the preserve of “core” or industrialised nations (Freeman 2000). As a result, the 
academic literature on women in white-collar employment in developing countries 
is, by comparison, rather limited with a shorter history and a comparatively new 
academic interest in the subject. More recently, however, as more women enter the 
skilled labour market, there has been a growing body of literature on women 
working in white-collar sectors. Some of the issues covered relate to the emerging 
trend of new technology employment in the wake of computerisation, as in 
developed countries (e.g. Lai 1987; Ng 1987, 1999; Ng and Yong 1995; Gaio 1995; 
Gothoskar 1995; Odedra-Straub 1995; Mitter and Rowbotham 1995; Freeman 
2000). The impact of computer automation and the approach of the “paperless 
office” has received increasing attention as technological advancements in 
telecommunications coupled with rapid changes in both local and global economies 
have presented new labour processes, recruitment patterns, and the reorganisation of 
work itself (Freeman 2000:44). The trends may be diverse: the stage of socio­
economic and political development of each society and the pre-existing division of 
labour are important mediators of how information technology (IT) and its different 
stages are implemented (Ng 1999:139).
The introduction of computer-based technology to clerical work can reinforce 
women’s skills and give them new opportunities to enhance human skills, or 
diminish them (Goodman 1987:80). In this environment, feminist writers point to a 
new dimension in the engendering process of new technology which has led to a 
gender polarisation of skills (Ng 1999:120; see also Webster 1990). For example, 
Gothoskar’s (1995) study of information processing jobs in the banking sector in 
Bombay found that, despite the numerical increase, women’s jobs were still 
concentrated at the clerical level, with the general picture changing only very 
slowly.41 However, Ng’s (1999) research on office workers in IT-using companies 
in Malaysia reveals a slightly different picture. While the clerical workforce was
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slowly becoming feminised and lower-level data entry operators were usually 
female, women (as systems analysts and programmers) are also gradually entering 
middle-level professional and management positions in the Malaysian IT and 
telecommunications industries (Ng 1999:165). This study further suggests that 
women have been the major beneficiaries of new computer-related white-collar jobs 
(see also Ng and Yong 1995). In Singapore, also, the expansion of those economic 
sectors reliant on new technology has created additional job opportunities for 
women in office work, albeit requiring new skills (Lai 1987) (see Goodman 1987 
for the implications of computerisation and microelectronics on women’s 
employment in South-east Asia).
While office work in the developing world may mirror similar trends in 
industrialised countries, there are also new initiatives particular to the former, such 
as hosting subcontracted office services for high-waged developed countries. In this 
‘offshore office work’, third world women are often employed to enter data at a 
fraction of the cost of comparable labour in developed countries; Pearson 
(1995:278-9) quotes the instance of data inputting by well-educated Caribbean 
workers earning less than one sixth of their American counterparts.
With this type of expansion of white-collar sectors in the developing world, new 
concepts relating to women’s involvement have emerged. Worth mentioning here is 
so-called ‘pink collar’ work. Freeman’s (2000) work on informatics in Barbados 
defines ‘pink-collar’ work as repetitive, manual labour carried out in an office 
environment. Her work explores the emergence of the “global assembly line” and its 
recent incorporation of clerical work as a feminised, proletarianised “pink-collar” 
sector.42 The nature of the labour process in the offshore industiy of informatics 
and the symbolic power of computer-based open offices introduces a blurred 
boundary between what we once described as mental, white-collar work and 
manual, blue-collar work. This feminised arena introduces a number of wrinkles to 
traditional ways of interpreting class. The very name “pink collar” is an explicit 
acknowledgement of the gendered, and in particular feminine, construction of this 
new sector (Freeman 2000:229).
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In summary, while the gendered practices of white-collar office work in 
developing countries tends to reflect those of developed countries, there are also 
some extra factors associated with the particular economic and socio-cultural 
climate of the country and its position in the global economy (see Pearson 2000; 
Pettman 2003). Although the introduction of new technology has universally 
influenced women’s labour participation, particular experiences of women in the 
developing world may differ importantly from those in developed countries: an 
example being the recent phenomenon of outsourced services providing Third 
World women employment in a ‘pink-collar’ sector. It is clear that office work for 
women in the developing world is a rapidly-expanding arena, the implications of 
which have yet to be fully understood and appreciated in their own social context 
rather than presumed from the developed world experience.
2.4 Conclusion
The first part of the chapter introduced the roles and status of Third World women 
whose labour, particularly in fast-growing export-processing industries, vitally 
contributed to their countries’ economic development. While the economic benefits 
for women of this participation in employment are often acknowledged, it remains 
questionable whether it has furthered gender equality. In this context, a review of 
current academic debate on the subject of the labour participation of female 
production workers was presented. In particular, Tiano’s three theses bearing on the 
impact of economic development on participating women were introduced to foster 
a discussion as to whether their labour involvement has led to women being 
integrated into, or exploited or marginalised, by the development process.
The second half of the chapter focused on the increasing participation of women 
in white-collar office employment in developed countries, particularly the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Japan. In discussing the growing numerical 
importance of women in clerical occupations, it was recognised that technical 
advances, coupled with progressive deskilling of white-collar work, have served to 
maintain gender discrimination and the often-peripheral role of women in
68
Chapter Two
employment. While these countries differ in the specific roles that women are 
expected (and allowed) to follow, they share some common features in that, 
although their participation in paid employment has improved their status in the 
labour market, it still remains largely peripheral. Gender segregation remains 
common and women usually occupy lower-grade, lower-paid jobs with fewer 
opportunities for promotion. In each of these countries, more advanced and with an 
assumed gender equality more progressive than in the developing world, women 
still suffer discrimination at work and their roles often remain secondary to that of 
men. The additional consideration, albeit brief, of literature on developing countries 
confirms the existence of gendered practices in office work, yet also reveals some 
new effects specific to their socio-economic position in the global marketplace. This 
literature review has contributed to a broader understanding of experiences of 
women in white-collar work and provides useful and parallel insights for the study 
of female white-collar employment in Korea.
Women have clearly played a significant role in the growth of new capitalism 
worldwide, both in blue-collar manufacturing work and white-collar clerical work. 
Their labour participation has undeniably brought some improvement in their roles 
and status in society, yet it reveals uneven and intermittent progress towards gender 
equality. Their increased economic participation, both in developing and developed 
countries, is too often characterised by low socio-political power, a questionable 
degree of integration into development and a status in the labour market which is 
frequently ‘peripheral’ or ‘marginalised’, yielding a wage gap and gender hierarchy 
in the organisation. The examination of this literature, even before undertaking the 
case study, suggested a rather negative perspective for working women in Korea, a 
country developing economically but also retaining a strong traditional patriarchal 
culture (see Chapter 4). However, the actual extent to which women experience 
discrimination at work, and the effect on them of the country’s development process 
and unique cultural tradition, need to be further investigated. For this task, this 
review of literature assists in developing an analytical framework for the study of 
white-collar women in Korean chaebol.
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Since my study focuses on the changes in gender relations within the white- 
collar sector of a rapidly-developing country, I was initially seeking a framework 
with a developmental context. However, unlike that covering factory work, the 
existing literature on white-collar work overwhelmingly relates to the developed 
world and does not offer a satisfactory framework for evaluating white-collar 
women’s work in developing countries. Therefore, while the nature of gendered 
work practices (such as women’s exclusion from the workplace, gender 
segmentation and segregation, unequal power and low pay etc.) may resemble those 
in developed countries, and which consequently may provide some insight, the 
broad framework for appraising white-collar women in rapidly-developing Korea is 
adapted from studies of factory work in developing countries.
For the analytical framework of this study, the context of development took 
priority over the nature of white-collar work. In this respect, Tiano’s theses make a 
good starting point, although they were formed with factory workers in mind. My 
contention is that their perspectives not only provide a useful analytical model for 
understanding the impact of economic development on female factory workers, but 
that they can be extended to encompass other categories of female workers within a 
developmental capitalist context. Tiano’s theses, therefore, offer a suitable structural 
framework within which the experiences of Korean women in the white-collar 
sector can be studied and evaluated.
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Notes
1 Jones (1984:6), for example, claims that “it may be true that women’s status in Southeast and East 
Asian societies is a generally subordinate one, and that elements of this subordination are present in 
the development strategies being pursued; but most planners undoubtedly perceive their strategies as 
benefiting women as well as men in both the short and longer run”.
2 The principle of equality of men and women was recognised in both the UN Charter in 1945 and 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
3 Boserup (1970) argued that development schemes had often deprived Third World women of 
economic opportunities and status, rather than improving their lives, by proving empirically that 
women in the developing world (particularly women in rural Africa, Asia and South America) had 
not benefited from whatever development had taken place in those areas.
4 The declaration of the International Decade for Women (1976-1985), with the official themes of 
equality, peace and development, signified the new visibility of Women in Development (WTD) in 
international forums (Kabeer 1994:4). WID emerged in the 1970s, not because women had been 
totally ignored by policymakers in the first decades of development, but rather because they had been 
brought into development policy on very sex-specific terms. In other words, while men entered the 
policy process as household heads and productive agents, women were viewed primarily in their 
capacity as housewives, mothers and ‘at-risk reproducers’ (Jaquette and Staudt 1988). Consequently, 
mainstream ‘development’ efforts were targeted mainly at the male population, while women were 
relegated to the more marginal ‘welfare’ sector (Kabeer 1994:5).
5 In fact Boserup’s work, as Kabeer claimed, helped launch a wave of new feminist scholarship on 
WID. The United Nations’ Decade for Women (1976-85) also stimulated WID literature (Moser 
1993; Charlton et al. 1989; Beall and Davila 1993), playing a crucial part in highlighting the 
important, but often previously invisible, role of women in the social and economic development of 
Third World countries, while also drawing attention to the particular plight of low-income women 
(Elson 1991; Moser 1993:2). Issues relating to women and their role in the development process have 
now become more central to feminist movements and important feminist debate. Because gender 
inequities and inequalities are increasingly regarded as a matter of conscience, concerns about gender 
issues progressively impact on development, as Brett (1991) argues.
6 The significant shift from the previous WID approach to a ‘gender and development’ (GAD) 
approach also began in this decade (Moser 1993; Beall and Davila 1993; Young 1997; El-Bushra 
2000; Rai 2002; Bhavnani et al. 2003). While the WID approach viewed the absence of reference to 
women in development plans and policies as the major problem, the GAD approach regarded 
unequal social relations between men and women, and their ‘naturalisation’, as the major problem 
(Rai 2002). According to Moser (1993:3), the WID approach focuses mainly on women in isolation, 
promoting measures such as access to credit and employment as the means by which women can be 
better integrated into the development process, whereas the GAD approach emphasizes a focus on 
gender relations when designing measures to ‘help’ women in the development process, while 
insisting that women cannot be viewed in isolation. As a result, their focus has altered from “women” 
in WID to “socially constructed, endorsed and maintained relations between women and men, with 
special focus on the subordination of women” with a goal of “equitable development with both 
women and men as full participants in decision-making” in GAD (Rai 2002:72).
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7 Building on the WID/GAD debates but extending them in different directions, the postmodernist 
feminist critique of development emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Rai 2002). Rai (ibid.:p75) 
explains the significance of the post-modern approach as follows:
“The growing acknowledgement of the fact that state-based strategies of development were 
not working, and that international agencies remained concerned with rather narrow 
development agendas, led to disillusionment with ‘the project of development’ itself. 
Within this ‘post-development’ framework ‘reason’ and determinacy were questioned, and 
a more diffuse sense of power relations discovered by focusing not on binaries of western 
philosophy but on the multiple differences that we live with and within.”
8 In the 1970s and 1980s, improved telecommunication system and transport facilities encouraged 
transnational companies to relocate a considerable number of manufacturing jobs, especially in 
textiles, clothing and electronics, to countries where wages were low and where there was a plentiful 
supply of young women workers (Mitter 1986). Within a decade or so, several million women 
workers were employed in manufacturing for export. This new form of employment gave women in 
the developing world recognition as an important industrial workforce, and a visibility they did not 
receive while working in small-scale or home-based units, broadly and vaguely defined as the 
informal sector (Mitter 1995:24).
9 A requirement which emerged from the United Nations Conference of the International Women's 
Year in 1975 under the tutelage of various international development agencies.
10 Plants that are 100 percent foreign-owned and specialise in assembly for export (ibid.)
11 Since labour-intensive industries tend to have low capital requirements, relatively simple 
technologies and low skill content, barriers to entry are low. Even in developed countries, they are 
highly competitive industries with low profit margins which exert continuous pressure on production 
costs and especially on wages, reinforcing the necessity of employing cheap female labour (ibid.).
12 When capitalism fuelled the recent industrialisation in some parts of the developing world, the 
gradual establishment of the wage labour system and the emergence of the nuclear family system 
(and separation of home and workplace) also took place, with the emergence of an ‘ideology of 
familialism’ (Eviota 1992:14) -  as it did in the developed world. This ideology, according to Eviota 
(ibid.), involved assigning appropriate roles for women and men within and outside the household. In 
this process men, as heads of households, were deemed the primary wageworkers, while the same 
process extended women’s procreative functions to responsibility for the home and the reproductive 
role; home became ‘women’s place’. Therefore, in capitalism, an ideology of gender was central to 
the division of labour and the reproduction of labour-power, and it is capitalism that encouraged 
strict sexual divisions of labour.
13 See Elson and Pearson 1981, 1989; Elson 1983; Stichter 1990; Moser 1993; Pearson 1998.
14 However, it is worth mentioning some challenging views on this issue. For example, as Sklair 
(1993) points out in his investigation of the maquila industry in Mexico, women do not necessarily 
have a monopoly of so-called ‘feminised’ characteristics (docility, undemanding, ‘nimble fingers’) 
considered suitable for production-line assembly work. He shows that men are increasingly being 
hired for this work at the same low wage rates paid to women (although he suspects that an employer 
cartel in some centres is partially responsible for keeping wage rates low in the face of a shortage of 
labour). He points out that men are just as likely to be similarly dexterous, although they are less 
likely to have been trained to sew when young -  by tradition a skill attractive to early export-oriented 
manufacturing which was often textile related. Similarly, he argues that women are not necessarily 
more docile or less demanding than men.
15 While there is a tendency for some existing forms of gender subordination (such as the control of 
fathers and brothers over the life-styles of young women) to ‘decompose’, there is also a tendency of
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new forms of gender subordination to ‘recompose’, both through the recomposition of gender 
ascriptive relations in new forms, and through relations which are not intrinsically gendered 
becoming bearers of gender. Indeed, the decomposition tendency itself helps to strengthen the 
recomposition tendency (Elson and Pearson 1981).
16 Tiano takes the work of Femandez-Kelly (1983) as one of the good expository examples of this 
category, arguing that Femandez-Kelly considers that the ‘maquiladoras’ programme contributes to 
their economic exploitation and structural oppression rather than being a source of women’s 
liberation and gender equality (Tiano 1986:163-4).
17 The work of Elson and Pearson (1981) would also be popular with this group, as they “see 
patriarchy and gender subordination as crucial underpinnings and inevitable consequences of all 
capitalism refuse to recognize any benefits to women in the Third World from employment in export 
factories, insisting that such employment intensifies rather than alleviates the gender subordination” 
(Lim 1990:116). However, they have since re-evaluated their initial position on the issue, 
appreciating the benefits of factory work on women for the potentially liberating implications of 
collective action in the public sphere (see Pearson 1998).
18 Mitter (1986) points out that the changing gender structure of employment (both in European and 
non-European countries) reveals that the TNCs now deliberately recruit female workers, in whom 
they see the promise of ‘subservience, obedience and punctuality’, and argues that in their search for 
this ideal labour force the global corporations have created a new female proletariat located in 
virtually all regions of the world.
19 Chant and Mcllwaine (1995) believe that women’s overall status, both in their own society and 
internationally, remains determined by continuing patriarchal relations and capitalist exploitation, 
even though they may gain minor improvements, mainly at the micro-level of personal and family 
life.
20 As a typical example of this stance, Tiano (pi60) cites Rosen's work (1982) of family change in 
Brazil which showed that industrialisation increases gender equality by bringing women into the 
labour force and supporting an egalitarian, achievement-oriented ideology.
21 The works of Lim (1981, 1983, 1985, 1990) may, in my view, fall into this category. Lim (1983, 
1990), while being fully aware of the exploitative nature of industrial development on women (see 
1985:2), suggests that the expansion of employment opportunities for women in the developing 
countries does improve conditions for them in the labour market. In her view, it does this by 
generating more income, with shorter working hours and better working conditions, than traditional 
housework, home-based work, or unpaid family labour, even though it may be inferior by standards 
in developed countries. She argues further that, in however limited a way, the availability of jobs in 
multinational and local export-oriented factories does allow women to escape the confines of the 
home, delay marriage and childbearing, increase incomes and consumption levels, improve mobility, 
expand individual choice, and exercise personal independence. She concludes that capitalism cannot 
wipe out patriarchy, yet exploitation in capitalist enterprises can provide some women with at least a 
temporary escape from traditional patriarchal social relations. In this context, she argues that 
development can provide opportunities for women to improve their economic lot, and that of their 
families, and may help them to overcome some oppressive aspects of traditional social relations (Lim 
1983, 1985).
22 Benena and Sen (1982:161) argue that the problems of Third World women do not arise from a 
lack of integration into the development process: on the contrary, the masses of Third World women 
are indeed integrated into that process, but at the bottom of an inherently hierarchical and 
contradictory structure of production. This view suggests that women in development have been 
marginalised in their participation in the process and have become peripheral in society.
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23 At this point, it is worth noting Scott's own elucidation of the 'female marginalisation thesis' (1986) 
which seems to share certain aspects of this perspective. To Scott (1986:653-4), marginalisation 
encompasses a range of particular elements which she itemises as follows: i) exclusion from 
productive employment; ii) concentration on the margins of the labour market; iii) feminisation or 
segregation; and iv) economic inequality. In brief, she argues that as capitalist economic 
development proceeds women are progressively squeezed out of production, and that when they do 
work they are confined to peripheral, low-prestige sectors or to occupational segments where the 
workforce is predominantly female. Moreover, the benefits accruing to women from their 
employment, in terms of wages, fringe benefits, security and so on, are vastly inferior to those 
accorded to men (Chant and Mcllwaine 1995:21).
24 The ‘white-collar workers’ category Bain used includes “lower professionals, shop assistants, and 
clerks”.
25 In the United States, by 2000 three quarters (74.1 percent) of all employment may be considered 
‘white-collar’, and of this 39.3 percent is represented by professional and managerial staff and 22.1 
percent by office and administrative support employees (Monthly Labour Review 2001).
26 Virtually all of the writers who contributed to the early development of new-working class theory 
shared an approach to white-collar workers that, while emphasising the ambiguity of their situation, 
assumed that in one way or another this ambiguity would be resolved: either by the lower white- 
collar strata finally joining the proletariat, or by their becoming part of a middle-class majority, or by 
their supporting the upper layers of the middle-class in an independent bid for power (Oppenheimer 
1985:77).
27 He (1958) included, as examples, a relatively-high income, a greater degree of job-security, an 
increased likelihood (particularly for male clerks) of rising to managerial and supervisory positions, 
and other non-pecuniary benefits of office work (cleanliness, comfort, even tempo, better hours and 
holidays etc.).
28 According to Crompton and Jones (1984:211), non-manual workers are divided along lines of 
gender: reasonably qualified young men who follow the organisational rules -  acquiring post-entry 
qualifications, demonstrating loyalty and good behaviour and, where required, being willing to be 
geographically mobile -  have been able to progress upwards through the internal labour markets 
characteristic of large non-manual bureaucracies. In contrast women, who on the whole find it more 
problematic to acquire and display these characteristics, do not similarly progress.
29 Flexible specialisation is an approach to employment and work organisation which offers 
customised products to diversified markets, building trusting and co-operative relationships both with 
employees, who use advanced technologies in a craft way, and with other organisations within a 
business district and its associated community (Watson 1995:344). Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that 
the ‘old’ Fordist system, characterised by mass production, is giving way to methods of production 
based on new technologies requiring the adoption of more flexible work practices.
30 Industrial Supply Corporation (Indsco) is among the larger and more powerful American-based 
multinationals. In the past decade, Indsco has taken an active look at its employment practices in an 
attempt to benefit workers and live up to the self-chosen designation of ‘people-conscious 
organisation’ (Kanter 1993:3).
31 Some jobs are regarded as ‘men’s’ jobs, and other jobs as ‘women’s’ jobs. This is known as the 
‘sex-stereotyping’ of jobs and occupations. Ideas about ‘suitable’ jobs for men and women have 
reflected prevailing notions of manhood and womanhood, of masculinity and femininity. Thus, for 
example, with the coming of the Industrial Revolution ‘woman’s work’ was seen as requiring high 
levels of dexterity and patience but little by way of skill and creativity, reflecting the assumption that
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women did not possess the drive or intellectual strength of men, but nevertheless surpassed men in 
their docility, patience, and attention to details (Bradley 1989).
32 Hakim (1979:34) earlier argued that:
“Occupational segregation [between the sexes has] remained relatively unchanged in 
Britain over seven decades. The types of occupation in which women or men are over- or 
under-represented have changed somewhat, with women increasingly forming the majority 
of the labour force in the lower grade of white-collar and blue-collar work, very often in 
occupations which closely mirror functions carried out on an unpaid basis in the home.”
However, in her recent work (2004) she also suggests that the pattern of occupational segregation 
and its functions have changed substantially over time (see page 145-184 for detailed discussion).
33 This was due to their belief that the entry of women to clerical work was responsible for 
depressing the pay and status of their positions (Walby 1986:148).
34 For example, during the post-war period, and especially in the last decade, there have been 
significant changes in the position of women in employment. Women are now almost as likely as 
men to be employed; but nearly all this increase is in part-time work. There has been a significant 
narrowing of the wage gap between women and men who work full-time (from 63 percent in 1970 to 
80 percent in 1995) - but this does not extend to women who work part-time (Walby 1997:30-31, 
37).
35 Bain in 1970, in his work ‘The Growth of White-Collar Unionism’, expressed his views (which 
subsequently become widely disseminated) of the major characteristics of female employment of the 
time as follows, describing women as supplementary or secondary earners:
"Most women do not participate continuously in the labour market because of marriage and 
family responsibilities, and they generally are supplementary earners in the sense that their 
pay is not the family's main source of income but merely supplements the earnings of their 
husbands. It is often suggested that these characteristics tend to reduce women's 
commitment to work, thereby increasing their indifference to trade unionism, and that the 
large proportion of women among white-collar workers therefore helps to account for their 
generally low degree of unionisation" (Bain 1970:40).
36 Some other academics are more optimistic about the future of working women. For example, 
Crompton concludes, in her recent study of women’s work in the United Kingdom (1997:139), that 
“there are some grounds for a guarded optimism as far as movement towards a less rigid division of 
labour between the sexes is concerned, in respect of both paid and unpaid work”. In her latest work, 
Hakim (2004) also acknowledges some substantial positive changes in recent years.
37 The proportion of women who have worked in the same company for at least 10 years has 
increased from 9 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1990 (Iwao 1993).
38 In 1990 it was 36 years compared with 26 years inl960 (Iwao 1993).
39 See Chapter 8 for a discussion on ‘reserve army of labour’ which also proves to be one of those 
characteristics that describe Korean women’s status and role in the white-collar sector.
40 Internal labour market is the creation by an employer of a stable and well-rewarded labour force 
through a policy of internal promotion and training. The use of internal labour markets by employers 
in order to maintain consistent, appropriately skilled and motivated workforces, creates at a societal 
level a primary labour force (Watson 1995:186).
41 This includes the burden of the dual role, sexual harassment in the workplace, the refusal of men 
to accept women as colleagues or seniors, the need to work twice as well as men to gain recognition, 
and the lack of solidarity among women (ibid.).
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42 She (ibid.:252) explains that the “pink collar” represents a feminine, professional “disguise” as 
well as an enactment of women’s sense of distinction: the data entry operator essentially performs 
“blue-collar” work but, in place of the dust and fumes of garment and electronics houses, she is 
situated within a cleaner, cooler “white-collar” setting, and as part of the trade she is expected (and 
expects herself) to appear distinctly feminine and “professional”.
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CHAPTER THREE
KOREAN DEVELOPMENT 
AND WOMEN’S LABOUR PARTICIPATION
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the background to the growing importance of female labour, 
particularly in white-collar employment, within the context of the economic and 
political changes in Korea over the last few decades. The chapter begins with an 
overview of the Korean economy and a brief historical summary of the way it has 
developed since the end of the active phase of the Korean War in 1953. The aim is 
chiefly to assist an understanding of the changes in female employment and gender 
relations at work in a country that has been undergoing rapid socio-economic and 
cultural development - from its status as an underdeveloped agrarian economy to that of 
a newly industrialised nation striving to modernise and match international competition. 
This section, consequently, examines recent social changes particularly relevant to 
gender relationships and the status of women at work.
The second half of the chapter deals with the participation of female labour in the 
economy during the corresponding period. It gives an overview of the role of female 
labour in Korean development, presenting an historical summary of women's 
participation in paid employment during the post-war period; how Korean women, 
traditionally home and agricultural workers, entered manufacturing industry and now 
increasingly as white-collar office employees. This historical approach encompasses the 
development of women’s roles and status within the labour market, while the focus 
moves from female employment in general to female white-collar employment, 
particularly in large commercial companies. Although Korean women work in a variety 
of white-collar occupations in many different types of organisations, the review will 
concentrate on female office employment in large commercial companies, such as 
chaebol, as this is the main object of this study. The severely limited body of literature1, 
particularly any dealing with the early historical genesis of female white-collar
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employment in Korea, inevitably means that the discussion will focus mainly on more 
recent developments and the current situation.
3.2 Economic Development in Korea: An Overview
Korean Economy during the Post-War Period
South Korea is a classic example of late industrialisation (Amsden 1989) and, together 
with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, has proved to be one of the outstandingly 
successful newly-industrialising countries (NICs) in East Asia (Berger 1987:ch.7; Hsiao 
1988; Riedel 1988; Schive 1990). Since the 1970s, the industrial development of East 
Asian countries has increasingly become a focus of attention for social scientists, 
particularly those interested in development studies. Together with academic writers in 
the fields of economics and politics, they have paid close attention to the success story 
of these Asian NICs. As a result, much has been written about these ‘four little 
dragons’, or ‘gang of four’, often focusing on the factors to which their success might 
be attributed and suggesting useful lessons for other follower nations (Berger 1987; 
Deyo 1987; Berger and Hsiao 1988; Hsiao 1988; Castells 1992; Woo-Cumings 1999; 
Chang HJ. 1999). In this regard, there seems to be a genuine consensus that the 
economic growth and dynamism of the East Asian NICs has resulted from export- 
oriented industrialisation which engendered a boom in manufactured exports2 (Gereffi 
1990b). According to Hsiao (1988), impressive performances in trade and exports by 
these East Asian NICs have demonstrated that they have successfully overcome the 
constraints of their limited natural resources by discovering feasible development 
strategies and exploiting the world market to absorb their increased output.3
Korea itself was little known to the world at large (except as a war zone) until these 
Asian NICs attracted international attention. The country was known as the Hermit 
Kingdom of the Orient' until the late 19th century when it was forced involuntarily to 
open its doors to outsiders (Kim KD. 1988). It was colonised in 1910 for almost 36 
years by the Japanese, and was finally liberated by the allied forces at the end of the 
Second World War. When Japan left Korea with its defeat in the Second World War, 
the country was almost deserted, with little industrial base and lacking trained technical
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manpower (ibid.: 199). The succeeding decade, dominated by the Civil War (1950-53), 
resulted in the destruction of much of the industrial plant and transportation network in 
the South (Kim HR. 2000: 203). Although a few industries were in existence before the 
hostilities, and the modem Korean economy derived its roots from the colonial 
experience, Korean industrialisation in a substantive sense seems to have developed 
only after the Korean War (Yu HS. 1993; Kim HR. 2000). As a result, the nation's 
history of industrial development and international trade is somewhat brief.
After the civil war, the task of rebuilding and developing the country during the 
second half of the 1950s appeared as a desperate effort to survive but with only a slim 
chance of success (Lee HK. 1994). Korean economic development in this period began 
from an impoverished base constrained by a limited endowment of natural resources, a 
low level of national income and savings, an immature social and economic 
infrastructure, informational asymmetry, restricted managerial capacity and a general 
lack of administrative experience in the government (Kim HR. 2000). Exports were 
almost non-existent because South Korea, unlike North Korea and other resource-rich 
developing nations, lacked raw materials on which to base exportable goods. Further, as 
agriculture had previously dominated the economy there existed no worthwhile 
industrial base. As a result, Korea was forced to rely heavily on foreign aid to finance 
the major part of the nation's balance of payments deficit in the 1950s (SaKong 
1993:137).
While the Korean economy of the 1950s can be characterised as being extremely 
depressed and dependent on American aid, the sixties can be considered as the 
beginning of state-promoted, export-oriented industrialisation. The early economic 
development plans of the 1960s began with encouraging light manufacturing, primarily 
of goods for consumption, in order to promote import-substitution and some exports 
(Shim-Han 1986-7:104). In spite of the turmoil of the civil war, according to Edwards 
(1992) there were two outcomes of this conflagration that became important in 
explaining Korea's subsequent rapid industrialisation: one was land redistribution and 
the other was massive US aid4. The country’s traditional ‘landlord’ class, with strong 
state support, invested aggressively in industry and commerce. This established a 
domestic manufacturing infrastructure for the production of basic consumer products
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during the reconstruction period of the second half of the decade, and was the basis for 
the first stage of import-substitution (Edwards 1992; SaKong 1993).
Although the intervention and support of the United Nations, and particularly the 
United States, was fundamental in providing the foundation for a modem economy 
during the 1948-1960 period, the inauguration of the process of economic development 
in Korea is particularly associated with the Chung-Hee Park regime, which was 
established by military coup in May 1961 (Castells 1992; Han SJ. 1995). As a result, in 
the 1960s Korea acquired a new political climate that was fully committed to national 
progress and economic expansion as the Park Chung-Hee government began to seek 
legitimacy through national development under such slogans as “liberation from 
poverty” and “self-sufficiency and independence from the US aid economy”. It 
launched a series of Five-year Economic Development Plans and encouraged export- 
oriented industrialisation (hereafter EOI)5 which began in 1962 with the First Five-Year 
Plan (1962-1966). The Plan was specifically aimed at achieving higher levels of 
industrialisation and progressive increases in GNP6. Park’s military government was 
intensely nationalistic, and its prime goal for Korea was rapid economic development; 
to this end it mobilised all available resources and demanded that people concentrate on 
economic growth in the shortest time possible (Edwards 1992; Han SJ. 1995).
According to SaKong (1993), the introduction of the First Five-Year Development 
Plan marked a new era in Korean economic history in that, for the first time, the 
government provided a truly national economic vision and a clear economic programme 
for business and the general public. In spite of the fact that US aid was declining in the 
1960s,7 this decade and the 1970s saw the beginning of industrial diversification and 
spectacular export-led growth (SaKong 1993). This policy of export-oriented 
industrialisation based on foreign capital inflows, which began in the 1960s, was 
similarly pursued in the 1970s. However, there was one important difference; while the 
1960s industrialisation was focused on light industry, particularly that producing easily- 
exportable goods for consumption, that of the 1970s was devoted to expanding and 
deepening the industrial infrastructure with a new focus on intermediate and capital 
goods (Shim-Han 1986-7:112). Programs to develop chemical and other heavy 
industries, which were forcefully promoted by the Park regime in the 1970s, completely
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changed the country’s industrial infrastructure. By the late 1970s big heavy-industry
conglomerates dominated Korean business and the appearance of a large industrial
working class, formed by migrant workers from the rural areas, was matched by the
rapid decline of the farming sector (Pak SJ. 1998). Between 1963 and 1974 the GNP
tripled, an annual growth rate of some 10 percent. During the same period, per capita
GNP doubled (Berger 1987:146). In economic terms the programme was highly
successful; industrialisation forged high economic growth, Korea met its financial
goals, and within a few decades the country was competing successfully in world
markets for manufactured goods.
Korea’s successful capitalist development as a late-industrialising nation is widely
considered to be a result of, or at least strongly influenced by, forceful intervention and
direction by the authoritarian state (see, for example, Hofheinz Jr. and Calder 1982; Im
HB. 1987; Jung KH. 1988; Amsden 1989; Cotton 1989; Gereffi 1990a; Porter 1990;
Edwards 1992; Whitley 1992; Lee HK. 1994; Choi and Lee 1995; Kim EM. 1997; Kim
YT. 1998 & 1999; Lim T. 1998; Kim HR. 2000)8. Timothy Lim (1998:457) explains,
“The particular relationship between the state and society in post-1961 South 
Korea is ....generally believed to have been the basis for the country’s rapid 
economic transformation. That is, because of the state’s supposed ability to 
thoroughly control and discipline both capital and labour, as well as its firm 
commitment to development goals, many scholars have argued that the state 
was able to literally ‘engineer’ the country’s high-speed growth and 
industrialisation. ”
The interventionist role of the Korean government was possible through its control of 
the banking system by supervising the allocation of bank loans, since the military 
regime dominated all commercial banks in the early 1960s9. The state has played a vital 
role in allocating financial resources, including foreign borrowing, into the hands of a 
small group of big businesses working in the targeted industries (Amsden 1989; Kim 
EM. 1991; Edwards 1992).
Another notable feature of Korea's industrialisation, partly related to the 
government’s strong intervention and control of the economy, was the emergence of 
large business conglomerates known as ‘chaebol’. While the state was strongly 
intervening in the national economy, it invariably linked with chaebol in this process of
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state-led industrialisation (Jung KH. 1988; Kim EM. 1991 & 1997; Castells 1992; Pak 
SJ. 1998; Gereffi 1990a; Edwards 1992; Choi and Lee 1995; KangMH. 1996; Cho YJ. 
1997; Lee SC. 1997; Kim YT. 1998; Whitley 1999; Shim and Steers 2002). In 
promoting export-led economic growth, the Park regime had cultivated a partnership 
with the country’s entrepreneurs that was aimed at creating a solid industrial structure 
based on large companies organised in the form of conglomerates (Castells 1992). To 
nurture these domestic companies, the government introduced strong protectionist 
measures to shield the domestic market from foreign competition. Further, given the 
existing narrow industrial focus of export-oriented manufacturing companies, it 
deliberately forced them to grow stronger and combine to form large conglomerates (the 
chaebol) by exercising its control over the banking system and the issuing of export and 
import licences. By 1977, 44 percent of the total labour force was employed in 
relatively few large groups (just 2.2 percent of all companies) having more than 500 
workers each (Castells 1992). The size of chaebol, and their broad diversification into 
unrelated product areas, enabled them, according to Amsden (1989:9), to survive the 
hardships of late industrialisation, to penetrate successfully a wide variety of price- 
sensitive foreign markets, and to deter foreign multinational firms from undertaking 
major investments in Korean industries. The relationship between the government and 
chaebol has altered with changes of regime (see Choi and Lee 1995:39-40), and the 
latter have steadily gained power and independence. All large businesses continue to 
depend on government support in some degree, but the country’s industrial sector is 
now largely dominated by chaebol, which have played a critical role as a major force 
behind the country’s phenomenal economic growth (Gereffi 1990a; Kim EM. 1991& 
1997; Kim IJ. 1995; Soh BH. 1997). Further consideration of the role and modus 
operandi of chaebol will be presented in Chapter 5.
The government's implementation of effective policies, backed by strong leadership 
committed to the nation's development, was seen by many (e.g. SaKong 1993:205; Han 
SJ. 1995) as a critical factor10 in Korea's success. The industrialisation and economic 
development of Korea since 1948 may be chronologically categorised as being in four 
successive stages (Koo and Kim 1992), each of which can be identified by a particular 
type of development strategy, state-economy relationship, and set of development
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alliances: i) import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), based on U.S. economic aid in 
the 1950s; ii) export-oriented industrialisation (EOI), based on labour-intensive light 
manufacturing in the 1960s; iii) evolving industrial maturity, combining EOI with 
selective use of ISI in the 1970s; 4) economic liberalisation and internationalisation in 
the 1980s.
The past four decades has seen Korea recording rapid economic growth. Its per 
capita GNP has increased from less than $100 in the early 1960s to more than $5,000 in 
the 1990s, with annual exports rising from less than $50 million to more than $60 
billion over the same period. In 1965, Korea ranked 118th among world nations in terms 
of per capita GNP, but jumped to 33rd in 1985 (World Bank 1967,1987). By the 1990s, 
Korea had one of the most highly-developed and envied business industrial complexes 
in the Third World (in which category inclusion now seems no longer appropriate) and 
had become closely integrated into the world economic system, ranking 13th in terms of 
volume of international trade (Kwon MH. 1991). Korea has now become one of the 
strongest NICs, and some of its industrial conglomerates (chaebol) can be considered 
major transnational corporations in their own right (Asia Monitor Resource Centre 
1987; Steers et al. 1989; Business Korea 1989/90). In 1996, Fortune magazine reported 
twelve Korean companies among its list of the world’s 500 largest corporations by 
revenue, and Korea (jointly with Italy) was the seventh most represented country.11
While achieving rapid growth the Korean economy developed structural 
characteristics, derived largely from the government’s development-oriented policies, 
which can be summarised in the following five elements (Kim U. 1995:43-44): i) all of 
the nation’s available economic resources have been committed to economic 
development through industrialisation; ii) economic development has been promoted 
under the strong guidance and control of the government; iii) the government has 
actively intervened in the private sector’s decision-making and management of affairs 
to advance key investment projects; iv) savings have been vigorously encouraged to 
secure the financial resources necessary for economic development; v) growth has been 
the foremost objective of all economic policies. Matters such as an equitable 
distribution of wealth and income, and balanced growth between different regions and 
industries, have been relegated to secondary importance (ibid.).
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With its growth-first policy (Cheng TJ. 1990), the economic strategy of Korea 
seemed to be generally successful in the light of the many positive social and financial 
changes it engendered. However, this rapid modernisation also brought some negative 
effects - such as suppression of basic civil and political rights in the interest of 
economic growth12 (Han SJ. 1995:60; Shin GH. 1998); conflicts between growth and 
income distribution (Bae KH. 1993:144); low wages for workers, income inequality, 
and paucity of discourse between labour and management (Shim-Han 1986-7:120); 
inequitable distribution of wealth and income, and unbalanced growth between different 
regions and industries (Kim U. 1995). According to Han SJ. (1995), the problem is that 
Korea's economic development since the 1960s has been what is termed a ‘rush-to’ or 
‘charge-towards’ modernisation13, being characterised by both absolute state control 
and a well-trained bureaucracy for the sole purpose of economic growth. He further 
argues that important issues, such as improving the quality of life for all and 
‘humanising’ social conditions, have been largely ignored while the government has 
pursued its primary goal of economic growth. This has meant that one of the 
characteristics of Korean development is the unevenness with which it has benefited 
different economic and social groups. A clear example of this is the way the workers 
who contributed so much to the economic growth have been denied its fruits, thereby 
intensifying the concentration of income and wealth (Shim-Han 1986-7).
As Korea’s large businesses continued to depend on the government’s repressive 
control of labour to maintain their workers’ wages at low levels (Shim-Han 1986-7; Lee 
JT. 1988; Bae KH. 1993; Pak SJ. 1998; Shin GH. 1998), the lives of Korean workers 
were characterised not only by low wages (at the end of 1986 wages barely covered 60 
percent of living expenses) but also by long working hours (more than 54 hours per 
week) and the world’s highest rate of industrial accidents (Asia Monitor Resource 
Centre 1987; Kim DO. et al. 2000). Women workers were often paid at about half the 
rate for men, and rural families had incomes which continued to lag far behind those of 
urban dwellers (Asia Monitor Resource Centre 1987). The continuing growth of the 
economy was in no way matched by improvements in wage levels or a reduction in 
working hours (ibid.) and these fundamental problems facing workers in Korea reached 
a critical level by 1987 when the country experienced its first major display of labour
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unrest14. One of the major criticisms levied at Korea is that its growth has been 
measured in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, and that it adopted development 
strategies which directly or implicitly rejected those human and social values which 
should be the real goal of the policies (Asia Monitor Resource Centre 1987:4) As Shin 
GH. (1998) shows, these issues were still unresolved in the late 1990s.
Korea in the 1990s
The Korean economy until 1995 demonstrated macro-economic success, despite 
structural problems identified by some economists15. However, in the latter half of 1995 
the growth of the economy began to falter before entering a serious recession (Chung 
UC. 1997)16 leading to the 1997 financial crisis, which required the negotiation of a $58 
billion emergency loan from the IMF. Korea's financial and industrial structures were 
shown to be incapable of absorbing rapid changes in market growth17. Because of this, 
the economy was forced to undergo painful readjustment (see Chung UC. 1997; Kim 
HR. 2000:199-201). “The rapid Korean economic growth came to a halt and an IMF 
bailout was required in 1997. The impact of the crisis on the economy was severe. The 
won depreciated dramatically, housing values plummeted, many lost their jobs and the 
number of homeless increased. Collectively, the standard of living was lowered 
substantially and the situation predicated a more difficult life for the majority of the 
population for some years to come”, as the situation was described by Ha and Lee (Ha 
and Lee 2001:199). The economic crisis brought an end to the $10,000 per capita 
income level achieved as recently as 1996. In 1997 the nation’s per capita GNP 
declined 9.8 percent to $9,511 from $10,543 the previous year (Bank of Korea 1998). 
More significantly, the nation’s domestic economic growth rate, measured by GDP, 
shrank from 7.1 percent in 1996 to 5.5 percent in 1997 and to a negative 3.8 percent 
during the first three months of 1998 (Kim HR. 2000: 200).
The deteriorating economic situation in late 1997 inevitably had an affect on the 
companies and employees involved in my field studies. It was already apparent when I 
visited Korea in mid 1997 that the situation had changed unmistakably from that the 
year before; most importantly, the general outlook was no longer so optimistic and the 
national economy appeared increasingly unstable so that employees were becoming
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worried about their job security, according to my preliminary interviews with business
executives and employees in a number of different sectors. A revision by the
government of labour-related laws in 1997 also caused widespread concern and
appeared to threaten job security. Choi KS. (1997:85), an economist, describes the
situation as follows, adding his own view:
"In the past, mostly blue-collar workers worried about job insecurity, but now 
white-collar workers, who used to be practically exempt from layoffs, also face the 
prospect of losing their jobs as a result of the extended freedom to declare 
redundancies provided by the revised laws. Yet, while white-collar workers fear 
that they will be laid off, businesses must have the ability to reduce or restructure 
their work force if Korea wishes to join the ranks of advanced countries and ensure 
continued economic growth."
Concerns about job security began to spread in 1997, when the national
1 ftunemployment rate was 2.6 percent . It subsequently reached a record high of 8.7 
percent in February 1999 when the number of jobless surged to 1.78 million; this 
became one of the country’s most serious social issues in recent years (Ha and Lee 
2001:200).19 The drastic and on-going reforms and changes in the Korean economy 
since 1997 have inevitably affected a large proportion of the population. The problems 
encountered by the government and people in Korea do not simply encompass the 
unemployment caused by the restructuring programs, but extend to the effect they will 
have on family, self-esteem, and the waste of the resources of the urban poor20, as 
pointed out by Ha and Lee (2001:210). A Korean economist, Professor Cho, estimated 
that the shock of unemployment for Korean families was 1.5 times as severe as that for 
their European or American counterparts (The Korea Herald, April 17,1999). He based 
his assertion on the division of labour in typical Korean households, where husbands are 
the sole bread winner, wives are confined to household chores and children rely on their 
parents’ support until they are aged 25 or so - particularly true for the middle- and high- 
income groups. In Korea, job losses by men are more painful to Korean families than 
those in Europe and the U.S. where, in most cases, family members other than husbands 
earn money. The lack of a social safety net further threatens low-income families as 
medical insurance benefits are suspended and children are forced to abandon higher 
education (Ha and Lee 2001:201). In this regard, the government has committed itself
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both to structural adjustment of the economy and protection of the dismissed workers. 
This policy direction has caused some confusion by pressing companies for structural 
adjustment while at the same time demanding that they avoid mass firing of workers 
(ibid. :210).
Although the situation had stabilised by the year 2000, by all accounts Korea's 
current economic difficulties are unlikely to end soon. As Kim HR. (2000:200) argues, 
the Korean government now faces the challenges of revitalising the financial sector, 
restructuring the corporate sector under market principles, reforming the labour market, 
and moving towards a leaner and more efficient public sector (see Chapter 5 for further 
discussion of the financial crisis and restructuring programmes). The Korean 
government is taking steps to prepare for globalisation and the liberalisation of 
worldwide markets by restructuring the financial and corporate systems (Ungson et al. 
1997; Lepage and Gross 2001)21. At the same time, the business sector is adjusting 
corporate structures along more specialised lines, reforming its historical practice of 
mutually guaranteeing debts owed by subsidiaries of the same business group, and 
beginning to hire professional managers. Although besieged by international and 
domestic pressures, the Korean economy may be exhibiting characteristics of change 
and reform that will propel it through the current crisis to a balanced position in the new 
global economy (Kim HR. 2000: 217; see also Kim JW. 1997).
So far in this chapter a brief review of the Korean economy during the post-war 
period has been presented to provide a background for considering the political and 
economic implications of women’s labour participation in the economy. The following 
section examines how changes in Korean growth and the economic climate have 
affected women, and especially their participation in economic development. For this 
purpose, a brief history of women’s involvement in paid labour, including the different 
roles they have played and the conditions under which they have worked in both 
production and white-collar employment, is presented.
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3.3 Female Labour Participation in Korean Development 
Background
Even though little information relating to female labour in Korea prior to the late 
nineteenth century is available, women were always important contributors in the 
traditional economy and were extensively engaged in agricultural production (Chang 
PW. 1994). However, a defining feature of women’s work was that it was, by cultural 
tradition, largely complementary - an immense reserve labour pool that was drawn upon 
in times of harvesting or transplanting (Yoon SY. 1977). The main responsibility of 
women on farms was for household-centred work and procreation, to which any other 
productive activities were forced to adjust (ibid.). Lee HC. (1985) also showed that, in 
addition to their agricultural work, women were exclusively responsible for the 
production of textiles - which were not only for family self-use but also had monetary 
value, since textiles were submitted as a means of paying tax to the nation in traditional 
Korea.
Most women remained as agricultural workers during the period of Japanese 
occupation and colonisation (1910-45), when they comprised one third of the farming 
population - even though the actual number of female agricultural workers decreased 
(Cho H. 1987). While the traditional agriculture, manufacturing and commerce sectors23 
lost women workers during this period, the expansion of colonial industrialisation 
provided some women with the opportunity for waged employment outside the home. 
Early industrialisation under the Japanese brought some changes to the traditional 
sexual division of labour, opening up opportunities for women to participate in outside- 
the-home economic activities (ibid.). The beginning of industrialisation combined the 
traditional work of women with new technology; the first modem factory in Korea 
manufactured textiles and recruited women as workers (Lee HC. 1988). By the 1930s, 
women made up half the work force in manufacturing, and more than half the women 
employed in manufacturing were concentrated in textile-related industries, where they 
represented over 80 percent of all workers (Chang PW. 1994:15). A few modem, 
professional occupations - such as teaching, midwifery and nursing - were pursued by 
educated women, although the number of such professional women was small24.
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Similarly, a small number of women began to enter white-collar jobs as secretaries and 
clerks (Cho H. 1987).
After the traumatic disruption between 1945 and I96025, described earlier in this 
chapter, the adoption in the early 1960s of an outward-looking development strategy 
laid the foundation that led to Korea becoming the major trading nation it is today. As 
the Korean economy began to grow it brought, among other benefits, an enormous 
expansion of employment opportunities. Beginning in the 1960s, the export-driven 
Korean economy increasingly required a highly educated and skilled labour force (Ha 
and Lee 2001). As a result employment multiplied; the participation of labour in 
manufacturing between 1961 and 1979 almost tripled (Lim 1985:54).
Seen in terms of the interests of labour, whose importance grew substantially with 
the onset of industrialisation, it can be argued that the low-wage policy was a direct 
result of the export-oriented industrialisation process, because cheap labour was 
constantly demanded for international market competitiveness (Shim-Han 1986/7; Lee 
JT. 1988; Bello and Rosenfeld 1990). According to Bello and Rosenfeld (1990:24), the 
secret of Korea’s success lay in the combination of long working hours, cheap labour, 
and the organisation of this cheap labour force into a highly efficient system of 
production. Amsden (1989) also points out that Korea was among the first countries to 
penetrate world markets for manufactured goods on the basis of low wages rather than a 
technological edge. In fact, from the 1950s to the 1980s, low labour costs have 
consistently been Korea's main, if not only, comparative advantage in the international 
export marketplace (Eckert et al. 1990) and have seemingly served as an engine for 
growth over the last two decades. In referring to Korea (and Taiwan) during this period, 
Lim (1990) argues that local firms in these countries could penetrate developed 
countries’ markets because the low-wage characteristics of pre-industrial and newly- 
industrialising economies made them particularly competitive in labour-intensive, 
female-intensive industries, such as textiles, garments, footwear, and toys.
This development strategy importantly planned the incorporation of women on a 
large scale into the national economy, and thus brought an unprecedented demand for 
female labour. When President Park took power in the 1960s and launched an export- 
oriented industrialisation program, it was mainly based on labour-intensive light
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manufacturing, carried out mostly by transitional female workers (Pak SJ. 1998:57). 
According to Yoon SY. (1977), the Korean government recognised during the early 
growth period that working women should be included in development through 
‘mobilisation’ (its more usual phrasing) since this interest of the national planners was 
prompted by the temptation of a more ‘rational’ use of female labour. As noted by Bello 
and Rosenfeld (1990:25), the centrality of cheap labour in global competition led both 
domestic and foreign export manufacturers to a preference for women workers in the 
early years of the industrialisation process. Women thus became the fastest-growing 
section of the labour force, both in manufacturing and services, and “Kong Soonie” (a 
Korean name equivalent to Rosie the Riveter) became “in great part, responsible for the 
Korean miracle.” (Launius27, cited in Bello and Rosenfeld 1990:25). This rapid increase 
in the number of female industrial workers allowed the expansion of 'female 
manufacturing industries', where women account for more than half of all workers (Park 
KA. 1994), and was concentrated in leading sectors, such as textiles, clothing, shoes and 
electronic manufacturing (Kim MJ. 1994). These industries, where female workers are 
characterised as ‘lower-wage’, 'unskilled' and ‘short-term’ labour, pioneered the growth 
in exports (Cho H. 1987; Yu HS. 1993). A study of gender-differentiated employment 
in the Korean textile industry by Lee OJ. (1993) demonstrated that success in that 
industry required products of a low unit cost to allow Korean firms to under-price 
competitors in the world marketplace while still making a profit. This, in turn, 
necessitated keeping labour costs low - often by maintaining exploitative wage levels 
for many industrial workers, particularly women.
Primary economic development, through labour-intensive, export-oriented 
industrialisation, brought women (particularly) into newly-emerging industrial sectors. 
As a result, women's participation in the manufacturing sector increased sharply from 
26.7 percent in 1960 to 36.2 percent in 1980, reflecting an eight-fold increase in 
absolute numbers (Lee HK. 1994) while the economically-active female population 
(aged fourteen years and older) increased from two million in 1960 to six million in 
198528. According to Park KA. (1994), the number of female workers increased 
fourteen fold between 1963 and 1990. Today, the participation of women in activities 
outside the home, particularly in paid employment, is at a higher level than ever before.
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In addition to the numerical increase in economically-active women, there has also 
been a structural change in the nature of female employment. The proportion of women 
engaged in primary industries in recent years has sharply declined, contrasting with a 
corresponding increase in the secondary (mining and manufacturing) and tertiary 
(services) sectors29. In 1960, 69.6 percent of working women were engaged in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, 6.4 percent in mining and manufacturing, and 24.0 
percent in indirect service industries. By 1990 these proportions had changed to 20.4 
percent, 28.1 percent, and 51.5 percent respectively, illustrating the dramatic shift in 
employment from country-based agriculture to urban manufacturing and service 
industries.
In the main, these urban female workers were young and unmarried. They typically 
migrated to cities in search of work in order to achieve temporary independence, 
purchase a few luxury consumer goods, and send remittances home to help support 
parents and siblings (Oh SJ 1983; Hong SW. 1984; Koo SY. 1984; Royal Asiatic 
Society 1988; Yu HS. 1993). They also considered their work temporary until they 
married or had children (Lee OJ. and Lee HC. 1988; Deyo 1984:28; Koo SY.1984). 
Examining the structure of the labour force in Korea, many (e.g. Deyo 1984; Koo H. 
1987; Bello and Rosenfeld 1990; Chang SJ. et al. 1991:29; Park KA. 1994) would agree 
that the remarkable economic growth that has been achieved in the past few decades is 
due in large part to the migration of this new female labour force to the manufacturing 
sector. However, most female workers are still engaged in low-wage jobs, where they 
are subject to employment and wage discrimination (Cho H. 1987; Cho SK. 1987; Koo 
H. 1987; Lee HC. 1988; Chang SJ. et al. 1991; Lee OJ. 1993; Chang PW. 1994; Kim 
MJ. 1994; Shim YH. 1994; Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 1996).
As industries progressed to more advanced stages of maturity, the demand for women 
workers increased and extended to technical, administrative, and managerial roles (Roh 
M. 1994). As young unmarried workers sought jobs with better conditions in an 
improved environment, some companies reacted to an insufficient supply of low-paid, 
unmarried female labour by introducing automation or by hiring married women. 
Whereas during the early stages of economic development young, unmarried female 
labourers worked primarily in unskilled jobs in labour-intensive manufacturing
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industries, in the 1980s it was largely married women from the urban-poor strata who 
were absorbed in lower-level jobs in manufacturing and service sectors (ibid.). 
According to Lee HC. (1988), because of the high productivity and dependability of 
married women, employers were now prepared to consider utilising this labour force, 
even though this tendency was gradual and uneven. Lee (ibid.) indicated that in terms of 
the dynamics of market structure, married women’s jobs tended to be the most unstable: 
they were located in the most peripheral, dependent part of the urban labour market.
As far as women factory workers in Korea are concerned, according to Pearson 
(1992a), they still constitute what may be termed a 'floating' or 'peripheral' labour force. 
She explains that, as industries progress from labour-intensive to capital-intensive 
technologies, men are encouraged to study and move up the promotion ladder through 
re-training programmes while women remain behind. However, women from poor 
social backgrounds often move from out-dated labour-intensive industries to jobs that 
have been discarded by men in more advanced sectors.
Female White-collar Office Employment
While young Korean women have been employed in large numbers in the 
manufacturing sector since the 1960s, their participation in white-collar office work has 
only grown significantly over the last four decades (further details are given later in this 
section) -  even though it was early in the 20th century when women first began to work 
in offices (Kim YC. 1976:273). The employment of office girls first started in about 
1910 when girls’ high schools began producing ‘certificated’ school leavers in numbers. 
Il-han Tile Company was the first company in Korea to advertise for office girls with a 
high-school education, aged fourteen to eighteen. In 1912, the Japanese occupying 
government set up the Land Investigation Bureau and recruited 130 men and also 
fifteen women, graduates of high schools, who were selected to be office workers in the 
drawing section and where they received technical training for three months. Typically, 
these women became responsible for graphic design and drawing (ibid.) A later report, 
referring to this period, noted:
“Those women of the enlightenment period who worked with men in private or
public offices were not looked on with favour. Breaking tradition by holding a
job well into their marriageable years, they brought great changes to the lives of
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Korean women. For whatever personal reasons, they pioneered women’s
advancement into the professional world” (Kim YC. 1976:273).
In the context of the dynamic changes during the last few decades, the emergence of 
white-collar work has become a significant feature in the country’s economic 
development. For instance, although ‘professionals and managers’ in general comprised 
only 2.8 percent of the total work force in 1965, the figure increased to 10 percent in 
1992 (Han SJ. 1995); clerical workers increased also, from 4 percent to 14.4 percent 
during this period (ibid.). Of the entire Korean work force in 1992, one of every four 
was classified as a white-collar worker. Women clearly have become an increasingly 
important constituent of the white-collar labour force. The proportion of women in the 
total 'clerical and related' population increased from 1.1 percent in 1963 to 15.3 percent 
in 1993 - while women's share of'clerical and related' staff increased from 11.3 percent 
to 41.1 percent over the same period30. By 1997, 15.8 percent of economically-active 
women worked in offices, where they comprised 53.3 percent of the clerical 
workforce31.
In recruiting for employment in Korea the educational attainment and sex of the 
candidates are in general recognised as the two most important variables (Lee HS. 1984; 
Park SJ. 1994; also interviewee fh4932). For example, in his categorisation of the 
Korean labour market by four distinct levels, Lee HS. (1984) used educational 
attainment and sex of job candidates as the most critical variables: level 4 (the most 
favoured) is made up exclusively of male graduates; level 3 comprises male high-school 
leavers and female college graduates; level 2 contains male middle- school leavers and 
female high- or middle-school leavers; while level 1 requires no particular educational 
qualifications. Of course, the study leading to this categorisation was undertaken in the 
early 1980s and the applicability of these labels to the late 1990s and the new century 
can be questioned and needs to be re-assessed. However, the vital importance of 
educational attainment and sex of job applicants for white-collar employment still 
remains largely true.
Therefore it is not surprising to leam that, not only do Korean companies usually 
specify the educational level required in job advertisements, but also - as Park SJ. 
(1989) points out - they have traditionally used different standards and methods
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according to sex for their recruitment. Korean enterprises have typically used two 
distinct approaches when hiring office employees: first, by restricted recruitment 
through personal introduction, and second, by an openly-advertised democratic process 
(known as 'kongchae’, open recruitment). The relative importance of these approaches 
varies with the size and nature of the company. In the 1980s, 86.1 percent of new 
employees in large companies, such as chaebol, were recruited by the open-recruitment 
process, while fewer than half of the employees in small and medium-sized firms were 
recruited by the same method (Seoul National University 1985). More than half (53.1 
percent) of these latter firms used a form of restricted recruitment to find their new staff. 
Even though most large Korean business groups have been using the kongchae system 
since the 1960s (Lee HC. 1989, cited in Kang MH. 1996:112), women had not been 
given an equal opportunity to participate until the mid-1980s. Until then, it had been a 
common practice for many Korean companies to specify the sex of the required 
candidates in their advertisements. Some companies would specify gendered 
characteristics in public recruitment advertisements in order to attract mainly (or only) 
men. As an example of this, companies (including chaebol) would confine recruitment 
to male candidates by advertising for "someone who has completed (or been exempted 
from) army service" -  which of course implies men as army service is compulsory for 
them while women are very unlikely to have participated (KWDI 1983:51-2). A 
quotation from an interview with a female graduate employee is particularly revealing 
in this regard:
“Until quite recently chaebol’s kongchae advertisements in newspapers used to 
specify ‘finished army service or exempted’. Even though women could apply 
in principle, it suggested by nuance that it was only for men and, therefore, 
discouraged women even to apply. Since it was not very clear, even if possible, 
very few women felt they would have much chance if they applied. The 
advertisement didn’t give a clear message whether or not it was to include 
women, but maybe that was what the companies intended. Anyway, one year 
only one woman was employed among 400-500 men” (fu43, from chaebol P).
Female college graduates with qualifications identical to male candidates had often 
been refused application forms from these companies; even when they did manage to 
apply, and had demonstrated their ability by written examination, they failed to get 
through the interviews (Chung & Chang, 1985; Chang PW. 1994). A study by Cho JA.
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(1992) that analysed recruitment advertisements in a Korean newspaper, Dong-ah Ilbo, 
also confirmed widespread use of gendered specifications in recruitment: he found that 
47.4 percent of job advertisements explicitly or implicitly specified male candidates for 
the job. Gender specification in recruitment was particularly noticeable among large 
corporate groups (chaebol), because of their practice of holding an annual mass 
recruitment, and in which over 90 percent of jobs in the 1980s had been for male 
graduates (Chung & Chang 1985). In recent years the situation appears to have 
improved: Korean companies’ representation of the sex of preferred job candidates in 
their job advertisements has changed from being overtly discriminating to a less- 
obviously-differentiating, if still implicit, designation. (This issue will be revisited in the 
following section when discussing the employment of female graduates during the last 
decade or so.)
Until the mid-1980s, therefore, it was common practice that, while large numbers of 
men (usually male university graduates) were recruited through kongchae, most female 
office employees hired by large commercial companies had customarily been high- 
school leavers (fu37, mu41). These female high-school leavers were selected, usually 
through school recommendation and interviews rather than objective examinations and 
tests, and were concentrated at lower levels of the organisation working on simpler 
administrative, clerical and bookkeeping tasks. Their duties traditionally also included 
some cleaning, tea serving and errand running, as ‘flowers of the office’. Steers et al. 
(1989:92) noted that the organisational hierarchy of a Korean firm usually comprised 
three principal groupings: managers and technical personnel, workers, and female 
employees. According to them (ibid.:94), the place of female employees in corporations 
could best be understood as consisting of a separate hierarchy, totally distinct from and 
largely subservient to the male hierarchy, since these women were hired almost 
exclusively as assemblers, clerks, typists, secretaries, or service workers. After being 
employed for a number of years these female staff tended to remain in their repetitive, 
administrative jobs at the same grade and with comparatively little salary increase, 
while men were promoted with improved salaries and conditions (Park And Kang 
1994). Female high-school leavers are further considered in Chapter 7.
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As far as female university graduates were concerned, only a very few were selected, 
usually by personal connection and introduction, for specific positions such as 
secretaries or computer-related jobs (Janelli 1993; also interviewees fu37, fu43, mu41). 
In Janelli’s 1993 case study of a chaebol a similar tendency was observed: his work 
revealed that women graduates of four-year university courses were hired in small 
numbers if they possessed technical skills that could be put to immediate use in the 
factories and research laboratories of the chaebol. According to him, before 1987 
women workers in the chaebol’s headquarters company were not eligible for promotion 
above the rank of sawon (ordinary staff)33. Steers et al. (1989:94) argued that female 
college graduates earned more and had a somewhat higher status and authority than 
other female employees, but that like them they were clearly less important to the 
organisation than were the salarymen or workers -  and also that they earned less than 
males doing similar jobs. They were seen as temporary employees whose role was to 
serve the (male) organisation until marriage. When a few women were hired for female- 
specified jobs in large companies, they were not allocated to mainstream business 
activities but almost always to secretarial jobs or library work (Chang PW. 1994). 
Female white-collar workers in large Korean companies have customarily been 
considered as being young, unmarried, usually with a high-school education and 
suitable only for reasonably simple tasks assisting male colleagues.
How then were these female white-collar workers actually treated by Korean 
companies? What was their status and what were their working conditions like? In 
1984, the Korean Employers' Federation (KEF 1984, cited in Chang PW. 1994) carried 
out a survey of 724 business firms employing more than 100 people and identified a 
distinct gender bias in conditions of employment, such as in methods of recruitment, job 
allocation, promotion and retirement age. Of the firms surveyed, 50.5 percent admitted 
that employment conditions differed between the sexes, 74.6 percent had an age limit 
for female workers but not for men, and 63.2 percent employed no married women at 
all while regarding the marital status of male workers as of no significance. Hahn JH. 
(1997) claims that Korean companies are typically male-dominated, with female 
workers serving under male supervisors in a division of labour that is in fact a division 
of gender.
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This gender division seems to be particularly reflected in remuneration. The 
existence of gender discrimination by Korean companies is not only suggested by their 
limited employment of female labour, but also by their tendency to under-value female 
labour once it is hired, which implies that they continue this discrimination during 
employment. One of the most obvious examples of this is shown by the large wage 
differential between the sexes in white-collar work: clerical and related work showed a 
gender differential in monthly salaries of 50 percent in 1985, and 43.9 percent in 1990 
(Moon and Joo 2000)34. The results of the study by Roh M. (1991:34) on wage 
differentials in 1988 also showed that only 37.8 percent of the male/female wage 
difference was non-discriminatory (i.e. stemming from differences in workers’ 
characteristics) and that the remaining 62.2 percent was due in effect to discrimination 
against women. Park (SI. 1982) argues that what is important in Korean wage 
determination is not the productivity or efficiency of a worker, but who the worker is. 
In other words gender, educational attainment and the seniority of the worker serve as 
the determinants of wages received (Chang PW. 1994). A male worker with a high 
educational attainment commands the highest starting wage. A female worker with 
similar qualifications would receive a wage of between 70 to 85 percent of the male 
starting wage. Seniority is more important than productivity in the determination of 
wage levels in the formal labour market (PW Chang, 1994). The work of Bai and Cho 
on women's wages in Korea (1995:136-141) also presents a number of factors to 
explain the large wage gap between the sexes: the heavy concentration of female 
workers in low-wage-paying firms; early retirement from the labour market (the shorter 
job tenure caused by marriage, child birth or childcare requirements); occupational 
segregation and internal labour market discrimination (women assigned to secondary 
jobs and serving as assistants to male co-workers); lack of fringe benefits normally 
offered to men (whose salaries normally include a cost of living allowance, family 
support, education and housing subsidies). The cumulative effect of all of these factors 
was regarded as explaining the wide, and gendered, wage differentials in Korea (see 
also Park SI. 1982; Meulen Rodgers 1997).
This wage structure is, according to Chang PW. (1994), one of the factors in the 
demand for an age-specific female labour force: young and less-educated female
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workers have the right ‘qualifications’ (attributes) to be employed cheaply. Because of 
the system which awards incremental wage increases with seniority, she argues, the 
optimal period for a worker to remain with a company (from the employer’s cost- 
conscious point of view) is about three years. Employers believe that for semi-skilled 
jobs the productivity of a worker does not rise after two or three years experience, so it 
does not concern the company if the workers leave after this period. As young women 
will in due course marry and then leave their jobs, this optimum working period can 
often be smoothly achieved (Chang PW. 1994). When looking at the age distribution of 
female workers in 1990, Roh M. (1994) found that 69.8 percent of clerical workers 
were in the fifteen to twenty-four years age group, which implies the existence of a 
voluntary (or involuntary) practice of 'retirement-with-marriage'. This has the effect of 
producing a high turnover of female staff coupled with low female labour costs.
There is another linked, yet more subtle and pervasive, influence that serves the 
same discriminatory purpose. This is the continuation and encouragement of the 
‘traditional feminine role’ for female office workers in Korean offices. In fact, the 
position of the female office worker (yo-sawori) still embodies, to a considerable 
degree, the traditional feminine role of Confucian patriarchal society. There is evidence 
that shows that these gendered practices have been condoned, even accepted, by the 
present sex-biased culture of industrial corporations. While this issue will be further 
explored in Chapter 7, it seems appropriate briefly to introduce it here. One good 
example of this practice is the importance given to the appearance of female job 
candidates (see Kim HS. 1994; Park SJ. 1989, 1994:252). Prompted by the widespread 
and increasingly overt focus on the physical attributes of female candidates and
2 c
employees, in 1994 Minwoohoe and the trade union representing school and university 
teachers reported 44 firms to the government’s legal authorities for sexual 
discrimination in their recruitment practices (Kim HS. 1994; Park SJ. 1994)36. The 
firms were shown to have specified criteria relating to physical appearance for female 
candidates only, such as 'T60cms or over in height and 50 kilograms or less in weight 
and pleasant appearance"37 (Kim HS. 1994:40). Further, according to another study 41 
percent of large firms (and 63.6 percent of small firms) admitted that for female 
candidates their personal appearance and impression is important (HanKyeoRe Sinmoon
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27 February1995). This has been particularly true in the case of female high school 
leavers. For example, in a study of vocational training for female students in a 
commercial high school, Jung and Jung (1997)' showed that, while the teachers 
recognised ‘academic performance’ as most important in influencing the students’ 
chances of finding employment, they regarded ‘physical appearance’ as the second most 
important factor, with ‘other relevant qualifications’ third. In helping female students 
find employment, most teachers (77.7 percent) stated that their greatest concern was the 
‘difficulty caused by the tendency of employers to put more emphasis on students’ 
appearance than on their ‘working ability or qualifications’ (see Chapter 7 for further 
discussion of this topic).
Thus, female school leavers have traditionally been recruited by separate means 
using different (often gendered) criteria, and then allocated to junior tasks, typically as 
assistants and supporters to male colleagues. In these roles they earn less, with poorer 
conditions of service, than male staff. Further, rather than investing in their training for 
long-term career development, employers seemed to encourage a relatively high 
turnover of these female staff which, given the system of salary increments with 
seniority, may be considered to cause employers little concern. In addition, their role in 
the office, and even their original selection, seemed to rely unduly on traditional 
feminine attributes, such as physical appearance, which raises some gender-related 
issues that will be considered later in this study.
In this climate, however, one of the most important developments in female white- 
collar employment began in the mid 1980s when, according to Chung and Chang 
(1985:30), large Korean companies, such as chaebol, began to appreciate and employ 
more educated female graduates in their offices. In 1985 the Daewoo Group, one of the 
top five chaebol, pioneered the inclusion of female graduates in their kongchae 
(Minwoohoe 1997:1) and other chaebol also gradually began to open their doors to 
female graduate candidates. This practice became popular among many chaebol and 
even some smaller companies in the early- and mid-1990s (ibid.) when female 
graduates were actively recruited through the same channels and using the same criteria 
as male graduates - even though the majority of recruits hired by companies were still 
men. For example, one of the chaebol studied (S2) had employed few female graduates
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until the 1990s but started including female graduates in their normal kongchae 
recruitment from 1993 (fu37). From the 1980s the proportion of female graduates hired 
by the top 50 chaebol showed a more or less steady rise until the mid-1990s: increasing 
from 4.2 percent in 1990, 9.7 percent in 1993, 8.6 percent in 1994,11.3 percent in 1995 
to 12.1 percent in 1996 (Minwoohoe 1997:2).
Due to labour market conditions, such as a shortage of qualified labour, together
with the effect of the Equal Employment Act in the late 1980s38, the government and
many chaebol became interested in the utilisation of female labour and actively
promoted gender equality in employment (Oh JJ. 1998; also see Kim YO. 1997).
Moreover, in the report of its meeting in May 1995, the Committee for the Promotion of
Globalisation recognised Korea's urgent need for new policies for the employment of
women to help the nation meet the challenges of globalisation (see Korea Observer,
Spring 1995; Kang MK. 2000; Shin KY. 2000; Pettman 2003). They claimed that the
growing importance of intellectual and communication skills in society required a new
role for women, where their sensitivity and creativity could make an important
contribution; they recognised that the proper development and utilisation of available
human resources required a deeper involvement of women as a resource to enhance the
country's competitiveness in the global market. They further argued that solving
women-related problems is a pre-requisite for improving the quality of life in society,
because most societal problems are directly or indirectly linked to women and gender.
The following quotation from Hahn JH. (1997), an economics researcher in HI
Group39, is particularly pertinent in suggesting that Koreans acknowledge the critical
inter-dependence between the wise use of female labour and future national success:
''Many futurists have predicted that the 21st century will see societies with 'softer1 
characteristics often associated with women. Already the demand for skills 
requiring delicacy and intellectual ability is greater than the demand for labour 
that relies on physical strength. This shift towards the growing importance of 
information technology and knowledge-based industries will inevitably mean
changes in Korea's existing male-oriented labour structure In 'soft' industries,
where information technology and knowledge are key elements, companies are 
discovering the importance of female workers. The social conditions that lead 
women to seek employment also play an important role. Women with a high level
of education increasingly pursue careers In Korea, where women's access to
higher education has improved and where software-embracing industries have
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developed rapidly, dependence on female workers will inevitably increase" (Hahn
JH. 1997:92).
Until 1996 conditions in the Korean labour market seemed to be positive and improving 
for women; a general recognition that women would be a critically important part of the 
labour force in the 21st century, the government's globalisation campaign and emphasis 
on gender relations, and the opening-up of society to outside influences all served to 
encourage increased employment of women (particularly graduates) by chaebol.
In spite of the various corporate and national initiatives designed to promote 
employment opportunities for women, however, the increase in absolute numbers 
remained small and they still represented a minor proportion of all recruited graduates. 
For example, in the early 1990s approximately 80 percent of female white-collar 
workers in Korea were high-school leavers (Park and Kang 1994). Even by 1995, when 
recruiting female graduates through kongchae was in full swing, only some 3,600 
female university graduates had been employed by Korea's 30 largest companies, 
representing just 13.6 percent of their new graduate intake (Minwoohoe 1997; Hahn JH. 
1997). However, when this is compared with the equivalent 4.5 percent of new graduate 
employees in 1990, it is clear that employment prospects for female university 
graduates had improved dramatically in just a few years (Hahn JH. 1997) and that the 
changes were in no way trivial. Yet this qualified progress towards gender equality was 
soon to be subdued by adverse changes in the economy and labour market in 1997. This 
issue will be considered further in Chapter 8 where the recent conditions for female 
employment, including the impact of economic recession, will be discussed. As my 
research began in 1996 and continued until 1999 when I completed my fieldwork, the 
important developments during this period will be considered in the main body of the 
study.
In summary, although clerical occupations have absorbed a conspicuous number of 
female workers in the past three decades, and more recent changes have offered wider 
opportunities to educated women, the role of women in white-collar office employment 
undoubtedly remains marginal in comparison to that of men. The overwhelming 
majority of female positions are junior and occupied by young, single women; these 
unmarried women constitute an absolute majority in clerical work (Chang SJ. et al.
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1991:32; Bai and Cho 1996). Official statistics and research studies in this field (Cho H. 
1987; Cho SK. 1987; Koo H. 1987; Lee HC. 1988; Chang SJ. et al. 1991; Pearson 
1992a; Lee OJ. 1993; Cho and Chang 1994; Kim TH. 1997; KWDI 1997; KWDI 2000) 
suggest that female workers have been facing considerable sexual discrimination, 
exemplified by restrictive recruitment practices, gender wage gaps, reduced 
opportunities for promotion, and lower security of employment.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter began by examining the historical development of the modem Korean 
economy over the eventful last century. After a relatively late industrialisation, the 
Japanese occupation and the economic and social turmoil of the civil war and its 
aftermath in the 1950s, came rapid economic expansion achieved only by collective 
dedication and self-discipline under the firm guidance of strong authoritarian 
government. Only during the past two decades, with the arrival of a nascent domestic 
consumer market and wider distribution of wealth, have some of the concealed social 
and gender-sensitive issues begun to be addressed. And now, more recently, economic 
difficulties have re-introduced an element of national anxiety and a climate of concern 
about security of employment.
The second half of the chapter attempted to suggest how women, typically young, 
unmarried and from an agricultural background, provided the low-cost dexterous labour 
force needed by the new export-oriented manufacturing industries to drive the economic 
development of Korea. These women operated the machines and worked in the 
assembly plants and (more recently) the offices, which enabled the country successfully 
to emerge from post-war disorder to attain its present recognised prosperity.
In particular, white-collar office work - the main subject of the study - has been a 
rapidly expanding occupation for women over the past few decades as the country has 
generated impressive economic growth. It is, however, clear that female office 
employment in Korean companies is still largely undertaken by young, unmarried 
women carrying out a limited range of tasks with low status and poor remuneration. 
Typically, high-school leavers have been employed in less-challenging jobs with few
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prospects, while male graduates have been recruited for ‘standard’ office work. Sexual 
discrimination appears to start at the recruitment stage with the selection of a small 
number of well-educated female candidates for work with promotion prospects, and the 
majority of women for less-valued administrative duties. This discriminatory practice 
seems to continue during employment with a gender gap in wages as well as the 
embodiment of traditional gender roles for women at work. The attempt in recent years 
by a number of large Korean companies (notably chaebol) to employ female graduates 
on the same basis as male graduates for the same type of work has undoubtedly been a 
positive influence. However, the true condition must be closely examined and the 
reality of any progress and its lasting benefits tested over time.
This chapter suggests that Korean women are not unique and, even though they have 
actively contributed to national development, share the low status and gendered, 
discriminatory working conditions of women in many other countries It is clear that in 
spite of the impressive economic achievements of contemporary Korea, and the crucial 
female contribution towards it, progress in improving the status of women has been less 
than impressive. For women the situation may have improved somewhat through 
advances in their education (and that of men), their increased economic rewards, 
positive cultural changes in society, and better, more equal, job opportunities promoted 
both by government and employers. However, the majority of women still appear to be 
employed, and trapped, in positions carrying low status and rewards while facing sexual 
discrimination. For them economic, as well as social, equality has yet to be attained. A 
large disparity still exists between the contribution of women in Korea and their 
economic and social rewards.
Among the many issues arising from the economic development of Korea, that of 
gender relations is one of the most clearly-recognised examples of a failure fully to 
benefit from development. It would seem, therefore, to deserve special attention. 
Whether the contribution of Korean women to their national development has been fully 
appreciated, and whether it has also been matched by improvements in the status of 
women generally, is one of the major issues to be addressed in this thesis. The fact that 
the country is currently experiencing economic difficulties, and undergoing rapid social 
changes to cope with these difficulties, provides a good opportunity to explore whether
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or not women's status and conditions at work have been improved - realities are often 
starker in bad times. An exploration of how the challenges of the present economic 
crisis affect the female employment policies and practices of chaebol at this particular 
time would be interesting. For example, will employers treat their female employees in 
effect as marginal workers - to be released first in troubled times? Are female office 
employees (and working women generally), who have been actively recruited and 
employed in recent years, any better than 'a reserve army of labour1? These issues will 
be discussed in more detail in later chapters, particularly Chapter 8.
For a proper appreciation of the status and position of Korean women in society and 
at work, it is important to understand the cultural environment as well as the socio­
economic climate of the country. This chapter has examined the historical development 
of the national economy and discussed the socio-economic changes affecting the 
participation of women, and their status, in the labour market. The following chapter 
considers the cultural influences affecting Korean women and their labour participation.
Notes
1 Of course there are some exceptions, such as the quarterly magazine Samujik Yosong (’White-collar 
Women', Minwoohoe 1990-96), which is now replaced by the bi-monthly Pyeong-Dung CEquality', 
Minwoohoe 1996-), ‘the Reality and Movement of White-collar Female Workers’ {Minwoohoe 1989), 
‘Female Graduates in Five Chaebols’ (Odaegurup daejolyosong, a discussion paper, Minwoohoe et al. 
1997), a few master dissertations, and occasional references in general works on gender issues in 
employment. Otherwise, the existing literature on white-collar work mostly ignores women or, 
misleadingly, includes them in general (male-based) material.
2 All four of the East Asian NICs pursued policies of outward-oriented industrialisation in the 1960s in 
order to generate foreign exchange via manufactured exports. During this initial phase of export 
expansion, the rapid growth of these East Asian nations was founded on light, labour-intensive industries 
like textiles, garments, and consumer electronics. In subsequent phases, however, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Singapore achieved success in much heavier industries like steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, 
vehicle manufacture and computers that were further removed from their original factor endowments 
(i.e., limited raw materials, unskilled labour, and small markets) (Gereffi 1990b).
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3
However, some academics take a contrary view. Bello and Rosenfeld (1990), for example, argue that 
NICs face serious structural challenges: their high-speed, export-oriented industrialisation model is 
threatened by democratic demands for a fairer distribution of income; rising wage costs have resulted in 
labour-intensive industries moving overseas leaving structural unemployment; erosion of agricultural 
sectors caused by cheaper food imports; environmental degradation from chemical pollution and 
deforestation; over-reliance of industry on foreign technology. In their view these countries, having used 
cheap labour as their ‘engines of growth’, were no more than ‘efficient mass doners’ with little 
innovation serving the “ ‘low-end’ of already mature markets with obsolete technology” (ibid.: 164). See 
also Hoveman (1998) for recent economic crises in these countries.
4 During the 1950s U.S. aid, estimated in total at about $2.5 billion at current prices, was a major source 
of finance for industrialisation. According to Mason et al. it accounted for nearly 80 percent of Gross 
Domestic Capital Formation (GDCF) and contributed 8 percent of GNP (Mason et al. 1980:185).
5 With a small domestic market and a poor natural resource base, export-oriented industrialisation was the 
only viable choice for Korea once it had exhausted its import-substitution industrialisation. Throughout 
the first EOI period, although most obviously in the initial phase, labour-intensive and low-technology 
industries like textiles, apparel, and footwear were the dominant industries (Yu HS. 1993:269).
6 While the First (1962-6) and Second (1967-71) Five-Year Plans emphasised industrial growth, the Third 
Five-Year Plan (1972-6) focused on balanced growth in both the industrial and agricultural sectors and 
the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-81) stressed sustained economic growth and equity. In the 1960s and 
early 1970s, these strategies focused on labour-intensive light industries and then on capital-intensive 
heavy industries in the late 1970s until the Park regime collapsed with his assassination in 1979 (Lee HC. 
1988).
7 During the 1960s, the role of foreign aid diminished drastically while foreign borrowing began to play a 
critical role in Korea's economic development (SaKong 1993:137).
8 Korea’s economic growth and industrial transformation has been regarded as one of the most 
noteworthy economic success stories in the history of capitalist development. This miraculous growth has 
been attributed either to pervasive and directive state intervention through a set of export-led 
industrialisation strategies (Amsden, 1989; Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1990) or to liberal prescriptions of 
industrial policies and the invisible hand of markets (Balassa 1988; World Bank 1993; Young 1994). 
Although the interpretation of the roles of the state and markets is controversial, it is believed that state 
intervention has been a determining force in economic development, but for some also impeding the full 
development of the financial and corporate sectors in the national economy (Kim HR. 2000:199).
9 The Park regime nationalised the banks in 1961. This move placed credit under state control, effectively 
making chaebol and private firms dependent on state officials. Moreover, foreign loan capital and foreign 
direct investment were also tightly controlled and closely monitored by the state. Distribution of both 
domestic and foreign capital thus rested in the hands of the state, which could then easily implement its 
economic-development plans and control the private sector (Kim EM. 1991:281).
10 Of course, Korea did have some favourable initial conditions for development. Among these were a 
relatively high standard of socio-cultural development, a literate and motivated work force, and plenty of 
latent entrepreneurial energy. Undoubtedly, these strengths were enhanced by political leadership 
committed to economic development and by the choice of an outward-looking development strategy 
(SaKong 1993:21).
11 In 2000, Korea had more corporations (12) in the list of Global 500 than any other Third World country 
(see Sklair and Robbins 2002).
12 During 30 years of authoritarian regimes the aspirations of the labour movement were severely 
suppressed, while universities became battlegrounds for violent confrontations. In the second half of the
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1980s, in particular, Korea witnessed the simultaneous eruption of labour and other social unrest (Han SJ. 
1995).
13 Or “growth first” policy, as Cho (S. 1994) describes it.
14 The eruption of labour since 1987 has underlined the point that Confiician piety was not the mainspring 
of the energies of Korea’s workers: even though Korean workers accepted the Confiician ethic of 
hierarchy and wanted their employers to behave like caring parents, they came to realise that, as the 
inequality widened, their employers were primarily motivated by profit, argues Bae KH. (1993:147-8). 
Workers felt that they had to protect themselves by pursuing their own class interests (ibid.) Indeed, 
according to Bello and Rosenfeld (1990:23), the working class that stormed onto Korea’s political stage 
and grabbed the world’s attention with 3,500 strikes in the hot summer of 1987 evoked images of the 
European working classes in the nineteenth century: rebellious, uncompromising, and passionately class 
conscious.
15 For example, Chung UC. (1997:65) believes that the cause of structural problems in the Korean 
economy is the fact that policy-makers often want to achieve too many economic goals in too short a 
time. He further acknowledges a number of economic 'bubbles' in Korea - in domestic households, in 
colleges, in businesses and in the government, and argues that these bubbles in the late 1980s were in part 
related to the excessive optimism of Koreans following the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and that economic 
optimism lowered people's enthusiasm to work and fanned over-consumption.
16 With the increasing influence of global capital markets, the domestic financial sector has shown various 
signs of weakness. Significant numbers of non-performing loans, excessive and poor lending practices, 
and increasingly high levels of risky assets have left Korean financial institutions vulnerable to the 
fluctuation of credit availability. In the corporate sector, excessive investment in a few industrial sectors 
and disproportionate short-term corporate borrowings have left companies so highly leveraged that an 
unprecedented number of business groups have become bankrupt since mid-1997. Furthermore, the 
contagious effects of the Asian currency crisis have appeared and developed further in the Korean 
economy. A major reversal in the fortune of Asian economies began in July 1997 with economic troubles 
and a currency crisis in Thailand. In a very short time the crisis spread to neighbouring countries in 
Southeast Asia, eventually triggering serious turmoil in the currency and financial markets of South 
Korea (Kim HR. 2000:199-200).
17 For example, according to Han ZS. (1994:57),
“The French magazine Le Point, comparing Korea to an “out-of-breath dragon,” pointed out that 
the current economic crisis in Korea was the result of limitations of the Korean style of national 
capitalism. According to its analysis, chaebol-centred growth policy pursued for so long by the 
Korean government is no longer working because of the sudden increase in wages, limited 
technology and intense competition from China and other developing Asian economies. For the 
Korean economy to overcome this hurdle and join the advanced nations, all previous business 
practices would have to be boldly discarded and the economy modernised.”
18 In the previous year, 1996, the rate was 2.0%. Source: National Statistical Office, The Economically 
Active Population Survey, cited in Ministry of Labour, Republic of Korea (2001) Year Book of Labour 
Statistics.
19 This high unemployment rate eventually reduced to 4.1 percent in 2000. Source: National Statistical 
Office, The Economically Active Population Survey, cited in Ministry of Labour, Republic of Korea 
(2001) Year Book of Labour Statistics.
20 Such a large drop in employment was mainly due to layoffs associated with the restructuring plans of 
companies. Since the IMF crisis, most (67 percent) low-income household heads had experienced 
difficulties in finding jobs, even so-called 3-D (dirty, dangerous and difficult) jobs (Ha and Lee 
2001:200).
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21 Concurrently with moves to deregulate foreign investment in Korea, the government is actively 
encouraging chaebol to progress towards globalisation as a response to “a tendency toward open markets, 
changes in domestic markets and the necessity of acquiring newer technologies” (Ungson et al. 
1997:111). Foreign language (especially English) skills are being strongly promoted, as also is an 
understanding of and adaptability to foreign cultures. Chaebol themselves are seeking to “utilize their 
resources all over the world”, and to develop a “managerial perspective that transcends national borders” 
(ibid.: 110), often by adopting more ‘professional’ organisational structures, grafting Western 
management techniques and recruiting second-generation Koreans in foreign countries. As part of the 
process, they form joint ventures with overseas business partners, participate in technology alliances and 
jointly fund research and development projects (Ungson et al. 1997: ch. 6).
22 The traditional agricultural sector lost women workers (some 500,000 between 1930 and 1945 - and a 
similar number of men) primarily due to land surveys and changes introduced by the Japanese colonial 
authority which deprived farmers of land - leading to a pauperisation of the farming sector and 
devastation of many villages.
23 In manufacturing, the decline in female employment was caused by the reduction in household 
industries (e.g. textiles, food, ceramics) - partly caused by the growth of the modem manufacturing 
sector, but mainly because of political suppression of traditional household industries where they 
competed with Japanese establishments for supplies of raw materials, such as cotton and silk. In addition, 
the commerce sector, where women tended family shops and engaged in petty trading, also registered a 
fall in female employment.
24 For example, there were about 2,000 female teachers (14 percent of all teachers) in 1938, and by 1940 
there were just over 4,000 female midwives and nurses.
25 Involving liberation from the Japanese colonisation in 1945, the Korean civil war during 1950-53, and 
also post-war reconstruction.
26 The target labour group were unmarried women aged sixteen to twenty-five with at least a middle- 
school education. One study for the International Labour Office notes that:
“Girls are preferred not only because their discipline is better, but also because female 
production wages are, on average, almost 50 percent of male wages. There is little evidence that 
women are less productive than men, and it is therefore much more profitable to employ 
women” (Michell T. ‘From LDC to NIC: The Republic of Korea: Employment, Industrialisation 
and Trade, 1961-1982’, unpublished manuscript, Seoul, 1988:134, cited in Bello and Rosenfeld 
1990:25).
27 Launius, Michael, “The State and Industrial labour in South Korea”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars 16, no.4, p. 10 (the year it was published was not specified in Bello and Rosenfeld 1990).
28 Source: Economic Planning Board, Population and Housing Census of Korea 1960; and Annual Report 
1985.
29 Source: EPB, Population and Housing Census Report 1960; EPB, Annual Report on The Economically 
Active Population Survey 1990.
30 Source: EPB (1999), Annual Report on The Economically Active Population Survey, cited in Kim TH. 
(2000:65).
31 However, since the ‘IMF crisis’ in late 1997 the trends have not surprisingly changed dramatically: in 
1997 15.8 percent of economically active women participated in clerical work, where they represented 
53.3 percent of the workforce; in 1998 the proportions were 14.1 percent and 47.1 percent respectively,
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and in 1999 they were 13.8 percent and 50.3 percent. Source: EPB (1999), Annual Report on The 
Economically Active Population Survey, cited in Kim TH. (2000:65).
32 The first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment on joining:
h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the interviewee (from 1 to 51); a 
final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile of chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘fulO*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a particular 
affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
33 In that year, however, a few women were hired as potential future managers and underwent the same 
training programme as the male recruits (Janelli 1993:145 -  note no. 14). This issue will be discussed later 
in this chapter when a major change in 1988 in the employment of female graduates is considered.
34 Original source: Ministry of Labour, Report on Occupational Wage Survey (1986, 1991); Ministry of 
Labour, Survey Report on Wage Structure (1996-1999). Cited in Moon and Joo (2000: 281).
35 ‘Korean Women’s Association for Democracy and Sisterhood’: an important pressure group formed to 
promote equal opportunity at work for Korean female white-collar workers. They are also active in 
publishing books, periodicals and publicity material on related topics.
36 Korean companies asked women's commercial high schools to recommend candidates for employment 
provided they were of a certain height, no more than a certain weight and of pleasant physical 
appearance. Protests by women's pressure groups and the trade union representing school and university 
teachers led the eight companies concerned to be convicted under article 6 of the Act of Equal 
Employment, and fined. This had the effect of preventing any further explicit discrimination against 
women on the grounds of their physical appearance, height, weight or marital status etc. (Kim HS. 1994).
37 The average height and weight of Korean women in 1994 was 158cms and 53kgs (Minwoohoe, 
summer 1994:54).
38 The Sex Equality in Employment Act was legislated in 1987, and the date of enactment was April 1, 
1988. The Enforcement Decree of the Labour Standards Act, however, was passed in July 7, 1988 and 
revised slightly in March 9, 1989, and is now in force. This Act is the execution of Article 10 of the 
constitution which prohibits sex discrimination in employment and asserts the state’s responsibility to 
guarantee fundamental human rights, as well as being one step in implementing the national obligation 
agreed in the Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination against Women. The 
convention demanded that State Parties should take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on the basis of equality of men and women, 
the same rights: (Article 11 (1)) (Shin IR. 1994).
39 This chaebol is known to hire comparatively fewer women than other chaebol because it does not have 
many ‘feminine’ departments or businesses that it believes are naturally suitable for women: in the first 
recruitment secession of two in 1996, less than 5% of the new recruits were women (Monthly Recruit, 
Aug 1996:91).
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CHAPTER FOUR
CULTURE AND GENDER RELATIONS IN KOREA
4.1 Introduction
To understand the dynamics of gender relations in a particular society the social and
cultural perception of masculine and feminine characteristics, and the roles they play in
that society, must be taken into consideration. When considering ‘gender’ (or gender
relations) in a society, it is hard to underestimate the critical importance of culture. This
is because “gender is learned through a process of socialisation and through the culture
of the particular society concerned”, as Brett (1991: 3) points out. Dawit and Busia
(1995: 8) also argues,
“Gender identity is a social construction, whose rationale is related to the 
biological difference between the sexes. The way in which gender identity is 
formed reflects the particular needs and worldview of each society. Culture and 
gender are thus intertwined, interdependent and mutually defining to a certain 
extent”.
As gender relations are acquired through a process of socialisation and through the 
culture of the particular society concerned (A. Scott 1986; Moore 1988; Brett 1991), 
there is a considerable variation in gender roles between and within cultures,1 each of 
which results in a specific form of gender relations. Therefore, the status of women and 
gender relations in a particular society cannot be assumed, but has to be explored and 
understood in their cultural specificity in each case.
Culture and traditional ideology play a vital role in shaping social structure, 
including gender relations, and can often having an adverse effect on women. In their 
study of Asian women, Afshar and Agarwal (1989:1) emphasised the importance of 
understanding the contradictory role of ideology, claiming that it can act both as a 
disabling and an enabling factor in the lives of women seeking to earn a livelihood for 
themselves and their families. According to them, in some parts of Asia (particularly 
south-western Asia) prevailing traditional ideologies impose restrictions on women’s
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participation in income-generating work by prescribing their confinement within 
circumscribed spaces, even while their economic situation necessitates wider 
involvement. On the other hand, freedom from such restrictions in much of southeast 
and parts of south Asia, coupled with prevalent traditional ideologies that encourage 
female employment and autonomy, and state policies opposing traditional restrictions, 
can support and complement women's attempts to survive and advance in economic 
terms. The importance of cultural influences on women's status and their labour 
participation in society has also been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Beneria and Sen 1981; 
Moore 1988; Brydon and Chant 1989; Lim 1990). An historical examination of 
women’s status and gender relations within the specific social context of the time 
would, therefore, help establish the causes of societal interrelationships and how 
women came to assume their present status and role in society and in the labour force. 
This historical approach will encompass the development of gender attitudes by giving 
an overview of women's roles and status within their cultural traditions.
The focus of this chapter, then, is to explore the traditional culture in Korea (where 
contemporary culture embodies a strong Confucian tradition) as well as more recent 
socio-cultural influences and changes, and how they affect the lives of women. The 
chapter begins with an introduction to the concept and philosophy of Confucianism as 
practised in traditional Korea, followed by a discussion of the status and roles of 
women in it. The second part of the chapter examines how modernisation and other 
recent cultural influences on women and gender relations have shaped the culture of 
modem Korea - where Confucian tradition remains influential but has inevitably been 
affected by changes introduced through industrialisation and modernisation. The 
importance of these recent socio-cultural influences and changes in assisting women to 
attain their present status in society is considered and assessed. The final section 
focuses on the influence that Confucian ideology, and social discourses originating 
from this legacy, still have on women and gender relations today - how the pervading 
culture influences social structures and policies and how the traditionally-accorded 
image of women and their roles directly and indirectly affects their lives in modem 
Korea.
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4.2 Traditional Culture and Gender Relations 
The Confucian Tradition
In recent years academic discussion in Korea has been marked by a re-evaluation of the 
impact of traditional traits in the modernisation process. While the rapid economic 
development of the country has attracted attention, and also some envy, academic 
writers and economists have suggested that there must be a connection between the 
country’s economic achievements over the past few decades and its cultural tradition of 
Confucianism (e.g. Foster-Carter 1985; Eckert et al. 1990; Edwards 1992; Janelli 1993; 
SaKong 1993; Kim KD. 1994; McKay and Missen 1995; Koh BI. 1996; Lew SC. 1997; 
Hahm CB. 1997; Compton, Jr. 2000; Kim AE. and Park GS. 2003) - even though they 
might disagree as to the relative importance of the perceived influences.
In fact, the post-war economic rise of East Asia (evidenced particularly by Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) has spurred a new interest in Confucianism 
(Eckert et al. 1990), and this has engendered an interesting if controversial debate 
centred around its possible influence on the economic and political developments in 
that region (e.g. Berger & Hsiao 1988; Tu 1996; Zhang 1999; Compton, Jr. 2000; Bell 
and Hahm 2003; Warner 2003). Even though the cultural origins of Asian politics 
derive from various sources, such as traditionalism, Confucianism, and Buddhism 
(Compton, Jr. 2000), it is recognised that Confucianism has been a major cultural 
underpinning or, at least, inspiration for many Asian countries including Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, and the People’s Republic of China (Kim 
BW. 1992; O’Harrow 1995; Rowley and Lewis 1996; Tu 1996; Song BN. 1997; Zhang 
1999; Compton Jr. 2000; Roces and Edwards 2000; Brinton 2001; Warner 2003).
Confucian ethics have been seen as promoting certain distinctive characteristics in 
these countries, such as an emphasis on education, firm government leadership, an East 
Asian management style involving consensus formation and entrepreneurial spirit plus 
a strong work ethic (Song BN. 1997:52). While some observers attribute the 
competitiveness of these countries primarily to the ‘education fever’ and strict work 
ethic of their people, others argue that the strong administrative capabilities of state 
bureaucrats having Confucian backgrounds contribute more significantly to the success
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of these new economies (Lew SC. 1997). Confucianism was once cited as an obstacle
to economic growth on the grounds that it emphasised abstract rather than practical
learning and that it disparaged commercial activity. Now, however, the economic
prosperity of Japan, followed by the remarkable economic development of Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong and the more-recent advances in Vietnam and the
People’s Republic of China, suggest that Confucianism can readily be adapted to, and
incorporated within, capitalism (ibid.).
Culture2, together with (social) institutions3, plays a critical role in explaining the
economic and political development of a society (Rowley and Lewis 1996; Compton Jr.
2000; Warner 2003). According to Compton Jr. (2000:39), by viewing economic and
political aspects of society as cultural constructs, as actions orchestrated by elites, it
becomes possible to explain economic and political development from a cultural
perspective. In this regard, Rowley and Lewis (1996:5) also recognise that it is because
familial, societal and contractual values and relations are universally so important to
human beings that many commentators have emphasised differences in culture as an
explanatory variable of national economic performance. While Confucianism has been
a significant common feature throughout East Asia, it can be expected to have a
differential influence within the region as it interrelates differently with diverse cultural
configurations in each society (Lowe 1996:121). According to Zhang (1999:167), this
is particularly true in relation to economic development as these countries have
displayed great differences over the past 100 years.
Today Korea is often believed to be the most Confucian country in East Asia, more
so even than Taiwan or mainland China, not to mention Hong Kong or Japan (Koh BI.
1996; Brinton 2001).4 Helgesen (1998:136) argues that Confucianism has been
pinpointed as a main source of traditional values and cherished by a majority of Korean
people, not specifically as Confucian but as representing “good old Korean values”.
This viewpoint is shared by some of my interviewees, such as:
“A large part of the so-called ‘Korean culture and customs’ is Confucian- 
influenced and can best be understood in a Confucian context. When we talk 
about traditional Korean values, we usually mean Confucian values, although 
without specifying them as such. While Confucianism can be criticised for its 
negative influence on contemporary society, it nevertheless represents some 
good traditional values that bond Koreans together” (fg61).
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This traditional culture has been kept alive, even strengthened, during the years of 
modernisation. Rowley and Bae (2003:192) support this view by stating that 
Confucianism’s fundamental influence remains in contemporary Korean society: 
Confucianism guides daily life, its social mores, values, way of thinking and modes of 
conduct centred on family life, with hierarchy, seniority and traditions paramount. It not 
only pervades people’s lives and is the core of contemporary culture, the ideology also 
permeates the political and social structures of modem Korea (Kim BW. 1992; Kim 
KO. 1996 & 1998; Koh BI. 1996; Tu 1996; Hahm CB. 1997; Helgesen 1998 & 2003).5 
Many of my interviewees (e.g. mu5, mul6, mul7, mu25, mu31, mu35, mu41, fu21, 
fu43, fu45, fu51, fg60 fg61, fg62) acknowledged that their social and working 
environment was strongly influenced by Confucian tradition. Two representative 
quotations are:
“Most social organisations in Korea (including our workplace) still operate with 
Confucian ideas and a male-centred patriarchal system. Even though the 
situation is improving and becoming less traditional with time, the changes in 
social structure and the system take place slowly” (fu21).
“A considerate and close family-like atmosphere at work can be one of many 
examples of Confucian influence; close and protective relationships between 
fellow workers can sometimes extend to ‘covering’ for a colleague unable, due 
to a personal problem, to work so that he needn’t officially be recorded as 
absent. With such consideration and care from colleagues we feel as if this is 
not merely a workplace with operating relationships, but something deeper than 
that” (fg61).
Hahm CB. (1997:91) also suggests that Korea’s political and economic development of 
the past 30 years, as well as its present policies for economic reform, are all strongly 
influenced by Confucian political discourse.6
While some negative aspects may subsist7, the Confucian cultural heritage has been 
widely praised for its positive effect on the country’s development. For example some 
academics, such as Edwards (1992), have acknowledged that Korea's ‘economic 
miracle’ since the 1960s was based on early-twentieth century industrialisation (under 
Japanese colonisation) set within a strong Confucianist cultural identity that in turn
113
Chapter Four
dates from the 14th century or even earlier. Kim ICO. (1996:219) also points out that
Confucian culture has been embraced by economic activity, arguing that Korea’s
‘miraculous’ economic development since the 1970s has been achieved through the
leadership of governments exercising patriarchal authority. In this context, other
attributes, among many, of Confucianism, beneficial to commerce, are “its effect on
policy formulation and implementation”8 (SaKong 1993:205) and helping to produce
an “educated and disciplined” workforce (Janelli 1993; Bae KH. and Chung CS. 1997;
Song BN. 1997; Zhang 1999; Rowley and Bae 2003).
During the past half-century, Confucian traditions have undoubtedly been
incorporated into the process of economic and political development and
bureaucratisation in Korea, notwithstanding the governmental program of
modernisation (Kim KO. 1998). Confucian practice can be observed not only among
individuals but also on the wider public and national stage. Before discussing the
influences of Confucian culture on gender relations in the public sphere and
organisations, which critically relates to women’s position at work, it is important first
to understand Confucian tradition in its historical context and how it impacts on
contemporary society.
What then is Confucianism? Compton Jr. (2000:39) explains that Confucianism is
not a religion but a philosophy that sets the parameters of social structures and
relations, including economic life. Helgesen (1998:104) also regards it as an ideology
and a political strategy, as being concerned with realising the prescriptive suggestions
for establishing an ideal society. According to Tu (1996:345), the Confucian faith is
“the betterment of the human condition through individual effort; commitment 
to family as the basic unit of society and to family ethics as the foundation of 
social stability; trust in the intrinsic value of moral education; belief in self- 
reliance, the work ethic, and mutual aid; and a sense of an organic unity with an 
ever-extending network of relationships all provide rich cultural resources for 
East Asian democracies to develop their own distinctive features.”
The essence of Confucianism is, as Edwards (1992:101) suggests, a belief in the 
continuity of authority and hierarchy extending from the household family right up to 
the emperor, the ‘son of heaven’; the family metaphor extends from the household, to 
the community, to the court, to the country.9 Kim BW. (1992:82) argues that, under the
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process of industrialisation, Confucian concepts of human relationships (known as the 
Five Human Relationships, see note 9) extended into industrial society: the virtue of 
benevolence by parents was transformed into a benevolent management style; the 
precept of loyalty to the ruler into loyalty to the company; the proper order between 
juniors and seniors into a payment system based on age; and the virtue of 
trustworthiness between friends into co-operation between co-workers.
The influence of Confucianism has permeated both public and private spheres of 
Korean society and has provided an element of social stability in a rapidly changing 
social and economic environment. It is now appropriate to examine how, historically, 
the principles of Confucianism were engendered and developed in Korea.
Historical Background
Because it is a peninsula of the Asian continent geographically located adjacent to a 
powerful and populous neighbour, Korea has historically been subject to dominant 
influences from China,10 of which the most powerful, especially on political and 
administrative systems, has been Confucianism (Eckert et al. 1990; Ro CH. 1993; 
Helgesen 1998). Traditional Confucianism was first introduced to Korea during the 
Three Kingdoms era (BC57-AD668), when leaders inculcated the Confucian ethic as a 
means of maintaining their aristocratic social order and cementing the solidarity of their 
societies (Eckert et al.1990). Although Buddhism became the official state religion 
during the Koryo dynasty (918-1392), at the beginning of the following Yi11 dynasty 
(1392-1910) it was effectively banished and (neo-)Confucianism was restored to 
practical ascendancy (Kim BW. 1992; Ro CH. 1993; Cumings 1997; Helgesen 1998; 
Deuchler 2003). This neo-Confucianism was used to consolidate the power base of the 
new ruling elite, who were mostly young, reform-minded Confucian scholars, and 
helped them establish a highly centralised, authoritarian form of government which was 
mobilised to bring the underlying civic structure and social mores into line with the 
political philosophy of the ruling class (Ro CH. 1993).
In the Yi dynasty, the introduction of Confucian-influenced institutions and 
patriarchal values constituted a vigorous attempt to mould Korean society into a 
Confucian state (Kim JM. 1995). The predominant ideology of the Yi dynasty, which
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12 •lasted for over five centuries, was what is known as the neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi
(Kim KD. 1988:202). Kim KD. (1988:202-3) argues that, as adopted and practiced in
Korea, this form of Confucianism had become a very rigid ideology governing
statecraft, principles of social organisation and human relations, and behavioural norms
on the one hand, and a very abstract system of metaphysical ideas on the other. Neo-
Confucianism became the ideological basis of a political, social, and economic
reorganisation designed to promote social cohesion and stability and maintain the class
11system. Classical texts in Korea, such as the Saryepyollam , exhort man to incorporate
Confucian rituals and ethics into everyday life (Kim JM. 1995). As a result, traditional
Korean society was closed and relatively stable; the stability was maintained by a
hierarchical system that segregated people according to inherited social status, age, sex
and generation (Cho H. 1987). Kim HS. (1993:50) explained the political reasoning
behind this state indoctrination as follows:
“From the beginning of the Choson [Yi] dynasty, the dissemination of neo- 
Confiician tenets was pursued on a very large scale in order to prescribe and 
influence the culture of political institutions and individual human relationships 
of all kinds. The inculcation of Confucian principles was necessary to 
consolidate the patriarchal monarchy, because Confucianism was very effective 
in institutionalising individual moral values through its emphasis on the 
continuity between family and state. There was no moral or practical difference 
between the administration of the state by a sovereign and that of the family by 
a father. The sovereign's relationship to his subjects was constantly assimilated 
through the analogy of a father's relationship to family members, most 
specifically to his son and wife. These relationships were taken to be the 
fundamental form of human association in a Confiician society, i.e., those 
between sovereign and subjects, between father and son, and between man and 
wife”.
In Korean society, as Paik W. (1990:46) writes, the basic component of 
authoritarianism is the domination and submission relationships between people 
determined by status, age, classroom seniority, sex, and the like. Paik W. (ibid.:49) 
argues that the authoritarian nature of Korean society stems directly from the Confucian 
precept that emphasised superior and inferior relationships14, and that this inequality 
and distinction in relationships has remained deeply rooted in the minds of Korean 
people in contemporary society. According to him (ibid.: 40-50), the father-dominated 
family is, first of all, the most important factor in fostering a naturally authoritarian
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character in Korean people. A second important factor is the system of seniority; the 
social order in Korea is to a great extent maintained by the subordination of the younger 
to the older, and the paternalistic concern of the older for the younger. A third factor, 
the Confucian ruler-subject relationship, Paik believes, still influences Korean politics 
today. The leader always reigns over the followers15; the traditional practice of 
considering the status of governmental bureaucrats as being above that of the people is 
still prevalent. The final factor that is considered important in engendering an 
authoritarian character among Koreans is the historical prevalence of male dominance 
generally. Korean women were effectively secluded from all social activities and 
confined within the home, as will be described later in the following section. Paik (p51) 
further conclusively explains that, with so many factors emphasising a social order 
based on inequality of relationships, a person’s frame of mind is essentially geared to 
that of an authoritarian and a hierarchical order. This was also confirmed by my 
chaebol interviewees (e.g. mu5, fulO, ful8, mu22, mu27, mu31, mu41, mu42, fu44, 
mu45, fu46, fu51), and will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5.
Confucian Influences on Korean Women and Their Lifestyle
Even though Confucian values pervaded and influenced the lives of all Koreans during 
the Yi dynasty, they inflicted particularly harsh restrictions on women, and enormous 
effort and resources were directed to train and indoctrinate women to conform to 
Confucian ideals (Chang YS. 1983; Kendall and Peterson 1983; Deuchler 1992; Jahan 
1992; Kim HS. 1993; Cho KW. 1994; Hoffman 1995; Kim JM. 1995; Kang SJ. 1998; 
Deuchler 2003; Haboush 2003). According to Deuchler (2003:144), the inequalities 
imposed on women and their offspring by Confucian ideology were much more 
pronounced than in China. Before this time, norms and ideology had been neither so 
oppressive nor discriminating towards women. For example, in the Silla dynasty (57 
BC -  AD 935) the right of a female to head the family was acknowledged: there were 
three women rulers, and mothers of young kings acted as regents - often exerting 
enormous political influence and power (Kim YC. 1976: ch.3). During the Koiyo 
period (918-1392), Buddhism was predominant and women and men interacted 
relatively freely outside the home (Chang YS. 1983:68; also see Lee KJ. 1994;
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Deuchler 2003). During this time, marriage involved the bridegroom living in his wife's 
parents' home until children were bom and raised, and remarriage by women was 
widely practised and socially accepted. Rules of property inheritance did not 
discriminate between the sexes. It seems, therefore, clear that it was largely the later 
influence of neo-Confucianism that led to the deterioration of the social and economic 
status of Korean women (Chang YS. 1983; Ha HK. 1985; Wade and Seo 1996; 
Haboush 2003). The particular version of neo-Confucian philosophy that was 
incorporated into Korean society during the era of the Yi dynasty was fundamentally 
patriarchal in its construction of women’s roles and status.
According to this neo-Confucianism, the ‘inferiority’ of women originated from the 
nature of the cosmic world. Beliefs concerning the relationship between man and 
woman were derived from the principle of Yin-Yang: Yang is the symbol of the 
heavens and Yin the symbol of the earth (Kim JM. 1995). Man was likened to the 
heavens in Confucian philosophy, meaning superior, dominant, and strong - while 
women were associated with the earth, inferior, submissive, and gentle (Chang YS. 
1983; Kim JM. 1995)16. According to this principle, a woman (the earth) should follow 
the decisions of man (the heaven) and must sacrifice her instincts in order to satisfy 
man’s will, thereby becoming a virtuous woman (Kim JM. 1995). The ‘virtuous 
conduct’ prescribed by the Confucians for women was well illustrated in Naehun
17(‘Instructions for Women’) which is considered to be the most important and 
influential textbook for women during this period, according to Deuchler (1992 & 
2003). Naehun taught girls the four basic rules of womanly behaviour: moral conduct -  
women need not have great talents, but must be quiet and serene, chaste and 
disciplined; proper speech -  women need not have rhetorical talents, but must avoid 
bad and offensive language and speak with restraint; proper appearance -  women need 
not be beautiful, but must be clean in dress and appearance; and follow womanly tasks 
-  women need not be clever, but must pay attention to such duties as weaving and 
entertaining guests (1992: 257).
By analysing the books of instruction and guidance for Yi dynasty women, 
including Naehun, Kim JM. (1995) argues that in feudal times the Korean state 
emphasised a hierarchical social order which subordinated women to men. As a result,
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males were valued as important in everyday life, and females as trivial. Therefore, it is
not surprising to learn that the core members of the traditional family in patriarchal
Korea were men, and that the family structure was based on a strict, male-centred
hierarchy with a masculine head of household (Cho OL. 1985; see also Cho YH. and
Yoon JK. 2002; Haboush 2003). Deuchler (1992:264)18 further describes the traditional
family structure and the position of women in it as follows:
“In Confucian terms, the family was a judicially self-sufficient unit within 
which domestic peace had to be preserved and disputes among its members 
smoothed over by ideological values that stressed the hierarchical structure of 
the family and the male-centred distribution of authority. Although women were 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the family and thus largely 
determined the quality of the domestic atmosphere, highest authority over the 
family members and their behaviour was lodged in the family or household 
head.”
Under Confucian doctrine women were largely defined by their roles - as a daughter 
dependent upon her father, as a mother dependent upon her husband, and as a widow 
dependent upon her son. Her life cycle was therefore continually dependent on the 
males in her family. Women were obliged to follow men’s decisions on all occasions, 
and regard their husbands as undisputed heads of their families. The relationship 
between husband and wife was maintained on the basis, not of equality and affection, 
but of domination and submission, and the husband-wife relationship was similar to 
that of king-subject (Kim JM. 1995).
This gender difference in the family was even more evident in ritual life where the 
male role was regarded as sacred and the female role as profane. Kim JM. suggests, in 
his study of Saryepyollam, that ancestor worship ( ‘che-sa ’), which is the main ritual for 
the men, encompasses the concepts of hierarchy, spatial separation and role-division 
between male and female, and as such contributes to a male-centred worldview. In this 
ritual, suggests Kim, women are defined as ‘other than men’, and their otherness is 
emphasised in ritual situations by the placing of women peripherally.
With the emergence of a lineage-based society in the middle of the Yi dynasty, 
women’s chastity also became an issue of paramount concern19 (Kim JM. 1995; Lee 
BY. 1995:15; Deuchler 2003:160). In order to protect their chastity, girls were not 
allowed to sit with boys after the age of seven. Even among family members it was
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thought inappropriate for men to come into contact with women. Confucian discourse, 
such as nam-nyeo-gu-byeol (‘difference between men and women’), was widely 
propagated to promote clear gender differentiation and also to ensure a proper spatial 
distribution within the household. Houses were divided into inner (for women) and 
outer (for men) rooms and they ate meals at separate tables. In this way women were 
not only kept separate from men but also confined to their own space, and restricted 
from entering ‘men’s space,’ both in family and ritual life.
As far as their productive role was concerned, women's work was restricted to the 
domestic circle, with some variation according to social status. For example, upper- 
status women concerned themselves with home management and household production, 
while their female servants looked after household labour and personal services. On the 
other hand the wives and daughters of commoners, representing the majority of women, 
worked on family farms or in household businesses. While for this latter category of 
women the boundaries between work and home would have been unclear, the rules of 
separation between the sexes must have restricted somewhat their active participation in 
outside-the-home economic activities (Cho H. 1987). The Confucian code, laws and 
customs strictly prescribed the women's place as inside the house; external matters 
belonged to the domain of men. Consequently, women in late Yi dynasty society were, 
excepting occasional royal figures, confined to the domestic realm (the ‘inner room’) 
and excluded altogether from public affairs (Kendall et al. 1983; Choi E. 1994; Wade 
and Seo 1996; Haboush 2003)20.
Ideologically Confucianism, according to Deuchler (1992:259), postulated a clear 
delineation of the male and female spheres of influence, with the public domain 
dominating the domestic. She further argues that this social division was accentuated by 
the emphasis Confucianism laid on kinship organisation as the backbone of the 
patrilineal family system (see also Haboush 2003). As a result of Confucian philosophy, 
the social status and living conditions of women in the Yi dynasty was markedly 
inferior to that of men. The idea of respecting men and belittling women, while at the 
same time constantly stressing their obedience and chastity, became a fundamental 
concern that dominated the lives of Korean women. The extent of these gendered 
practices was widespread, and to ensure obedience a number of restrictive mandates
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came to regulate women’s lives and behaviour during the period (Chang YS. 1983). 
These mandates illustrate well the degree to which Korean women at that time suffered 
oppression and sexual discrimination:
i) Marriage was arranged by parents; prospective partners were given no 
voice in the selection process.
ii) After marriage, a woman belonged to her husband's family; visits to her 
own family were kept to a minimum.
iii) Women were not able to retain formal names but were identified by their 
position relative to men or by the place of their geographic origin; at 
marriage, the name of her maiden family only was recorded in the 
husband's household registry.
iv) Females could not perpetuate the family line; if there was no son from 
the first wife, a male relative would be adopted or the husband would 
bring in another wife to bear a son.
v) Women could not perform ceremonies worshipping their own ancestors.
vi) Widows could not remarry; they were expected to look after their in-laws
even after their husband's death.
vii) From the age of seven a girl should not sit with a boy; when she 
reached the age of ten she could not move at will outside the house.
viii) Women were not allowed to stroll in their gardens nor venture out 
during daytime.
ix) Outside the house women were required to veil their face.
x) Mature women were not supposed to be seen by men who were not 
close relatives.
xi) Married women were not free to speak directly to strangers.
This control of woman within her family, in terms of marriage, education, sexuality, 
and the metaphysical indoctrination of Confucian values, was essential for the 
establishment and consolidation of the Confucian polity. According to Kim HS. (1993), 
the Confucian political system could not have been upheld unless the patriarchal 
institution of the family was maintained. This, in turn, was not possible without 
emphasising women’s chastity, obedience to men (father, husband, son) and house work 
(including serving in-laws), and their obligation to produce a son to perpetuate the 
family line and hold memorial services for ancestors. Separate aspirations and 
independent initiatives for women, including efforts to improve their social status and 
identity, were not allowed; submissiveness was regarded as the highest womanly virtue. 
Interestingly, Deuchler (2003:165) argues that, within this social climate, elite women 
in the Yi dynasty were able to develop an inner disposition that allowed them not only
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to find a meaningful place in this order but also to rietain a sense of their own identity: 
self-confident in their ability to fulfil successfully the responsibilities of daughter, wife, 
and mother they, no less than men, contributed to the perpetuation of the Confucian 
system well into the twentieth century.
4.3 Modernisation and Other Recent Cultural Influences on Women
Before evaluating the extent to which the strong, traditional gender hierarchy has 
influenced the status and conditions of women in today’s society, it is important to 
acknowledge that Confucian tradition is not the only component of contemporary 
Korean culture. Since the early part of the twentieth century Koreans have also been 
subject to external, non-traditional cultural influences when modernisation21 began in 
earnest. Towards the end of the extended Yi period (throughout the 18th and the 'eye- 
opening’ 19th centuries), the country progressively came into contact with Western 
influences and culture, including those of Christianity introduced by missionaries. 
According to Ro CH. (1993:41), the most significant factor and true source of Korea’s 
modernisation process was perhaps the introduction of Christianity22 in the late 
nineteenth century. It encouraged the spread of education and generated ideals of 
democracy and modem thought, thereby unleashing indigenous independence 
movements and allowed the ‘progressive’ Shil-Hak (Practical Learning) school to play a 
significant role in Korea’s early modernisation efforts (Kim YC. 1976:195). These 
influences, as some argue (Yu EY. 1987; Lee BY. 1995:25-30), helped weaken the 
class system and the rigid barriers between the sexes, and promote the education and 
advancement of women. The succeeding period of Japanese occupation (1910-1945), 
however, saw often-bmtal repression of many of these initiatives (Ro CH. 1993). In 
spite of this, the spread of Christianity, Japanese-inspired industrialisation, expansion of 
a modem education system, and also Korean independence movements, all served to 
provide some improvement in the lot of women (Yu EY. 1987). There was also some 
cultural infusion from the West as a result of American engagement: the intervention by 
the United States at and after the end of World War II undoubtedly had a major impact
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on current Korean society23; the subsequent Korean War, in which other Western 
countries also participated, was undeniably an important influence.
During the post-independence period (1945-present) the concept of equality of the 
sexes, having been written into the 1948 Constitution, led to the attainment of major 
improvements in education. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, only men were 
given formal education and women, with little conventional schooling, had to look after 
the home and bear children to maintain the family line. Although education for women 
(and men) has improved dramatically since the beginning of the last century, the 
difference in educational attainment between the sexes is still apparent. Girls still 
receive less schooling than boys; for example, as recently as 1985 males spent more 
than two years longer in formal education - 9.7 years compared with 7.6 years for 
females (Chang SJ. et al. 1991:15).24 Nevertheless, the educational attainment of 
working women has advanced considerably in recent decades and has accordingly 
affected their labour participation. The proportion of female employees with higher 
education has increased as modernisation and development has encouraged female 
enrolment in institutions of higher learning, and at the same time women’s attitudes 
towards their participation in paid employment and their career aspirations have 
changed. In a study published in 1985 (Chung and Chang 1985:42), 79.5 percent of 
female university student respondents expressed their intention to work for the duration 
of their capable life - while in 1970, when a similar study was done, only 28.2 percent 
of all respondents had a corresponding view and 40.4 percent said that they would 
continue only until marriage.
Chang SJ. et al. (1991:40) anticipated that, as more women receive higher education 
and are better motivated to engage in economic activities, an increasing number of 
educated and experienced women would engage in professional and skilled work and 
would take senior administrative and supervisory posts, and that this trend would 
accelerate. Together with the improvement in educational opportunities, economic 
development and industrialisation in recent years has engendered numerous and 
significant social changes bringing, in particular, a great expansion in employment 
opportunities for women (as well as men), as was referred to earlier in Chapter 3. This
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has led to a dramatic increase in the proportion of women in employment, and they
25clearly now constitute a major component in the country's work force .
It is also encouraging that a new awareness of women's oppression has recently 
developed, which has given birth to an active social movement which seeks 'new values 
and a new culture' (Lee SJ. 1993) for gender equality. The women's-rights movement is 
relatively new in Korea, and concern with issues of gender equality and equal 
opportunity is quite recent - even though historically women's societies have long been
96in existence. The 1980s were a time of major expansion for the women’s movement 
in the country. Groups and organisations that identified with women’s rights were 
formed in major cities and increasing numbers of women became involved in 
programmes addressing questions of female labour, urban poverty, environmental and 
consumer issues, community childcare, more-democratic education, and other matters 
affecting the culture of the country. However, there was no systematically organised 
body dealing with feminist theory in Korea (Cho SK. 1994), and Palley (1994:292) 
wrote of the situation of women, ''what is most significant seems to be the very fact that 
the question of women's rights is discussed at all". Media presentations, Western 
education, and the rise of women's studies programs have all affected the emergence of 
the movement (ibid.). Moreover, some of the concerns that women's groups articulate 
have moved onto the nation's policy agenda; for example, the gender issue was included 
as part of the government policy of promoting ‘globalisation’ in the mid-1990s (Cho U. 
1996), as has already been discussed in the last section of the previous chapter.
What then does ‘globalisation’ mean in Korea, and how has it affected Korean 
society in the last decade or so? When President Kim Young-Sam assumed office in 
early 1993, he proclaimed that “segyehwa”, globalisation of the economy and society, 
was his central objective (Mimiko 1996:360). The Korean economy in the early 1990s 
was regarded as simultaneously facing both threatening challenges and new 
opportunities from its internationalisation27. During the previous thirty years of rapid 
expansion, the economy was steadily internationalised. However, the degree of 
internationalisation28 achieved is considered still to lag behind the growth and 
sophistication of the domestic Korean economy (Ha DM. 1994). It is also recognised in 
Korea that the world economy appears to be taking on the character of a 'global-village':
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this would underscore the importance of ‘globalisation’ policies designed further to
open up Korea to the world (Kim IJ. 1995). The following statement of President Kim
(1995:118)29 justifies the necessity for the new policy.
“Globalisation is the quickest way to build the republic into a first-rate nation in
the coming century Our perspectives, attitudes, institutions and practices
must all be elevated to global standards It is the only way for us to go.
There is no other choice. Therefore, I set globalisation as the foremost national 
goal for this year.”
Consequently, the Kim government (1993-98) explicitly set about encouraging the 
country, both economically and culturally, to become more internationalised and 
globalised. During the 1990s, “segyehwa” (globalisation) became a fashionable word 
frequently used in Korean business society with the growing recognition that 
‘globalised living’ is an important part of new societal developments (Lee SJ. 1993; 
SaKong 1993; Lee HK. 1994; Kim YT. 1998; Bae and Rowley 2001). The concept of 
‘globalisation’ has since become popular in Korean public debate30. This was because it 
was believed to describe a policy that would help increase and strengthen Korea’s 
influence and presence abroad (for example, by establishing more overseas 
manufacturing plants), and has been interpreted to persuade Koreans that they stand to 
benefit from closer economic integration with the rest of the world. It has become clear 
that the country is increasingly exposed to, and must compete in, a global economy and 
society. Korea, realistically still at a developmental stage, must play by the rules of 
advanced countries while at the same time competing with other developing countries 
(SunHS. 1995).
However, in the pursuit of globalisation to ensure Korea’s survival and enhance its
prosperity in global competition, there are some major tasks. Above all, government
policy should be aimed at making Koreans "cosmopolitan and open-minded citizens of
the global community" (Soh JA. 1994). According to Lee HK. (1994), some of the
major obstacles to successful internationalisation and globalisation originate from the
nation's political and cultural traditions, which are primarily based on Confucianism.
This view was also shared by some of my interviewees, for example:
“While Confucian influence may have been one of the major reasons for Korean 
companies’ success so far, it may also be an obstacle to the further development
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of Korean business due to the traditional rigid mind-set” (mu41, a chaebol 
employee).
“The movement towards ‘globalisation’ that was strongly encouraged by the 
Kim government in the mid 90s proved a kind of failure in the sense that, 
although widely debated and discussed, the necessary fundamental changes in 
the mindset of Korean people and their institutional structures never really 
materialised. While claiming to embrace ‘globalisation’, we were repeating the 
same old things with the same mentality and customs that were deeply rooted in 
Confucian tradition” (mb64, an ex-president of a chaebol, now a business 
consultant).
Ha DM. (1994) believes that the type of internationalisation that Korea is pursuing31 
will only be possible when supported by the internationalisation of every sector of 
society - including education and culture, as well as the economy. As Kim HC. (1996: 
83) explains, "the concept of globalisation encompasses a wide domain. It goes beyond 
the idea of opening up domestic markets or urging local firms to advance overseas. It 
encompasses also the idea of sharing common values and quality of life as citizens of 
the world".
In summary, the development and modernisation of Korea in the twentieth century, 
and most intensively during the past few decades, has transformed both the country’s 
economy and its culture. Traditional Korean values have been tested, particularly by 
economic and demographic changes since the 1950s: consciously or unconsciously, 
many ’non-Korean' values and mores were introduced and adopted by Korean society 
during the period of rapid modernisation (Kim KO. 1998; Moon SS. 2003). 
Confucianism as the dominant ideology has certainly been fading in Korea -  as it is 
elsewhere in East Asia (Koh BI. 1996). In spite of the difficulty in assessing the impact 
of these diverse changes and influences upon the beliefs, values, and attitudes of 
Koreans, it is indisputable that the country is in the process of changing from a 
traditional into a modem society32. According to Helgesen (1998), the findings in his 
study indicate that people are both traditional and modem, and tension between 
tradition and modernity is acknowledged by most people in Korea.33 This tension may 
also be inherent in the working environment, as a female government employee (fg61) 
suggests:
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“Although we live in a modem society and work in a modem workplace, it is 
often confusing to know how to behave and relate to work and colleagues. The 
organisation of the workplace and work systems should in principle be logical 
and rational; yet in reality logic and rationality can be blurred by our ‘Korean’ 
mentality and ways of approaching and handling things. For example, work 
efficiency can become secondary to personal politics and affected by special 
connections and relationships with superiors, the extent of which can be 
extreme. For example, if one works hard during working hours and leaves on 
time (or before others) one can be criticised for being ‘selfish’ and 
individualistic. On the other hand, if someone is lazy during the day but works 
late until the boss leaves he is considered loyal and hard-working, and with 
better opportunities for a successful career. It seems that the structure is Western 
while the contents are Korean; this is often contradictory and illogical and can 
be frustrating for us, but that is the way it is in Korean workplaces.”
The consequential, sometimes contradictory, association of traditional (and nationalist)
ideology with external cultural and political influences in the growth process has
frequently posed cultural and political challenges34. The prime cultural challenge would
undoubtedly have been to maintain and develop a uniquely Korean identity in the face
of an intense barrage of foreign cultural influences (Eckert et al. 1990). How to be both
modem and Korean at the same time remains a deeply felt problem in society (Eckert et
al. 1990:414), and the meaning of tradition and modernity seems to vary according to a
person’s political ideology and generation (Kim CS. 1992:200). One chaebol employee
(mu2) expressed a similar view on this matter:
“The ways of thinking and attitudes vary a lot according to individuals and 
generations. The new generation, who tend to be more liberal, individualistic 
and ‘westernised’, think and act differently. They usually do not live up the 
expectations of the previous generation, who seem to value more the traditional 
‘Korean’ culture. In general, the legacy of traditional culture appears to be 
weakening. This tendency is also present at the workplace where there is a big 
gap between younger employees and older senior members of the firm in their 
attitudes towards work and their interaction with colleagues.”
4.4 Gender Relations in Contemporary Korea
While the patriarchal Confucian tradition has endured, the country’s economic 
development and cultural modernisation has increasingly exposed its society to non-
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traditional, international influences so that contemporary Koreans face conflicting
viewpoints on the role and status of women. On the one hand traditional Confucianism,
with its strongly patriarchal notions about women, remains persistently influential,
while on the other hand a more contemporary conception of equality between men and
women is taking root and questioning the former perspective. Korean women are facing
conflicting experiences and challenges in their everyday life, at home and in society at
large. They frequently find themselves caught between these contrasting ideologies - the
strongly sex-discriminative Confucian tradition and the more liberating, less-gendered
new ideology derived from modernisation and international influences. A female
employee (ff55) of a foreign-owned company, who had lived abroad for a number of
years, gives her views on this subject as follows:
“Most women, especially graduates, now consider work after education as 
desirable, if not essential, to match the image of a modem woman. Historically, 
some women might have attended university partly to marry well and then settle 
down as a housewife. Nowadays, even the concept of an ideal bride in the 
marriage market has changed to someone with a privileged job (e.g. in a foreign 
company or chaebol) rather than ‘at home preparing herself to be a future wife’. 
Nevertheless, these concepts of working women are still not as contemporary or 
westernised as in some countries like the USA, according to my own 
experiences. The legacy of Confucianism causes women to be less confident 
about their ability as workers, less ambitious, and more likely to consider work 
as an option if pleasant enough. Subsequently, if really challenged they may 
give up and settle for marriage and being a housewife. But it is not easy for 
women to think and act differently in the face of the sex-discriminative working 
environment and gendered social expectations.”
This dilemma was also recognised by Kim SN. (1997) in her study of the presentation 
of Korean women in the mass media. According to her, women were portrayed in 
Korean media, such as women’s magazines, as both progressive and traditional role 
models at the same time. At this stage, it would be useful to examine the situation that 
Korean women find themselves in at present. What kind of cultural environment do 
they live in? What kind of status do they have and what roles do they play? To what 
extent have they overcome the impediment of the strong gender-discriminative 
traditional culture?
As far as gender relations and the status of women in society are concerned, these 
may have altered to a certain extent as part of societal change; yet a measure of
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inequality still remains. The cultural tradition that distorted women’s existence through
gender discrimination, as described earlier in this chapter, was not merely a problem
confined to traditional Confucian texts. The core of the patriarchal discourse, and the
sexism that originated in this cultural tradition, has been continued until the present and
is evident in many aspects of modem life in Korea. The legacy still stigmatises women,
and the customs of male superiority still permeate every aspect of women’s lives. One
example of this is the continuing dominance of men over women (nam-jon-yeo-bie).
This notion of nam-jon-yeo-bie was originally extended to traditional sex discrimination
in society and male dominance in the family. Not only was the power of a patriarch
guaranteed in law35, it was also (and often still is) customarily exercised in important
facets of everyday life, such as the still-important ritual of ancestor worship (che-sa)
which is based on the principles of patrilineality, and from which women are excluded.
Elaine Kim’s study (1998) on constructions of women, gender, and masculinity
clearly shows how contemporary Korean men and women conceive their gender roles,
and how they view their expectations for the opposite sex. According to her, women of
all classes accept the sexual division of labour; she supports this with some illuminating
quotations: one woman described how she viewed “Korean traditions” (referred to by
Kim as the “Confucian patriarchal ideal”):
“I think sex [gender] roles are just fine the way they are. Korea has an 
excellent tradition. I like to see men be the pillar and women the support. . .  
Women should never surpass men. Anyway, the basic roles of men and 
women will never change" (the 38-year-old wife of an airline executive, 
interviewed and cited by Kim E. 1998: 90).
Kim states that most of the men she interviewed expressed a belief in the notion of 
hierarchical opposition between men and women. A male respondent of hers stated this 
clearly:
"It is genetically ordained that men should win over women. Think about it: 
can a dog give birth to a rabbit or a rabbit have a puppy? Men and women are 
physiologically different. If you don’t agree with my opinion now, you will in 
the future. God made it this way; that's why He made two sexes. I am on the 
outside, and my wife is on the inside. Is that system not efficient? Of course, if 
I were a woman I might not like it, but I am a man" (Dr. Y., the director of a 
large hospital in Seoul, cited by Kim E. 1998:73).
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A quotation from one of my interviewees, recalling her earlier-life experience in her
family in the 1970’s, shows the nature and extent in which gender roles were perceived
and hierarchy maintained in modem Korea:
“When I was young, I excelled at school and consequently I was usually relieved 
from helping with household chores - that most girls in other families had to do. 
Boys were of course excused from chores because they were boys. This was 
rather unusual as my parents did not treat me unfairly because I was a daughter. 
But after my elder brother failed to enter a university because of poor exam 
results, I was not even allowed to apply to a university. It was unimaginable for 
my parents to allow a daughter to surpass her elder brother by securing a 
university degree that he couldn’t have. If I had been a boy, it would have been 
quite different” (fg62*36: a manager in her early 50s, working in a governmental 
organisation).
These gender-discriminative practices are rarely challenged but still pervasive in the 
minds and lives of family members, as well as society. As a result, women still take 
secondary positions and remain in marginal roles (Han JS. 1996) in the family, a 
practice which is reflected in society in general.
Women in contemporary Korea not only have a secondary status to men, but also
continue to be assessed first and foremost by their traditional, primary roles as wives
and mothers. The image of the ideal woman as mother and wife, rather than merely
herself, is still deeply entrenched in modem Korean values, and the role model of
'hyeon-mo-yang-cheo' (wise mother, obedient wife) is what society demands and to
which many Korean women aspire. A classic example of this tendency is described by a
female chaebol employee (fu32-Dl)37:
“I have this female colleague at work who has become a close friend. Her mother 
(who is the wife of a doctor and has had an easy, comfortable life) frequently 
tells her that the happiest and best life for a woman is to marry well and stay at 
home. She even told her not even to dream of marrying anyone other than a 
doctor or a lawyer. I know that my colleague wouldn’t dream of having a life­
time career, and therefore would leave work when she is married. For her the 
ultimate goal is to be a good wife to a successful man and to stay at home to look 
after her family.”
Being consequently expected to make any necessary sacrifices for her family, a married 
woman is supposed to look after not only her immediate family but that of her husband 
as well. According to Kim E. (1998), many of the women interviewed in her study on
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gender relations in contemporary Korea believed (like male interviewees) that, in the
ideal family wives should be responsible for the care of the young and the elderly, and
should provide sympathy, encouragement, and relief for men from the anxieties of their
work and the burden of household management. Partly for this reason, her female
interviewees felt that wives should be 'inside' people, tender and nurturing, while
husbands should be assertive, go-getting 'outside' people.38
Since women have traditionally been excluded from any social, economic or
political activities outside the domestic sphere (Cho H. 1992), this practice has become
accepted as the social norm with which most contemporary Koreans (both men and
women) feel comfortable - even if many contemporary Korean women work outside the
home. Kim IG.’s study (1995) is most informative in this regard. According to her, a
survey in 1995 by Monthly Win9 showed that slightly more than half (56.8 percent) of
the respondents thought that an ideal family should be composed of the husband as
breadwinner and the wife as housekeeper -  while those aged in their 50s (67.4 percent)
thought that the traditional division of work between husband and wife was ideal (p88).
Interestingly, however, it also found that 85 percent of all respondents supported both
husband and wife working outside the home, and that more women (87.9 percent)
believed in the idea of a dual-income family than did men (82 percent), while more men
(62.5 percent) supported the traditional family than did women (51.1 percent) (ibid.).
This seems to suggest a disparity between the ideology of Korean people and the
reality, and a gender gap in attitudes towards the suitability of traditional living in
contemporary society. One female employee (fu44*-P), interviewed during my
research, strongly protested against ‘traditional’ living in present day Korea as follows:
“It is not right to think as if we were living as we were in the past, when women 
stayed at home and were financially dependent on their men. This shouldn’t be 
the case in modem society, when women go out to work and gain financial 
independence for themselves. We must change our way of thinking and life style 
in order to keep up with (and fit in with) the changes occurring in society.”
The dynamics of change affecting the lot of working women may encompass 
changes in the structure of households and families. As society has undergone profound 
social change in recent years, it has brought about an increase in nuclear families; due to 
the success of the government’s active family planning campaign, the size of the family
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unit has reduced significantly (Choe SY. 1994). However, these changes can be 
deceptive, argues Choe SY. (ibid.): the male-dominated value system that has supported 
the asymmetrical power structure of the patriarchal family remains firmly entrenched. 
Choe further suggests that, despite changes in the physical organisation of the family, 
traditional Confucian ethics, stressing patrilineage, filial piety, solidarity among 
brothers and the importance of domestic harmony, still pervade the Korean family and 
that, as a result, the traditional gender division of labour persists. Others (e.g. Koh BI. 
1996; Song BN. 1997; Hampson 2000) agree in that in spite of significant changes in 
the Korean family structure during the recent rapid national development, adherence to 
Confucian family values remains strong.
Kim JM.’s (1995) study of contemporary rural life, which explores the 
characteristics of the daily social order in a typical country village, confirms the strong 
influence of traditional culture and the ensuing tendency towards gender differentiation 
and sexual division of labour in that society. In the study, Kim showed that the social 
status of women in the village did not increase correspondingly with an increase in their 
participation in economic activities. Women’s status, she concluded, could be better 
explained by cultural factors than by economic ones. The particular cultural factors 
cited were: the social structure of the patriarchal family, the system of inheritance, and 
marital patrilocality, all reinforced by traditional concepts of, for example, the 
predominance of men over women, preference for male children, and acceptance of 
women as ‘inside persons’ and men as ‘outside persons’. These concepts seemed to 
persist in spite of the increased economic activities. In this instance, a woman’s 
economic participation is even perceived as an integral part of the role of housewife. 
Despite changes in the social system, such as an increase in the number of women 
engaged in waged work, the cultural system had not changed; the ‘female is inferior’ 
perception was still evident in the village (ibid.).40
In contemporary Korea, where a woman's place still is seen to be in the home, the 
reproductive role of women with full childcare responsibilities has been a major 
obstacle to their active involvement in paid work and equal treatment for employment 
opportunities. Despite the growing incidence of the nuclear family, custom still prevents 
a woman who is living with her parents-in-law from asking them to help with childcare
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or other household chores in order to allow her to work (Pearson 1992a).41 With little
family support working women in Korea remain at a disadvantage in the labour market,
as they often find it difficult, in an environment where they have to cope with ‘single
parenting’, to devote themselves sufficiently to work or to remain long enough to
acquire needed tenure and skills. The challenges for a working mother are well
illustrated in the following quotation by a male interviewee (mu2), referring to his wife:
“As it was impossible for my wife to keep her full-time work while caring for 
the new bom baby or securing nearby help after her short maternity leave, she 
decided to leave the infant with her mother (in another city, 3-4 hours drive 
away). She visits whenever she can during weekends; however, I haven’t seen 
the baby for the last 4 months as I have been very busy with my working life. It 
is tough, but we may have to continue like this for a while.”
This issue will be further explored, with women’s own experiences, in Chapters 8.
Another important example of the way that traditional Confucian culture still affects 
women’s lives in modem Korea is well illustrated by the development and status of 
women’s education, which is closely linked with their status and working conditions 
when employed. As will be shown in later chapters, particularly Chapter 7, the 
socialisation process and their formal education seem to be critical factors for Korean 
women, affecting their participation in employment and the way they approach work -  
generally considered to be quite different from those of their male colleagues. This 
point was frequently mentioned in interviews with office employees (e.g. fu l8*, mu22, 
fu32, fg60, fg62), some of whom admitted that the most important things that affected 
their attitude towards their career and life in general were their home environment and 
early education. Two quotations from female employees support this:
“Although I am quite happy with what I do, I sometimes wonder whether I have 
fully achieved my potential. When I was young my parents had different 
expectations for me as a girl from those they had for my brother. They 
sometimes discouraged my academic ambition by saying, ‘You are a girl. You 
don’t need to aim that high. Just that will do’. When I faced some important 
decisions for my education and career opportunities, I seemed to choose easier 
alternatives, feeling that they were more sensible for a girl” (fg60*, a graduate 
government employee).
“Compared with most of my female contemporaries, I would consider myself 
to be less affected by the traditional image of women as secondary citizens,
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inferior or less capable than men. I believe that I am as capable as a man. This 
is, perhaps, mainly because of my childhood upbringing: both of my parents 
were middle-class professionals, and my father always regarded my mother 
highly, recognising her (professional) ability and supporting her career 
development - which was rare in their time. Also, the fact that for several years 
in my early teens I was able to live abroad and be educated in the West 
influenced the way I regard myself’ (ff55, working in one of the most- 
privileged foreign companies in Seoul, with a Master’s degree from a highly- 
regarded American university).
In spite of the generally-improved access for women to public and higher education,
the legacy of sex-discriminatory Confucian values and teachings (such as male-centred
doctrine and patrilineal ideology) still holds a profound influence over the upbringing of
family daughters in Korea. It is hardly surprising that parents still tend to concentrate
their scarce economic resources on educating sons. Sons, after all, always remain within
the family, carry on the family line, and traditionally bear responsibility for keeping
their parents in their old age, while daughters leave on marriage -  even though there are
indications that this tradition is now weakening42. An example of girls being less-
favourably treated by their family in educational opportunities is typically demonstrated
by the following case of a female high-school leaver (fh49):
“When I had to decide which high-school I should go to, my brother was just 
entering university. Since it would be difficult for our family to afford sending 
two children to university, I was forced to chose a commercial high school rather 
than a normal one (which usually prepare students for university). At the time I 
accepted it as a fact of life, but now regret it and wish to go to university.”
Another case illustrates the different expectations and treatment for girls by the family.
The following quotation is from a hard-working government employee (fg60) who is
married with a child, and who thought she could have had a more successful career if
she had been treated as her brother at home.
“My elder bother was sent to a boarding school in a large city for a better 
education, which enabled him to go to a good university and improved his 
chances of a successful career. Meanwhile, since I was a girl, I had to attend the 
local school in a small town where I could commute from home. I was also 
taught to follow my parents’ advice, with many restrictions, especially in major 
life decisions rather than doing what I wanted; my future was being directed by 
them. One important example was that they advised me to go to a teacher’s 
college, which I didn’t particularly wish to do. They must have thought it was
134
ChapterFcrur
best for me since it was safe and secure, less competitive and an easier life for a 
woman if she wanted a career. Even though my parents loved me as much they 
did my brother, with little preference or discrimination, I believe that they 
brought me up as a ‘girl’ to adjust to the existing society and fit in comfortably, 
rather than be different, so that I could have a less-troubled life.”
During my interviews with female employees it was interesting to discover that a
substantial number of female high-school leavers (and sometimes graduates) expressed
their deep desire and determination to educate themselves well in order to secure better
employment opportunities (see Chapter 8 for further discussion on this matter).
Formal education in Korea is itself sexually discriminatory, not only in equality of
opportunity provided by families but also in the teaching content at schools. The
importance of formal education is well stated by Chung SW. (1986) who argues that
schools accommodate socialisation through systematic organisation, and education
plays a vital role in the democratisation of woman as well as in promoting equality in
gender relations. Recognising the importance of school education as a major
development process that has far-reaching effects on the position of women (and other
disadvantaged groups), Boserup (1990) also argues that the role of school systems is not
only to teach intellectual skills and scientific knowledge, but also to indoctrinate pupils
with the dominant cultural values. According to her, however, cultural education for
both girls and boys often (whether deliberately or unintentionally) consists of imparting
traditional prejudices against members of the female sex. The early social experiences
within the family, as well as later experiences in schools, serve to contribute to a feeling
of superiority in boys and inferiority in girls (ibid.). One interviewee (fw63*, married
after her Master’s degree; currently a housewife and part-time voluntary worker for a
women’s rights organisation) recalls her own school-days experience, which
demonstrates how powerful the impact of schooling can be on girls in shaping their
view of life and themselves as women.
“It was when I was in junior high school, a mixed school but with sex- 
segregated classes: one day a male ethics teacher came into the class to 
announce the overall examination results for the month, and compared the 
academic performance of girls and boys. He said that although the top three 
academic performers in the grade were girls (including myself) as usual, we (the 
girls) shouldn’t be too smug since it was merely temporary, and when we 
reached senior high school boys would naturally outperform us as their real
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potential emerges. It was the most disturbing statement I had heard during my 
school days. It must have deeply affected, and I began having some doubts 
about my ability and became afraid of competing with boys. Eventually, when I 
applied to an all-female senior high school it was partly because it seemed safer 
and avoided the possibility of being beaten by the boys I had previously 
surpassed, and also eluded any confirmation of the ominous prediction of the 
ethics teacher.”
The continuing legacy of Confucianism in the modem educational system ensures that 
this influence is still maintained in Korea.
The reality is mirrored in the traditional views found in educational goals, curricula, 
textbooks, and in all aspects of schooling in Korea (Chung SW. 1986; KWDI 1986; 
Wade and Seo 1996; Han JS. 1996). According to Wade and Seo (1996:45) in 
particular, school curricula in Korea continue in large part to derive from traditional 
conceptions of gender roles (and, no doubt, bureaucratic inertia) that are, in today’s 
world, often far removed from the realities of women’s lives. They further indicate that, 
for the most part, gender equality and women’s non-traditional concerns have not been 
of particular interest to educational authorities (who are, at higher levels, almost always 
men) (ibid.). For example, Chung SW. (1986) compared respective school mottos43 for 
boys and for girls, and argued that those that represented educational goals that the 
schools wished to inculcate in the minds of their students illustrated sexual bias. She 
noted that the great difference in emphasis between the mottoes for boys and girls 
exemplified the reality of today’s education. According to her, the mottoes showed that 
boys were inspired to emulate the image of progress and achievement while girls were 
encouraged to foster an image of purity, endurance, service and other attributes befitting 
the traditional role of women. Chung consequently concluded that, even though schools 
do not appear on the surface to acknowledge or promote gender differences, today’s 
education in reality operates in accordance with prejudice based on sex - a prejudice 
which permeates the consciousness of parents, teachers, students and others.
More recently, Han JS.’s study (1996) of the effects of Confucianism on the 
development of Korean women’s education is particularly illustrative in this regard; it 
examined the school system and the philosophy and curriculum of women’s education 
at difference stages of its development. According to Han, in spite of the fact that the 
system of formal education in Korea has been based on the notions of equality and
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democracy, and the official goals and ideals of public formal education have been the 
same for both sexes, in practice the experience in schools has been quite different for 
women and men because sex-discriminatory Confucian teachings and values still 
maintain a strong negative influence on female education. She explains that the school 
curriculum in some areas had, for a long time, been clearly segregated by gender: for 
instance, boys were required to take technical-skills courses, while girls had to study 
home economics. In 1995, however, a new unified school curriculum was designed and 
implemented; this can be seen as progress in changing the sex-role-stereotype practices 
in schools (Han JS. 1996; see also Lee OJ 1996; Ro HS. et al. 1996). Improvement in 
education alone cannot eradicate the existing gender divisions, yet by narrowing the gap 
in educational opportunities and implementing a non-gender-biased system, the 
education of women can positively contribute to furthering gender equality in society. 
However, it is important to recognise that improved educational opportunities, including 
those at higher levels, for women do not necessarily lead to gender equality in society 
and at work. For example, female graduates working in chaebol that are as qualified as 
their male colleagues seem often to receive unfavourable treatment because of their sex. 
This will be further explored later, particularly in Chapters 6 ,7  and 8.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the influence of traditional culture on the status of women 
and gender relations in Korea by demonstrating how the philosophy that originated with 
the teachings of Confucius has occupied a central role in the development of the 
country’s culture and traditions. Apart from its influence on the political and economic 
climate of contemporary Korea, one of the most important legacies of the Confucian 
tradition, and one that is highly relevant to modem Korean society and especially to this 
study, is its discriminating attitude towards women and the resulting inferior status of 
women in society.
This ideological tradition required that the ideal woman should be passive, quiet, and 
chaste, and that she should be an obedient daughter-in-law, devoted wife, and dedicated 
mother. Now, at the turn of the 21st century, this traditional perception still has a strong
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effect on people’s lives and ways of thinking. Korean women are still widely regarded 
as inferior to men (nam-jon-yeo-bie), with their primary role being that of wife and 
mother remaining at home (an-sa-ram), are often segregated from ‘privileged’ male- 
only traditional practices (such as rituals) and excluded from male bonding in a male- 
centred culture. According to Palley (1990), inequality in women's opportunities is 
maintained through an elaborate system of role relationships that are rooted in and 
rationalised by Confucian customs; they are socially mandated and often legally 
condoned.
External influences, stemming from the political hiatus after the end of World War II 
and the country’s later economic participation in international trade, naturally served to 
introduce changes to the working and living conditions of Korean women. However, 
despite being challenged by the forces of Western-influenced industrialisation and 
modernisation and more recently globalisation, Confucian influences undeniably still 
persist in the value systems of contemporary Korea, as my research shows. As Choi E. 
(1994) correctly argues, the social structure and cultural norms have not yet changed 
sufficiently to support the economic transition of the society. The modernisation and 
development process, which has seen major improvements in education for women, 
coupled with changes in the structure of the household and family, is serving to 
challenge the traditional dominance of the embedded Confucian culture and women’s 
place in it. However, in spite of these modernising influences, and women’s more active 
involvement in public life44, socio-cultural conditions still remain unfavourable for their 
participation in economic activities and often act as a deterrent to the achievement of an 
equal role in the labour market. Clearly, in spite of the impact of more recent external 
influences, the legacy of Confucian thought still permeates modem Korean society, as 
was confirmed by many of my respondents. As long as socio-cultural bias and the rigid 
attitudes of both men and women continue to restrict opportunities for women 
participating in economic activities on an equal basis, expectations of gender equality at 
work and in society will remain unfulfilled. Because Confucianism has undoubtedly 
played such an important formative role in the development of Korean culture and the 
national identity, in order to secure a permanent improvement in gender equality it
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would seem necessary to engage directly, and prevail over, the still pervasive and 
malign influence of patriarchy in the nation’s psyche.
The aim of this chapter was to explore gender relations in Korean society generally, 
to assist a better understanding of women’s role and status in working organisations, 
such as chaebol. This is because rules within organisations operate to confirm wider 
rules of masculinity and femininity - the rules for being a man and the rules for being a 
woman (Harlow and Hearn 1995). These rules seem to vary between different cultures 
and societies and, in fact, different patterns of gender relations are found in different 
spatial locations. These variations are, according to Walby (1997:7), due to the balance 
of gender and class forces sedimented over time in local gendered institutions, including 
the local industrial structure and local political institutions; changes in the economy and 
the sexual division of labour occur unevenly through time and space. In the light of its 
strong influence on human relationships in society and the structure of social 
organisations in Korea, it is necessary to explore how far the special cultural tradition of 
Confucianism has affected the work culture and organisations of modem Korea, and 
thus still influences women’s status and conditions in them. The deep-rooted sex-role 
distinction in Korean society may serve as an important ideological basis for justifying 
gender discrimination in the workplace. Not only do we need to ask what the rules are, 
but how they are constructed, maintained, re-interpreted and, on occasion, challenged in 
everyday practice. This, however, will be considered in more detail in later chapters 
(particularly Chapters 5 and 7) where it becomes relevant to a discussion of the office 
culture, and its gender relations, within chaebol. In particular, the following chapter 
(Chapter 5) offers a general introduction to chaebol as the context of the case study, 
exploring the nature of their working environment and organisational culture in order to 
discover the particular characteristics that produce the existing gender relations in their 
offices.
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Notes
1 Every society uses biological sex as one criterion for describing gender but, beyond that simple starting 
point, no two cultures would completely agree on what distinguishes one gender from another (A. Scott 
1986; Brett 1991).
2 c“Culture is generally taken to be the collective programming of the mind-set of members of a group 
which is then reflected in assumptions, beliefs and norms held in common by that group.” (Rowley and 
Lewis 1996:5).
3
See Chapter 5 for discussion on culture and institutions.
4 One of the good examples of the Confucian legacy is ancestor worship that was found by a strong 
majority to be worth maintaining in the currents of modernisation (Helgesen 1998:136). Koh BI. 
(1996:195) argues that ancestral memorial rites and funeral ceremonies constitute the backbone of the 
Confucian heritage, and that probably nowhere else are these ceremonies more intensively and 
extensively observed than in Korea.
5 For example, Helgesen (1998:139) argues that the majority’s acceptance of the traditional patriarchal 
family system and its ideology, and their reluctance to acknowledge the societal effects and 
consequences, support the idea that Confucianism in Korea to a large extent regulates human behaviour, 
regardless of people’s knowledge about this particular philosophy and its moral guidelines.
6 In this connection, the following explanation by Helgesen (1998:105) is pertinent:
“When searching for the politically most important traditional influence on current Korean 
perceptions of politics, Confucianism stands in an exceptional position. Having assumed the role 
of state ideology as well as the essence of all educational efforts in a centralised state for more 
than 500 years, Confucian ideas and values, moral and norms have apparently been internalised 
as the right and cultured way of judgement and behaviour.”
7
Such as the perpetuation of authoritarian, factional, gerontocratic, and male-oriented ideas and practices 
(Tu 1996:188).
8 Given a strong leadership commitment, in a society where hierarchical loyalty and civil service are 
highly valued, bureaucratic energies were effectively focused on national priorities. The results-oriented 
pragmatism of Korean bureaucrats and their ability to show non-ideological flexibility at the policy 
implementation level emanate from this cultural heritage (SaKong 1993 :205).
9 The following quotation from Kim BW. (1992:81) helps understand the nature of human relationships 
in a Confucian context:
“For a long time, Confiicianists agreed that the harmony of the universe depended upon a 
reciprocal relationship of justice from superiors and obedience from subordinates. One 
venerable Confucian scheme for ensuring this harmony is to rely on the bond of the Five 
Human Relationships. The Five Human Relationships and their attendant obligations are (a) 
affection between father and son, (b) righteousness between ruler and minister, (c) attention to 
their separate functions between husband and wife, (d) a proper order between the old and the 
young, (e) fidelity between friends. These relationships were often combined with Confucian 
virtues and stressed (a) filial piety to one’s parents, (b) loyalty to the state (or ruler/lord), (c) 
submission to one’s husband, (d) respect towards one’s elders and (e) faith towards friends.”
10 Although strongly influenced by its neighbour’s culture, adopting Chinese legal and other institutions, 
Buddhist and Confucian ideologies (Eckert et al. 1990:30), Korea at the same time had to face a long 
history of conflict and struggle to preserve its independence. For example, in AD 612 the Chinese 
launched a strong attack against the country and, according to Eckert et al (ibid.:35), “had Koguryo [one 
of the Three kingdoms, approximately equivalent to modem North Korea] not beaten them back, all the
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states of the peninsula might have fallen under long-term Chinese domination and ultimate absorption” 
and it was recognised that “Koguryo’s military prowess existed alongside Confiician education”. Korea 
was, in fact, “never ‘sinicized’, although it came close in the Choson period” (Cumings 1997:19). It may, 
therefore, be argued that the historical development and independence of modem Korea, with its strong 
self-identity as a nation, owes much to the country’s legacy of Confucianism with its strict discipline, 
moral teachings and impact on social institutions. It is, therefore, not surprising that the culture of modem 
Korea and its social organisation remains strongly influenced by Confucianism.
11 Yi and Choson are interchangeable.
12 During the later Sung dynasty in China (AD 960-1279), a form of Confucianism which incorporated 
elements of Buddhism and Taoism evolved and became known as neo-Confucianism. There were 
ultimately two distinct branches of neo-Confucianism, one inspired by Chu Hsui (1130-1200) was known 
as Li (principle) school, and the other developed later by Wang Yang-min (1472-1529) became known as 
the hisin (mind) school. It was the earlier Li school of neo-Confucianism which was introduced to Korea 
at the beginning of the Choson dynasty and promulgated by Yi Hwang that was formally adopted as the 
orthodox guiding philosophy for governing the country. Neo-Confucianism of the Chu Hsi School 
considered everything in the universe as having just two constituent elements: Li (non-material, 
formative, universal principles) and chi (changeable, material things); while placing emphasis on Li, both 
elements were considered an inseparable duality (Eckert et al. 1990:chl0; Deuchler 1992:15-24; 
Cumings 1997:chl). By some accounts, the state itself was the church or the 'body' of neo-Confiician civil 
religion that permeated throughout the society; this was most pronounced during the Choson (Yi) dynasty 
-  when neo-Confucians most effectively promoted their vision of achieving an ideal Confiician society in 
Korea (Kim KD. 1994).
13 According to Saryepyottam, ancestor worship, which is the male’s main ritual, includes hierarchy, 
spatial division and role-division between male and female itself; such divisions contribute to the male- 
centred world view (Kim JM. 1995:168).
14 Confiician principles characterised the “Five Relationships”: father and son, husband and wife, ruler 
and subject, elder and younger, and friend and friend. The son is subordinate to his father, the wife to the 
husband, the subject to the ruler and, finally, the younger to the elder (Paik 1990).
15 According to O’Malley (1988:332), the duty of the subordinate in these relationships is to show 
respect, loyalty and deference, while the duty of the superior is to give the proper moral example and 
to act in the way that his status requires.
16 However, it is worth noting some challenging views that bring a new insight to this discourse. For 
example, Chan’s work (2003) argues that the yin-yang based conception of gender is not an essential 
element of Confucianism (it was only when Dong Zhougshu tried to seek cosmic justification for the 
social-political hierarchy that genders became codified as the exemplification of yin-yang forces) and, 
hence, it can be detached from Confucianism without tampering with core Confiician ideas.
17 Naehun is a guidebook for women to teach the virtue of submissive behaviour, and was published by 
Queen Sohye (in spite of her nickname, ‘Tyrannical’ Queen). The queen edited male-chauvinist texts (for 
example, Sohak), collected the instructions which reflected the male-centred worldview, and published 
them as a collection; it was divided into several chapters: words and deeds; filial piety; married life; thrift, 
etc. The book became a model for all textbooks for women during the Yi-dynasty (Kim JM. 1995).
18 The original reference is Pak Pyong-ho, 'Han ’guk ui chont 'ong kajok kwa kajanggwon, ’ Hankuk 
Hakpo 2.1:67-93 (Spring 1976).
19 During the Neo-Confiician era, women who lost their chastity were punished by a now-defunct 
community court. Women’s remarriage was prohibited, whereas a widowed man could marry again three
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years after his wife’s death (or one year should the widowed husband be over 40 years old or his parents 
demand immediate remarriage). In today’s society, concern with women’s chastity is reflected in the 
continued desirability of a single, lifelong marriage. (Kim JM. 1995:167).
20 See also Sorensen (1983) for the continuing practice of division of labour in modem rural Korea.
21 A quotation from Kim CS.’s work (1992:200) may be useful here in understanding the meaning of 
‘modernisation’ in Asia. Kim writes, “Eisenstadt (1966) states that modernisation is historically the 
process of change toward those types of social, economic, and political systems that developed in 
Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in the south American, Asian, and African continents. Jacobs (1985:6) understands that for 
Asians modernisation is usually labelled as Westernisation”.
22 See Kim YC. 1976: ch. 18, ‘The Coming of Christianity’. It is interesting to connect this argument with 
Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’.
23 The United States had played a critical role in the Korean economy until the mid-1970s (Eckert et al. 
1990:395) and has been the decisive factor in the creation and maintenance of a political environment on 
the Korean Peninsula in which Korea's particular form of capitalist development has taken place (Eckert 
et al 1990; Cumings 1997).
24 According to a more recent (1995) record of educational attainment, 34.8 percent of women had 
completed high-school education (in comparison with 41.4 percent of men) and 13.1 percent completed 
two-year college, four-year university or higher levels (compared to 26.6 percent of men). Source: 
National Statistical Office, Population and Housing Census Report, 1997. Cited in Moon and Joo (2000).
25 Women represented 40.3 percent of waged employment in 1993: this included 31.2 percent of 
professionals or skilled engineers; 50.3 percent of clerical workers; 60.4 percent of service/sales work; 
45.8 percent skilled agricultural and fishery workers etc. Source: EPB (1999), Annual Report on The 
Economically Active Population Survey, cited in Kim TH. (2000:65).
26 The character of the women’s movement in Korea is largely shaped by historical context. Korean 
history has been interspersed with colonialism, economic backwardness, national division, and 
authoritarianism. These circumstances have led women to participate in movements for national 
liberation, modernisation, re-unification, and democratisation of Korean society. Socio-political reform 
and the abolition of women’s subordination have been the foremost tasks of the women’s movement; as a 
result, issues of women’s rights, especially in the private sphere, have been the subject of benign neglect 
in the movement. In many cases, women have been asked to put aside their own demands in order to 
support a struggle for independence or democracy (Cho SK. 1994).
27 Internationalisation [in Korean firms] implies expanding the sphere of competition around the world. It 
also means making institutions and practices comply with international norms and globalising public 
attitudes (Ha DM. 1994).
28 It is often said that the world has entered the age of a global-village economy. The concept of a global 
village underscores the importance of those policies designed to open up Korea to the world, namely, 
‘internationalisation’ and ‘globalisation’. ‘Opening’ means unlocking the doors and exposing things to 
the outside world; ‘internationalisation’ denotes boosting Korea’s relations with other nations; and 
‘globalisation’ means approaching issues from a global perspective (Kim U. 1995:41).
29 This is a partial text of a statement by President Kim Young-sam at the beginning of his New Year’s 
press conference January 6, 1995, entitled “Great Strides into the World and into the Future”. The 
Committee for the Promotion of Globalisation was also set up by his government in 1995.
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30 Interestingly, during the seminars attended and interviews conducted in 1997, the word globalisation 
came up frequently. Presenters and fieldwork interviewees from chaebol repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of their international strategy for their company's survival, and suggested that they regarded a 
capability for working in a global environment as vital both for companies and their staff.
31 Internationalisation means expanding the sphere of competition around the world. It also means 
making institutions and practices comply with international norms and globalising public attitudes. The 
ultimate goal of internationalisation is to enhance Korea’s role and presence in the world to yield greater 
competitiveness and more rationalised institutions (Ha DM. 1994:68).
32 For example, Monthly Win (wol-gan-sung-ri, a Korean monthly magazine) surveyed Koreans on their 
current views on life and concluded that these have been moving away from those based on traditional 
values, thus signalling vast changes in Korean society (Kim IG. 1995). The survey was conducted by the 
Media Research opinion survey firm, which randomly polled 1,000 men and women over the age of 20 
throughout the country.
33 For example, there is an apparent contradiction in seeing Confucianism as a negative tradition and at 
the same time accepting and possibly cherishing the Confiician family system (Helgesen 1998:136).
34 This is largely due to the fact that Korea is strongly nationalistic and considers itself the historical 
victim of great-power intervention (Eckert et al. 1990:416) - by countries such as China, Japan, U.S.A. 
etc..
35 One good example is ‘ho-ju-je which legitimises the head of the family who leads and controls the 
household members, manages the property and wealth, and handles ancestor rituals. This system helps 
maintain traditional patriarchy since men receive priority in inheritance (Cho H. 1996:ch4). See Cho H. 
(1996) for more on gender equality in the Korean legal system.
36 Interviewee code: the first letter denotes sex, the second occupation (s - student, f  - foreign company 
employee, g - government employee, w - housewife, and b - own business); the number identifies 
interviewee (from 52 to 64). See Appendix 1.2 for the codes and profile for non-chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
37 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment on 
joining: h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the chaebol interviewee 
(from 1 to 51); a final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile of chaebol 
interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘ful0*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a particular 
affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
38 Among the chaebol employees (who are probably from a younger generation than E. Kim’s subjects) 
whom I interviewed, the belief in the division between women as ‘inside’ and men as ‘outside’ people did 
not appear to be as clear as Kim found. Most female interviewees already working in chaebol did not 
believe that they should stay at home while their husbands go out to work, yet many still felt they were 
the ones who had primary responsibility for the household chores and childcare -  even though they hoped 
that their husbands would help with these duties.
19 Cited in Kim IG. (1995). See note 32.
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40 However Kim (JM. 1995) also notes that women’s attitudes toward patriarchal ideology are changing, 
as is reflected in their acts of resistance, in contrast to the accepted patriarchal discourse. In the context of 
rapid change, Kim argues, these acts of resistance may be associated with a new kind of power of young 
women.
41 This markedly contrasts with Singapore (Pearson 1992a), where the extended family is very supportive 
of the working woman. There, family support enables women to continue working long enough, even 
after marriage, to acquire the tenure and skills necessary for upgrading as industries become more capital 
intensive.
42 According to Monthly Win's survey in 1995 (see note 24), Korean families traditionally have placed 
considerable importance on having a son, if for no other reason than sustaining the family’s lineage. 
However, the survey found that only slightly more than half (51.8 percent) agreed that having a son was 
important, though the survey also revealed that there were generational differences. Most of the older 
participants believed that “a son is a must.” Increasingly those in their 40s (57.4 percent), 50s (72.9 
percent) and 60s (79.7 percent) felt that having a son was essential. However, the younger generation (32 
percent of those in their 20s and 49 percent of those in their 30s) claimed that having a son was not 
important (Kim IG. 1995:85-6).
43 Some examples of mottoes (Chung SW. 1986: 180) are as follows:
For boys:
1) If you earnestly attempt something you will succeed, using faith, creativity and effort.
2) On to victory, having set forth with ambition.
3) Let us explore and develop.
4) Let us practice one good deed a day.
5) Let us seek truth, create civilisation and work for self-cultivation.
6) Let us become workers who lead the way to progress......
For girls:
1) Be tolerant, be patient, be helpful and be sacrificial.
2) Be gentle, be beautiful, and be soft of voice and deft of hand.
3) Enhance the virtue of women.
4) Purity, sincerity and diligence.
5) Love, faith and chastity.
6) Mother of wisdom, wife of wisdom and citizen of wisdom......
44 In 1995, 48.3 percent of Korea’s female population was participating in economic activities (Kim HC. 
1996:78). Mimiko (1996:344) argues that the importance of this high rate of participation of Korean 
women in paid employment can only be fully appreciated when perceived against the backdrop of the 
extensive cultural inhibitions against women participating in activities outside the home.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CHAEBOL: Employer and Workplace
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to establish an understanding of the nature of chaebol as the 
context of this case study of Korean female office employees. For this it is important to 
understand the characteristics of chaebol as business organisations and as the locale 
where employees work and interact with each other. An individual’s workplace 
experience depends on the organisation -  which determines not only the career patterns, 
remuneration, and formal working conditions of those who work in them, but also 
shapes to a large degree the kind of social interactions that occur among employees 
(Carruthers and Babb 2000:84-86). Employees’ work experiences and interactions 
between them in the workplace are influenced both by the way that the business systems 
are established and operated within the organisation, and by the corporate culture1. To 
analyse a business organisation, therefore, it is important to understand both its 
institutional and cultural aspects, which may be contrasting yet complementary at the 
same time (see Rowley et al. 2002; Warner 2003).2
For an institutional perspective, Whitley (1999:33) well describes the concept of
business systems as “distinctive patterns of economic organisation that vary in their
degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the
organisation of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and other
employees”.3 He (ibid.:47) further explains,
“Business-system characteristics in different societies developed 
interdependently with dominant social institutions during and after 
industrialisation, so that distinctive forms of economic organisation have 
become established in particular institutional contexts. Additionally, the 
distinctiveness and cohesion of business systems reflect the extent to which 
dominant institutions are integrated and their features mutually reinforcing.”
According to Quack and Morgan (2000:21), the directions of economic development 
of different sectoral and national business systems are dependent on historically- 
evolved institutional legacies. Thus no two economies are wholly alike - even one
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Confucian ‘little Dragon’ differs from another in itts business and management, as
Warner (2003:20) points out. Referring to Korea, Whitley (1999) suggests that the
dominant institutions structuring post-war Korean business systems stem from both pre-
industrial Korean society and the period of Japanese colonial rule, as well as the Korean
war and the post-1961 period of military-supported rule (for details see Whitley
1999:152).4 He (Whitley 2001:30) further elaborates the business system as such:
“This kind of economy is dominated by very large firms that are highly 
vertically and horizontally integrated but display adversarial and zero-sum 
competitive relationships with other firms. Typically, growing rapidly with 
substantial state support -  often through highly subsidized credit -  these firms 
remain owner controlled, with the founding family in clearly dominant 
positions.”
In studying management and culture in Korea, Rowley and Bae (2003) recognise
that while institutional perspectives remain important, culture also retains its salience
for management and an understanding of its behaviour and practices. The importance of
culture in business and economic development has been widely recognised. For
example, examining how far culture shapes business, economic and management
behaviour and values, Warner (2003:2) argues:
“It is clear that there are complex causal relationships between ‘culture’ and the 
economic and management variables it may shape. There are also feedback 
loops and ‘culture’ itself may be in turn reshaped by major economic and 
management innovations.”
Even for some non-culturalists, ‘societal culture’ is considered important, as Rowley 
and Bae (2003:191) recognise. Indeed, cultural underpinnings have consequences for 
institutional environments (see Whitley 1991, for a comparative discussion of Korea, 
China and Japan). Culture, together with institutions5, thus remains crucial to 
understanding management and behaviour in an organisation.
As shown earlier in the previous chapter, Confucian culture pervades the processes 
of economic and political development and administration in Korea; it maintains a hold 
over contemporary society and influences its social organisations, including workplace 
customs and practices. In view of its strong influence on human relationships in society 
and the structure of social organisations, it is pertinent to examine how far the 
Confucian tradition has affected the work culture and organisation of contemporary
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Korean businesses. This chapter explores how the dynamics of a rapidly-changing 
national economy and traditional Confucian culture; have affected specific business 
organisations, chaebol. The chapter is presented in ttwo parts: the first describes the 
essential characteristics of chaebol and how they operate as employer and workplace for 
office employees. It includes an introductory description of chaebol and considers their 
position in the national economy, their relationship with the government and their role 
as employers of office workers. The second part focuses on their organisational 
characteristics and work culture which contribute to the social and cultural environment 
in chaebol offices - in order better to understand their system of employment and the 
gender relations operating within it. This will show the particular characteristics that 
help create and maintain existing gender relations at work, and that critically relate to 
women’s position and conditions in chaebol offices.
5.2 Introduction to Chaebol 
What Are They?
Large business groups, known as chaebol, have been a major force behind the 
phenomenal economic expansion of Korea over the past three decades, as shown earlier 
in Chapter 3. Their dynamic growth mirrors that of the Korean economy and their 
entrepreneurship helped create a genuine capitalistic system in Korea (89/90 Business 
Korea). The extent of their importance and the concentration of their economic power 
can be illustrated, for example, by the fact that the ten largest chaebol accounted for 72 
percent of total sales of all Korean manufacturing industries in 1987 (Bello and 
Rosenfeld 1990:63). Korea’s burst of entrepreneurship has impressed many observers, 
and some of these large conglomerates have become worldwide household names: 
twelve Korean companies were listed, in 1996 and 2000, amongst the world's 500 
largest corporations by revenues and Korea was the seventh most represented country in 
the Fortune Global 500 (Fortune, July 1996 and July 2000)6.
Although chaebol have been portrayed in many different ways by different 
academics and business economists, they most simply can be defined as ‘family-owned- 
and-controlled groups of businesses operating in a number of unrelated industries’.
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They are similar to the Japanese Zaibatsu, in the; sense that their operations are 
diversified (spanning a wide range of products) but at the same time are highly co­
ordinated7 (Kim EM. 1991; Edwards 1992; Kang MH. 1996:ch.5; see also Whitley 
1992:ch.2, 1999:ch.6). Chaebol, in short, are a unique form of Korean business 
conglomerate with the two defining characteristics o f "family control," and what has 
been referred to as "multiple development"8 (Kim W. 1994:102). Several academic 
definitions of chaebol can be offered. Hattori (1986), after reviewing a number of 
published definitions, confirms the two requisite features quoted above as inherent in all 
chaebol: ownership by a family and diversified business operations. Other 
characteristics typically associated with chaebol include: i) dramatic growth stemming 
from unrelated diversification, ii) monopolistic position in a market(s), iii) close 
relationships with government, iv) highly-centralised structure with top-down decision 
making, v) low degree of formalisation and standardisation, vi) flexible lifetime 
employment9 policies, and vii) paternalistic leadership practices (cited in Kang MH. 
1996:11). Besides these academic definitions, there are also technical definitions for the 
purposes of policy regulation and empirical study. Beginning in the early 1980s, the 
term chaebol acquired a technical connotation as the government decided to (a) restrict 
large business conglomerates’ seemingly undisciplined expansion through interlocking, 
cross-shareholding structures and (b) control the growing concentration of bank credit 
to large business groups.10
While most of these characteristics will be discussed later in this chapter, the two 
most important features characterising chaebol, the ownership structure and diversified 
businesses, need special consideration. In defining chaebol as large diversified business 
groups owned and managed by a closed kinship group, ‘diversified’ denotes operating 
businesses in many unrelated areas, and ‘closed kinship’ refers to the founder and 
blood-related family members of the business group11 (Kang MH. 1996:12). Because 
chaebol have a relatively short history, many founders are still active in top 
management positions (ibid.:95). Like pre-war Japanese zaibatsu, there is great family 
inter-penetration (Mason et al. 1980; Cumings 1987; Edwards 1992; Whitley 1992): the 
Harvard project found that, of current chaebol chief executives, 61.4 percent were the 
original founders of the group, 7.9 percent were direct descendants of founders, 12
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percent relatives of founders, and only 18.8 percent unrelated to the founding family 
(discussed in Mason et al. 1980:277). In most chaebol, it is the traditional family 
structure that provides the basis for the organisation of the group (Cho and Yoon 2002). 
Even by the late 1990s, according to Whitley (1999:201), there seemed little indication 
that family owners were willing to hand over the reins of power to ‘professional’ 
managers, despite some restructuring of top management and the reduction in size of 
the chairman’s secretariat in a few chaebol. Whitely (ibid.:203) argues that overall the 
owner-controlled chaebol remain quite strongly tied to the Korean economy and the 
state, despite their growing overseas investment and the weakening of the state’s control 
over the economy which had become more complex and affected by political 
liberalisation.12
Not only is ownership in chaebol typically confined to a single family, but control is 
also usually concentrated in a single individual. Most groups afce led by a chairman or 
president who, typically, established the enterprise, brought it to prosperity, then 
perhaps put it under the direction of a relative or trusted subordinate before moving on 
to found a new subsidiary (Kang MH. 1996:96). Generally, according to Kang MH. 
(p95), shares in these firms are often widely dispersed among members of the family for 
tax purposes, but control remains hierarchical and centralised13. Even in the mid-1990s 
the chaebol’s major corporate activities -  strategic governance, personnel management 
and finance -  remained firmly in the hands of the planning department or secretariat of 
the president, according to Lee HK. (1996:92). Kang MH. (1996) further explains that 
in most chaebol the major stockholder (the effective owner of the group) intervenes in 
the decision-making process of affiliated companies through formal or informal control 
- even though each company has a structure specific to itself. As the ownership and 
management of most chaebol are not separated, and the transfer of both ownership and 
management is based on blood relationship, managerial succession has recently become 
an important issue. Although the proportion of professional managers has been 
increasing steadily, their role is still relatively restricted, primarily because of the family 
ownership and control structure (ibid.: 107). As a result, the relative dearth of 
professional top management in chaebol has been one of their most characteristic and 
criticised features.14
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As part of the planned economic development of Korea, a strategy of diversification 
has been a feature of the national economic policies of successive governments, and 
large chaebol groups have reflected this approach over the past three decades (Kim EM. 
1991; Kim W. 1994; Kang MH. 1996)15. Because business groups in late- 
industrialising countries lack the technical or marketing expertise of advanced industrial 
enterprises, they cannot grow merely by developing new, related product lines or by 
moving into higher-quality niches in their existing markets; to diffuse risk or utilise 
slack resources they diversify by entering unrelated markets (Kang MH 1996:116). 
Both chaebol and the government have striven to create business organisations that can 
compete effectively in the international marketplace, and thus create an industrial base 
to facilitate future economic expansion and provide employment opportunities for the 
growing population. With governmental support chaebol were able, and encouraged, to 
pursue this ‘octopus-like’ diversification.
Chaebol, the National Economy and Government
Although industrialisation in Korea began during the Japanese colonial period (1910- 
1945) when some present-day chaebol existed as small enterprises, there were few 
diversified organisations at that time; it was during the late 1940s and 1950s that the 
majority of today’s largest chaebol were established (Baik SY. 1995; Kang MH. 1996; 
Cho DS. 1997). While a handful of Korean chaebol were founded under the adverse 
circumstances of the Japanese occupation and the Korean War, nearly all of today’s 
successful chaebol owe their position to the economic policies of post-war government 
regimes16. The real growth of chaebol can be attributed to the aggressive business 
policies in the 1960s and 1970s of the Park government, which pursued rapid economic 
growth with a series of Five-Year Economic Development Plans. Decisions on the 
allocation of major investment licenses were often made personally by President Park 
himself (Lee H. 1968; Institute of Korean Political Study 1987). Park’s emphasis was 
consistently on building economies of scale and securing the rapid economic growth 
that would result from them. His developmental orientation was inclined towards a 
somewhat unbalanced, concentrated pattern of growth over which the government 
attempted to exercise close supervision and guidance. The chaebol complied perfectly
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with this orientation (Koo and Kim 1992). As a result, the vast majority of the projects 
specified in the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan were monopolised by a 
small group of chaebol -  which subsequently were accused of unbalanced, and 
sometimes illicit, wealth accumulation.
What was it then that made the emergence of vigorous entrepreneurship in chaebol 
possible? Edwards (1992) considered that it was a combination of two factors: one was 
the strong intervention in the economy by government, whose pragmatic policies 
allowed the growth of an intemationally-competitive, private capitalist industrial 
structure; another was the high standard of education among the workforce. Even Cho 
S. (1994:62), who suggested that “the innate drive and shrewdness of Korean business 
leaders” was essential, also gives equal importance to “the government’s guardianship 
of them, and particularly those leading large businesses”. While the emphasis might 
vary, most commentators would agree on one particular mainspring: strong intervention 
by the state and chaebol’s special and close ties with the government (as seen in 
Chapter 3). All the chaebol conglomerates grew with the benefit of significant state 
favour, including direct financial support, tax concessions and market-entry tariff 
barriers against competition, which helped them to capture markets and monopolise 
particular sectors of the economy (Kang MH 1996; Cho YJ 1997; Lew SC. 1997; 
Whitley 1991,1999).17
However, the relationship between the government (bureaucrats and politicians) and 
chaebol could rarely be considered a partnership of equals; an element of hierarchy was 
involved, especially in the past. “The state is senior, the corporations lesser partners”, as 
Cumings puts it (1987:73). For most chaebol the government was an omnipotent entity, 
able to decide whether an enterprise should prosper or collapse. Entrepreneurs' co­
operation and loyalty to the government generated business prosperity, whereas 
disobedience meant alienation from the government’s strategic support (Choi YH. and 
Lee YH. 1995; Cho YJ. 1997). Part of this control was through state provision of loans
1 ftand access to foreign currency. This reliance was particularly strong in the 1960s and 
1970s. Although subsequently declining,19 their financial dependency has continued 
through government-controlled credit institutions (Edwards 1992; Whitley 1999,2001; 
Hahm JH. 2003; Kim WB. 2003; Jeong SI. 2004).
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In the late 1990s there were crucial changes, primarily due to the Korean financial 
crisis in 1997 and the subsequent IMF bailout programme.20 The national economy 
went through a series of structural reforms in its financial sector (Cathie 1998; Chang 
HJ. 1998; Rowley and Bae 1998; Kirk 1999; Whitley 1999; Bustelo 2000; Kong 2000;
Joh SW. 2001; Kim S. 2001; Haggard et al. 2003; Kim WB. 2003; Shin JS. and Chang
9 1HJ. 2003; Bae and Rowley 2004). The Korean government was required by the IMF
to regulate more closely the access of credit to chaebol who needed to maintain more
transparent financial reporting systems (Min BS. 2003).22 At the same time, the
government acted to ease terms of trade and lower foreign exchange barriers (Kong
2000; Bishop 2001; Kwon O. Y. 2001). They also agreed to accept some chaebol and
bank closures, as well as foreign investment (even including control) in selected Korean
companies. These actions enabled the Won to find its market value in the wake of the
exhaustion of the central bank’s foreign currency reserves (Cathie 1998).23 However,
even after seemingly major changes the essence of the state-controlled credit
institutions has changed little, as clearly shown by the following statement by a
manager from chaebol D1 (mu30m24- D l25):
“Government often requests or gives instructions in relation to exports etc. since 
its power over chaebol is strong. If the chaebol does not cooperate, the 
government can apply pressure by controlling banking loans or by threatening a 
tax inspection.”
Another respondent (mb6426, a previous president of an affiliate of a major chaebol, SI)
also confirms this by saying,
“There are many regulations made by the government. For a chaebol to borrow 
a big sum of money from a bank, it needs the permission of the government. So 
it is difficult not to agree to what the government requires from the chaebol.”
My interviews in 1999 suggested that, even in the late 1990s, the influence of the
government on chaebol was still too strong for them to ignore ‘guidance’ affecting their
corporate policies and business practices, including employment. The personal
perception of the chaebol manager referred to above (mu30m-Dl) on the relationship
between his company and the government was expressed as follows:
“The government demands that chaebol do this or that. As the government’s 
power over Korean companies is still very influential, when asked chaebol do
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their best to obey the government, even if it is not in their best interests. If the 
company doesn’t comply with the requirement, the government can apply 
pressure by affecting bank loans or initiating a thorough tax investigation.”
Although the state’s power over chaebol was strong, it was also beneficial. As Jenkins 
(1992:196) argued, “the prime beneficiaries have been a relatively small number of 
domestic chaebol which account for a large share of the economy’s output”.
While chaebol have contributed positively to the quantitative growth of the 
economy with special support from the state, they have also created some negative 
effects that are viewed as barriers to further economic development in Korea. Lee HK. 
(1996:92) explains that chaebol commonly advanced loans to subsidiary or affiliated 
businesses by guaranteeing payments between these firms. As a result, any insolvent 
affiliates of chaebols are rarely weeded out and, according to Lee HK., this has become 
a major stumbling block to the restructuring of the domestic economy, because mutual 
trading between chaebol affiliates is widely prevalent. Yet when chaebol affiliates do 
business with unaffiliated companies a variety of unfair practices, including 
discriminatory price treatment, tie-in sales agreements and deliberate disruption of 
transactions, are common.
It is also worth noting here that for many Koreans the term chaebol holds some 
negative connotations. These negative attributions have arisen in large part from the 
perception that some chaebol were able to accumulate their wealth either through unfair 
advantage or by exploiting government connections (Koo and Kim 1992; Kang MH. 
1996; Soh BH. 1997; Kim EM. 1997). Concentration of economic power within a 
selected few leads to a deterioration in the structure of income distribution and gives 
rise to estrangement between members of a society. As Lee HK. (1996:93) argues, it 
hinders the establishment of a sturdy foundation for continuing economic development. 
Accordingly, the question of economic concentration in Korea has been raised, not only 
as an industrial problem linked to lower productivity but also as a social problem that 
leads to unfair distribution of wealth. For example, there has been an imbalance 
between conglomerates and small businesses, and the role of small and medium-sized 
enterprises has, in comparison, been markedly peripheral to that of the chaebol over 
some three decades of economic expansion. (McKay and Missen 1995; Chung UC.
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1997). Further, public perception of chaebol as ‘rentier’ capitalists that have grown too 
powerful for the good of the nation was reinforced by the conviction that the state- 
chaebol relationship had become extremely corrupt under Chun Doo-Hwan (1980- 
1987), the successor of the comparatively austere Park Chung-Hee (Bello and 
Rosenfeld 1990:71). Chaebol still represent a concentration of economic power that 
dominates critical industries, and are themselves controlled by a closed ownership 
circle. It is therefore not surprising that, in a relatively closed economy, both 
government and big business see themselves as mutually dependent on each other, and 
strive to maintain close relationships (Soh BH. 1997). Such influential links can become 
corrupt27; Soh BH. (ibid. :57) refers to “the widespread collusion between politicians 
and businessmen”. Another frequently-claimed problem was, of course, the exploitation 
of labour, particularly that of young women in the export-processing zones for unskilled 
assembly work, which has been discussed previously in Chapters 2 and 3.
In summary, it is clear that chaebol are closely linked to the government and that 
they have been very well cushioned by a supportive state. They have a history of relying 
on government for their capital needs, and for their corresponding obligation to 
accommodate government ‘guidance’ on strategy. Not surprisingly, chaebol strive to act 
in accordance with government’s policies and demands. One of the disciplines in which 
chaebol were required to follow government ‘guidance’ related to human resources and 
employment (Kim DO. et al. 2000; see also Bae and Rowley 2004). An example of this 
was the government’s developing policies concerning skilled female labour, which has 
influenced at least the formal practices of chaebol. In the early 1990s, improving gender 
equality at work entered the national agenda linked to the encouragement of 
globalisation, and this had a positive impact on female employment by chaebol in the 
mid-1990s (as referred to in Chapter 3) -  although the elected government and the 
political and economical circumstances of the country have changed since then (see 
Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion). It is important, therefore, to examine 
government policies within the prevailing socio-economic climate to determine how 
they influence chaebol, and in particular their employment polices and practices. As 
chaebol employees acknowledged, the promotion of gender equality in recruitment has 
been positively affected by government pressure on chaebol to hire more female
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graduates - at least in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Chapter 7 for further 
discussion).
Chaebol as White-collar Employers
While chaebol perform a critical role in the Korean economy and have historically 
maintained close links with the government, they also create major employment 
opportunities and contribute vitally to the country’s labour market. They are widely 
considered as role-model employers by other Korean firms with less advanced working 
conditions and organisational systems, and also as favoured employers by many white- 
collar employees. How then are chaebol really regarded by job candidates and office 
employees? What kind of employers do they make in the eyes of their staff?
Chaebol in general are considered popular by job seekers and among the most 
sought-after, prestigious employers of white-collar job applicants. Working for a 
chaebol, particularly those four or five that are considered ‘the best’28, is highly 
esteemed in Korean society. During my interviews with chaebol employees it was quite 
clear that most people working in chaebol were proud to be part of their corporate 
culture, even if they did not always mention it specifically. When asked what were the 
most positive aspects of their present employment, many interviewees (both men and 
women) replied that it was the fact that their employer was a chaebol. Many employees 
whom I interviewed apparently chose their employer initially because it offered 
advantages provided only by chaebol. The reasons why they chose their present 
employer did vary, but more than 50 percent of the responses were directly related to 
the fact that the company was a chaebol.
Inevitably, though, there were some unsatisfying features. When asked to describe 
the negative or unsatisfactory aspects of their current employment, the responses of 
male chaebol employees varied widely: for example, “work too hard” (e.g. mu2-Sl), 
“work not challenging enough” (e.g. mul6-Sl), or “poor rewards or working condition” 
(e.g. mu22-Hl, mu34m-S2). A number of respondents, both men and women, felt 
dissatisfied with their work and the management culture because it was “inflexible, too 
strict, hierarchical and authoritarian”, and “too often typified by the rule ‘boss orders, 
junior obeys’” (among others, mul5m-Sl, fu20*-Sl, mu22-Hl, mu41-P, fu44*-P,
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mu45-H2). These attitudes of chaebol employees will be discussed further later in this 
chapter. The responses from female staff were broadly similar to those of their male 
colleagues, but they often specifically included “sexual discrimination at work” (e.g. 
fh9-Sl, fulO*-Sl, fh ll-S l, ful8*-Sl, fh23-Hl, fh29-Hl, fu32-Dl, fh36-S2, fu40-L, 
fu43*-P, fu46-H2, fu47-H2, fu48-H2, fh49-H2, fu50-H2, fu51-D2). As we see from the 
interviewee samples, this was true for both female high-school leavers and university 
graduates, and applied in almost all the companies and chaebol studied (e.g. SI a, Sib, 
Hla, Hlb, D l, S2, L, P, H2 D2).
However, many of my interviewees (both male and female, and high-school leavers 
and graduates) acknowledged that their chaebol employer provided them with a 
comparatively high salary, better training and educational programmes, more overseas 
visits, superior welfare benefits and a better future than most other employers, 
especially smaller or medium-sized companies in Korea (e.g. mu3, mu5, mh6, mul5, 
mu 16, mu30, mu31, fu32, fu46, fh49). For some, the accepted image of chaebol as 
‘being prestigious employers with high public recognition’ was one of the vital 
attractions. In fact, the “good image of chaebol” was the main reason that many gave 
for choosing to work for them (mu3, mu7, mh8, fh9, mul7, fill 8*, mu22, fh23, mu27, 
fu32, mu34, mu35, fh36, mu45, fu40).
On the other hand, when Korean companies that are not chaebol were discussed, no 
one expressed any desire to work for them. During the interviews with job candidates 
about their future employment, and employees who were already working for chaebol, 
the respondents hardly indicated any interest at all in working for small or medium­
sized companies (with the exception of one man who wanted later to join a firm owned 
by a relative as a junior partner). A few employees (e.g. fh28, fu32) confirmed the 
assumption that small or medium-sized companies usually make less-attractive 
employers than chaebol. A female employee of chaebol HI (fh28) was one of the few 
respondents who had worked both in a smaller company and a chaebol. She had joined 
the smaller firm after finishing high school, but left it after three months because of 
poor working conditions -  disappointing welfare and fringe benefits, and in particular 
the unpleasant atmosphere at work caused by an authoritarian boss (who was its 
president). After that experience she now much favours her employment in one of the
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largest chaebol (HI) - even though its culture is considered to be more traditional and 
conservative than other major chaebol (such as SI), and also less ‘women-friendly’ due 
to its primary involvement in ‘heavy’ industries. The view that (major) chaebol usually 
make better employers was shared by male employees, one of whom (mu5-Sl) 
expressed his personal opinion as follows:
“In chaebol, women are not sexually discriminated against too much - while 
it can be much worse in smaller or medium-sized companies where women 
would find it difficult to survive. This would especially be the case where the 
owner or high-ranking executives are of an older generation believing in strict 
male superiority and who would treat women in a gender-discriminative way.”
Thus there seems little doubt that chaebol are generally considered, by both men and 
women, to be more desirable employers than small or medium-sized companies.
Interestingly, however, there was some disparity between men and women 
employees as to why they favoured chaebol. While the more general and positive 
reasons were common to both men and women, a few more specific (yet still positive) 
views were limited to women. Unlike their male colleagues, many women (half of those 
who chose their employer mainly because it was a chaebol) indicated that chaebol’s 
apparently “less-gendered discrimination” or “better treatment for women” with “open- 
minded attitudes towards female candidates” was the main reason that they had applied 
for a job there (e.g. fulO, ful2*, ful3, ful4, ful8*, fu20*). This was particularly true 
among female graduates, less so among high-school leavers; perhaps due to the former 
being more gender-aware and with a higher self-esteem as a result of their education. 
Some female respondents also added that many other Korean companies did not offer 
opportunities for women to apply for jobs on the same terms as men. In explaining why 
she had applied for work at the chaebol where she was now employed, one female 
graduate respondent (fulO) recalled that she chose this particular chaebol (SI) with an 
expectation that there would be less sexual discrimination than in other Korean firms. 
This was mainly because she particularly remembered a television advertisement by the 
chaebol in the mid-1990s: the image showed Margaret Thatcher (the former prime 
minister of the U.K.) with a message implying that even a woman could develop her 
full potential and be successful in this chaebol if she was capable and worked hard. The 
actual experiences of female employees in chaebol after they were employed will be
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explored in more detail in the following chapters.
A significant finding on the appeal of chaebol as employers was that, whereas 
chaebol had been the first choice for most male job candidates from more-privileged 
universities, this was not always the case for women. When three female university 
students in their final year at one of the most privileged universities were interviewed, 
while expressing some interest in chaebol two of them specifically stated that they 
would prefer to be employed by a foreign (Western) company. These female job 
candidates believed that foreign firms make better employers, particularly for women, 
than Korean companies. The reasons given by the female interviewees, both chaebol 
employees (e.g. fu32, fu37) and job candidates (fs52, fs53, fs54), may be summarised 
as follows: foreign (typically Western) companies are known to be less gender 
discriminating, demand shorter working hours, offer more responsibility and provide 
longer and more secure employment for women. This was further confirmed when a 
number of female graduate employees, currently working for foreign companies 
(mostly Western), were interviewed. These women (ff55, ff57*, ff58*, ff59* - the last 
three being married with children) expressed their satisfaction with their present 
working conditions, which they believed to be better than those in chaebol, and had 
little regret in choosing a foreign (Western) company to work for. The positive aspects 
of their working conditions were: less interference by others in their work, more 
responsibility, more autonomy, interesting and challenging work, fair chances for 
promotion and other job opportunities, good salary, proper appreciation of ability and 
good work, better attitude with little gender discrimination by male colleagues or bosses 
towards women, and less negative outcome after marriage or childbirth.29
Overall, chaebol were usually considered by women to be better employers than 
small or medium-sized companies, but often regarded less favourably when compared 
with foreign (Western) companies in Korea -  but not Japanese firms. Whom, then, do 
chaebol prefer to employ? What attributes do ideal candidates for employment in a 
chaebol possess?
Ideal candidates for chaebol
The recruitment exercises of chaebol seeking to hire college and university graduates
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have been regarded as major social events, and also of general public interest. Most 
recruitment is conducted during the same short period of a few weeks in the students’ 
last university term before graduation. The pressure on candidates to find employment 
before they graduate is particularly high and competition between them is strong. It has 
become almost a matter of ‘survival’ and the gravity and importance for students is hard 
for those in Western cultures to understand. It is critically important in Korea for a 
graduate to enter employment at the same time as his contemporaries (a kind of 
conformity) in order not to be seen as a 'loser1 who has to compete with more-junior 
graduates recruited the following year. ‘Gap’ years are not recommended: anyone who 
has been unemployed for a year is regarded as having poor employment prospects. 
However, as chaebol prefer to hire new college graduates rather than people with 
experience, they typically recruit their regular staff as graduates and school leavers 
direct from their educational establishment - a common practice for many large 
companies in Korea (Steers et al. 1989; Sohn KN. 1993; Janelli 1993). As a result, job 
openings for mid-career workers in chaebol are limited. Some older and more 
experienced managers might be hired, but in large chaebol this was considered 
exceptional and occurred only in special circumstances (Janelli 1993:139). My own 
research showed that only three out of 51 interviewees (6 percent) had previous work 
experience - and each had worked very briefly for only one previous company. 
According to Janelli (pl40), setting strict age limits for recruitment restricted the 
mobility of more experienced and valuable employees and ensured that new recruits 
were young and (presumably) more pliable. When combined with the internal 
promotion system, he argues, these limitations also helped to ensure that a manager had 
more experience with the company than any of his subordinates.
Another feature prevalent in recruitment by chaebol is their tendency to give 
preference to male applicants, particularly those from a few privileged universities 
(Sohn 1993; Bai and Cho 1995). Historically, chaebol have explicitly considered male 
graduates from a few top universities more favourably, and would hardly entertain male 
applicants from less-privileged universities, or female candidates even from elite 
universities. However, due to mounting pressure against discrimination from the public, 
the media, and also from government, in the 1990s chaebol appeared ready to modify
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their approach. Their discrimination against candidates from less prominent 
universities, and female graduates from any universities, consequently became much 
less apparent -  or perhaps less explicit. For example, many chaebol in the mid 1990s 
claimed to use ‘open recruitment’ (yeolin chae-yong)30 with an ‘open-minded’ attitude, 
while in the past they would consider applications only from a few top universities (Lee 
YS. 1996:89). Some chaebol even attempted to use an application form without a 
section specifying which university the applicant attended. When recruitment seminars 
(a few of which I attended personally in 1997) were given by personnel managers from 
a number of different chaebol, the importance of the status of the university was not 
mentioned - as if confirming this tendency (see also Pucik and Lim 2002:144). Yet it 
became clear later (from a university job placement counsellor, cs7531) that, apart from 
the few most-prestigious universities that chaebol always wished to visit, relatively few 
other universities were able to persuade the companies to give recruitment seminars to 
their graduating students. Furthermore, in spite of the ‘apparent’ effort by chaebol not to 
favour one university over another, the identity of the candidate's university would 
emerge sooner or later during the selection process.
Since there was little difference in salary or conditions for those who joined the 
company at the same time, companies naturally wanted to hire the best possible 
candidates for the same rewards (mu38m, mu41). This, according to a senior manager 
in chaebol L (mu38m), explained why candidates from sought-after departments of 
privileged universities were highly desired, while others found securing employment 
difficult. Clear evidence of discrimination was suggested by the fact that most of the 
successful recruits turned out to be male graduates from a few select universities, as 
later confirmed by interviews with job seekers and chaebol employees of both sexes. A 
personnel manager from one of the top chaebol (mulm-Sl) admitted this frankly, and 
explained why:
“It is naturally advantageous, for the company’s competitiveness and future, to 
have high-quality manpower. Even if top university graduates do not necessarily 
make the best employees, there is a basic assumption that job candidates from 
more prestigious universities are likely to be of higher quality and with greater 
potential. Furthermore, ever since the IMF economic crisis in late 1997, and the 
ensuing rise in unemployment and surplus of good manpower in the labour 
market, the company has recruited chiefly from a very few top universities, such
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as Seoul, Yonsei and Koryo. Of course, exceptions, are made for regional 
branches and factories where staff from a local university would probably fit in 
better and be more likely to accept a long-term commitment to living and 
working in the region.”
While chaebol prefer to hire male graduates from a few of the most-privileged 
universities, their ideal candidates for recruitment would also be capable, ambitious, 
loyal, positive, motivated and active, and also well informed and fluent in one or more 
foreign languages, according to managers from different chaebol (e.g. mu30m-Dl, 
mu38m-L, cs66-Hl, cs71-L). When interviewing job candidates the subjective opinions 
of interviewers are critical to the final decision and the focus is more on the candidate’s 
character, attitude and interpersonal skills than specific job aptitude. This is because 
work in chaebol tends to be more people-oriented than work-oriented (referred to in the 
later part of this chapter). New recruits are hired, not for a specific position, but as loyal 
team members32 with well-rounded personalities, common sense and basic knowledge, 
and who would be able to fit in easily anywhere in the group (mu25m, mu30m, mu41, 
mu42, cs71). One male employee (mu41) from chaebol P explained the reasoning as 
follows:
“A rounded personality is still advantageous in a Korean employment setting. 
Bright people with creativity might be good for the success of the company but 
would not necessarily be well appreciated in the firm if difficult for the 
company and superiors to handle. They tend to break the unspoken rules and 
customs of company tradition or culture. For this reason, they might be given 
challenging or important tasks to carry out, but would not necessarily receive 
the best evaluation by their seniors.”
In his study, Janelli also suggested that the common thread running through most 
accounts of his interviews was a cultural understanding that they favoured subordinates 
inclined toward docility (Janelli 1993:140). Overall, ‘generalists’ with a wide range of 
knowledge are preferred to ‘specialists’ in particular fields. Partly for this reason, 
chaebol HI tends to distrust ‘over-qualified’ candidates. One male graduate interviewee 
(mu22) from this chaebol explained that people with an MBA or Ph.D. degree would 
probably leave eventually because of dissatisfaction with the conditions and 
remuneration offered by the firm. Companies prefer candidates who can accept existing 
working conditions and remuneration, who would not try to avoid demanding work
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under less-than-perfect conditions, and who have sufficient patience and long-term 
ambition to anticipate what comes later.
Nevertheless, more recently the criteria for selecting staff seem to be changing, even 
though the extent of change may vary between companies. For example, in the past 
hard-working, sincere candidates with good academic records were most sought after, 
while nowadays candidates with creative, flexible minds and individuality are preferred 
(Chang and Sung 1996; also interviewee mulm). According to Chang and Sung 
(ibid. :78), most companies now place greater emphasis on individual character and 
personality than on specialised knowledge or technical skills.
5.3 Characteristics o f Work Culture and Administrative Style in Chaebol
While the previous section introduced chaebol as employers of white-collar office 
workers, and the attributes of their ideal employees, this section seeks to illustrate some 
of the characteristics of the administrative style and work culture within chaebol. As 
referred to in the introduction to this chapter, not only institutional but also cultural 
variables have to be considered to understand fully how the administrative organisation 
of a company works (see Whitley 1991; Harlow and Hearn, 1995; Rowley & Bae 2003; 
Warner 2003). While the first half of this chapter has examined the more institutional 
aspect of chaebol as employers, the remainder discusses the cultural aspects of their 
organisation.
There clearly is an interaction between social values and corporate culture; the 
country’s social values and its traditional culture inevitably influence employees’ 
perceptions and choices of action at work and relationships with colleagues. As Bae and 
Rowley (2001:411) argue, Confucian values and heritage, despite Japanese and 
American influences in the twentieth century, have remained important and strong in 
Korean culture and are reflected in the human resources management (HRM) practices 
of Korean companies (see also Whitley 1991; Kim BW. 1992; Kim KO. 1996; Song 
BN. 1997). The administrative style and working environment of chaebol cannot be 
truly understood unless Korean culture, and how it affects interactions between people 
on the work floor, are comprehended. The work culture within chaebol, and in
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particular the way it is viewed by those working in theim, is well illustrated in the 
interviews with chaebol employees. Some of the questions; in the survey were designed 
to explore the main characteristics of the culture, and the extent to which traditional 
Confucian influences affect the workplace and the employees themselves -  including 
gender relations. This section is based largely on these interviews, and attempts to 
elucidate contemporary Korean work culture and how it engenders and influences 
certain workplace practices.
Work Environment and Corporate Culture
When discussing their chaebol as a workplace, many employees admitted that, on the 
whole, they enjoyed a ‘pleasant and comfortable working environment’ largely because 
their employer had encouraged a “pleasant working atmosphere” (e.g. mu34, mu 17) or 
“good human relations” (e.g. mu42). However, they also pointed out several aspects of 
work culture and the environment that they found unsatisfactory or problematic. The 
first (and for men the major) concern referred to selfishness, individualism, or excessive 
personal politics at work. For example, many managers and members of staff were seen 
as “chiefly focusing on what benefited them or their section, rather than the good of the 
company in general” (mu42-P). Some senior managers would seek favourable company 
recognition by working solely for their own benefit to the detriment of staff or 
colleagues - for example by dismissing staff on their own initiative in order to 
demonstrate loyalty to the company during the 1997 ‘IMF crisis’ (as it was so referred) 
(mu45-H2). Even for ordinary staff, characteristics such as logical thinking, 
aggressiveness, and (if necessary) selfishness, rather than friendliness and consideration 
for colleagues, were encouraged to ensure survival at work and recognition by senior 
members of the company, as was convincingly described by one female employee 
(fh23-Hl). Many interviewees found these situations unpleasant, serving to hinder the 
efficiency of the workplace. Some respondents drew attention to their company’s lack 
of concern for employees, and felt that working conditions, welfare systems and general 
infrastructure could be improved (e.g. mu22-Hl, mu45-H2). However, they also 
acknowledged that this situation had arisen partly because the company had been going 
through a period of economic difficulty since the IMF crisis.
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While these opinions may well be reflected in offices in other countries, some 
features appear unique to Korea - particularly those related to the cultural environment 
of the country. A large number of interviewees admitted that there were certain 
characteristics of their work culture which they believed to be part of a traditional 
cultural legacy, yet which they saw as a hindrance to their working life. When 
interviewees were asked about the influence of traditional Korean culture in their 
offices, most (88 percent) of those, both men and women, who worked in chaebol 
agreed that they considered that their work place was influenced to a greater or lesser 
extent by traditional (Confucian) culture33. Of the remaining 12 percent, half thought 
that the influence had been much reduced and half were unaware of any influence of 
traditional culture on everyday working life. Interestingly, when interviewees identified 
particular elements of traditional culture, their initial reaction was often negative. For 
example, there was a commonly-held view that some traditional influences at their 
workplace - such as authoritarianism, hierarchy, conservatism, formality, and 
collectivism - were too strong for their liking. Although this negative view was 
expressed by both men and women, it was my impression that women (e.g. ful3-Sl, 
ful9*-Sl, fh24-Hl, fu48-H2) had a clearer perception of the impediments that may be 
linked to their (usually) more-junior positions in the organisation (see later chapters for 
further discussion). Many of these influences, in fact, had been previously identified 
(e.g. O’Malley 1988; Paik W. 1990; Whitley 1992; Kang MH. 1996) as distinctive 
characteristics of Korean work culture in large organisations like chaebol. Among these 
influences, several are particularly relevant to this study and are considered in more 
detail.
One of the most distinctive characteristics of work culture that was frequently 
mentioned by chaebol employees (regardless of their sex or employer), was 
‘authoritarianism’ and related features such as a strong hierarchy (e.g. mu5-Sl, fulO-Sl, 
ful8*-Sl, mu22-Hl, mu27-Hl, mu31-Dl, mu41-P, mu42-P, fu44*-P, mu45-H2, fu46- 
H2, fu51-D2). O’Malley (1988:336) earlier recognised that obedience to authority and 
deference towards superiors are fostered by Confucianism and are intrinsic to the 
functioning of the major institutions behind the economic success of Korea, as well as 
of Japan and Taiwan. ‘Authoritarianism’ can have different meanings in an office
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context: for some it means simply the hierarchical bossi-subordinate relationship in
terms of its domination-submission characteristics; for others it is the tendency to force
people to submit to one’s own ideas and opinions. Many (e.g. Kim BW 1992; Whitley
1992; Kim KO. 1996; Kang MH. 1996; Compton, Jr. 2000; Kim DO. et al. 2000; Cho
YH. & Yoon JK. 2002; Kim YT. 2003) agree that the basic leadership style in the
Korean management system is authoritarian and paternalistic, suggesting that the
company is seen as an extension of the family, and relationships in the company are
similar to those within a family34 (see Chapter 4 for a description of the philosophy of
Confucianism). My interviewees most frequently recognised authoritarianism, together
with other related characteristics, as the legacy of traditional Confucian culture in their
everyday working life. Examples of these characteristics are: a strict hierarchical order,
implying formality between superiors and subordinates (such as ‘Sang-myeong-ha-bok
the superior orders, the subordinate obeys); respect for age (‘Jang-yu-yu-seo \  between
the elder and the young there is an order); a high degree of formalisation and
centralisation of authority35. To illustrate the extent to which authoritarianism and
related traits are manifest in Korean offices, the following quotations and extracts from
interviews appear typical.
“Junior members of staff are supposed to follow orders rather than producing 
and presenting their own ideas at work” (mu5-Sl).
“There is little freedom for criticising the employer or the superior. Once an 
order is given you are expected to obey, whether it is the best choice or not
Unconditional obedience to superiors is required No answering back is
allowed” (fu44*-P).
“It is common practice in Korean offices that, even if members of staff have 
finished their day’s work, they would (or would feel constrained to) stay on 
until the boss leaves, as a mark of respect for the senior person” (ful8*-Sl).
“Seniors or bosses believe, as they are usually older, that they are always right 
and don’t want to listen to opinions from juniors, and they expect them to obey - 
whatever they are asked to do” (fulO-Sl).
“The older you get the wiser you become, and therefore you cannot argue with 
the elder” (mu42-P).
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“Work is performed not by the person but by his title: the more senior he is, the 
more he can achieve when dealing with other people, or in business generally” 
(mu22-Hl).
“The emphasis on formality rather than practicality at the company is such that 
senior members of the company are often more concerned with giving a good 
impression to the chairman than with the work itself. This is demonstrated, for 
example, by accompanying the chairman to the airport when he leaves for an 
overseas business trip, or meeting him there on his return” (mu45-H2).
What kind of working environment do these characteristics then create? Most large 
Korean corporations with a people-oriented structure are organised into ordered 
hierarchies. With no clear allocation of responsibility to individual members of staff, an 
authoritarian, ‘top-down’ decision-making style has become typical in chaebol. This 
decision-making system, involving numerous operational rules and procedures and a 
strict hierarchy of authority and control, is typical of the bureaucratic organisation in the 
Korean workplace (Lee and Yoo 1987, cited in Kang MH. 1996:111). Another 
distinctive feature of chaebol management style is the high degree of formalisation and 
centralisation (e.g. mu27, fu40, fu48). Decision-making is concentrated in upper levels 
of managerial hierarchies and major decisions, especially those requiring financial 
expenditure, must pass through a formal procedure known as ‘kyeol-jae ’ (“approval 
from upper levels of management”). Some interviewees (e.g. fu40, fu48) expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the *kyeol-jae ’ procedure as being too slow and protracted, and 
breeding inefficiency by allowing new, perhaps brilliant, ideas to be destroyed during 
the extended process. As Lee HC. (1989) points out, while the formal approval process 
can be a means for discussion and consultation among employees and different levels of 
managers, in Korean organisations it is considered more a means of expressing 
authority and control than consultation and participation. Important decisions typically 
are made at the top-most level of management, with little evidence of consensual 
agreement, and then filtered down to lower levels.
One female interviewee referred to her shock when she realised the extent to which 
rigid conservative tradition was reflected in her everyday working life. For example, at 
a social dinner for departmental employees all the junior staff had to sit and wait for one 
hour, with food served but growing cold in front of them, until the departmental
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manager (the most senior among the party) arrived (ful3-Sl). Nevertheless, according 
to Kang MH. (1996:110), there is little overt resistance to this decision-making system, 
primarily because of its Confucian ethic incorporating paternalism, loyalty, and respect 
for elders and seniors.
However, it is also important to acknowledge the possibility that Confucian tradition 
is not the only source of authoritarian culture in chaebol. Other scholars have identified 
influences from traditional but non-Confucian cultures, which they believe have 
contributed to the authoritarian and hierarchical nature of current administrative culture 
in Korea. In his study of a chaebol (Taesong), Janelli (1993) found certain analogies 
drawn by workers between military and office life which were centred on a unified 
chain of command that suppressed even the appearance of collective decision making or 
autonomy at lower levels (see also Whitley 1992: ch.6; Janelli & Yim 1998). He further 
argued that management at this chaebol was usually described as ‘top-down’, with 
decisions emanating from the head of the chaebol and then passed down to its lower 
ranks. Military service gave Taesong workers the knowledge that strict ranking and a 
unified chain of command were militaristic, and these workers used that knowledge to 
interpret company experiences. Interestingly, whereas the company claimed that 
relations between superiors and subordinates were ‘family-like’, younger office workers 
viewed them as militaristic. Thus, even army experiences could foster both 
subordination and resistance (ibid.:49). This was confirmed during my interviews; some 
respondents suggested that their organisational culture was positively related to army 
culture, such as ‘sang-myeong-ha-bok’ (the superior orders, the subordinate obeys) (e.g. 
fu44*, fg62)36.
However, despite these negative effects on administrative behaviour, 
authoritarianism has been used as an effective means to mobilise human and material 
resources in order to achieve developmental goals in a short time (Paik W. 1990:55). An 
interviewee identified the positive aspect by remarking, “once one gives orders to junior 
staff, they manage to make it happen against all the odds, which works perfectly well 
for the existing organisation” (fg61, employee in a governmental organisation)37.
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Inter-personal Relationships at Work
In Korean society the family, kinship and extended forms of familism were and still 
remain the basic units of political, economic and all other social life (Paik W. 1990:35; 
Song BN. 1997; Helgesen 1998; Hahm CB. 2003; Lew SC. et al. 2003). In Korean 
companies, if  the relationship with the owner is based on kinship it is called ‘hyul-yun ’ 
(literally, blood-related); if it is based on geographical affinity it is *ji-yun ’ (locality- 
related); and if it is based on educational links it is then referred to as ‘hahk-yun ’ 
(school-related) (Kang MH 1996:112).
As previously described, chaebol are normally family-owned and controlled 
businesses, centred around the founder and his blood-related family members. In 
chaebol, ‘hyul-yun ’ is the most important relationship, especially within the central core 
of the company’s management structure. In many chaebol, power groups of key 
managers are formed on the basis of shared geographical and school ties (Pucik and 
Lim 2002; Kim YT. 2003; Lew SC. et al. 2003; also confirmed by interviewees mu26- 
Hl, mu27-Hl, mu30m-Dl, mu34m-S2, fh49-H2). Owners recruit from their hometown 
or school, just as they bring relatives into management. In some companies, the top 
management group is dominated by executives who are all from one geographical area, 
for example from Seoul, or Yeongnam (a south-eastern province), or Honam (a south­
western province), reflecting whichever region the owner came from. It is also quite 
common for the executive group to be dominated by graduates of certain universities 
(e.g. Seoul National, Yonsei, or Korea) or high schools (Kyunggi, Seoul, or 
Kyungbook). For example in DaeWoo, one of the five largest chaebol, many members 
of its top management are from Kyunggi (K) High School and Seoul National 
University (Kim W. 1994; Paik SY. 1995). Outnumbered by graduates from K High 
School (where the chairman, Kim Woo-Jung, was a student), employees speculate that a 
manager who did not attend that school could never hope to be successful in DaeWoo 
(Paik SY. 1995:71). Interviewees from the same chaebol also confirmed this in my 
research:
“In chaebol D, Ljul ’ [connection] is the most critical factor for a successful 
career. It is called the ‘KS Line’, which refers to a career path leading from K 
High School [for boys] through Seoul National University to the chaebol” 
(fu33-Dl).
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“Chaebol D has a comparatively strong tendency for hahk-yun [school-related], 
especially at upper managerial levels since the chairman is KK and a Seoul 
graduate. This is much criticised” (mu30m-Dl).
This propensity was also shown in other chaebol, such as chaebol HI, where members 
of staff (e.g. mu26, mu27) claimed that most colleagues and senior staff of their 
department went to the same university and that, therefore, those that had not felt they 
would be regarded less favourably for promotional and other job opportunities.
Hyul-yun, ji-yun, and hahk-yun operate not only in the power structure at the highest 
executive level, but also in informal relationships within groups and cliques at all 
levels. Hahk-yun (school-related) is particularly strong in informal relationships, and 
gives a feeling of common identity and of belonging. It places particular attention on 
the year of graduation, which identifies older employees as sun-bae (a senior) and the 
younger employees as hoo-bae (a junior). These relationships, which operate within all 
types of organisation, serve as important factors affecting employees’ behaviour. 
Similarly, ji-yun (locality-related) gives those from the same region a feeling of sharing 
a common background and promotes compatibility - and likewise affects personnel 
decisions and social interactions between employees39. This provincialism based on a 
region can be strongly felt and permeates into every comer of every social organisation 
in Korea, according to Paik W. (1990:38). All of these bonds are important factors that 
affect the power structure and informal groupings in Korean businesses (Kang MH. 
1996:113; see also Kim YT. 2003; Lew SC. et al. 2003). However, familism based on 
loyalty to family and the above-mentioned primordial social groupings necessarily leads 
to the development of a form of exclusive collectivism, and restricts the natural growth 
of human beings as individuals (Paik 1990:38).
This ‘factionalism’, based on loyalty to a family, a locality or a school, extends 
throughout Korean society. According to some interviewees (mu34m, fu46), there is too 
much ‘factionalism’ (and ‘opportunism’) within their chaebol - and is seemingly 
common in other large companies. In relation to factionalism and opportunism, one 
female chaebol employee commented:
“If you happen to be working well in a good relationship with a particular senior
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manager who becomes successful, you too become successful as he makes sure 
that his loyal subordinates also do well. On the otheir hand, if you work for 
someone with whom you don’t have a good relationship, or you are sent to work 
for someone doing less well, you face a gloomy future in the company. That is 
why it is so important to line up well in the first place. Of course, this might be 
common in other countries but here the importance o f these issues is worth 
paying particular attention to” (fu46-H2).
According to Choi JS. (1994:129), a person who is particularly loyal to his or her boss
is more successful in a Korean business setting than a person who works hard for the
company. This was confirmed by an interviewee from chaebol Dl, who said:
“Once you become part of a group you effectively belong to the senior person in 
the group; he will look after you and influence your career in every possible 
way (for example, by arranging a favoured job allocation or an overseas 
appointment) as long as you are ‘his man’ by being loyal and devoted to him.
This factor is more important than objective work ability” (fh33-Dl).
This implies that company loyalty can be of secondary importance to displaying 
personal loyalty to a boss.40 This interviewee strongly suggested that offering 
allegiance and devotion to a superior could be more effective in ensuring a successful 
career than merely working hard for the company. This is particularly relevant to 
gender relations at work since such close bonds between superiors and subordinates in 
traditional male-dominant workplaces serve further to disadvantage women (see 
Chapter 7).
Lifetime Employment and Loyalty
Korea has effectively been operating on a lifetime employment system (Choi KS. 1997) 
- although the precise nature and extent has been a subject of debate (see below).41 
Lifetime employment refers to the practice whereby an employee enters a company 
after school or graduation, receives in-company training, and remains an employee of 
the same company until retirement (usually at the age of 55) (Janelli 1993; Choi KS. 
1997; Kim DO. et al. 2000). Although some recognised a weakening of this practice in 
recent years (see later for current changes), a number of interviewees (e.g. mu25m-Hl, 
mu34m-S2, mu35-S2, mu42-P, fu46-H2) viewed lifetime employment as a distinctive 
feature in their chaebol.
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In the past, chaebol would seldom lay off staff even in tiimes of recession42, although 
some more-talented employees might voluntarily leave the company to obtain better 
positions or opportunities elsewhere, especially in high-tech industries (Kang MH. 
1996:113). Until the mid 1990s, it was usually considered that once a person (typically 
a male) was employed by a chaebol he was effectively assured of lifetime employment 
until retirement, unless he committed a crime or a major managerial mistake (Janelli 
1993; Ungson et al. 1997).
This practice was supported and reinforced by the seniority-based wage and 
promotion system (see Chapter 6 for further discussion), whereby wage increases are 
based more on age, length of service and education than on job performance. This wage 
system reinforced a high level of commitment to the company, because leaving would 
mean giving up all the accumulated seniority and promotion opportunities. This mutual 
long-term commitment by both employer and employee constituted the most important 
aspect of the employment system in large companies such as chaebol, and to some 
extent also in medium-sized firms. The economic security that the prospect of lifetime 
employment within a chaebol offers, when compared with that in smaller companies, 
seems to appeal strongly to job applicants and employees. When asked why they chose 
to work for a chaebol, both male and female employees frequently answered that it was 
for this security and lifetime employment.
However, some academics (e.g. Kang MH. 1996; Chang HJ. 1998; Bae and Rowley 
2004) regard the Korean interpretation of lifetime employment as flexible in practice, 
and view this as a high degree of mobility in comparison with the immobility of 
Japanese employees43; Chang HJ. (1998:230) referred to this system as ‘quasi-lifetime 
employment’. Bae and Rowley (2004) interestingly suggested that, although until the 
mid-1980s Korean HRM was characterised by seniority-based lifetime employment 
systems, after 1987 (facing high labour costs and international competition) firms 
adopted many new practices, including ability/performance-based remuneration 
systems. This trend was accelerated by the 1997 crisis, since when firms have moved 
towards flexible HRM systems (see Kim WB. 2003, for the increasing labour market 
flexibility). Consequently, according to Bae and Rowley (ibid.), Korean HRM systems 
seem currently to be characterised by a medium-level numerical flexibility and mixed
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remuneration systems based on both seniority and ability/performance.
While the concept of lifetime employment, albeit flexible, has long prevailed in 
chaebol, the loyalty of an employee to superiors and the company seemed to come 
naturally. In exchange for committing himself wholly to his superior and the company, 
the subordinate expected both to take care of him in his private, as well as in his 
business, life. In exchange for the insurance of ‘lifetime employment’, the subordinate 
offered limitless loyalty far beyond that normally required at the work place, and 
provided his superior with many free services unrelated to work (Kang MH. 
1996:112).44 For example, managers commonly kept subordinates in the office until 
certain documents had been completed or other assigned tasks accomplished, even after 
normal working hours and without over-time payment. Expecting a high degree of 
loyalty from an employee towards superiors and the firm was possible largely because 
of Korean norms and value system that were based on Confucian tradition and heritage 
(ibid.).
However, these concepts of assumed lifetime employment and compensating loyalty
were not immutable and seem now to be changing, particularly after the economic
downturn of 1997 (as specifically stated by mu34m, mu35, mu42). The severe
economic crisis of 1997 forced Korean employers to face up to restructuring their
employment - through ‘downsizing’, early retirement systems, performance-based
incentives and employing contingent workers (Oh JJ. 1998; Kim TH. 2000; Bae and
Rowley 2004). Many chaebol were forced, unprecedentedly, to release significant
numbers of staff, a process made easier by the relaxation of legal restrictions (see
Chang HJ 1998; Rowley and Bae 1998; Kong 2000; Kim S. 2001).45 This enhanced
labour flexibility (see Chapter 2 for the discussion of the flexibility of markets), yet it
inevitably eroded the practice of lifetime employment (Chang HJ. 1998; Lepage and
Gross 2001; Bae and Rowley 2004).
The effect that these changes have made on employees’ perceptions and attitudes
featured forcefully in a number of interviews. One employee stated:
“In the past, every employee was part of the organisation, with a family-like 
feeling and a sense of belonging. However, since the IMF economic crisis and 
the subsequent structural adjustments, many employees were forced to leave -  
employees who had devoted their life for the past 10-15 years to the company.
172
ChapterFive
Yet the company didn’t seem to care much about thatt and hasn’t made much 
effort to improve the situation, which shows that the company is inhuman and 
indifferent in their treatment of staff. Furthermore, when the company is going 
though a difficult time it would be nice to share the had news rationally and 
openly with the employees. Staff members are usually left in the dark without 
much information, understanding or discussion about what is going on in the 
company: it is mostly a top-down, one-sided style of giving orders” (mh8 -  one 
of the few male high-school leavers working in SI a46).
Another employee admitted that seeing colleagues leave had lowered the spirit of
remaining staff, while it made them feel somewhat under pressure to commit
themselves to working harder. However, this newly-generated dedication comes not
from loyalty to the company but more from fear of being one of them in the future (as
mu7 put it). One female employee (fulO, from SI a), even though she knew that the
company would keep her under any circumstances because the nature of her work could
not easily be performed by others, also felt that the company was heartless to lay off its
staff without much notice (even if compensating them with several months salary) and
consequently realised that she should concern herself more with her own future, rather
than remain complacent and over-confident about her security of employment.
Chaebol are now less prepared to guarantee the future of their staff members. In
most cases, this has had a negative effect on the morale of employees. Since their
previous belief in ‘lifetime employment’ seems no longer valid, and their traditional
security of employment appears to be disappearing, their loyalty towards their company
has become less strongly felt than before. This reduced expectation of lifetime
employment has led employees to revise their whole way of thinking about coping with
the changing labour market environment.
“When ‘lifetime employment’ is changed to the concept of a ‘contract’, it means 
that a company can exploit its employees for its own benefit; in this event, each 
employee can reciprocate. In reality, companies have already changed but 
employees have yet to adjust themselves to the new environment and work 
conditions. The safety and security of ‘lifetime employment’ previously offered 
to employees is fast disappearing, yet people’s attitudes and expectations are not 
catching up with the changing situation. For example, senior employees still 
expect the same loyalty from their junior staff, expecting them to remain in the 
office until they themselves leave - even after working hours and when there is 
little work to be done. It could have made sense in the past but it doesn’t sound 
logical any more” (ful4 -  Sla).
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The new concept of a ‘lifetime career’ seems now more acceptable, especially to the 
younger generation of workers who have joined the company relatively recently (as 
pointed out by mulm-Sl, mu7-Sl, mu25m-Hl, mu42-P, fu43*-P, fu44*-P).
A ‘lifetime career’ was mentioned frequently in the interviews, not only by men but 
also by women, and implies that they now prefer to focus on developing their own 
career rather than devoting themselves exclusively to one company under the 
assumption that long-term employment until retirement is guaranteed. The following 
quotation well describes this view, which is becoming increasingly common among 
office workers:
“When first employed I intended to stay with the company until retirement. 
However, since the IMF crisis, the trend is changing from lifetime employment 
to ‘lifetime career’. Therefore, while staying with the present company I will do 
my best by learning as much as I can, and move on to another firm whenever 
any better offer is given to me” (mu7-Sla).
The changes in attitude among members of staff have also been recognised by 
companies. Some senior managers confessed that now there are more staff who believe 
that they are able to leave this company at any time, and correspondingly that the 
company could dismiss them if they did not meet expectation or had some problem 
(mulm-Sla, mul5m-Slb, mu30m-Dl). However, the gap between the commitment 
which employees are ready to make and the expectation and demands that employers 
set is ever widening; this is clearly expressed by a staff member as follows:
“In this transition period from ‘lifetime employment’ to ‘lifetime career’ in the 
minds of many white-collar workers, and possibly in the labour market as a 
whole, employees have become more aware and concerned about their own 
career path rather than their commitment and loyalty to their employer. 
However, in reality the demands that Korean companies make on their staff 
have remained unchanged and therefore no longer correspond with the changing 
attitudes and priorities of their employees” (ful4-Sla).
This trend has also been recognised by others. Bae and Rowley (2004:85-90) suggest 
that there are HRM trends in Korean companies from ‘job security (lifetime job), 
flexibility through attrition, and no service for leavers’, to ‘job mobility (lifetime 
career), early (or honorary) retirement, and outplacement activities’. According to them,
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the general trend has been away from lifetime employment towards easier and more 
flexible working adjustments; yet it is not just a question of ‘pure’ lifetime employment 
versus complete flexibility, as there are a range of options and degrees.
A senior manager (mulm) in chaebol SI, where employee loyalty had been 
considered stronger than in most other Korean companies, said that as a result the group 
is no longer able to expect their staff to be as fully committed and loyal as they used to 
be. For example (as noted by another manager, mu25m-Hl), some younger employees 
no longer necessarily identify their company’s success with their own happiness, as 
employers have historically encouraged. The senior manager (mulm) further added that 
it has now become more important for employees to develop themselves academically, 
and gain higher qualifications, so that their value as employees increases and prepares 
them for any possible change of employment - or even promotion within the same 
company.
It is clear that the idea of ‘lifetime employment’ with one company has begun to 
weaken in employees’ minds and, as a result, so has their willingness to remain devoted 
and loyal to one company. It is too soon after the economic crisis of the late 1990s, and 
the resulting reduction in employment by chaebol, to be sure whether these changes are 
temporary or more permanent. In any event, it is clearly influencing the Korean labour 
market and introducing changes affecting both employers and employees. As a 
consequence the work culture in chaebol offices, and the dedication of staff, seems to be 
changing from the traditional Korean attitude to a more modem and rational approach 
towards work and employment. Nevertheless, these are new trends and, in spite of them 
most relationships appear still to be founded on strong commitment and loyalty to the 
company with an assumed security of employment.
It is also interesting to note that there are some new changes in values bearing on 
working for chaebol: some employees now hold less-conforming ideas in relation to the 
merit of their employer, and their commitment to lifetime employment. In contrast to 
the usual image of a chaebol executive as ambitious, committed and prepared to 
dedicate his life to the company, one male employee (mu5-Sl) expressed his misgivings 
about working for one of the country’s most desirable employers. Although perhaps not 
unusual in Western countries, it was somewhat surprising to find this different
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perspective in a chaebol employee -  particularly a man in a success-driven yet
conformist society. Such views would have been very unusual in the past. He revealed
his thinking, and his new doubts about his ‘dreamed-for life’ as a successful chaebol
executive, as follows:
“Because making lots of money wasn’t my priority in life, as long as it is 
reasonably comfortable, I had a strong sense of life-time employment when I 
started, and I wished to remain working till I become a senior manager or top 
executive (or even one of the directors), and be well respected for my 
achievement and who I am. Then after retirement I wanted to enjoy the rest of 
my life the way I wished, with the money saved. However, when I consider 
what and where I am now, after having worked for the last 5 years, the reality 
and future doesn’t seem as positive or ideal as I had dreamed. If I stay in the 
company until I become a top executive, I would become someone whom I 
don’t want to be - in personality and in a moral sense. Therefore, I would like to 
leave the company before I turn into someone whom my present values would 
not approve of, and who would be living a life with little meaning” (mu5-Sl).
Group-oriented Culture and Bonding
Overall, the organisational culture of chaebol emphasises the importance of the group
rather than the individuals within it. It can be argued that this group-orientation has
contributed to the rapid development of the national economy; one male respondent
(mu31 - from Dl) pointed out that ‘group culture’ is one of the major factors
contributing to the business success of chaebol. He recited a common slogan in the
workplace that encouraged workers to advance together as a group or team: “one step
forward by 10 people together as a team is more valuable than ten steps forward by one
person”. He further explained that this spirit enabled workers to help their colleagues if
they were lagging behind. This consequently fostered strong bonds between colleagues
(especially among men47), who frequently socialised together after work by going out
for drinks, meals or sometimes to cinemas, as was explained by some interviewees (e.g.
mu31, mu35, fu37, fu46, ff55). One female interviewee (fu46-H2) explained clearly
how this could affect work positively since it would help employees feel comfortable
with their colleagues, and encourage mutual support and assistance. The importance of
this socialising in chaebol offices should not be underestimated48.
“Socialising after work is very important in this company. Usually we work 
from eight in the morning until eight in the evening; after finishing work for the 
day we often go out for dinner and then drink with colleagues until midnight.
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Home is almost like an inn or hotel for us. Since most hours in a day have to be 
spent with colleagues, relationships with them are very important. If there is any 
conflict and trouble with them, we try to resolve it by open and frank discussion 
over a drink. Such a frank chat usually involves an exchange of mutual 
criticism or forthright opinions with each other, often including complaints 
about bosses, and eventually leads to mutual understanding and bonding. We 
also trade informal but pertinent information about work and company politics” 
(mu31-Dl).
The work culture in Korean companies respects and values human relationships among 
employees that is so important for their survival at work: employees are mutually 
dependent on each other, often with strong emotional bonds, and work as a team for a 
collective goal. A good understanding of colleagues (including personal matters), a 
readiness to help team members when needed, and maintaining a harmonious 
atmosphere, are highly desired features (as was expressed by a number of female staff, 
such as fh33, fu39).
However, this type of working environment, and the employees’ life style it 
demands, is sometimes subject to doubts and criticism. A manager expressed his view 
that this “human-relationship-based” work culture might be good for teamwork, but he 
was not sure whether the teamwork-oriented system was as efficient and beneficial as 
one which considered each individual’s capability and allocated jobs accordingly 
(mu34m-S2). Another respondent also argued that the work culture is based on a strong 
group bond, which is a typically-Confucian feature, and could be considered one of the 
major reasons for the success of Korean companies; however, it can also be an obstacle 
for further development because it can stifle creativity and restrain brilliant employees 
who might bring positive change to the organisation (mu41-P). In an environment 
where formality, strict job hierarchy and flattery towards senior members are prevalent, 
normally-desired characteristics such as loyalty and diligence can also produce less- 
appealing practices at work. A substantial number of employees (particularly female) 
have complained about the common practice of many (male) staff who remain after 
working hours -  waiting until their seniors leave even if there is little work to be done. 
According to some female respondents (e.g. fh36-S2, fu37-S2, fu44*-P), this was 
because senior executives consider an employee who stays late to be hard working and 
praiseworthy (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of how this practice influences women’s
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job evaluations). Some are also dissatisfied with the extent of socialising required,
stating that even after working hours they have to spend time with colleagues (including
those whom they do not like) as a group; they considered it an extension of work and a
duty since they are criticised if they are absent too often (fu39-L). In relation to work
commitment and loyalty to the company, one hard-working manager said,
“I am very proud of working for this chaebol and it is an important part of my 
life. But we also need to live a normal life, as well as devoting time to work and 
our company. We work very hard and are usually too busy to think about our 
lives; we don’t even know where we are going” (mu25m-Hl).
In summary, it is clear that the workplace environment of chaebol has been strongly 
influenced by traditional Confucian culture, and reflects employees’ ways of thinking 
and attitudes that are still undeniably Confucian-influenced. Naturally, cultural facets 
differ between chaebol and even between firms within the same chaebol, according to 
their respective characteristics.49 Nevertheless, the pervading work culture currently 
combines traditional and Western influences, and will probably become even more 
Western (or modernised) in future, as affirmed by chaebol employees themselves (e.g. 
mu41-P, mu45-H2). The new changes could arise from further development, 
modernisation and globalisation of the businesses and Korean society, as well as from a 
different outlook and way of thinking about work and private life by a new generation 
of employees who “tend freely to express their thoughts, unlike the older generation 
which tended to suppress their personality” (Chang and Sung 1996:82). Chang and 
Sung (ibid.:83) further argue that companies are being overwhelmed by the new 
generation, and that one reason for their efforts to transform themselves is that the 
concurrent demands of the information age, liberalisation and globalisation, are now 
drastically altering Korea’s business culture. As a workplace that is influenced by 
traditional culture, yet modernising at the same time50, Korean chaebol present a unique 
environment which positively reflects, and critically influences, general employment 
practices and gender relations in the nation as a whole.
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5.4 Conclusion
The first half of the chapter described how chaebol emerged from entrepreneurial 
family businesses after the turmoil of the post-war period and grew to become the 
central force of the Korean economy. In close partnership with government, their 
growth mirrored that of the economy; with assisted finance they expanded by 
diversifying into new government-favoured industries. As major employers of skilled, 
educated workers, they began to assume role-model status in the employment 
marketplace; this status, opportunity for growth and the security of employment that 
they offered allowed them to recruit candidates of high quality. Their importance as a 
valuable context for studying white-collar employment and its gender relations in Korea 
was explained. The characteristics of chaebol as major economic enterprises and 
important employers of office staff were examined, suggesting that they offer privileged 
white-collar employment with good working conditions for both male and female 
employees. They have clearly been regarded as favoured employers: chaebol 
employees, particularly men, enjoy the privileges of long-term employment in one of 
the most sought-after white-collar environments in Korea. It was also shown that many 
female employees considered a chaebol as one of the few employers with which they 
could find security and remain for a comparatively long-term, and that chaebol, in spite 
of some negative elements, demonstrated positive aspects of gender equality when 
compared with smaller firms.
In the second half of the chapter, the characteristics of work culture and 
administrative style in various chaebol were more closely examined. It is clear that the 
culture and organisation of chaebol offices remains strongly influenced by a legacy of 
traditional Confucian values - although the extent of this influence may vary according 
to the specific culture of the company or chaebol. This is reflected in the authoritarian, 
formal and hierarchical nature of the organisation, and the way its administrative 
systems operate. Confucian family-based values and customs are also still exhibited 
through proprietorial blood kinship and the existence of power groups of key managers 
originating and bound together by locality and educational affinity. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that this traditional Confucian ideology is progressively being diluted
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by modem, Western cultural influences, as well as by changes in attitude on the part of 
those working in the organisations. This steady erosion of Confucian ideology by 
Western influences, spurred by international economic developments and pressures 
from a global marketplace, has intensified since the 1997 crisis. For example, there has 
been a gradual transformation of the traditional practice of ‘lifetime employment’ 
towards the new concept of ‘lifetime career’, while the recognition of work ability and 
performance has increasingly replaced the importance of seniority in remuneration and 
promotion (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). Recent influences are encouraging a 
new generation of employees to pay more attention to their own ‘lifetime careers’ and 
personal values and aspirations, rather than offering blind loyalty to one company.
In brief, this chapter anticipates and provides groundwork for the succeeding 
chapters that will focus on the main issues relating to employment practices and gender 
relations in chaebol. Recognising the characteristics and mode of operation of chaebol, 
where modem employment practices are often combined within a traditional 
administrative work culture, will assist an understanding of gender relations at work 
that are particular to Korean chaebol. In the next chapter the employment policies and 
practices of chaebol will be examined.
Notes
1 Throsby (2001:63) argues that the corporate culture may be one of concern and care for employees and 
their working conditions, and that these values may mitigate the importance of profit-seeking or other 
economic goals in the firm’s objectives - thus acknowledging culture as influencing, or even determining, 
the economic and social objectives of the group.
2
According to Warner (2003:2), there are two interesting and possibly useful perspectives that have 
emerged in recent years in the academic literature dealing with organisations. The first may be called the 
‘culturalist’ school and focuses on variances in values across cultures; the second may be termed the 
‘institutionalist’ school, stressing the historical and political structures influencing economic and 
organisational activity. He further argues that using ‘culture’ in its widest sense might be seen as more 
encompassing, in that it might include both values as well as institutions.
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3 According to him (p33), differences in the nature of relationships between five broad kinds of economic 
actors are particularly important in contrasting business systems: (a) providers and users of capital, (b) 
customers and suppliers, (c) competitors, (d) firms in different sectoirs, and finally, (e) employers and 
different kinds of employees. These vary in both the extent of organisational integration, and whether this 
is achieved primarily through ownership-based hierarchies, formal agreements, personal obligations, or 
informal commitments, etc.
4
Whitley (2001:29-30) also compares economies in terms of the degree of ownership-based coordination 
and the extent of non-ownership or alliance-based organisational integration of economic activities. From 
this he generates four ideal types of business system: they are i) fragmented business systems ii) 
coordinated industrial districts iii) compartmentalised business systems iv) collaborative business 
systems. While he categorises these four ideal types, he considers Korean chaebol as a state-organised 
business system, a sub-type of ‘compartmentalised business systems’.
5 In this context, Lowe (1996:121) helpfully explains the relationship between culture and institutions. 
According to him,
“Culture is assumed to act as an intervening variable, in the form of ‘societal norms’ as value 
systems, filtering an interpretation of the environment which accumulates to the development 
and pattern maintenance of institutions in society. These institutions (including the category of 
organisations) in turn reinforce the societal norms and environmental conditions that created 
them, a ‘loop’ which enables cultural patterns to remain in stable equilibrium for long periods. 
Thus, institutions, in this view, are both a ‘consequence’ of culture and an instrument in its 
formulation and reformulation.”
6 According to its 1999 ranking (Fortune July 2000), the list includes a total of 12 Korean companies; 
they are Daewoo (234th), Hyundai (107), Hyundai Motor (202), Korea Electric Power (382), Kyobo Life 
Insurance (450), LG Electronics (308), LG International (301), Pohang Iron & Steel (460), Samsung 
(115), Samsung Electronics (131), Samsung Life (257), SK (105). See also Sklair and Robbins (2002) for 
an historical perspective since 1980s on transnational corporations (including those from Korea) from the 
developing world.
7 The size and diversity of chaebol mean that they are much more self-sufficient than their Japanese 
counterparts; complementary and dissimilar activities are co-ordinated through authority hierarchies 
rather than through networks of relational contracting. Consequently, enterprises are less dependent on 
each other than in Japan and have less need to organise market connections to reduce risks (Hamilton et 
al. 1990; Whitley 1992:46).
8 In effect, diversification. Diversification characterises the range with which it internalises externalities, 
and the ‘family control’ affects the ease with which it does so (Kim W. 1994).
9 Kang MH. (1996:113) explains ‘flexible’ lifetime employment as follows:
“Lifetime employment is evident in many Korean organisations. Once a person (typically a 
male) is employed by a company, he is guaranteed lifetime employment until he retires, unless 
he commits a serious crime or managerial mistake. An employer will seldom lay off employees, 
even in times of recession. However, some of the more talented employees will voluntarily quit 
the company to obtain better positions or opportunities elsewhere, especially in the high-tech 
industry. This can be expressed as a high degree of mobility in comparison to the immobility of 
Japanese. As a result, the concept of lifetime employment in Korea is flexible.”
According to Song BN. (1997:199), who shares a similar view by calling it ‘semi-lifetime employment’, 
the ideal of a long-term commitment to the firm based on lifetime employment generally appears more 
appropriate to Korea’s circumstances than a short-term commitment based on a fixed-term contract. 
However, in recent years the concept of ‘flexibility’ has become more acceptable due to the unstable 
labour market since the economic crisis of the late 1990s. For example, according to recent work by Kim 
YT. (2003:186), although Korean employment resembled the Japanese lifetime-employment model for a
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long time, now even senior executives are forced to retire whenever chaiebol owners find it necessary.
10 To address these two major concerns in relation to the activities of chaebol, the Economic Planning 
Board (EPB) and the Central Bank drew up a definition of chaebol. The EPB defined chaebol in terms of 
combined total assets, including those of subsidiaries; the threshold level was set at 400 billion won 
(equivalent then to about US$550 million); as of 1992, a total of 78 business groups exceeded this 
threshold and were consequently subject to guidelines relating to cross-shareholdings and equity 
investment in affiliates. The Central Bank defined chaebol in terms of combined bank credits (i.e., 
borrowings and guarantees); business groups with credits in excess of 150 billion won (equivalent then to 
about US$200 million) were ranked by combined total assets and the top 30 such groups were put on a 
credit control list; using this criterion there were 40 large business groups as of 1990 (Kang MH. 
1996:12-13).
11 There are exceptions to this definition among today’s largest chaebol. Several chaebol are controlled 
completely by professional managers instead of a closed kinship group. A typical example was the Kia 
group, which specialises in the manufacture of automobiles. Kia Motors subsequently was taken over by 
Hyundai in 1998.
12 This was the case during my field research. Although important changes in the governance and 
regulation of chaebol had recently been introduced, especially during and after the financial crisis of 
1997, in those chaebol that were the subject of my research, any modifications to the traditional family 
structure that provided the basis for the organisation of the group were not yet evident in the subsidiaries 
and affiliates where the fieldwork was carried out. A recent study of Hyundai by Kwon SH. and 
O’Donnell (2001) also confirms the still-significant role of family owners, as well as professional 
managers (in a central, if subordinated, role implementing the decisions of top management), in the 
coordination and control of large diversified conglomerates.
13 Exceptions to this pattern occur in a small but growing number of older chaebol where control has 
passed to a second generation (for example, Ssangyong and Lucky-Goldstar) and where the reins of 
control are held in the hands of two or more successors (ibid.).
14 However this is changing, according to Kim W. (1994:91): as the general trend is toward the separation 
of ownership and management, one could expect to see the increasing importance of professional, non­
family managers vis-a-vis family members. Kim YT. (1998 & 2003) also argues that there are signs that 
the family-dominated structure of the Korean chaebol is beginning to collapse in the succession process. 
For example, in recent years the Daewoo group and the Dong-Ah group openly announced that in the 
next generation they plan to transform their chaebol into more institutional corporations under 
professional managers - suggesting a beginning of the end of family capitalism (Kim YT. 1998:232).
15 The chaebol’s diversity is crucial to their position within the Korean economy since their influence is 
derived from their ability to be more or less self-sufficient through ownership of a wide variety of firms, 
among them the often-lucrative retail and service-oriented businesses. Their flexibility in mobilising and 
utilising personnel, capital, and technology within their member firms greatly enhanced their power (Kim 
EM. 1991:287).
16 Following the definitions offered by Kim SK. (1987), Kang MH. (1996:38) explains how the recent 
economic history of Korea is mirrored by the growth of chaebol, and as such can be considered in three 
stages: the consolidation period, leading to the expansion period, and finally the mature period. The 
consolidation period occurred in the 1960s, which was a time of high, sustained economic growth, strong 
political commitment to development, extensive and effective intervention by the government, and a 
reversal from an inward-looking to an outward-looking national strategy. The expansion period of the 
1970s saw an accelerating growth of chaebol, as well as that of the national economy. Although the basic 
attitude of the government towards business remained largely unchanged, this was a period of even 
stronger political commitment to economic growth, the establishment of an outward-looking 
internationalist strategy, and a change in emphasis from labour-intensive light industry to more-capital­
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intensive heavy industry. The mature period covered the 1980s, when economic growth began to slow. 
The Chun government then in power aimed for more stable growth with reduced direct government 
intervention and a greater reliance on market mechanisms, while at the same time increasing indirect 
regulatory pressures on chaebol. While the growth of chaebol was able to continue, it was a growth that 
was based largely on lateral product and market diversification.
17 Kang MH.’s (1996:127) view on this matter is particularly indicative and is summarised below:
“The government is largely responsible for the concentration of economic power in Korea. 
Because strategic industries emphasised by the government required a huge capacity in 
technology, capital, manpower, and organisation, the chaebol were favoured over other firms. It 
was then natural that the benefits of the tax credit and trade policies should accrue primarily to 
these chaebol groups. In other words, the growth of chaebol groups through diversification, 
attributable to the original advantages provided by their business capabilities, was further aided 
by the growth-first policy of the Korean government. Since many chaebol owe their success 
entirely to government support, a close relationship between government and business has been 
inevitable. These benefits included preferential access to the disposal of government-vested 
properties during the period of confusion (1945 to the end of the Korean War in 1953); 
preferential allotment of foreign aid and grants during the period of reconstruction (after the 
Korean war to the late 1950s); preferential consideration for obtaining loans during the period of 
development (the 1960s to the early 1970s); preferential treatment in taxation and financing; and 
inclusion in the five-year economic development plans of the government.”
18 The government used the nationalised banks to reward companies that conformed to government 
policies and to attract firms into sectors that they otherwise regarded as insufficiently profitable or too 
risky (Kang MH. 1996:147). According to Edwards (1992), their ratios of debt finance to equity (or 
‘shareholders funds’) rose from around 1:1 in the early 1960s to almost 4:1 in the late 1970s. This has 
been a central element in Korean govemment-business relations and has had an important bearing on the 
extent of private economic power (Edwards 1992; Mason et al. 1980:286).
19 Kang MH. (pi51) suggests that the close relationship between the government and chaebol continued 
through the 1980s, but with the government’s pre-eminent power beginning to fade.
20 On 21 November 1997, the Korean government made a request to the IMF for financial assistance and 
by 3 December an IMF-supervised rescue package worth $57 billion had been assembled (Kong 
2000:ch.6).
21 The new Kim Dae-jung government at that time initiated transformation programmes, and most 
corporations responded to these changes by making efforts to restructure (Kim S. 2001; Shin JS. and 
Chang HJ. 2003; Bae and Rowley 2004). Restructuring programmes included adjustments in business, 
financial, ownership and governance elements, according to Bae and Rowley (2004). Institutional 
contexts (that is, labour, product and venture capital markets) also have been changed: with the increase 
in venture capital firms, it became easier to raise funds for start-up enterprises (ibid.: 100-101).
22 This had the effect of forcing chaebol to seek to withdraw from peripheral (often marginally profitable, 
or even loss-making) activities and focus on fewer (perhaps just two or three) core enterprises (Kwon 
O.Y. 2001; see also Shin JS. and Chang HJ. 2003).
23 This had the effect of opening domestic markets to imports and international competition and also 
encouraging FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). Foreign capital was attracted to Korea as direct 
investment, often bringing technological benefits, through mergers, joint ventures, and even acquisitions 
of domestic companies. This significant increase in foreign currency investment provided an alternative 
source of finance for chaebol, yet one subject to the discipline of the international marketplace (Bishop 
2001; Kim WS. 2001; Kwon O.Y. 2001; Seo JS. 2003; Shin JS. and Chang HJ. 2003; Yun M. 2003)
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24 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second imdicates educational attainment on 
joining: h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the interviewee (from 1 
to 51); a final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile of chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘fulO*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a particular 
affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
25 See Appendix 2.1 for chaebol codes and business sectors.
26 Interviewee code: The first letter denotes sex, the second occupation (s - student, f - foreign company 
employee, g - government employee, w - housewife, and b - own business; the number identifies 
interviewee (from 52 to 64). See Appendix 1.2 for the codes and profile for non-chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
27 As an example, President Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-87) apparently promised favours if chaebol 
contributed to his personal and political slush fund (Bello and Rosenfeld 1990:72).
28 Usually Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, LG, and SK were regarded as the most powerful, ‘top five’ 
chaebol in the 1990s when my research was undertaken.
29 However, this did not apply to Japanese companies in Korea. According to female employees of these 
firms, in contrast to their initial expectation that a foreign company would be a better employer than a 
Korean firm, they found that the working conditions and status of women in them could be worse (fu47, 
356). A female respondent (fu47), who had recently been laid off by her financially-struggling chaebol 
employer (H2) and then joined the Seoul branch of a major Japanese zaibatsu (conglomerate), said that 
the working conditions in the chaebol were far better than in the current company (M). In particular, there 
was a clear sexual division in job allocation with a strict gender hierarchy: female graduates in M were 
allocated to tasks that would usually have been given to female high-school leavers in her previous 
employer. Furthermore, there was a large wage gap between male and female graduates working in M.
According to these women this was due to a combination of factors, such as the ‘imported’ work 
culture and strict Japanese hierarchy, inflexibility in Korean offices that have retained the rules and 
customs of the 1960s when their office first opened, and the local climate of gender discrimination 
prevailing in Korea. It seems that while the status and conditions of female office workers in Japan have 
been improving over decades, however slowly (e.g. Carter and Dilatush 1976; Lebra 1984; Condon 1985; 
Carney and O’Kelly 1990; Saso 1990; Lam 1990, 1992, 1993; Iwao 1993; Shinotsuka 1994; Makoto 
1996; Ogasawara 1998), the work culture and administrative systems of Japanese branch offices in Korea 
have apparently changed little as far as gender issues are concerned. This evinces the complexity of inter­
relationships in the global marketplace between foreign MNCs, national culture and enterprises, and 
specific workplace practices.
30 Samsung introduced ‘open recruitment’ (yeolin chae-yong) in 1995 to allow anyone who wished to 
apply, and selected them for their ability and potential rather than their personal background, education 
and ji-yeon etc. For example, about 80 people who did not attend university were hired at the same level 
as graduates. Women were also expected to represent 15-20 percent of their new recruits (Lee, YS. 
1996:89) Samsung’s announcement that it would abolish discriminatory assessment based purely on 
academic background and initiate a “first generation of open recruitment”, has sparked a flurry of these 
kinds of advertisements considered sensational in Korea (Chang and Sung 1996:77).
31 Interviewee code: cs denotes chaebol seminar, the number identifies the presenter (from 65 to 75). See 
Appendix 1.3 for codes for presenters at chaebol recruitment seminars.
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32 It is not unusual for workers to stay after working hours to help colleagues with allocated tasks since 
they consider themselves as team members in the same group (mu25m-Hl).
33 Their understanding of “the influence of traditional (Confucian) culture” at work naturally varied 
between individuals. For some it was almost unnoticed (possibly because they were used to it, and 
accepted it as ‘natural’ without giving it much thought) while for others it was too great to ignore (such as 
“influencing 70-80 percent of their work culture” (e.g. mul6-Sl)). As clear evidence of this influence at 
work many interviewees identified strong hierarchical relationships between elder and younger, 
authoritarianism, male superiority and many others. See the later part of this chapter for more details.
34 For example, in chaebol offices interactions between people take place on an unofficial and emotional 
plane as well as an official level. While the employer or superiors somewhat represent father figures to 
both male and female staff) women are often viewed as playing a role as a daughter or little sister to 
superiors or male colleagues. Even among female staff, they often call their female seniors (in age) as 
"Uni’ (meaning ‘sister’ in a family context). In this working atmosphere similar to an extended family, 
women often find themselves in a lower position in the (family) hierarchy - not only for their work- 
related tasks but also to serve men and undertake private errands for them as expected in the family. 
Chaebol’s tendency to maintain a family-like work atmosphere, due to the strong influence of familism, 
will be further discussed in later parts of this chapter.
35 While stating that one of the important organisational characteristics of chaebol is their degree of 
control (that is, how tightly and hierarchically the internal relationships are organised), Kim W. (1994:89) 
explains that the degree of internal control affects the ease with which external influences are absorbed, 
and that the tighter and more hierarchical is a chaebol’s internal structure, the easier it should be to 
implement change among member companies.
36 In this regard, the following quotation well explains the relationship between Korean militarism and its 
influence on organisational culture:
“Successive military governments, together with compulsory military training for most young 
men of nearly three years each, saw the principles of military organisation disseminated through 
much of Korean society. The predominating learned hierarchical structure was one where every 
lower station is subordinated to a higher one. With management and labour alike well drilled in 
this ethos, it is little wonder that such a militaristic attitude is so accurately reflected in industrial 
relations. Some analysts suggest that what a Confucian heritage does do, however, is to make it 
easier for such a system of authority to be implemented” (Asia Monitor resource Centre 
1987:27).
Whitley (1992:195) also argues that the transfer of military systems of organisation and control to many 
parts of the state bureaucracy after 1961 was echoed by their influence on private business organisations, 
not least through the recruitment of military officers. According to him, military styles of management 
thus became important models in the rapidly expanding chaebol and matched traditional patterns of 
authoritarian supervision.
37 These characteristics are not unique to chaebol; they also appear in other Korean organisations, such as 
government offices (fg60, fg61)
38 Similar practices are also quite common outside Korea: for example, see Scott (ed.) (1990).
39 An interesting, yet indicative, example is that when some chaebol managers were asked (as a favour 
through personal channels) to introduce me to members of staff for interview, they would suggest male 
and female employees working at different levels in different departments -  but who, in many cases, just 
happened to have graduated from the same university attended by the manager himself.
40 This contrasts with the Japanese concept of loyalty whereby the commitment is primarily to the
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organisation as a whole and its collective goals (see Whitley 1991, for a (detailed comparative discussion).
41 According to Janelli (1993:235), while the low level of mobility bettween firms and ponderous career 
paths of most white-collar workers reflect the somewhat similar situation in Japan (see also Kumazawa 
and Yamada 1989; Nakamura and Nitta 1995; Broadbent 2003 - for the discussion of Japanese lifelong 
employment), in Korea lifetime employment was never even implicitly guaranteed. Ungson et al. (1997) 
also argue that, in contrast to Japan, layoffs in Korea are not uncommon and that the concept of lifetime 
employment is rarely seen in practice. However, from my personal experience of the interviews, the 
concept of ‘lifetime employment’ was very familiar to most male chaebol employees -  especially in view 
of their perception and attitude before the ‘IMF crisis’ and the subsequent severe redundancies (this view 
is also strongly supported by Kim DO. et al. 2000:141-2).
42 However, this seems no longer to be the case since many Korean companies have reduced the number 
of their staff in the wake of the IMF crisis in 1997. The details will be discussed in Chapter 7.
43 According to Baba (2004), although the seniority system may have weakened since the breakdown of 
the bubble economy in Japan, long-term, or ‘lifetime’, employment (another principal characteristic of 
Japanese-style management) has remained almost unchanged.
44 On the other hand, Song BN. (1997:197) interestingly points out that the lifetime employment ideal 
also encourages employees to become familiar with the variety of skills they are likely to need during 
their lengthy employment with the firm.
45 The IMF bailout requirements forced the Korean government to override union objections to easing 
laws restricting the ability of large companies to lay off staff, which had previously been virtually 
impossible in Korea (Chang HJ. 1998; Rowley and Bae 1998; Kirk 1999:ch.7; Kong 2000; Kim S. 2001). 
According to Kim S. (2001), the railroaded bill of December 1996 was designed to broaden the scope of 
layoffs; however, due to procedural defects, this law was re-amended in March 1997 after a general 
strike. The financial crisis in November of the same year changed the assessment again; in order to fulfil 
requirements of the IMF bailout package it was no longer possible to delay the layoff procedure for two 
years as re-amended by the congress in March that year (see Kim S. 2001 for more details). As the 
economic shock of 1997 deeply affected every aspect of life in Korea, the depressed economy pushed the 
unemployment and poverty rates up. Before the 1997 crisis, national unemployment was usually kept 
under 3 percent (Park NH. 2002); a year later unemployment reached 8 percent and peaked at 8.4 percent 
in the first quarter of 1999, before declining then plummeting to 3.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2000 
(King 2000; Park NH 2002). Kong (2000:240) explains that organised labour’s acceptance of lay-offs 
(implying acknowledgement of its weak position) was contingent on its perception that the burdens of the 
crisis would be shared fairly (see also Kim S. 2001).
46 Sla denotes company a from chaebol SI. See Appendix 2.1 for chaebol codes and business sectors 
(companies).
47 This practice seemed to be more common among male employees, most of whom were frequent 
participants, while many women tended to be more individualistic and less enthusiastic than men in after- 
work group socialising. This may also be due to the fact that men sometimes implicitly exclude women 
from their ‘male-bonding’ occasions.
48 However, this trend has been declining due to various factors, such as economic pressures arising from 
the IMF crisis, changing individual attitudes towards work commitment, and outlook on life in general. 
For example, many would nowadays spend more time investing in their career (e.g. by studying for better 
qualifications) or on their private life (e.g. on family or leisure activities) rather than hanging out drinking 
with colleagues (mu35) - which is often seen as a positive change.
49 A quotation from a female employee can illustrate the point well here:
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“For chaebol H and its related companies (e.g. H2) traditional influences are stronger. Other 
companies that have been influenced a lot by modem Western or Japanese culture, such as S, 
are said to be much less influenced by traditional Confucian culture. As an example in the 
everyday working life in our company, when there is an excellent idea suggested by a staff 
member, if the boss doesn’t buy the idea and wants to do it in his own different way (which can 
be seen by others as clearly less efficient or effective) everyone has to obey. But, to my 
understanding, in some companies like SS, staff members were given opportunities to discuss 
and challenge things more freely, and if a junior’s opinion is more sensible the boss may find it 
difficult to stick to his own way all the time” (fii46-H2).
50 For example, the study of a chaebol, Taesong, by Janelli and Yim (1998) demonstrated that the cultural 
understanding and practices of its office workers for achieving harmony had multiple origins and 
disparate qualities; they were simultaneously traditional and modem, in that past ideas and practices had 
been transformed and adapted to modem circumstances.
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CHAPTER SIX
EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN CHAEBOL: 
A Gender Perspective
6.1 Introduction
The primary aim of this chapter is to examine policies and practices for both male and 
female office employees in chaebol. The source material is derived mainly from an 
analysis of interviews with employees and managers, supplemented by additional 
published information relating to employment policies and practices in chaebol. The 
chapter is ordered into four sections covering the key elements of human resource 
management: i) ‘recruitment’, ii) ‘development’, iii) ‘rewards’, and iv) ‘termination’. 
Each of these four sections embraces both general considerations and specific gender- 
related aspects of the topic; in each case, the chaebol’s general policies and practices 
relating to the subject are considered together with their application from a gender 
perspective where appropriate.
The ‘recruitment’ section covers the general methodical approach, the availability 
and access of information to kongchae (open recruitment) candidates, the procedures 
and criteria used in the selection process and the allocation of successful recruits to 
departments and jobs. In the ‘development’ section, the way chaebol train and prepare 
their employees for promotion will be examined, including staff training (both general 
and ‘on the job’), task assignment, job rotation and transfers. In the ‘rewards’ section, 
performance evaluation, promotion and remuneration issues are discussed, while in the 
final section, ‘termination’, the topics of retirement, resignation and dismissal will be 
examined.
To undertake a general evaluation of labour employment processes from a gender- 
aware perspective, a number of important questions must be addressed. Such questions 
would relate to whether women are treated less favourably than men in recruitment and 
staff development; whether their work performance and attitudes toward their job are
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evaluated differently from men; whether one sex receives better opportunities for 
promotion and rewards than the other, or perhaps is less likely to advance rapidly with 
poorer career prospects, and also whether one sex is more likely to be dismissed or 
leave voluntarily (perhaps as a result of pressure from the company or the working 
environment) than the other.
6.2 Recruitment
a) Recruitment Method
Chaebol have customarily recruited most of their new staff by kongchae, which takes 
place once (or sometimes twice) each year at the same time when prospective 
candidates seek employment. For example, Janelli’s study (1993) of one of the major 
chaebol showed that by the mid-1980s the group’s annual hiring was concentrated into 
two major recruitment drives -  one in the autumn (habangi) and one in the spring 
(sangbangi). The former was aimed at college seniors who were about to complete their 
last semester, and the latter for commissioned ROTC1 officers soon to be discharged 
from military service. Other workers were recruited in smaller numbers whenever a 
special need arose (ibid.: 135; also mu34m2)3.
The perceived security, high wages and good working conditions in chaebol have 
resulted in intense competition for employment by them4. Benefiting from this, chaebol 
often show preference for male over female workers (as noted in the previous chapter) 
and, even though the tendency may not be as explicit as formerly, some of their 
recruitment methods naturally favour men. Examples of these are recruitment through 
the intern system and from among ROTC-commissioned officers about to be discharged 
from military service. The intern system allows university students from particular 
faculties of more-privileged universities to work in industry for a short period (which 
varies from a couple of weeks to 6 months) while they are still students; apart from 
providing quality temporary labour, it enables chaebol subsequently to attract them into 
full employment on graduation5 (mulm, mu38m, mu41, mu42, cs73). To employ 
ROTC-commissioned officers, chaebol use special, focused recruitment advertisements 
and a selection procedure using interviews and aptitude tests. A good reason for
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preferring ROTC officers, according to a chaebol manager, is that their army service 
marks them out as having leadership qualities, which gives them priority over other 
candidates. In the past, especially in the mid 1990s when it was hard to secure top- 
quality recruits, this approach was also practised at particular universities. Continuation 
of these selective practices in the future will depend on the labour market and the 
economy. Staff hired through the intern system are mostly men (fh28) and ROTC 
officers are always men (mu5, fill8*, ful9*). Therefore, both these recruitment 
methods can be considered male-centred and effectively exclude women.
b) Information Access
The usual chaebol kongchae recruitment process follows an established path: 
advertisement in the press and at selected universities, collection of completed 
application forms, initial short-listing of promising candidates from these application 
forms, and finally two or three face-to-face interviews, sometimes followed by some 
written tests -  as confirmed by chaebol HR managers and representatives during their 
recruitment seminars (CS676, cs65, cs69, cs71)7.
During the major recruitment drive by chaebol each year, which begins with large 
advertisements in leading newspapers and on bulletin boards at selected universities, for 
candidates seeking employment it is vital that they can secure relevant information 
about jobs and employers. Expectant graduates have to seek information on 
employment from the job centre of their university, their departmental notice board, 
newspaper advertisements and established job information centres. On occasion, 
individual subsidiaries within a chaebol might initiate direct contact with particular 
universities, or even particular faculties, in order to seek access to superior candidates. 
This is usually arranged by members of chaebol staff who are also alumni of the 
particular university or faculty in question. The company would then select new staff 
from the pool of those candidates through a process of interviews and tests (such as 
aptitude tests) (mulm, ful4, ful9*, mu38m, mu41, mu42, cs73).
However, there seems to be some disparity between the sexes in their access to this 
recruitment information, in making direct contact with companies, and in benefiting 
from these special approaches to their university or faculty. It is quite common for male
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job candidates to have easier access to alumni contacts within companies and their 
promotional visits, as well as recommendations by their faculty, even though the 
recruitment process is ostensibly by open competition. The corporate climate appears 
more supportive and welcoming for men, especially those from more-prestigious 
universities (also see Brinton et al. 2001). On the other hand for female job candidates, 
many of whom are from women’s universities (even if prestigious ones), it is more a 
process that they have to handle by themselves. For example, as indicated by my field 
research interviews (see Appendix 2.5), all female employees were hired by the open 
competition (kongchae) method, yet only 81 percent of male employees were hired in 
this manner; the remaining 19 percent were initially contacted by their future employer 
through a faculty or company-sponsored scholarship, or an internship, or recommended 
by an already-employed alumnus - even though most of these cases were considered as 
part of kongchae. In terms of pure ‘open’ recruitment, while 48 percent of male job 
candidates learned about and applied for the position through university or faculty 
contacts (e.g. through alumni, by faculty recommendation or by company promotion at 
the university), only 16 percent of female graduates interviewed specified this 
involvement and assistance from their university, faculty or other alumni. Further, 
while 33 percent of male graduate interviewees learned about and applied for jobs 
through public notices and newspapers, the majority (84 percent) of their female 
counterparts made no particular mention of their university or faculty, suggesting that 
most of the information gathering and application process was carried out by 
themselves.
c) Selection Process
A valid application usually specified a maximum age of 29 years8, a bachelor’s degree 
from a four-year university, a specialisation (usually) in one of several specified fields, 
and completion of (or exemption from) military service (Janelli 1993:135; also cs66, 
cs73). The application form would also disclose the candidate’s academic performance 
at university, prizes awarded and other qualifications (e.g. foreign languages, computer 
knowledge, and additional courses attended), while interviews would reveal the 
personality and character of the candidate (Lee JK. 1996). For the selection of new
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recruits, academic performance and the impression made in interviews seemed to be the 
most important criteria for success (cs73). In evaluating academic performance, the 
criteria varied according to the university attended by the candidate. For example, a 
personnel manager (mulm) in chaebol SI revealed that, for candidates from a top few 
universities 3 points (out of a maximum 4.5) would be considered sufficient to qualify 
for recruitment, whereas for those at less-privileged universities (including most 
universities outside Seoul) 4 points might be required. However, this manager also 
added that, provided candidates meet this basic academic threshold, chaebol would 
nowadays tend thereafter to ignore academic performance and interview all candidates 
without prejudice. The purpose of interviews is to make a general evaluation of the 
candidate, judge personality and character, assess motivation and desire for the job, in 
addition to appraising the candidate’s general knowledge and common sense, verbal 
ability, overall approach to life, as well as likely loyalty, co-operative and leadership 
aptitude (Chang SJ et al. 1992:38; also cs67-Hl, cs69-Dl, cs71-L).
In spite of an increase in the proportion of female graduates employed by chaebol 
since the late 1980s, which reached a peak in the mid-1990s9, the ratio of women to 
men in chaebol offices has remained comparatively low. At chaebol recruitment 
seminars in 1997, the recruiting representatives (e.g. cs66, cs69) claimed that their 
companies aimed to select a new-staff induction pool comprising, on average, 
approximately 10-12 percent women in the forthcoming recruitment season. However, 
this aim seemed rarely to have been achieved in any of their companies, either in that or 
the following years: according to female interviewees (e.g. fu37, fu43*, fs5310), top 
chaebol, such as SI, usually hired one woman for every ten men when they were 
actively recruiting female staff, and in recent years, especially after the economic crisis, 
this ratio has declined with very few women now being hired.11
Since the Sexual Equality in Employment Act (first enacted in 1987 and 
subsequently amended three times) intended to improve gender equality and eliminate 
obstacles to women’s participation in employment (Kim and Park 1992; Kim E. 1999), 
Korean employers have been more aware and careful about their employment policies 
and practices (fh33, mu34m). However, they still show either a strong preference for 
male recruits or have little real awareness of gender equality, as one manager even
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admitted (e.g. mu34m-S2). While a significant number of interviewees (not only men
but also women) stated that there was no or little apparent gender discrimination in
recruitment and other employment policies and practices (e.g. mulm, mu2, mu4, mu5,
mh8, ful 8*, fh24, fh29, fu32, mu34, mu35, fu37, fu40) the following statement by a
male interviewee involved in recruitment (mu35-S2) demonstrated an inherently
contradictory perception and understanding of gender issues.
“Since I, as a recruitment team member, had first-hand experience of hiring 
new staff, I know for sure that there is no gender discrimination in recruitment.
We hire fairly based only on the candidate’s record in the application form, and 
interviews. However, one thing to mention is that in recruiting new staff there 
are two approaches: one is to employ a certain number of people and allocate 
them accordingly; and the other is to hire according to the specific demand from 
each department. In the latter case (which we used for the last recruitment 
process), most departments specifically required male staff and we naturally 
followed their requests. In that situation there was no need or reason to employ 
women, was there? So even though there were many good female candidates, 
with good academic records and impressive interviews, we had to cut down on 
employing them.”
It is clear that gender discrimination still exists in recruitment, as one female staff 
member from the same chaebol (fh36-S2) pointed out: “even if women are better 
qualified objectively, they are less likely to be hired because of their sex and 
companies’ gender-biased attitude”.
d) Job Allocation
While formal policies may show little overt gender discrimination, the practical aspects 
of implementing the policies are somewhat different and display clear evidence of 
gender discriminatory practices in recruitment. Even if women have a similar level of 
educational attainment and qualification, the distribution of jobs between the sexes 
often differed. This propensity has already been observed elsewhere. The work of 
Chung and Chang in the mid 1980s (1985:32) identified the sectors in which companies 
employed female graduates by hiring through kongchae (open recruitment). Female 
graduate employees in these companies were mostly confined to certain tasks, such as 
secretarial work, designing, computer programming, translating and research work, 
where the assumed ‘feminine traits’ suited best12. More recently Hahn JH. (1997)
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criticised the fact that, when the Samsung Group launched its large-scale female 
recruitment programme in 1992 and employed 200 female graduates through kongchae, 
the female recruits were employed mainly as professional secretaries, software experts 
and design specialists, while successful male candidates suffered no such restrictions in 
job allocation.13
When a small number of female graduates are selected by chaebol at the same time as 
men for the same jobs, they tend often to be better qualified and more capable than their 
male colleagues. This is not only because these women are recruited in competition 
with men but also, as fewer women are hired, they are selected from a proportionally 
larger and very competitive pool of female candidates, as some interviewees (e.g. 
fill 8*, fu l9*, m42, fs53) recognised. Of personnel managers interviewed in a study by 
Sohn and Jo (1993), 80 percent admitted that their employed female staff had generally 
scored higher than their male counterparts in their recruitment evaluation (which 
included academic performance at university, foreign language skills etc.). This was 
also confirmed by many of my interviewees (e.g. fill 8*, fill9*, fu37, mu41, mu42, 
fu44*), both men and women, who acknowledged that in their experience the female 
candidates tended to be brighter, more capable, and better qualified than most of the 
men recruited at the same time.
The next question, then, is to ask whether these highly qualified women, having 
been hired by a chaebol, would be treated by their employer as equally as men and as 
favourably as they deserve? Would they be able to forge a successful career in their 
companies as their male colleagues do? These issues are explored in the remainder of 
this chapter while examining chaebol’s policies and practices in relation to staff 
development, rewards and separations.
6.3 Development
a) Staff Training
Once they are recruited, the development and training of members of staff is widely 
recognised by chaebol as being of paramount importance. The nature of this training 
varies from chaebol to chaebol, and also between subsidiary companies within the same
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chaebol. Typically, however, after a relatively short induction period the new 
employees are assigned to core departments, such as planning, finance and accounting 
(Steers et al. 1989:112). Staff training and education in chaebol primarily involves 
induction courses for new staff and OJT (‘on the job training’), supplemented by 
specific development programmes, which include external courses (such as foreign 
language and computer courses) and educational visits overseas (mu38m, cs65). In 
addition, training for management, preparation for promotion and instruction in general 
etiquette (typically for female staff) are also common. For example, in chaebol SI, 
where the commitment to training and developing new staff is regarded as among the 
best in Korea (according to mul5m-Sl, mb64), the usual process was described by a 
manager in charge of staff recruitment and training (mulm-Sl) as follows:
i) The initial inductive training of newly recruited staff14, both recruits employed 
directly by the chaebol and those hired by subsidiary companies, is usually 
organised by the chaebol as a large group forum. This formal training would last 
some 3-4 weeks and take place away from home, after which the recruits would 
be sent to their particular companies. When a company received its new staff it 
would devote the next 6 to 12 months to providing further intensive training, 
usually involving an introduction to each department, computer and data 
processing instruction and field training. Occasionally, if a particular 
department urgently needed staff, recruits might be allocated to it immediately 
and receive their on the job training there.
ii) Apart from formal inductive training, the subject chaebol provides frequent 
opportunities for staff to receive classroom training by specialist lecturers. 
Increasingly, of course, many training and educational courses are disseminated 
by computer (available to all staff) and through the internet.
iii) At each managerial level staff can be offered training for promotion to the next 
level.
iv) For more senior executives, the company provides general management 
development programmes.
v) Occasionally, the chaebol sends members of staff away on external courses and 
programmes. If this is at the staff member’s initiative, a small (10 percent or 
less) contribution by the employee towards the cost is normally taken to 
encourage commitment and diligence. Many such courses are attended in the 
evenings after work.
Staff training and education are considered by chaebol as vital for long-term success. 
In chaebol, where the idea of lifetime employment has been historically important (as 
seen in the previous chapter), the close attention paid to personnel matters and career 
development has been based upon the assumption that employees commit themselves to
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long-term, if not lifetime, employment. As far as employees’ views on staff training 
were concerned, while some (both male and female) interviewees were pleased to learn 
new skills (e.g. mul7, fu47) and felt that their employers; were supportive and better 
than medium or smaller-sized companies in developing staff (e.g. mul5, mul6), others 
expressed some dissatisfaction with their company’s lack of effort in promoting 
education (e.g. fh23, mu34). Even though the views of individuals varied according to 
their personal experiences and impressions, working conditions in chaebol were 
generally regarded as superior to those in non-chaebol companies.
From a gender perspective, the majority of the female graduates interviewed 
indicated that, in terms of formal training offered by the company, men and women 
were treated equally if they were assigned to the same jobs. However, some women 
(e.g. fu32-Dl, fu47-H2, fu50-H2, fu51-D2) pointed out that, despite the multitude of 
formal training programmes for staff, OJT still constitutes the most important type of 
staff development and that there were major differences in treatment between the sexes 
in prolonged OJT and in the type of work assigned to individual employees. “As far as 
formal policies are concerned, it is believed that there is no gender discrimination. Yet, 
when it comes to opportunities, I admit that fewer chances are given to women”, stated 
one male interviewee (mhl3) from company Sla (textiles), which was well regarded 
for its modern and less-gendered working atmosphere. Even though there appears to be 
no apparent gender discrimination in formal company policies, chaebol are often 
regarded as preferring to invest in the development and training of male, rather than 
female, employees -  which was pointed out by many women (both high-school leavers 
and graduates) and admitted even by male staff members (e.g. fh9-Sl, mhl8-Sl, fh23- 
Hl, fh29-Hl, fu39-L, mu38m-Dl, mu42-P, fu43*-P, fu44*-P, fu47-H2, fu50-H2, fu51- 
D2). For example, while training and overseas educational visits are motivating 
incentives for staff, and regarded as a long-term investment in human resources, they 
seem to be somewhat restricted as far as women are concerned. Women are given fewer 
opportunities than men, and their chances are usually worse if they are married (as was 
specifically pointed out by fh23-Hl, fu43*-P, fu44*-P, fh49-H2). It is quite common 
for a woman to be excluded from educational training or attending a symposium with a 
superior because developing junior male staff is often favoured over training (even
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more-senior) female staff, as was stated by a female graduate (fu51) from a minor 
chaebol D2.
One of the main reasons for this general tendency of chaebol and senior executives 
to invest less generously in training and development for female employees seems to be 
the superiors’ discriminating attitude and treatment toward female staff. “Work 
allocation for female staff largely depends on the boss and his attitudes towards 
women”, said one employee (fu50-H2). Even though managers’ ways of thinking and 
attitudes have changed considerably, many still believe that women (especially those 
who are high-school leavers) are not really suitable for the job or the company in the 
long-term. Even if a woman is very good, superiors usually have little intention of 
investing in her as they would with men - as was recognised by both men and women 
(e.g. mu3-Sl, fh33-Dl). The training and development of staff naturally incurs heavy 
costs and chaebol seem to focus their human resource investment mainly on employees 
whom they believe to be more likely to provide future benefit to the company. The 
perceptions, biased or not, of employers and male superiors on female staff will be 
further discussed in Chapter 7. Meanwhile, the following quotation from one male 
employee of chaebol SI (mu3-Sl) offers an interesting insight into this apparent 
partiality:
“Some superiors or bosses, when male and female members of staff have 
completed work which does not satisfy them, tend with women to take the easy 
way out through half-hearted acceptance, while with men they criticise harshly 
to make sure that they produce better work the next time. Superiors are more 
likely to be hard on their male staff, but at the same time they are more 
supportive and concerned about their future career development. And I do not 
find this treatment fair for both men and women.”
b) Task Assignment
Although the organisational structure in chaebol is centralised and its functions 
formalised, individual jobs are not formally structured as in other Korean business 
firms, according to Kang MH. (1996:111). He suggests that job descriptions and 
specifications rarely exist, and that job tasks and work responsibilities of individual 
employees are largely determined by the supervisor while the jobs are being performed. 
Kang further argues that, although the absence of job descriptions may cause
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inefficiencies, such as duplication and an unbalanced workload, it may also increase 
flexibility in work assignment and allow an organic adaptation to changing conditions. 
Under this arrangement of unstructured responsibilities with a high degree of 
centralisation and formalism, individual and departmental performance depends 
importantly upon the ability of the individual or supervisor to get things done with the 
support of other people (ibid.). As pointed out by a male employee (mu41) of chaebol 
P, few tasks and little responsibility are given to individuals, but they are given to the 
team collectively (see also Chapter 5 where the group-oriented work culture of chaebol 
is considered). As a consequence, individual workers have to report to senior staff even 
trivial matters that are beyond their own decision-making limits when, in the view of 
the respondent, allocating clear responsibilities and authority would have helped to 
create a more efficient working environment. Similar practices seemed to be common 
in other chaebol, according to my personal observation during interviews.
When assigning jobs to newly-recruited employees, according to Janelli (1993:139), 
limited recognition was given to the students’ university major: only graduates of 
business schools were put into finance or accounting departments, for example, and an 
international trade or foreign-language major stood a good chance of being assigned to 
exports work. He further suggested that the training acquired in college rarely provided 
sufficient knowledge of detailed procedures, skills, or even special terminology needed 
for permanent work assignments, and the company’s decision was based only partly on 
the students’ academic specialism. In making job assignments in chaebol, claimed some 
managers (e.g. mulm-Sl, mu38m-L), the company tries to reflect as far as possible the 
wishes of the individual in the light of available openings, and also in view of the 
vocational aptitude and performance shown during the job interviews and in the 
induction training period after recruitment, when they received extensive information 
about each department and its main tasks.
In allocating work, a supervisor or manager may tend to give more-important, core 
tasks to his favourite members of staff, while those less favoured would receive 
ancillary work which is less likely to allow the demonstration of skills and potential - as 
was confirmed by both men and women, managers and employees (e.g. mulm-Sl, 
mu5-Sl, mu31-Dl, fu37-S2, fu46-H2). In this type of situation, establishing a special
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relationship with a boss and ‘pulling strings’ can influence the job assignment and
subsequent career development. As a male employee (mu5-Sl) comments,
“Once an employee has established a special rapport with his or her boss or 
senior [usually a man], and is favoured over other colleagues, the employee has 
a much better chance of receiving support and developing a career faster in the 
company. A good relationship with the boss makes the allocation of core tasks 
with higher responsibility more likely, and the reverse, where a poor 
relationship results in less important work, is also true. Initially, until the first 
supervisory (<daeri) level is reached, this effect can be comparatively 
insignificant, but at more senior levels it can become very important. This may 
ultimately cause less-favoured employees to leave the company.”
Even though it was not unusual to find some male staff who expressed
dissatisfaction with their work assignments for being less challenging than expected or
for not being what they had wanted (e.g. mul6-Sl, mul7-Sl), it was more common to
come across female employees who were not satisfied with their assigned tasks. Many
female graduates and some high-school leavers felt that important or responsible work
was not usually given to female employees regardless of their capabilities and that they
found their given tasks somewhat boring or unchallenging (e.g. ful3-Sl, ful8*-Sl,
fh23-Hl, fu37-S2, fu47-H2). Even if worthwhile work was allocated to them, it was
often less important than that given to their male colleagues (Janelli 1993). Some
women also expressed frustration because they felt that they had not been so well
trained, and had received less coaching from their superiors, mainly because of being
women, and that if a male employee was as capable as a female employee the
opportunity was likely to be given to the man because the company favoured him more
(e.g. ful3, fill8*, fu47). A quotation from a female graduate employee from chaebol
H2 (fu47-H2) illustrates their situation as follows:
“In training and job allocation, the company is more supportive towards men 
and allows them more time to develop themselves. Superiors, on the other hand, 
would give women work left over from men, or less interesting and fragmented 
work that men didn’t wish to do. For this reason, women have less time to 
invest in developing themselves and learning how to do proper work.”
This tendency of women to be allocated less-favourable tasks than their male 
counterparts was also recognised by some men themselves, from different chaebol (e.g. 
mu4-Sl, mu26-Hl, mu42-P, mu45-H2) -  even though one man (mu4) added that it was
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the fault of women themselves because they tended to avoid difficult tasks instead of
making efforts to accomplish them (see Chapter 7 for further discussion on this issue).
A good example of gender discrimination in training and development is well
illustrated by an experience of a male interviewee in chaebol P (mu42): an opportunity
to travel overseas on an educational trip was offered to him, although it was obvious
that his female colleague, who had joined the department before him, was more
deserving. The male interviewee took the opportunity, but felt guilty and sorry for her
because it was in conflict with accepted practice based on seniority according to the
length of time worked. Another male employee, while being interviewed, voluntarily
expressed his shared frustration that his wife (working in a different chaebol) felt
discouraged because very little challenging work had been given to her over the last ten
years (mu45-H2). Importantly, this kind of unfair treatment towards women was
acknowledged by a manager who had work experience in a human resources
department of chaebol S2 (mu34m-S2), as follows:
“There is no discrimination in recruitment; we hire according to performance 
and potential. That is why we have some female employees in our company. 
However, a problem arises when we allocate them to different departments 
since the mangers from certain departments are often reluctant to take female 
staff. For example, the sales department don’t want to have women due to 
practical restrictions, such as the need to make overseas business trips. In such 
cases, we tend to allocate them to other supporting departments, where many 
female high-school leavers work. But then these female graduates seem to 
create other problems - like conflicts with the existing non-graduates ”
c) Job Rotation and Transfers
Career development and promotion in chaebol often involves job rotation and transfers. 
Regular job rotation is used both as a means to acquire different skills and to enhance a 
worker’s administrative ability, as well as providing increased flexibility for the 
organisation. According to the manager quoted above (mu34m), a staff member with 
high potential is likely to receive a succession of tasks and training opportunities to 
assist promotion to general manager or specialist15. He considered himself well 
appreciated by his seniors, but also admitted that he had been well circulated among a 
number of the best departments, and that his career prospects within the company were 
good - even though he was secretly planning eventually to move to join a relative’s
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company, where he would have more power and authority. On the other hand another 
male interviewee from a different chaebol (mu5-Sl), who thought he was doing 
reasonably well in his allocated job, felt less confident as a company employee because 
he had not been well circulated; he knew little about other departments and doubted he 
would be successful in them. He (mu5) also added that, if the current situation 
continued, he would leave the firm within five to seven years to change his career path. 
This comparison seems to indicate clearly the importance of training and job rotation in 
Korean companies.
Women, however, tend over time to lag behind their male colleagues in career
progression, even when assigned the same jobs as men. This is partly because of the
difference between men and women in opportunities for job rotation and transfers (see
Chapters 7 and 8 for their actual experiences). An example of this was described by a
female graduate from a less-known, smaller chaebol (D2) where the discrimination was
probably worse than in most other chaebol studied:
“When I first started working for the company, two men also joined the same 
department at the same level. After almost four years of working I have 
remained in the same department and am still the most junior of seven staff 
members - while the two men have moved up to a higher level. The main reason 
is that the company has kept me in the same department doing the same work, 
depriving me of the opportunity to learn and gain experience elsewhere within 
the company, while the two men have circulated through a number of 
departments learning different work. In our company, it is only women who 
remain in the same department for a number of years, which is clearly gender- 
discriminatory. Even if women were promoted to a managerial level after many 
years experience, they would usually be allocated to a position assisting men, as 
in administration. Even though there is no obvious discrimination in written 
promotion policies (women are usually promoted after due time, and I have 
accordingly been promoted to a ke-jang level), the differing job assignments 
and rotation greatly affects promotion opportunities, making for a huge 
difference between men and women” (fu51-D2; 28 years old).
The view that when a female and a male employee compete on similar terms priority 
was given to the man, was held not only by female employees but also recognised by 
some male staff. In a business environment where this kind of job assignment system is 
common, women benefit less than their male colleagues and often find themselves in 
situations less favourable for their career development. For instance, as one female
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respondent (fu50-H2) reasoned, if a woman usually receives less-important work than 
the core tasks given to a man, this will inevitably resultt in fewer opportunities for 
promotion and further career development, and she will become disheartened.
This perceived gender bias in relationships betweem senior management and 
members of staff will be further examined in the following chapter where employers’ 
perceptions and attitudes towards their female staff are considered. These differing 
perceptions and attitudes can lead to quite different treatment of staff, in turn resulting 
in different outcomes for their careers. As Park SJ. (1989) correctly argued, there was a 
positive relationship between the employer's attitude towards (and perception of) 
female employees and the way they recruited female staff and treated them.
6.4 Rewards
a) Performance Evaluation
For any employment reward system encompassing remuneration and selection for 
promotion to function properly, an impartial process of performance evaluation must be 
in place. One of the most distinctive features of performance evaluation in Korean 
employment is, however, “the ambivalent criteria for evaluating work”, as noted by 
some interviewees (e.g. mulm, mu4, ful4)16. This is partly because the actual 
performance of a task tends to be a joint effort of a work group or team, which makes 
the evaluation of an individual’s performance difficult (as recounted by mulm, fill4) in 
an environment where teamwork as part of a group is considered more important than 
individual achievement (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed consideration of the work 
culture of chaebol). This has led to a work climate where, apart from a few who are 
either outstandingly good or similarly bad, the capability and performance of most staff 
members are regarded as broadly similar. Moreover, in evaluating work performance 
there is always a tendency that the process becomes an assessment of the person rather 
than the job, since human relationships are valued more highly than the work itself. 
This fact was readily admitted by a senior manager from chaebol S I:
“In a people-oriented work culture, the work cannot be clearly divided between
individuals, whereas in a work-oriented culture an employee’s work is
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appreciated for the performance of the work itself. And human relationships 
play an important role in work evaluation” (mulm-Sl).
Most employees interviewed regarded the performance evaluation system in their
chaebol as being generally fair, but on occasion less so for a variety of reasons. One of
the most common reasons for dissatisfaction, which was related to ambivalence about
performance evaluation in chaebol, was that managers tended to give good assessments
to employees under consideration for promotion and poor ones for those who were not,
regardless of their real work performance (as confirmed by mu4-Sl, fh24-Hl, mu41-P,
fu43*-P, fu48-H2; see also Pucik & Lim JC. 2002). The interviewees (e.g. mu4, fh24)
explained that, apart from a few whose work was clearly outstanding, for most
employees evaluation related less to their work performance and rather more to a
consideration of their promotion prospects or possible salary increases. According to a
female graduate employee from chaebol P,
“It happens often. In the company’s performance evaluation system, merit 
grades from A to D are allocated to each individual, and they are supposed to be 
evenly distributed. As a result, if someone is under consideration for promotion, 
the grades of other workers might be sacrificed to give the promotion candidate 
a better grade” (fu43*-P).
It was a widely held view that the company’s evaluation process was not fully rational 
since staff were promoted when they had reached the ‘right time’, rather than whether 
they had earned it17.
Another aspect of the process with which the interviewees were not satisfied was the 
fact that performance evaluation was not usually open to the employees themselves, 
and that staff who were assessed by their managers knew neither the result nor any 
particular comments (as pointed out by mu22-Hl, fu48-H2). Rather than being candid 
and open, it was a one-way, ‘top-down’ system from managers and directors to the 
staff, and the resulting evaluation was officially kept secret even from the staff 
themselves (mu22). This system of evaluating performance was also confirmed by 
other studies, such as the one by Kang MH. (1996:115), in which he revealed that most 
Korean firms did not hold appraisal interviews, and that there was no feedback or 
discussion between the superior and the subordinate. As a result, appraisal data are used
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more for reward decisions (ibid) than to evaluate performance. The problem with this,
according to one male interviewee (mu22-Hl), was that employees did not know the
result of the assessment and this made them uncertain and insecure. Discrimination was
more likely to occur in this situation, yet it was difficult to detect, said another
respondent from a different chaebol:
“Since the evaluator is often not the direct superior but usually a more senior 
manager, in my opinion the system gives assessments that are 60 percent fair 
and 40 percent unfair. The unfairness comes from a lack of communication or 
awareness of the real situation, plus other factors such as the interpersonal 
relations between them. The relationship of the staff member with the direct 
boss is as important as that with the evaluator, because the intermediate direct 
boss plays an important role. The better and closer the relationship between the 
evaluated staff member and the manager (and between the manager and the 
evaluator), the higher is the chance of the employee securing a good 
assessment” (mu5-Sl).
Because an objective evaluation of the work performance of individuals is not easy to 
establish, it was usually the team manager’s personal opinion that played a critical role 
(as argued by mu5-Sl, fu48-H2). As a result, assessment of the performance of 
members of staff is, inevitably, to a large extent subjective. In his study, Kang MH. 
(1996:115) came to a similar view that in many cases seniority or the top manager’s 
personal evaluation played a large part in the reward decision. In these circumstances, 
individual favouritism could be important and affect the performance evaluation as well 
as job allocation, as admitted by both male and female staff (e.g. mh8-Sl, mu22-Hl, 
fu50-H2). A human resources manager (mulm-Sl) who frequently evaluated staff 
performance, was well aware of the dissatisfaction of some employees with the system, 
and the difficulty of making fair and objective assessments of performance where the 
nature of work is different for each member of staff. However, unlike those employees 
who found some aspects of the company’s job evaluation system biased and 
unsatisfactory, an apparently confident member of staff from the human resources 
department, whose career appeared to be going well, held a slightly different view, as 
follows:
“I consider the work evaluation by seniors and the personnel department as fair 
and non-discriminative. Work performance evaluated by figures or data can be 
important but the impression and intuition of the senior [boss] is generally
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correct. Anyone who is considered by others as capable and good at work is also 
equally well regarded by the person in charge of evaluation” (mu2-Sl).
It was interesting to see this junior member of staff, in the same human resources 
department as the previously-quoted manager, having such a strong positive view with 
few doubts about the firm’s evaluation system, while his direct boss (mulm) and 
seemingly his ‘protector’18 in the company had a more balanced, less categorical 
outlook on the same matter.
As shown earlier, it is generally (if superficially) accepted that women who are hired 
through a chaebol’s kong-chae (open recruitment) procedure are as capable as men and 
have similar, or sometimes better, qualifications than their male colleagues. Newly- 
hired female graduates are usually appreciated both for their potential and for their 
ability to learn and perform their responsibilities. Their employers and managers 
viewed them as being well qualified and focused. According to Sohn and Jo (1993), 
personnel managers were usually satisfied with the work performance of their female 
staff and held a high regard for their sincerity, their capacity for work hard and attention 
to detail, and their consistency. However, they were considered as quite different from 
men in the way they carried out their tasks and their attitude towards work, and this 
often affected their progress and career development unfavourably. Women usually 
considered themselves, and were so regarded by male colleagues, as quick learners, 
creative thinkers and rather better than men in their attention to detail (e.g. mu5, mh6, 
mul7, fill8*, mu27, mu35, mu42). There were, therefore, some disciplines in which 
women were considered to make better workers than men - such as design, public 
relations and advertising, computer programming, management and storage of data, and 
financial administration and planning - where their more-delicate ‘feminine’ 
characteristics and attention to detail could be effectively employed (as suggested by 
male respondents, such as mulm, mu5, mh6, mu35)19.
In comparison, men were viewed as excelling in situational judgement and more 
determined, forceful, loyal, and good at networking - often regarded as essential for a 
successful career, as stated by men as well as women (e.g. fu l8*, mul7, mu42). This 
also implied that, to a certain extent, women were correspondingly lacking in initiative, 
leadership and dedication to the company as a lifetime (or at least long-term) employer.
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While women usually undertook ‘desk work’, mostly in supporting departments (such 
as planning, finance and human resources), men were assiigned to tasks that required 
action, quick judgement and decision-making, communicatiion with clients or suppliers, 
and frequently involving ‘working outside’ - as recognised by women themselves (e.g. 
fu27-Hl, fu37-S2). With a few exceptions, women were mot considered to like, or be 
active enough for, sales or related disciplines; while men were eager to take initiative 
and meet clients, women tended to remain behind and consequently miss opportunities 
(mulm-Sl, fh23-Hl, mu34m-S2). Women would either find sales work difficult 
because of the frequent business trips and meetings with many people (often involving 
meals and drinking), or the (usually-male) clients preferred to deal with men, with 
whom they felt more comfortable socialising (fh23-Hl, fh49-H2). Even though all jobs 
and disciplines were considered important for the company, ‘men’s work’ normally 
undertaken by male staff members was usually seen as more important and offering 
better career-prospects (fu27-Hl, fu37-S2).
While women saw themselves as less likely to be corrupted, and more objective in 
dealing with projects or contracting with suppliers (ful3-Sl, fu43*-P), they admitted
that they were less likely to be good at office politics involving superiors and
20colleagues (fu43*-P, fu39-L). Men were usually considered to have better social 
skills and more likely to achieve progress through networking and personal 
relationships with clients and superiors (almost always men), to the benefit of their 
careers (mu7-Sl, ful3-Sl).
Sohn and Jo (1993) suggested in their study of chaebol that while personnel 
managers (mostly male) evaluated women’s work performance (and potential) as being 
as good as men, or even better in certain tasks, when it came to an overall evaluation 
they tended to consider male staff as superior. My own research confirmed this in that 
women, in spite of their recognised abilities, appeared to be evaluated less favourably 
than their male colleagues. Unless demonstrably exceptional, women were usually 
excluded from the highest grades and typically assessed as ‘mediocre’. The reasons for 
these less-favourable performance evaluations may be numerous and are probably 
complex. There is little doubt that it is partly because work performance assessment in 
chaebol is informally geared to assist those being considered for promotion, and that
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women were less likely to fall into this category (as suggested by fh9-Sl, mu4-Sl, 
fu43*-P) - this is considered further in the following section. Another possible 
explanation, supported by my findings, is the fact that work relationships and 
interaction with their (male) bosses are intrinsically different from those of their male 
colleagues. Due to their usually superior ability to network and participate in office 
politics in the male-bonding culture of Korea, men have established closer relationships 
with their superiors and male colleagues, yielding benefits of mutual cooperation, 
loyalty and commitment. This has clearly benefited men and, as a result, women have 
often missed important information, and also opportunities to develop their career.
b) Remuneration and Promotion
Korean companies generally take both seniority and performance into consideration 
when making their reward decisions. The reward system is traditionally based on 
seniority even though, with the growth of Korean business and the increasing 
sophistication of its management, companies are gradually moving towards considering 
performance evaluation as a factor in reward decisions (according to mu34m-S2; see 
also Kim S. and Briscoe 1997; Bae and Rowley 2004). On the whole, however, 
seniority is still seen to be the most important factor in reward decisions in most Korean 
business firms (Lee HC. 1989; Kim DO. et al. 2000) and promotion is more likely to be 
based on ‘yeon-kong-seo-yeol'21 (length of service) than work performance (as reported 
by ful8*-Sl, fu44*-P). However, the criteria used for evaluation depend on the type of 
reward decisions. In promotion, according to Kang MH. (1996:114), seniority tends to 
be more important at lower levels of the organisation, while at higher grades, especially 
those with general management and executive status, performance is usually more 
important than seniority. Janelli (1993:144) also noted that employees in Korean firms 
had been regularly promoted to the next-higher level after a certain period of time, and 
advancement (particularly among the lower white-collar ranks) depended primarily on 
years of service and annual assessments by the two most-immediate superiors. Clearly, 
as in other hierarchical organisations, in chaebol the more senior the position the fewer 
there are available.
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In chaebol, as in other Korean companies, staff performance evaluations embrace an 
assessment of work performance and a procedure known as 4Insakokwa *, both of which 
are reflected in promotion decisions (fu44*-P). Insakokwa means, according to the 
definition used in one of the major chaebol (SI), “a regular assessment, evaluation, 
criticism and guidance on the performance ability and achievement of employees, to 
help them with their self-development and work progress, and to promote a harmonious 
growth between individual staff and the company” (Strategic Business Consultants 
1997:7; see also Lee HY. 1996). While the evaluation of work performance is ‘work- 
centred’, insakokwa is ‘person-centred’ (Strategic Business Consultants 1997:8). Even 
though employees are regularly promoted to the next higher level after a certain period 
of time, the average duration between promotions was not usually a matter of public 
information.
According to Monthly Recruit magazine22 (July 1987:37), variations in the speed of 
promotion existed not only between chaebol but also between sister affiliates of the 
same chaebol, according to the company’s rate of growth. Major chaebol typically 
required a new recruit (sawon) to work for about fourteen years before qualifying for 
promotion to department head. The reported average time before preferment for current 
department heads in 1987 was 14.7 years (Maeil kyongje sinmun, Jan.26, 1987:2), but 
some individual promotions had taken several years longer (Monthly Recruit 1987:37). 
At one chaebol company (Sla), for example, there used to be 11 mini-promotion levels 
(sung-kyeok), each of which was supposed to take approximately two years. However, 
currently this two-year period has been extended to some three years. As a result, it 
would now take three years for a graduate recruit to be promoted to ju-im ’ (between 
general staff and daeri), another three years to ‘daeri’ (supervisory level), a further 
three years to ‘kwa-jang’ (junior/section manager) and so on (mulm-Sl)23. In a 
different chaebol (L), in comparison, each mini-promotion requires four years for a new 
staff member to reach daeri, kwa-jang, and then cha-jang levels respectively (mu38m- 
L).
However, new changes in the assessment and promotion system are beginning to 
appear: some firms recently have started to stress the importance of ‘merit’ and ‘job 
performance’ in their promotion system (see also Kim S. and Briscoe 1997; Kim DO. et
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al. 2000; Lepage and Gross 2001; Pacific Bride, Inc. 2001; Bae and Rowley 2004).24
One of the most important new changes is the introduction of ‘yeon-bong-je \  whereby
employees are promoted according to their work performance rather than mainly on
their length of service (yeon-kong-seo-yeol). In a number of companies, this system has
already been introduced and applied to some more senior levels in the organisation. For
example, this yeon-bong-je system was implemented at daeri (supervisor) level and
above in company Sla in 1999, whereas in company Sib it had only been introduced at
managerial level, with the daeri level to be included during the following year (mulm-
Sl a, ful8*-Slb). With the practice of yeon-bong-je, each employee of daeri status and
above would receive a different salary, which could vary between individuals by up to
20-30 percent. This, according to a manager (mulm-Sl), could lead to pressure and
serious stress among those staff members whose work performance was less-favourably
assessed. Further, the applicability of this system was questioned by some (e.g. mu34m-
S2) since the nature of Korean work culture, with its person-oriented rather than task-
oriented focus, made an objective evaluation of an individual’s work difficult (Ungson
et al. 1997). Nevertheless, it was clear that the general trend was moving towards yeon-
bong-je, with its more objective appreciation of employees’ work performance rather
than length of service (mulm-Sl, mu34m-S2, mu45-H2)26.
On the whole, however, in the chaebol studied it was still seniority that was the most
important factor in reward decisions, as in most other Korean business firms shown in
Lee HC.’s study (1989).27 It also appeared that, although performance evaluation did
recognise work achievement, employees in chaebol were still promoted by a system
based largely on seniority, dedication, loyalty and their personal relationship with their
superiors and top management, rather than on their objective contribution to the
company through work performance.
Women in chaebol generally seemed to be considered less seriously for promotion,
which they were achieving slightly more slowly than men (according to mu4, mu5,
fu43*, fu46, fu47, fu50). This was not only felt by women themselves but also
recognised by their male colleagues. For example,
“There is a tendency that when both a woman and a man are under 
consideration for promotion, the company or superiors tend to support the man 
instead of the woman by giving him a better work assessment” (fu43*-P).
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“There are some women who are hard working and equally appreciated by 
the company but I am not sure whether they have an equal chance to be 
promoted, and with as good a future as men” (mu4-Sl).
Some respondents added that gender discrimination in promotion could be more 
obvious, especially in those companies where the main industry was less female- 
friendly, such as heavy manufacturing and construction. In such companies it was 
considered very difficult for a woman to be promoted to managerial status alongside 
men - even though a few women could have reached the daeri (supervisor) level. 
Furthermore, the nature of a department or its work does affect promotional 
opportunities (as suggested by fu21-Sl, fh33-Dl, fu43*-P, fu47-H2). As mentioned 
earlier, women were usually allocated to certain ‘feminine’ departments (e.g. designing, 
planning, administration, public relations) where their chances of career development 
and promotion were considered better. However, there were very few instances of a 
chaebol employee doing purely administrative work being promoted to a senior level, 
however long they served. As pointed out by one female member of staff (ful4) from 
chaebol SI, most of the long-serving senior executives are men promoted from the 
management department, while the highest position achieved by a man from an 
administrative discipline was departmental manager (bujang) of a less-popular 
department, such as planning. This has important implications for women and their 
career development since they usually work in administrative or supporting, rather than 
core, departments.
Even for those few female workers who had been promoted to daeri, and had so far 
experienced little discrimination, when it came to being considered for further 
promotion to a higher level (such as middle management grades and above) they were 
less confident and feared that there might be some gender bias (as stated by mu5-Sl, 
fulO*-Sl, ful8-Sl, fu37-S2, fu43*-P, fu44*-P).28 This uncertainty was further 
increased by the fact that there were few instances of a woman having reached
9Qmanagerial level in their company. Consequently, there was little indication of how 
far a woman could progress and no role model for new female staff to aspire to (ful 8*- 
Sl). In a way, however, this is perhaps understandable since chaebol only began hiring
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female graduates through kongchae (open recruitment) in the late 1980s, and in larger 
numbers in the early and mid 1990s. As one female interviewee (fu39-L) pointed out, 
considering the short history of hiring female graduates it might be too early to judge 
objectively whether or not women have been discriminated against in promotion. 
Women have, so far, often reached daeri (supervisor) level, a promotion that can 
usually be achieved by staying with the company for a certain length of time rather than 
through superior work performance. Therefore, only in the future, when the time comes 
for women to be promoted to managerial level where more responsibility is involved 
and work evaluation is considered critically important, will the truth about gender 
equality or otherwise in promotion be revealed. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the 
case of a newly-launched affiliate of a chaebol which had to headhunt some managers 
because, due to their short five-year history of kongchae recruitment, the highest 
position reached by a new employee was only at the daeri level. Although the 
company’s target market comprised women as potential clients, and it therefore hired a 
high proportion of women (50 percent of their new recruits in the first year were 
women), among all the managers headhunted by the firm there was only one woman 
selected for a junior managerial position {kwa-jang\ whereas all the other managers 
were men (fu39-L).
Overall, the likelihood that women have fewer opportunities for promotion is chiefly 
for the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter: the fact that women appear to their 
superiors as less suitable than men to be considered for promotion is compounded by 
the resulting lower likelihood of favourable assessments.
In concluding this discussion of rewards systems, there is another important element 
to consider - remuneration. Like promotion, basic salaries are largely based on seniority 
in chaebol. Most Korean companies determine an employee’s base salary after 
considering the level of education30 and seniority of the employee, and then add 
appropriate special allowances to arrive at the gross salary (Kang MH. 1996:115). In 
addition to the salary paid monthly, Korean companies pay seasonal bonuses (such as at 
Christmas, New Year, Korean Thanksgiving Day, and for vacations) (Kang MH. 1996; 
Ungson et al. 1997), and frequently also performance bonuses distributed according to 
work accomplishment, particularly at the end of the year. According to Janelli
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(1993:147, 149), an employee’s salary correlated closely with his or her rank, yet base 
pay was not determined by rank but by the system of pay grades and salary steps. He 
also suggested that salaries increased with the size of the company and that bonuses 
increased with age, years of service, education, and occupation (ibid.: 151). It is worth 
noting, however, that due to the recent economic crisis and the consequent IMF- 
inspired structural adjustment, there have been particular difficulties in staff 
compensation involving reductions in salary or (at least) fringe benefits. It has been 
common practice in many companies to reduce employees’ bonuses or fringe benefits. 
For instance, in company D la there were no salary cuts for general staff (while there 
were at managerial level and above) yet fringe benefits, including housing loans for 
(usually married) employees, have been reduced (as reported by one of its employee 
fu32).
Basic starting salaries for male and female graduates recruited at the same time were 
usually the same.31 Some male employees (mu4, mu25m) claimed that there was no 
difference in payment between male and female graduates when he started, unlike in 
the past when men were better paid. He also added that the policy of equal pay was 
being maintained and was expected to continue in the future. However, according to 
Bai and Cho (1995:140), because the wages paid by Korean firms include a number of 
fringe benefits (such as cost-of-living, housing, family support and children’s education 
allowances) that are normally offered only to male workers, there are additional 
factors that help create a wage differential between male and female workers. A female 
respondent (fh9-Sl) also confirmed that fringe benefits were not equally distributed to 
all staff, but were affected largely by marital status and seniority: for example, a 
married man with children as a household head received special benefits, such as 
housing benefit, family support and children’s education allowances, whereas 
unmarried women like herself received almost no benefits.
6.5 Termination
There are three main pathways out of regular employment: retirement (natural 
conclusion of a working life), resignation (voluntary termination of employment) and
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dismissal. For white-collar employees, retirement at present predominately involves 
men, as female graduates have been recruited in any number only since 1985 (see 
Chapter 1) and few female high-school leavers remain at work after marriage or 
childbirth (see later chapters); for female white-collar employees natural retirement is 
currently rare.
Dismissal has certainly become more common since the recent economic crisis, 
together with the gradual erosion of the concept of ‘lifetime’ employment, as discussed 
in Chapter 5. However, chaebol often prefer to manoeuvre selected employees into 
‘voluntary resignation’ or ‘honourable retirement’, which may be considered a blurred 
combination of all three pathways. How ‘voluntary’ a resignation or retirement is can 
be hard to determine, in view of the work culture and many subtle means of applying 
pressure on an employee. The main discussion in this section, therefore, will focus on 
dismissal in its various forms.
For ordinary male employees, apart from a few high-achieving top executives and 
directors, the usual age limit for retirement is around 50 to 55 years in most chaebol33 
(Steers et al. 1989; mul5m, mu41). Traditionally, it was accepted that once a person 
(typically a male) was employed by a chaebol he would usually remain until he retired 
(mu5-Sl, mu7-Sl, mh8-Sl, ful4-Sl, mul5-Sl, mu22-Hl, mu41-P). However, 
according to Ungson et al. (1997), estimates of annual voluntary labour turnover in 
Korean firms range from 10 percent to 20 percent34, but much of this is attributed to 
women leaving the company to get married or have children. In fact, as they argue 
(ibid.), it is estimated that more than 70 percent of all employee turnover is among 
women.
Even though overt dismissal was not common, there were discrete mechanisms by 
which the company would be able to dispense with less-suited staff members before 
they reached retirement age. For example, when layoffs are necessary companies often 
encourage older workers or female employees of marriageable age to leave - and 
provide a financial incentive to do so (Steer et al. 1989:123; Ungson et al. 1997:207). 
For some other cases, the company might repeatedly exclude someone from timely 
promotion or allocate him or her to a position that was obviously unattractive; the 
employee would probably feel uncomfortable or embarrassed and eventually decide to
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leave (fh24-Hl; see also Janelli and Yim 1998). Further, im the very hierarchical work 
culture of chaebol where seniority is a vital element in interpersonal relations, should 
the company promote a younger person to a higher position than an older employee, 
leaving the latter to serve under the former, neither would feel comfortable working 
together (ful8*-Sl)35. In this case the elder (usually),, feeling less capable and 
abandoned by the company, would soon leave (fl8). A similar practice was also 
identified elsewhere; according to Janelli’s study (1993:153), when asked how the 
company would go about getting rid of someone, several junior managers explained 
that instead of firing a man outright the company would humiliate him into resigning by 
giving him no work to do or by transferring him to an undesirable post.
Dismissal or redundancy of chaebol staff had not been the object of particular 
attention until about 1997. As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, the concept and practice of 
lifetime employment has been changing, especially since the 1997 economic crisis 
when many chaebol were forced to release large numbers of employees while ‘down­
sizing’ their business organisations (cs73; see also Kim DO. et al. 2000; Bae and 
Rowley 2004). The response of chaebol to the crisis was to introduce a new policy to 
encourage their unwanted employees to leave, since they could not force them to do so. 
This policy was known as ‘voluntary resignation’ or ‘honourable retirement system’ 
under which employees were encouraged to leave honourably rather than facing more 
severe action (as explained by mu4, fu51).36 The following quotations from 
interviewees well illustrate the practice:
“Before the economic crisis, typically 7-8 percent of employees left each year 
through resignation or retirement. Since the crisis, however, almost 50 percent 
of the staff members have left as the company could not afford to keep them. 
Because the company did not wish to force its employees to leave, it introduced 
a ‘voluntary retirement/resignation’ scheme under which anyone who had 
worked for seven years or more would receive a bonus of nine months salary on 
leaving, while anyone who had worked less than seven years would get five 
months salary. Realising the situation that the firm was facing, many men and 
women left voluntarily under this scheme” (mu4-Sl)
“At the end of 1997 when the financial situation became difficult, the company 
closed a number of departments by combining them with others (e.g. a 
previously-separate staff training department was absorbed into the HR 
department) and wanted to reduce the number of staff. That was when they
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introduced the policy of ‘voluntary resignation’. The immediate future of the 
company looked gloomy and I thought that it would be wiser, and that I would 
be better off, if I resigned immediately with a cash payment (5,000,000 won31, 
including overdue bonus) since there was speculation that cash benefits might 
cease if the financial situation got worse. Also, there were rumours that after the 
voluntary resignation period many employees were going to be asked to leave 
anyway. As a result many members of staff, who considered that they were 
being kept in the dark and felt insecure, eventually decided to leave voluntarily 
before the time ran out. So like many others, I hurried! to resign. However, we 
later learned that the company’s financial situation wasn’t as bad as had been 
rumoured, and in the end the company managed to reduce the number of staff to 
almost half (from 1,500 to 700-800 employees) by getting rid of most of those 
whom they considered least needed in the company” (fu51-D2).
In fact, due to the ‘voluntary resignation’ scheme many chaebol employees left their
companies. The number of voluntary resignations and the extent of pressure applied to
staff varied between chaebol: some forced all their staff to hand in ‘voluntary’
resignations, which they then accepted from those least needed and refused from those
they wished to retain. In other cases, superiors would have a ‘direct and frank’
conversation with their staff, along the lines of “we only need so many in this
department and you rank outside this number” (mu4-Sl). In this case, the employee
would have little choice but to leave. Although by this process the company might lose
some of its most capable staff, nevertheless they did manage to remove many less-
capable or less-wanted employees, or those who did not get along well with their
superiors - regardless of their true capability (mu4). One incident is particularly
illuminating in this respect. A senior HR manager claimed that, since officially there
were no forced dismissals, there was no seniority or gender bias among those
employees who left. However, when he further explained the situation as follows, the
reality seemed to be somewhat different:
“An instruction (or an order) came down to each department with an indication 
of the desired number of employees to be retained in the department, and asking 
the senior manager of the department to make the critical decisions in selecting 
those people he needed to keep, considering the efficiency and best interests of 
the department” (mulm-Sl).
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In these circumstances, where the power to decide resides im the person in charge of the 
department, his choices are likely to be largely subjective and depend on his personal 
opinion and relationship with each member of staff.
The people who have left the company by the process of ‘voluntary resignation’ or 
‘honourable retirement’ could be categorised into different groups. These included: i) 
experienced members of staff and middle managers who had worked long enough but 
seemed to be struggling or lagging behind their peers and who consequently had poor 
future prospects; they were often regarded by their employers as not cost-effective, 
being less valued than their remuneration justified; ii) capable employees who were not 
well suited to the company, or unappreciated by their superiors - often recent graduates 
who were bright and confident, yet felt unappreciated and who took the opportunity to 
make a major career change; iii) women, especially, who felt they had little future in the 
company - particularly those who had worked for an extended period, such as married 
female high-school leavers (as recounted by mu4-Sl, ful3-Sl, fu51-D2).
Even though these separations were voluntary and the choice was offered to the 
employee, some claimed that the prime targets of this policy of ‘indirect dismissal’ or 
‘voluntary resignation’ were women, especially those who were married (such as wives 
whose husbands also worked in the company, or women on maternity leave) or long- 
serving, junior staff. Even before the economic hardship, Korean companies had a long 
history of laying off married or pregnant female employees in an ‘unofficial’ way. 
Women in the office were prone to informal, indirect pressure to leave when they 
married and, more often, on becoming pregnant. One male employee (mu27) from 
chaebol HI suspected, although there were still some married women in the office, that 
they would face difficulties once pregnant: since it was not possible to force their 
resignation directly, managers would put the women under a certain amount of pressure 
to leave, assisted by the gender-biased working atmosphere that would contribute to 
their discomfort. Women themselves understood the situation well; a number of 
interviewees said that even if there was normally little discrimination, when it came to 
reducing staff women were usually the first to go (e.g. ful2*-Sl, ful3-Sl, ful4-Sl, 
fu44*-P, mu45-H2, fu46-H2).
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Resignation was often encouraged by bosses who pleaded the company’s hardship,
or warned of a posting to less-privileged work. In some cases where the number of staff
had to be reduced, bosses would even ask female employees to “be sympathetic” by
giving up their own position in favour of a male colleague who was the main
breadwinner of his family (ful9*-Sl). One female employee expressed her
dissatisfaction with the different way the company treated men and women in a similar
situation as follows:
“It seems that there is normally no sexual discrimination here. However, in a 
critical situation like this [suggested resignation] sexual discrimination does 
apply. This is largely due to the conventional way of thinking and the attitude of 
the employer and superiors. When the company has to reduce the number of 
staff, there is no doubt that women would be the first to be laid off since men 
need work as they have a family dependent on them, while women can depend 
either on their parents or their husbands” (ful2*-Sl).
Kim TH. (1995) also noted that many chaebol have recently introduced an ‘honourable 
retirement’ policy to reduce costs. According to his study on the honourable retirement 
practice of several banks, the major targets of this practice have turned out to be female 
employees in their 30s, or those whose work conflicted with the demands of their 
children’s upbringing or education, or women who have passed the promotion 
examination for daeri (supervisor level) but were still waiting for actual promotion.
The treatment of women in the context of dismissal and resignation is a complicated 
issue. Further discussion of this matter will be reserved for the following chapters, 
when other related factors are also considered while exploring in more detail women’s 
work experiences, and their reactions and adaptations to those experiences.
6.6 Conclusion
Even if some female employees do not feel strongly that there is an overt policy of 
sexual discrimination, it is clear that fewer recruitment, training, education and 
promotion opportunities are being offered to women, in practice demonstrating 
discrimination. In spite of the increase in recruitment of female graduates in the early 
and mid-1990s, chaebol have more recently failed even to maintain the female
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proportion of recruits at the level then achieved. Further, fennale employees have clearly 
received less beneficial OJT, having been assigned to less-important or less-challenging 
jobs, or to functional areas traditionally regarded as more suitable for women. This also 
implies that female workers are given little opportunity to' transfer to more important 
jobs that would enable them to leam more about the company, and acquire different 
skills in preparation for further career advancement. Gender discrimination in training 
and job assignment, however small in degree, inevitably leads to further discrimination 
in work evaluation, promotion and remuneration, and must adversely affect career 
prospects. In most cases men’s careers were taken more seriously, and consequently 
their work was more favourably evaluated by their superiors - while promotions for 
female staff to higher positions (such as kwa-jang and above) were restricted. Although 
overt direct dismissals were not common in chaebol offices, women traditionally have 
been under pressure to leave on marriage or pregnancy. More recently, when the 
economic pressures of the late 1990s led chaebol to introduce tougher and more robust 
policies involving staff dismissals (e.g. by ‘voluntary resignation’ or ‘honorary 
retirement’), women have been the easiest targets.
Consequently, even in chaebol that are regarded as better employers than most other 
Korean companies, the number of female employees is still small and women who 
command managerial jobs are very rare. One good example, that demonstrates how 
difficult it is for women to survive in this gendered environment, is that among 400 
female graduates recruited by DaeWoo Group in 1985 (the first year that their graduate 
recruitment programme officially accepted women) only 12 remained in the company 
at the beginning of 1995 - a survival rate of just 3 percent {HanKyeoRe Sinmoon, 27 
February1995). Referring to the low survival rate of women in chaebol, one female 
worker (fu20*-Sl) explained that most women, even those showing the same 
capabilities as men, were undervalued at work and their opinions ignored; as a result 
they tended to become discouraged, lose interest and leave the job after a few years.
The extent of these gendered practices appeared to vary from company to company 
and chaebol to chaebol, according to the size and sophistication of the organisation and 
the characteristics of the firm’s work culture. Further, gender discrimination also varied 
according to the industry in which the company operated, the role of the department, as
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well as the education level of the women concerned. However, my findings clearly 
confirmed that in all the chaebol and companies studied sexual discrimination existed 
from the initial recruitment process through to the end of employment.
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the employment policies and practices 
that operate in chaebol, and view them from a gender perspective in order to promote a 
more objective understanding of these practices and their scope. The following two 
chapters will examine the essential nature of gender relations in chaebol offices and 
how both employees and employers (superiors) consider gender discrimination. Even 
though the study of company-wide policies promoting gender equality are valuable and 
necessary, it is clear that people’s actual behaviour, ways of thinking and attitudes are 
far more important in influencing interactions at work and gender relations in the office. 
For example, how do employers and male colleagues really regard female employees, 
and what types of explanation or excuse do they give to justify gender discrimination? 
What are women’s actual experiences and feelings about unequal treatment at work, 
and what practically can they do about them, and how do they affect their future plans? 
These questions and issues will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8.
Notes
1 ROTC denotes Reserve Officers Training Corps (or called ‘hak-goon-dcm ’ in Korean).
2 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment on 
joining: h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the interviewee (from 1 
to 51); a final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile of chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘fulO*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a particular 
affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
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3 Apart from kongchae, there are other less-known recruiting methods used by some chaebol at different 
times, such as by recommendation (‘choo-cheon’), special hiring (‘tiuk-chae’), internship (‘intern’), or 
company-sponsored scholarship (‘san-hak-jang-hak-saeng’) (mu38m,, mu41, cs73). As far as the quality 
of recruited labour is concerned, the scholarship method is usually thie best, intern and recommendation 
being good, and kongchae less good. However, once employed working conditions and rewards are the 
same since in Korean companies (unlike foreign firms) the starting salaries are identical for all new 
recruits (mu38m, mu41).
4 This has changed somewhat since the 1997/8 economic crisis: somie traditional benefits flowing from 
working in chaebol (such as job security) have diminished, while recruitment has become even more 
competitive. See the remaining chapters for further discussion.
5 This practice, however, has been less popular in recent years due to adverse changes to the economy and 
labour market since 1997.
6 Interviewee code: cs denotes chaebol seminar, the number identifies the presenter (from 65 to 75). See 
Appendix 1.3 for codes for the presenters at chaebol recruitment seminars.
7 In recent years most chaebol have hired their new staff mainly by application form and interview (in 
some cases with an aptitude test), rather than by written examination that was commonly practised in the 
past (typically until the mid 1990s).
8 Which means that the candidates should be no more than 28 years old (by western age count). This does 
not allow much flexibility as most students enter university for their 4-year degree course when aged 20 
years; males then have to complete two-and-a-half years of compulsory military service.
9 As already shown in Chapter 3, the ratio of female graduates hired by the top 50 chaebol had risen 
steadily from 4.2 percent in 1990 to 12.1 percent in 1996 (Minwoohoe, 1997:2). The percentage of 
women hired through kongchae by the top 30 chaebol reached only 13.6 percent in 1995 when this trend 
was in its full swing (Minwoohoe 1997; Hahn JH. 1997).
10 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex, the second occupation (s - student, f - foreign 
company employee, g - government employee, w - housewife, and b - own business; the number 
identifies interviewee (from 52 to 64). See Appendix 1.2 for the codes and profile for non-chaebol 
interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
11 It was not possible to obtain the precise figures.
12 Company A: secretary, staff management, translator, industrial design, architectural design, computer 
programmer for display rooms (sales display), researcher, nutritionist (for company canteens), employee 
counsellor, preparer of papers in English, management of exhibition hall/room.
Company B: designer, translating and researching data and information, editing work papers, in-company 
broadcasting, electronics, designer/projector (architecture), company librarian.
Company C: copywriter, company newspaper editor, librarian (collecting and managing data, translation), 
market researcher, design of products and clothes, architecture and interior design, research.
Company D: secretary, general administration, architecture, industrial design, translation, computer, and 
editorial work (Chung and Chang 1985:32).
13 . ,iThis practice seems to have continued after my field research. According to Pucik and Lim JC. (2002), 
compared to their male colleagues women still face considerable obstacles in finding desirable white- 
collar jobs in major companies. However, because skill requirements are changing in many business 
areas and the number of female graduates is increasing, companies are trying to hire more women for
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specialist jobs: for example, Samsung is now placing particular emphasis on recruiting female graduates - 
at least in professional fields such as software design and international business (ibid.).
14 Concerning induction training, the case of chaebol Taesong, studied by Janelli (1993), offers some 
interesting insight into the nature and purpose of induction training for new recruits:
“The Taesong company staff who conducted and supervised the training of new employees 
were charged with imparting substantive information about the company’s history, organisation, 
products, and production processes in a way that supported the ideological claim, impressing on 
the new recruits the company’s contribution to South Korea’s economic development and its 
advancement of high technology. In addition, the staff attempted to forge among the recruits a 
new identity as Taesong company employees. But perhaps the most ambitious goal of all was to 
alter their ways of dealing with social relationships. What I would like to highlight here is how 
training practices attempted to inscribe subordinates with habits of acquiescence and to reshape 
their understandings of how to deal with others” (ibid. : 140-1).
15 However, some companies prefer not to encourage frequent transfers to different departments. This 
leads staff to acquire particular professional skills and experience in relatively few areas (according to 
ful3-Sl).
16 This is also recognised by Ungson et al. (1997:203) who argue that most managers believe that, in view 
of the cooperative nature of work, it is simply not possible to differentiate performance between 
employees with any degree of accuracy (except at higher levels of management).
17 See the “Remuneration and Promotion” section later in this chapter for new changes in the assessment 
and promotion system, such as the introduction of yeon-bong-je which shifts the emphasis in job 
evaluation from employees’ length of service to their work performance.
18 During a number of meetings with the manager to arrange interviews, it became clear that the junior 
employee (mu2) was working closely with him as if he was his personal assistant and handling many 
trivial matters (both work related and private); they would frequently even go out for meals together. It 
was apparent that this junior staff member was the manager’s favourite, and that he had good career 
prospects as long as his relationship with his boss continued and his boss retained importance in the firm.
19 This point was discussed in the early part of this chapter. Please see the earlier note for more details of 
areas where women are considered to be better suited.
20 A female respondent (fu39) explained that men are usually more patient and better at controlling their 
feelings when necessary, especially with their superiors, and argued that their easier employment of 
flattery and hypocrisy makes them better than women at office politics.
21 This means literarily “ranking according to length of service”. In the past it was the system of yeon- 
kong-seo-yeol whereby, when the time came staff were promoted (fill8*). In this previous ‘yeon-kong- 
kup’ system, the basic salary would remain the same with a varying bonus added according to work 
performance (mulm).
22 A monthly publication devoted to the white-collar job market.
23 According to recruitment literature distributed by one chaebol (H2), the employee grades of seniority 
were as follows (fu46; printed company policies):
1 gup (gap) bu-jang : senior manager
(ul) cha-jang: manager
2 gup kwa-jang: junior/sectional manager
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3 gup daeri :
4 gup sawon :
5 gup sawon:
6 gup sawon:
Although seniority grades and promotion systems in other chaebol are not necessarily identical, this 
example fairly represents general practice in Korean companies. Some companies also have ‘ge-jang’ 
(between daeri and kwa-jang), and ‘ju-im ’ (between sawon and daeri).
24 For example, in the recent study of the human resource management (HRM) practices of Samsung, 
Kim S. and Briscoe (1997) show that, under their new policy established in 1995, rewards are more 
performance-oriented with the company aiming to foster and recompense individual accomplishment and 
creativity - unlike the previous group-based system which promoted team spirit among employees but 
also tended to foment mediocrity.
25 Salaries in this yoen-bong-je system are rather more based on ability and achievement, than on age, 
educational qualification and work experience that had been considered important hitherto. This means 
that there is a different salary level for each individual, based on a regular evaluation of their work 
performance for the year. The evaluation consists of both ‘potential (bo-yu) ability’ and ‘performance 
(bal-hyie) ability’: while the former relates to basic abilities and skills, the latter is to do with actual work 
performance {Monthly Recruit, Aug 1996:171).
26 According to one employee (mu45), this change is evident as the administrative systems become more 
Westernised and modernised to compete better in the world marketplace: the more predictable, less 
threatening yeon-kong-seo-yeol system of promotion seems to be breaking down, and is gradually being 
replaced by the new yeon-bong-je ’ approach. While under the traditional yeon-kong-seo-yeol system 
employees found office life easier and more harmonious, the ‘yeon-bong-je' system probably implies a 
less-friendly, more-competitive atmosphere among colleagues, since it is more focused on individuals’ 
ability and work performance. Although the former approach encouraged teamwork and harmony, its 
work efficiency was probably lower than in the newer system (mu45).
27 However, in recent years there has been some modification to this system; as already pointed out in 
Chapter 5, Korean HRM seems to be moving towards remuneration based both on seniority and 
ability/performance (see Bae and Rowley 2004, for current trends).
28 This fear was clearly confirmed by the research findings: of the interviewees, 65.2 percent of men were 
in supervisory positions and above (39.1% were daeri and 26.1% in managerial positions) while only 
17.9% of women were daeri, without any single woman at managerial level (Appendix Table 2.4).
29 This sometimes excludes female designers hired for their professional and technical skills (mu5). 
According to a recent study by Kim A.E. (2004:232), women comprised a mere 0.7% of those at 
managerial level in chaebol -  while the proportion of Korean women generally in management reached 
5% in 2001 (original sources: Hankyoreh 8 January 2001; Dongailbo 7 March 2002) (see also Pacific 
Bridge, Inc. 2001:8).
30 There is a salary differential between college graduates and high-school graduates. One chaebol 
manager (mulm) stated that the starting salary for female high-school leavers is usually about 75% of 
that for university graduates. For comparison, in 2002 high-school leavers earned, on average, 69.7% of 
university graduates’ salaries generally across Korean industries, according to a Korea Labour Institute 
report (Jeong JH. et al. 2004).
equivalent to supervisor level
four-year university graduates or those promoted from 5 gup. 
starting position for two-year college graduates (degree courses require 
four years), or those promoted from 6 gup. 
starting position for high-school leavers.
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31 Although official data from chaebol themselves were unavailable, some other published sources throw 
light on this. According to a 2002 survey of wage structures by the Ministry of Labour (2003), the regular 
monthly per capita payments to female graduates in the clerical/white-collar sector were 94% of those to 
male graduates within the same 25-29 years age group - although, on average, it was 73% across all age 
groups (derived from data on p72-73).
32 There is no national survey of the amount of fringe benefits paid to workers or its composition. But the 
ILO-ARTEP survey in 1991 of the manufacturing sector in Seoul shows that a much smaller proportion 
of females than males reported receiving cost of living allowances (17% vs. 38%), educational 
allowances (23% vs. 42%), and severance pay (37% vs. 47%) (Bai and Cho 1995). According to the 
Survey Report on Wage Structure by the Ministry of Labour (2003:72-3), annual special payments 
received in 2002 by female graduates in the clerical/white-collar sector were 54% of those received by 
their male counterparts.
33 In most cases retirement is mandatory at age 55. Retiring employees typically receive a lump-sum 
payment equal to one month’s salary for each year of service (Steers et al. 1989: 123).
34 It should be recognised that these figures may only be valid for the period before the ‘IMF crisis’ in 
1997.
35 According to the study of Samsung Chaebol by Kim SS. and Briscoe (1997), seniority-based promotion 
allowed Samsung to maintain the Confiician tradition that precludes younger persons from supervising 
older colleagues.
36 A similar practice has been also identified in Japan. According to Nakamura and Nitta (1995:325), 
when industries face a severe market downturn, companies often encourage ‘voluntary severance’ (seen 
by some as a euphemism for ‘layoff* with severance pay’) in order drastically to reduce the number of 
workers.
37 Equivalent then to approximately £2,500.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
AN ANALYSIS OF 
CULTURE AND GENDER RELATIONS AT WORK
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that while formal written policies may not have 
been in essence gender discriminatory, actual employment practices in chaebol were 
gendered and female employees were experiencing sexual discrimination at work. The 
personal attitudes and views about women held by individuals in the organisation, 
particularly (mostly male) superiors who were implementing the policies, strongly 
influenced the actual practices and general environment where women worked. It is, 
however, unlikely that they would openly admit to discriminatory practices, and 
perhaps would not even be fully aware of their gender-biased attitudes and actions. 
Moreover, even if employers and male colleagues did not discriminate intentionally, or 
explicitly, many of the customary rules and practices that characterise management in 
Korea still operate to the disadvantage of women. The office floor, as the working 
environment, is where employees and their superiors interact on a daily basis, and 
where each individual’s beliefs and attitudes play a critical role, often as informal office 
discourses, in producing and influencing gender relations at work. Therefore, while the 
previous chapter was devoted to an objective examination of employment policies and 
practices from a gender perspective in general, this chapter focuses on actual gender 
relations in the office by examining real, if informal, attitudes and practices of both 
employers and employees.
While most characteristics of work culture (discussed in Chapter 5) were similarly 
identified by interviewees of both sexes, many women (and some men) particularly 
recognised that traditional gender roles, often combined with other Confucian 
characteristics, have been affecting women’s status and conditions in Korean 
workplaces. How then are gender relations and women’s status at work actually
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affected by the influence of Confucian tradition still prevailing in work culture? The
broad examination of chaebol organisations earlier in Chapter 5 showed that the work
culture of contemporary chaebol does exhibit a strong Confucian influence. This
chapter explores how the characteristics of traditional Korean culture create and
perpetuate certain gendered discourses in the workplace and, therefore, still to this day
influence the condition and status of women at work.
Before doing so, it may be helpful to clarify the use of the words ‘Confucian’ and
‘traditional’. In everyday discourse, ‘traditional Korean culture’ effectively implies
‘Confucian influence’. As already pointed out (e.g. in Chapters 1 and 4), although
Korea is a nation of mixed religions with many non-Confucian influences, the crucial
and distinctive impact of Confucianism has been both enduring and profound, and
undeniably permeates the culture and institutions of contemporary Korea and the
psyche of its people.1 Ordinary contemporary Koreans confirm the strong influence of
Confucian culture and customs on their everyday life - even that Korean culture means
Confucian tradition (e.g. mu26, fg61; see also Chapter 1). One interviewee (fg61)
particularly states that “while the organisational structure may be borrowed from the
West, the content is Korean, Confucian”.
As shown previously (Chapters 4 and 5), while Confucianism has been a common
feature throughout East Asia, its influence has varied within the region - as it
interrelates differently with diverse cultural configurations in each society. Since
Confucianism is itself a multifaceted value system, it is interpreted differently in each
political or social locale; Confucian culture has been made, reshaped and regenerated by
different groups with different purposes (Kim KO. 1996). In this regard, when
considering Korean culture as Confucian, the following statement by Moon S.
(2003:123) may assist a better understanding of the interchangeable usage of
‘traditional’ and ‘Confucian’ in Korean society:
“The focus on Confucianism does not mean that it is the only system of 
meaning in contemporary Korea. The tumultuous history of colonialism, 
imperialism, and capitalism industrialisation has complicated the normative 
domains employed by different social groups. Therefore, I approach 
Confucianism here as a hegemonic system, not only widely internalised and 
accepted, but also as contested by alternative systems of meanings in the context 
of socio-political democratisation.”
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Confucianism, therefore, may be viewed as a body of flexible guidelines that can be 
employed in everyday life to uphold and justify social relationships and interactions 
between ordinary people in Korean society. In this context, Confucian ideology has 
been used as a bedrock to legitimise and sustain gender inequality and female 
subordination in Korea, just as other religions or ideologies in different cultural settings 
may also have been used for the same purpose elsewhere in the world.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first, largely based on interviews 
carried out in the subject chaebol, explores how common beliefs, office discourses and 
customary rules and practices affect women at work, and how they relate to Confucian 
tradition. For this, the following issues are examined: i) is there any gender bias, 
prejudice or gendered assumption in the attitudes of (male) employees and managers? If 
so, how is it justified?; ii) what are the customary gendered discourses on women’s 
traits and roles?; iii) do these influence women’s ways of thinking and behaviour, and 
adversely affect the evaluation of their performance and their career development?; and 
iv) how do they relate to Confucian influences, and are manifested in the workplace?
The second section describes and analyses gender segregation and the assumed 
gender roles of women at work, drawing chiefly on relevant features of Confucian 
tradition affecting women’s status and roles (introduced in Chapters 4 and 5) augmented 
with opinions expressed by interviewees. Even though some women’s views are 
included in this chapter, these are mainly examined in the succeeding chapter, the focus 
of which is on women’s own experiences and perspectives.
7.2 Evaluation o f Female Employees by Superiors and Male Colleagues
In examining possible gender bias or male prejudice on the office floor, I will first 
consider how male colleagues and superiors view gender equality, and how they regard 
their female co-workers and their roles. One of the most revealing questions posed in 
connection with gender relationships at work is whether men are aware of gender 
discrimination, and whether they are really prepared to acknowledge it. When an 
influential personnel manager from chaebol SI (mulm2) was asked, for instance,
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whether women in his company were discriminated against, he protested, “absolutely
not” and quoted examples involving job assignments and career developments:
“If a woman is familiar with computers, she is more likely to be allocated to 
computer-related tasks that are ‘feminine’, such as designing informative web­
pages in the public relations department. Job assignment is ideally based on 
each individual’s disposition and vocational aptitude. In general, job 
assignments are made on ability, attitude and commitment regardless of sex, not 
on the assumption that certain tasks are more appropriate simply because the 
employee is a woman - which used to be normal practice in the past. Since 
allocating work critically depends on the ability of individuals, some capable 
female employees (often more capable than men) are given responsibilities that 
are as important as those given to men. For example, certain women are 
assigned to sales or trading tasks where they have contact with foreign buyers. 
Therefore, there is no gender discrimination in this company” (mulm-Sl).
However, when asked again whether women were usually given exactly the same tasks 
as men, he added,
“Naturally, there are some gender differences which we take into consideration.
If you, as a superior, are responsible for allocating work, or need to execute a 
particular task, you are more likely to give the work to someone whom you can 
trust to complete it successfully on time. Therefore, it is normal that some 
important tasks may go to male members of staff in whom you have more 
confidence. On the other hand, some less important or less urgent work can be 
given to female staff, since they often tend to find certain tasks too daunting. 
This is mainly because they consider themselves as women, with a ‘feminine’ 
approach towards work. Yet this is not always the case” (ibid.).
Another manager from a different chaebol L (mu38m) was more open in expressing his
dissatisfaction with female employees’ attitudes towards work and, attempting to justify
the gender differentiation and different treatment of women in his office, he said:
“I try not to discriminate against women but sometimes I can’t help it since I’ve 
realised from my experience that women are different from men. For example, 
women usually like routine tasks, and make little effort to push their boundaries. 
Also, partly due to their household responsibilities, many women consider their 
work temporary until marriage or having a family. As for married female 
employees, since they have to manage both work and home they don’t like to 
expand their work tasks and instead prefer easy and routine, rather than that 
intellectually demanding and creative, work. Women often prefer to complete 
given tasks well rather than undertake creative projects or solve problems. 
However, the company needs employees who like to push their limits, be 
intellectually challenging and creative, and contribute to the company’s survival 
in the very competitive domestic and world market” (mu38m-L).
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Although some female employees, both high-school leavers and graduates, (e.g. 
fh9, fu21, fh23, fu39) acknowledged that certain aspects of women’s attitude to work 
can be less desirable, such as a tendency to give up easily, poor inter-personal 
relationships with clients, reduced drive and sense of responsibility, they also protested 
that these perceptions could have been derived from male prejudice, and certainly have 
the effect of isolating women from the heart of the workplace (see Chapter 8 for more 
details of women’s experiences). Even though the criteria of gender equality and the 
validity of perceptions applied by these managers can be questioned, what they said 
undoubtedly showed an attitude towards gender that was discriminatory. Moreover, it 
provided an interesting insight into how women are often regarded, and their 
performance evaluated, as employees by male superiors and colleagues. It also 
suggested a further question to explore, which is what typical ‘feminine traits’ men use 
as reasons to justify, in their own eyes, gender differentiation in allocating job tasks and 
career opportunities.
What then are the common gendered assumptions on women’s traits and roles? 
Chaebol usually have been reluctant to employ women in any substantial numbers and, 
although often better qualified than their male colleagues, they are also frequently 
regarded as making poorer employees to whom core tasks should not be given. The 
varied reasons for this belief, as revealed from interviews with managers and male staff 
(and sometimes from women themselves), may be considered as either referring to their 
attitude towards work and commitment to their employer or their social skills in 
interacting with their colleagues and ‘the team’.
In considering men’s attitude towards their female colleagues, three major elements 
should be borne in mind: first, the continuing influence of Confucian culture, conferring 
on Korean men an historical belief in their ‘inherent superiority’ over women, which 
has led some (if not most) men still to consider women as less capable at work because 
they are ‘women’; second, men’s perceptions, rightly or wrongly, of the capability and 
attitude of women towards their work: some men may accept that women are 
potentially as able as men, but consider them lacking in certain qualities and attitudes 
required for working in chaebol; third, the acknowledgement by some men that women
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find it difficult to compete on an equal basis because of the male-oriented work culture
with little support for their reproductive role -  that it is the working environment and
societal system which functions against women’s interests. These separate elements are
neither mutually exclusive nor each fully explanatory by itself.
While a woman who excels at her work is considered exceptional (ful9*-Sl), some
men seem to believe that in general women are inherently inferior to men -  at least at
work -  and do not regard women as their equals. Typical examples of this attitude are:
“I am not trying to put down women in any way but, apart from a few areas 
where women are known to be better (such as in design), they are generally not 
as capable or productive as their male colleagues” (mu2-Sl).
“I try not to discriminate against women, but it is a fact that women are not 
usually as capable as men” (mu22-Hl).
It was not common to find male interviewees who would freely express such frank 
opinions, even if they believed in the inherent inferiority of women, yet it could 
sometimes be detected in the way they spoke. The two male respondents quoted above 
were among those interviewees who held the most obvious gender-discriminative 
attitudes. However, it may be assumed that some other interviewees were also as 
gender-biased, yet without such explicit expression.
Many managers and male employees from different chaebol believed that, even if 
their female colleagues were as able as themselves (as implied by their recruitment), 
women often did not have the same qualities as men or as good an attitude towards 
work. Women were often considered deficient in qualities considered indispensable for 
a good employee and for developing a successful career in a Korean company. These 
qualities, as variously enumerated by male interviewees, include: will-power, drive, 
persistence, a challenging spirit, initiative, adaptability, endurance, resilience, loyalty, 
self-sacrifice, dedication, professionalism, and ability to bear responsibility (as 
suggested by, among others, mulm-Sl, mu2-Sl, mu3-Sl, mu4-Sl, mu5-Sl, mu22-Hl, 
mu26-Hl, mu34m-S2, mu38m-L, mu45-H2). For example, male interviewees (e.g. 
mulm, mu 16, mu34m) criticised women for being lacking in ‘‘adaptability and 
dedication” by quoting an occasion when female members of staff were asked to work 
in a remote city but showed much less enthusiasm than their male colleagues. In
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relation to “endurance and responsibility”, others (e.g. mu2, mul7, mu38m) felt that if
women were given a challenging task they would attempt it for a while but eventually
give up. The men added that more challenging work, such as negotiating and attending
meetings and conferences outside the company, was usually allocated to more-
experienced employees of at least four or five years seniority, yet many female
employees (with some notable exceptions among those striving to develop their careers)
would have given up and left before then because they found the work either
uninteresting or too demanding. These criticisms were also confirmed by some women
(e.g. ful8*-Sl, fu40-L)4.
As far as endurance is concerned, some women (e.g. fulO*) argued that an ideal
employee for Korean companies needed the physical condition of a man to cope with
the demanding work. One female graduate employee, who was pregnant at the time of
the interview, stated:
“Men are physically stronger than women, are more willing to use their physical 
strength and can take more hardship than we women can. For instance, when the 
work requires us to stay and work until late women find it very tiring, while 
men seem to be able to work all night in the office without sleeping. Sometimes, 
when things are extremely busy, they can work overnight for a few days in 
succession, which most women including myself find extremely difficult. I 
think this has more to do with physique and the environment than responsibility 
or attitude” (fulO* -  SI).
Although some inherent physical differences between men and women are accepted, 
there are some stereotyped gender attributes that can act as a handicap for women. 
Women5 are often considered reluctant to join men where physical strength and stamina 
are required, for example in situations involving extended working hours and overnight 
stays mainly because they lack endurance and commitment (as was suggested by, 
among others, mu25m, mu34m, mu42). These men claimed that it was more a matter of 
mind than physical condition or personal circumstances. A male interviewee, who 
regarded women potentially quite as capable as men, pointed out that many women 
appeared to give up too easily, thinking “well, after all I am a woman” instead of 
making more effort as men might (mu4). This tendency was repeated in the context of 
some mental qualities, such as loyalty, sacrifice and responsibility (mu2, mu3, mu5) -  
this is discussed further later this chapter. Women were regarded as being deficient in
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‘loyalty’ and in a readiness to sacrifice their private life to prove themselves as hard
working, capable employees. “Until they correct these shortcomings women will not be
regarded, and treated, as equals with their male colleagues”, one member of a personnel
department of chaebol SI (mu2) said.
The importance of loyalty, that women are considered sometimes to possess to a
lesser degree, has been acknowledged by others. In a recent study, Hahn JH. (1997)
pointed out that while Korean employers and personnel managers generally accepted
the view that there was no difference in performance between male and female
workers, they (a significant 22.4 percent) saw female employees as less capable than
their male counterparts. According to Hahn, the rationale behind this view stemmed
more from the belief that women were less devoted to the company (39 percent of
respondents) than that they were less competitive (29 percent), and that the emphasis,
fundamentally, was on loyalty for the company (ibid.) (See Chapter 5 for a discussion
of work culture and loyalty).
The other explanation, partly related to that given above, for the belief that women
make less satisfactory employees is their alleged unenthusiastic attitude towards
‘teamwork’ and ‘sharing’. Even if they completed allocated tasks well, their work
would often be less appreciated due to their unwillingness to co-operate with colleagues
or make sacrifices for the team. They were considered to have a more individual
approach coupled with a self-centred attitude, and seemed mainly concerned with their
own tasks and correspondingly indifferent to others and the team. For example,
“When there are hard challenges many women are reluctant to participate. 
When we had to relocate the office, most women took the attitude that men 
should do the removal work because they are men, and they need not participate 
since they are women. Men, on the other hand, were prepared to do it without 
thinking, even though it was something they did not enjoy” (mu3-Sl).
Some (e.g. mu7-Sl) also claimed that women disliked sacrificing time and energy 
helping their colleagues -  an attitude that is considered undesirable in Korean 
workplaces6. For example, women tended to finish their work and leave early rather 
than helping others, while their male colleagues would remain and work late. This 
pattern was even more apparent with female high-school leavers, who often would 
finish promptly on time in order to attend an evening college or for some other reason.
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A male interviewee felt that this practice did not contribute positively to the office 
atmosphere and female members of staff were not appreciated because of it (mu2). 
Noting that most of his female colleagues (who had joined the firm when he did five 
years previously) had already left, he asserted that to be successful women should 
sacrifice themselves more and spend more time with the company and colleagues. Some 
other men also saw women as less responsible because they tended to give up more 
easily, and resign when faced with difficulties - especially after marriage. To these men 
this confirmed their general perception that the attitude of women can be summarised as 
(according to mu45-H2), “it really doesn’t matter if I get a poor appraisal for not doing 
this work well. I will get married one day” .
Many men pointed out that women’s different, more individualistic and detached, 
approach to interactions with colleagues and socialising at work was not likely to be 
helpful for their careers. Women generally appeared more reasoned, steady, perhaps a 
little distant in their relationships with colleagues, whereas men were usually closer and 
more casual with each other. While these male relationships could change with time, 
affecting work efficiency, women tended to miss out on bonding with colleagues or 
being “part of the group” (as suggested by mu3, mu5). Women’s reluctance to flatter, 
and difficulty in disguising their feelings, does not assist their career prospects because 
it hinders cementing relationships with their superiors - particularly important in Korean 
companies. These characteristics affect not only relationships with colleagues and 
superiors but also with business clients. Women were often regarded as less suitable 
than men for certain jobs such as sales, where skilful polished communication is 
essential with customers and business associates (who, usually men, would often take 
women less seriously and preferred dealing with other men, with whom they could 
establish a rapport). This facet, in some ways, equates to the traditional Confucian 
attitude whereby men could legitimately view women as inferior. This attitude was 
demonstrated, according to one female graduate respondent from chaebol D1 (fu32), by 
instances when the company avoided sending a woman to meet clients - especially in 
‘masculine’ business sectors, such as heavy industry, where the clients might consider it 
an insult or a demanding sign.
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A male interviewee (mu4-Sl) argued that women, partly because of their different
attitude toward work and interpersonal relationships with colleagues, were being given
less important tasks. He further added that this was not a trivial matter, since the
company and its managers were becoming unwilling to allocate any significant tasks to
women for that reason (as was described in Chapter 6).
In fact, this was a view widely shared by superiors and male members of staff from
different companies and chaebol. A personnel manager from chaebol L (mu38m)
expressed his opinion on the subject as follows:
"Men and women alike start from the same level and with the same conditions 
when they are first employed. However, male employees have proved to be 
more competitive, energetic and responsible, and show more initiative in order 
to survive. On the other hand female members of staff, while they can focus 
well on certain things, tend to be less competitive, active and committed and 
also somewhat more narrow-minded with fewer interests. Anyway, achievement 
at work for them is not the sole measure of a successful life: they can have other 
outlets for their energies, like marriage. That is why we cannot fully rely on 
female employees" (mu38m-L).
These concerns of employers have often been accepted as valid by women themselves. 
For example one graduate interviewee from chaebol SI (ful2*) said that, since joining 
the company two and a half years before, she and her colleagues had been trained for 
one and a half years. Many female colleagues had left during, or just after, this formal 
training period for a variety of reasons, including marriage, moving abroad with their 
husbands and sometimes to pursue further studies to enhance their career prospects (as 
reported by, among other, ful3-Sl, fu37-S2, fh49-H2). That the turnover of female staff 
was considered high became accepted as a ‘fact’ by employers, regardless of the real 
and varied reasons for the resignations (as argued by mulm-Sl, mu30m-Dl, fu32-Dl, 
mu41-P).
When women lack a challenging spirit and positive attitude towards work and are
more likely to leave, the company has little choice, as one manager asserted:
“We can’t dismiss them without a legitimate reason and can’t get rid of them 
until they leave voluntarily. Therefore it is only logical to allocate simpler and 
safer tasks to them. It is too risky to give them any important work since they 
often fail to complete it properly, leading to inefficiency” (mulm-Sl).
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Taking his point, it is quite common to find employers relying less on women, and
investing less in their training, which was considered ‘risky’ or ‘wasteful’. “That is
why”, added a male member of staff from the same company (mu2-Sl), “there are no
female high-ranking executives in the company, apart from a few sectional managers in
a ‘feminine’ department such as designing”8.
Sometimes men’s low estimation of female staff extends further. This same male
staff member, from a human-resources department, expressed his opinions of female
graduate employees as follows:
“In comparison with their male counterparts, female graduates are not as 
capable in work accomplishment and have less energy and motivation. There 
are only a few areas where women perform well and where they are as 
appreciated for their ability as men. While there is little difference in their 
salaries, the work performance and output of the women is inferior. Frankly, 
since simpler clerical and administrative tasks and assisting roles can be 
performed by female high-school leavers, from an over-all perspective female 
graduates are not really needed in the company” (mu2-Sl).
There is evidence that some women agree with men in this respect. A small number of 
female interviewees admitted that they could not blame employers for bias or 
discrimination against women. This was particularly because women frequently left 
during, or just after, the extended induction training given by the company. One female 
member of staff (fulO*-Sl) said that this had happened repeatedly, and consequently it 
would be understandable and safer for the company to recruit and invest in men, rather 
than accepting a higher risk with women (as was also recognised by ful8*-Sl, mu30m- 
Dl, fu32-Dl). She also added that, unless women change their attitude towards work 
and their employer, the propensity towards gender discrimination, especially in people’s 
minds, would continue. This statement seems to reflect fairly the views of many 
women.
These attitudes and practices may relate to the continuing influence of Confucian 
culture in the contemporary workplace. In criticising women’s general attitude towards 
work, some men (e.g. mu2, mul7, mu38m, mu45) believed that those less-appealing 
characteristics that prevented them from being considered as valuable employees were 
largely due to the influence of Confucian culture and the traditional role of women in it. 
According to their argument, when women grow up in a family where, as is usual, the
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father worked and the mother stayed at home, ‘feminine traits’ acquired within this 
family environment would eventually emerge. Even with the will to be different and 
ambition to become successful, such women would tend to opt for an easier life and if 
possible avoid hard or challenging tasks. To improve the status of women at work and 
widen their career opportunities, therefore, these men concluded that women should 
strive, not only to perform better in allocated work, but also concentrate on other less- 
obviously task-related matters, such as inter-personal relationships and co-operation 
within teams. Most importantly, however, they should stop regarding themselves as 
temporary workers, and change their general attitude towards their career and their 
employer to one that is more professional, responsible, pro-active and committed 
(according to mulm-Sl, mu2-Sl, mu5-Sl, mu22-Hl). This view was also shared by a 
number of women themselves (among others, fh23-Hl, fh36-S2, fu37-S2, fu43*-P) 
However, some interviewees (e.g. mulm, fh36), both male and female, were optimistic 
and anticipated that women in the next generation would be quite different since the 
culture of Korean society is changing, and that so will the ways of thinking and the 
attitude of women towards work.
Women also argued that those ‘feminine’ characteristics and attitudes, derived from 
their cultural tradition, that were less admired by male colleagues did not apply only to 
women. Some female interviewees declared that women generally experienced gender 
discrimination at work partly due to men’s traditional, conservative ideas about 
women’s inferior status, and expectations of different modes of behaviour according to 
their prescribed gender roles. Apart from direct work-related discrimination, female 
employees also felt and experienced prejudice generally in their working environment. 
Such discrimination included male prejudice in their general attitude towards women; 
this accustomed, if often implicit, sex-discriminatory treatment of women demonstrated 
the prevalent male chauvinism of a male-centred office culture, and appeared to apply 
in all subject chaebol (e.g. ful2*-Sl, ful8*-Sl, fu43*-P, fu44*-P, fu48-H2, fh49-H2, 
fu51-D2). Giving examples of unpleasant treatment by male colleagues or superiors, 
female interviewees registered their disapproval of: “men giving the impression of 
looking down on women or having low expectations of them”, “casual or impolite 
modes of address” (e.g. fh23-Hl, fu32-Dl, fu40-L, fu47-H2), “gender-differentiated
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treatment in allocating tasks”, “asking women to perform trivial errands, including tea
serving” and “jokes with sexual innuendo” -  all serving to discourage women from
taking their careers seriously. Some male respondents (e.g. mu45-H2) supported this
point of view by admitting that there is, to some extent, a gendered attitude and way of
thinking among men at work which has to be changed. One young, male respondent
from chaebol SI (mu3) also argued that many, particularly seniors from an older
generation, believe that “this work is not for her because she is a woman”, “she can’t do
it because she is a woman”, or (simply) “ ....., because she is a woman”.
A strong connection between the existing culture in society and women’s status and
roles at work was frequently confirmed by both men and women during interviews with
employees. While contemporary organisational culture is still deeply rooted in
Confucian tradition, it also seems that gender relations in the workplace may derive
their characteristics from the ancestral values and relationships of men and women. The
ideology of modem Korean women has been much influenced by traditional Confucian
culture and the position in it accorded to women, as previously shown in Chapter 4.
Many interviewees themselves, both high-school leavers and graduates of both sexes,
recognised that the status and conditions of modem working women resonate, if to a
lesser extent, with those of ancestral Korean women (e.g. mu7-Sl, mh8-Sl, fh9-Sl,
fh23-Hl, mu34m-S2, mu35-S2, fu37-S2, mu41-P, fu51-D2). After all, the workplace is
where men and women interact, using values and customs that have formed and
developed in their culture over centuries. According to one male employee, a high-
school leaver from chaebol SI:
“There must be some influence of traditional gender-discriminative culture at 
work since the accustomed attitude that men are superior and women are 
inferior is reflected in everyday working life. It implicitly shows in people’s 
way of thinking and their way of speaking” (fh9-Sl).
To what extent, then, are gendered practices condoned by traditional Korean culture and 
customs, and manifest in the office as sexual discrimination? How has Confucian 
ideology, even if changing and weakening, influenced the roles assumed by women in 
the workplace?
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The following section explores how office life for contemporaiy Korean women has 
been influenced by the culture and their allotted roles under traditional Confucianism 
(which was examined in Chapter 4). In doing so, general characteristics of work culture 
and administrative style in chaebol - such as ‘authoritarianism’, ‘the importance of 
inter-personal relationships’, ‘loyalty and the tendency towards life-time employment’ 
(see the latter part of Chapter 5) - are also considered since the combination of these 
cultural characteristics and ‘gender’ can be particularly relevant to a discussion of 
gender discrimination in the Korean workplace.
7.3 Gender Segregation and Expected Gender Roles for Women at Work
This section examines how expected gender roles act to the disadvantage of women 
when the general characteristics of work culture are combined with a ‘gender’ element, 
and manifest in everyday working life. The major features of Confucian tradition 
bearing on women’s status and gender relations (which were considered in some details 
in Chapter 4) are specifically: 1) inferiority to men (Nam-jon-yeo-bie) and segregation 
from men (Nam-nyeo-gu-byeol), 2) primary role as wise mother and obedient wife 
(Hyun-mo-yang-cheo) and confined at home (an-sa-ram), 3) male-centred (work) 
culture with bonding and networking in the public domain.
1) “Men are superior, women debased” {Nam-jon-yeo-bie) and “differentiation and 
segregation between men and women” (Nam-nyeo-gu-byeol):
The traditional view that women should be regarded as inferior often has a detrimental 
effect on women’s career development in modem society. When the not-always- 
apparent but deep-rooted notion of * Nam-jon-yeo-bie' is combined with 
‘authoritarianism’ in Korean social organisations, it produces a particularly damaging 
effect on women. Many female interviewees observed that men at work often casually 
used expressions that implied that they look down on women, and consequently they 
felt that they were regarded as someone inferior and unlucky. Common expressions 
used by men, such as “this is a woman’s job!”, not only described women’s ‘supposed’ 
tasks but also would appear to limit their roles and freedom at work.
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An example of subtle sexual discrimination is the practice, using the English form, 
of addressing female employees as “Miss (surname)”9. In the different chaebol studied 
most employees and senior staff were aware that addressing female staff as “Miss 
was undesirable and not welcomed by women, since in Korea the English terms 
‘Mister’ and ‘Miss’ are used only to indicate lower status (Janelli, 1993:160)10. Yet 
some men still continued to do this, especially to high-school leavers (as pointed out by 
fh23-Hl, fu32-Dl, fu40-L, fu47-H2). This seemed to women to be a constant and 
effective reminder by men that they considered women to be inferior, even though on 
the surface it did not seem to be particularly important.
In Korea, where seniority and gender are the two major elements in determining 
status and role, the combination of ‘authoritarianism’ (i.e. Jang-yu-yu-seo, “between the 
elder and the young there is an order”) and women’s traditionally inferior position, 
coupled with their corresponding ‘feminine traits’ all combine to hinder the treatment of 
women as fully equal employees. In Korean offices, where junior staff are not usually 
expected to talk back to their superiors, a woman is discouraged from offering her own 
opinions in conversation with a senior male. If she did so she would be criticised, not 
only for showing insufficient respect to her superior, but also for being “too aggressive 
and daring” as a woman (as explained by ful3-Sl).
Some women were unhappy when male colleagues or superiors attempted to 
distinguish between male and female staff by separating one group from the other. A 
female graduate employee of chaebol P (fu44*) recalled a number of occasions when a 
departmental manager would invite only male staff to dinner one evening, and women 
on another -  as if they were regarded merely as women rather than employees. She 
considered this as particularly unfair and making little sense since female graduates, 
hired under the same conditions as male graduate staff, were then included in the group 
comprising mainly female high-school leavers. This, according to the interviewee, set a 
double standard and encouraged the treatment of women as a different group, thus 
serving to perpetuate the sexual segregation and division of labour and implying that 
‘feminine’ tasks are for women and ‘masculine’ tasks are for men.
The presence of female high-school leavers in chaebol and the roles they play is 
particularly illuminating in this context. Even though there were, in fact, some male
238
Chapter Seven
high-school leavers in the chaebol studied, they were very few and their recruitment had
not been actively pursued for some years. On the other hand, female high-school leavers
have been recruited continuously for specific tasks by most chaebol, though recently in
declining numbers11 (as pointed out by fhl7-Sl, mu30m-Dl, fh36-S2, mu38m-L,
fu43*-P), and they still comprise the major part of the female labour force in offices.
The jobs that most of these female employees take are usually fairly simple and their
salaries increase with the length of their employment {Urisahoe yonku hakhoe
1998:185). As female high-school leavers are hired through separate channels, they are
easily differentiated from male graduates and placed lower in the hierarchy as assistants
to male members of staff. According to interviewees (both high-school leavers and
graduates, and men and women) from different companies, these female high-school
recruits form a kind of sub-group reporting to male colleagues, most of whom would be
male university graduates recruited for 'standard' office work (e.g. fh9-Sl, fh ll-S l,
ful8*-Sl, mu27-Hl, fh28-Hl, fh29-Hl, mu30m-Dl, mu31-Dl, mu41-P, fh49-H2).
This clear distinction between male and female staff throughout their employment
seems to have served Korean companies well. These female high-school leavers
typically tend to remain with the company for six to nine years, until they marry and
leave (mulm-Sl, fh36-S2), and their starting salary is usually about 75 percent of that
for graduates (mulm). Employers welcome a regular turnover of such staff as it is more
cost-effective for them to use junior female labour on low rates of pay {Urisahoe yonku
hakhoe 1998:185). A female non-graduate staff member expressed dissatisfaction with
her company’s treatment of women in this regard, as follows:
“The company considers women as likely to remain only for a short time, and 
suitable only for undertaking ‘assisting’ tasks for men. Therefore, they don’t 
train women as well as men, and avoid teaching them or giving them a deeper, 
critical knowledge of the work. Even though training female staff to visualise 
and comprehend an entire project or task would enable them to work more 
efficiently, the company prefers to let them work on partial or fragmented tasks 
with no understanding of the full picture” (fh28-Hl).
Both high-school leavers and other interviewees considered that gender 
discrimination was usually more serious in the case of high-school leavers (as 
recognised, among others, by fh24-Hl, mu25m-Hl, fh28-Hl, fh29-Hl, fh33-Dl, fu37-
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S2, fu46-H2, fh49-H2). According to one female junior employee from chaebol HI 
(fh24), for most female high-school leavers the combination of sexual discrimination 
and prejudice against less-educated employees made their status, treatment and working 
conditions much worse than for female graduates. One female graduate employee from 
chaebol H2 (fu46), who experienced little discrimination herself, acknowledged that 
female high-school leavers in her office were usually considered not as equal work 
colleagues but rather as parts of the organisation (as of a machine), being there to help it 
run smoothly. She understood that many female high-school leavers were unhappy with 
this double discrimination -  for being women and also less educated. These gendered 
employment practices for female high-school leavers have arisen, and are maintained, 
through the mechanism of requiring different educational qualifications when recruiting 
men and women. This segregation can be further accentuated by the policy in some 
chaebol, though now becoming less common, of requiring junior female staff (high- 
school leavers, and sometimes even graduates) to wear uniforms (e.g. fh24-Hl, fu32- 
D l, fh36-S2, fu37-S2) - which, of course, did not apply to men in the office; the 
subjects felt that they were treated more as part of a ‘female staff group’ than as 
individual employees (fh36-S2).
Even though working conditions for female graduates are in many ways far better 
than for female high-school leavers, the former often encountered sexual discrimination, 
sometimes unwittingly, because they were regarded as belonging to the main body of 
female staff. As a consequence, newly-employed female graduates often found 
themselves caught between two different groups, male graduates and ‘general female 
staff (overwhelmingly female high-school leavers) without really belonging to either -  
as was recognised not only by themselves but also by others (e.g. fh29-Hl, fu32-Dl, 
fu37-S2, mu41-P, fu47-H2). This would result in female graduates being treated 
differently from their male graduate colleagues and consequently feeling dispirited and 
frustrated (as suggested by mu22, fh36, fu37, mu41, fu47)12.
Gender hierarchy in authoritarian social relationships not only leads to gender- 
segregated job allocation but also views women as inferior and less capable at work. 
The traditionally-prescribed feminine traits of an ideal woman call for obedience, 
chastity and the requirement to perform a secondary, ‘helping’ role (fu37, fu43*, fu47,
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fu50). According to a number of female interviewees, the office culture seemed to 
encourage a real differentiation between the expected characteristics and roles of men 
and women, emphasising a clear distinction between them. There appeared to be an 
expectation that women undertake ‘womanly’ tasks (e.g. serving tea, running errands 
for bosses and assisting male colleagues) and as a consequence fewer worthwhile tasks 
were allocated to them, even when they were eager to learn (e.g. ful9*-Sl, fu21-Sl, 
fh24-Hl, mu26-Hl, fu43*-P, fu51-D2). Although this was more commonly experienced 
by female high-school leavers, nonetheless few female graduates were allocated to core 
departments (e.g. foreign trading or sales) and most, in spite of their equivalent 
capabilities, were engaged in supporting tasks. This practice, in the opinion of some 
interviewees (e.g. mu26-Hl, fh28-Hl), was mainly because men, especially those who 
were senior in the company, believed in a rigid gender hierarchy and usually considered 
female members of staff as more suitable for an assisting role.
Men appeared to expect the traditionally-endowed feminine attributes of beauty and 
charm (‘flowers of the office’) from their female colleagues (as specifically pointed out 
by fh28-Hl, fh29-Hl, fh36-S2, fu44*-P, fh49-H2). Confirming the tendency of overt 
focus on the physical attributes of female candidates and employees, as already 
suggested in Chapter 3, female interviewees acknowledged that in recruitment their 
physical appearance (e.g. minimum height of 160cms for female high-school leavers) is 
as important as academic performance, especially for high-school leavers (as argued by 
fh28-Hl, fh29-Hl, fh36-S2, fu44*-P). Even after being hired, men in offices would 
often comment on female employees’ dress and appearance, which would tend to make 
them feel uncomfortable (fu37-S2). The following quotations from female non-graduate 
interviewees demonstrate the importance of appearance for female job candidates in 
Korean companies:
“While we were still at high-school, some of my classmates had plastic surgery 
and followed a strict diet in order to lose weight before job interviews. If you 
are plain looking, or not slim, even the school is hesitant to recommend you for 
an interview since they know from experience that you would not be well 
received by the prospective employers. You must also wear a skirt for 
interviews; it is not just about the ability of job candidates to perform the work” 
(fh49-H2).
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“No matter how good you are academically, if you are plain (or not good 
looking) you are often rejected at interviews” (fh36-S2).
“I don’t understand why appearance and height are important in interviews for 
staff. It is like a beauty parade -  when men in the office look at pretty female 
colleagues they find it more pleasant” (fh29-Hl).
It appeared that this kind of discrimination was more strongly felt by high-school 
leavers, than female graduates, perhaps because their role and assumed tasks in the 
office were less ‘professional’, but involved simpler tasks assisting their (male) 
graduate colleagues and contributing to a smoothly-run, pleasant working environment 
that is convenient for other ‘core’ employees -  a role, therefore, as ‘flowers of the 
office’.
In her work on female office workers in Japan, Saso (1990:228-9) makes a sharp 
comment on the nature of this office work for women which could well apply to Korea. 
According to her, while men exercise a near monopoly on middle management and 
supervisory positions, female office work, which includes a lot of time spent serving tea 
and at the copy machine, seems to be quite superficial and almost wholly non­
productive -  however, it may be conceded that their presence in the office does serve a 
decorative function and perhaps engenders the much-prized harmony in the workplace.
One of the issues raised most frequently by female interviewees, both high-school 
leavers and graduates, in discussing gender differentiation at work was ‘tea serving’13 
(fhll-Sl, ful2*-Sl, ful9*-Sl, fh24-Hl, fh29-Hl, fu32-Dl, fh36-S2, fu37-S2, fU51- 
D2). The dissatisfaction of women (particularly, but not exclusively, the high-school 
leavers), with their ‘presumed’ role of serving tea to superiors or visiting clients is 
widespread in Korean offices. In the past, the duties of recruited high-school leavers 
customarily included a number of trivial, less job-related tasks such as arriving early at 
the office to tidy up before work begins, wiping colleague’s desks and telephones, 
emptying ashtrays and, of course, serving tea. However, when female graduates were 
recruited alongside men for similar jobs at the same level, it was assumed that they 
would be free from these chores. Nevertheless, for these duties the borderline between 
graduates and female high-school leavers can sometimes be blurred, and is certainly 
stressful, for graduates since both are ‘women’ working in the same office. An example
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of this was clearly illustrated by a female graduate employee working in chaebol SI as 
follows:
“When clients or visitors have to be served tea while the usual junior female 
staff (usually high-school leavers) are not in the office the boss, instead of 
asking a junior male of the same department, would call a female graduate 
member of staff from another department to provide the service. This illustrates 
well the presumption that there are certain jobs that men shouldn’t do and 
others, influenced by traditional values, that are reserved for women” (ful2*- 
Sl).
When asked what he thought of the instinctive association of tea serving with female 
staff, a male supervisor (daeri) from the same company replied that,
“When some clients are visiting it is a bit awkward to let them wait while I go 
and make tea for them. So I prefer to ask someone else to make and serve tea, 
and it always happens to be a women, which I feel most comfortable with since 
women are accustomed to doing small favours in the office, such as running 
errands to the bank or post office -  even though this is more usual for female 
high-school leavers than graduates” (mu5-Sl).
These female ‘tea serving’ practices, and the relegation of women to a ‘serving and 
helping’ role would, sometimes, be extended further beyond the domain of work. One 
example, as a female interviewee (fu43*-P) recalled in the case of a high-school leaver 
colleague, was to be in attendance at the funeral of a male colleague’s relative. While it 
is normal for both men and women to attend a colleague’s wedding, only men go to the 
funeral of a colleague’s close relative, leaving women behind at work. She (fu43*) 
suggested a loose connection between this practice and the fact that only men could, 
traditionally, attend rituals for ancestors - and a funeral is more a ritual than a 
celebration. On this occasion, a manager sent the female junior colleague (during 
working hours) to the funeral of the relative of a male colleague - but only so that she 
could help in the kitchen and serve food and drink to the guests!
2) “Wise mother and obedient wife” (Hyun-mo-yang-cheo) as woman’s primary role; 
a woman is an indoor person, confined at home (An-sa-ram)\
The customary rules and practices in the Korean workplace are based upon the 
traditional assumption that “men’s sphere is at work and women’s domain is at home”.
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In Korea, women are primarily responsible for household duties and childcare 
regardless of whether or not they have paid employment. Therefore, while men are 
expected to be committed and loyal workers, women’s roles at work can be viewed only 
as partial or marginal. “In the minds of many men women should do ‘women’s work, 
preferably at home”, said one female graduate employee (fu44*) of her male colleagues 
in chaebol P. Some female interviewees also noticed that there is a tendency among 
men to discourage women from pursuing their careers seriously (fh23-Hl, fh29-Hl, 
mu41-P, mu42-P, mu45-H2, fu46-H2). For example, one such female employee aged 
20 years (fh29-Hl) said that a male staff member in his late 20s was considered still 
young, whereas a single female employee of the same age was the subject of 
speculation as to why she still worked instead of getting married. “There are persistent 
comments by some male bosses and colleagues discouraging female employees from 
working or pursuing a career, and suggesting that they should marry and make home as 
a housewife while leaving affairs outside the home to men”, said another (fh23-Hl, and 
also mu22-Hl). This message was even clearer for high-school leavers: the same female 
high-school leaver (fu23-Hl) remembered the time when she joined the company and 
was discreetly informed by her senior female colleagues that, when women get married, 
they have to leave the company. Even though her female colleagues were not happy 
with this unwritten rule in their company, they felt that they had little power to change 
the system in view of the prevailing business climate.
The persistence of traditional cultural values emphasising the importance of 
women’s roles as family mother and wife often leads to the assumption that women are 
less suited to developing a serious career than men. Therefore, when a woman marries, 
the attitude and expectations of her employer and colleagues towards her change; 
should she become pregnant this change in attitude becomes more pronounced. While 
motherhood is not officially regarded as incompatible with a career in a chaebol there 
is, nevertheless, a strong prejudice against (or at least uncomfortable feelings about) 
pregnancy. One female graduate employee from chaebol SI expressed concern about 
her planned pregnancy as follows:
“As I am working in the Sales department, I may have to leave the firm when I
get pregnant because it will be unpractical and awkward to meet (mostly male)
clients with a big belly. It would be both physically and emotionally tiring for a
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pregnant woman to be in a situation that others find uncomfortable and, at the 
same time, be pitied for having to work while pregnant” (ful9*-Sl, married and 
26 years old).
This is not only a matter of emotional concern for the pregnant employee, but it also 
affects the way superiors and colleagues treat her. One illustrative example of this 
concerned an official briefing for the chairman by a research team in chaebol P. When a 
key member of the project team arrived at the briefing, a senior manager stopped her 
and sent her back to her office, thus excluding her from the presentation, because she 
was heavily pregnant and he considered it would be “embarrassing” at a formal 
presentation with the chairman (fu43*).
It is broadly accepted in academic circles worldwide that women’s household duties 
and their reproductive role have been key elements hindering their successful career 
development and gender equality at work. In Korea, where the organisational culture 
particularly values ‘loyalty’ towards employer and the closely-related concept of 
‘lifetime-employment’, women’s opportunities at work are further diminished. Lifetime 
employment has long been prevalent in chaebol and, even when administered with 
flexibility, essentially requires in return the full loyalty of an employee to superiors and 
the company; commitment to work and company is considered vital for a successful 
career. As mentioned earlier, it is generally the case that female employees are 
considered to be somewhat deficient in loyalty and full commitment to their employer. 
This issue will be considered in more detail in the later part of the chapter.
In chaebol, where loyalty and work commitment are chiefly recognised by working 
long hours and being completely at the company’s disposal, many male employees 
(particularly those from an earlier generation) consider work their priority in life and 
commit themselves completely to the firm, sparing little time for their private lives. 
This was clearly expressed by one male graduate respondent from chaebol SI (generally 
regarded as having one of the best and most stable HR systems among all chaebol) as 
follows:
“Working for the company like this means that my life is too absorbed by the 
organisation. There isn’t much life left after work. It seems that work has 
become the priority, and more important than my private life. There is also no 
clear boundary between work and private life. The work also can get very
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stressful with difficult inter-personal relationships, including those with bosses. 
Particularly when the boss is senior and powerful, the junior employee may find 
the situation very stressful and yet need to be careful to maintain a good 
relationship with him to avoid lagging behind rival colleagues” (mul7-Sl).
“Korean work culture is based on the assumption that an employee has full support 
from his wife, who remains at home and takes care of domestic responsibilities and 
household duties” (Chang and Kim 1998:131; also confirmed by interviewees mu22- 
Hl, fu39-L) in order that he can devote himself entirely to work.
For women, on the other hand, staying late to show strong work commitment is more 
problematic since they have responsibilities at home -  and also for those who have a 
different attitude towards company ‘loyalty’. This can cause adjustment problems 
between employer and employees, and for some can serve to justify sexual 
discrimination. In considering the general attitude of women towards commitment to 
work, a male employee (mu2-Sl) commented that in Korean companies, where there 
was no clear distinction between work and leisure, it is often necessary to sacrifice 
private life, especially in departments involving external meetings and client 
entertaining (such as sales), but women were reluctant to do it. Female employees to a 
certain extent agreed with this view, yet at the same time protested that their reluctance 
was more to do with their situation than their personal lack of loyalty. One female high- 
school interviewee from chaebol HI (fh23) explained that it was sometimes necessary 
to work overnight, but when a woman is married she cannot combine both marriage and 
overnight working, and therefore it soon becomes a problem. Women appear to be 
disadvantaged by the fact that loyalty towards the employer and commitment to work is 
regarded as particularly crucial in the Korean work environment, and that these 
attributes are often measured and high-lighted by extremely demanding schedules (such 
as long working hours, sometimes continuing over successive nights) that women 
usually find difficult to follow (as reported by, among others, fh36-S2, fu37-S2, fu44*- 
P). Instead of working hard during normal working hours and then leaving on time, 
employees (particularly men) seem habitually to stay late, even if it is not strictly 
necessary. This is chiefly to wait for their boss to leave, since few dare to go home
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before their superiors: if top executives are still in the office managers cannot depart, 
which consequently prevents the general staff from leaving (ibid.).
3) Male-centred culture, combined with the importance of personal association; such 
as locality kinship (Ji-yun), school kinship (hahk-yun), familism, factionalism, and 
emotional bonds (Jung)
As discussed in the previous chapter, men are usually considered more skilful at
socialising than their female colleagues, and frequently reach agreement and
accomplish tasks through networking and inter-personal contact with other men. Their
ability to maintain pleasant relationships with colleagues and, more importantly, with
their superiors (sometimes employing flattery) contributes to their career success. In an
organisational culture where personal associations, such as ji-yun (locality-related) and
hahk-yun (school-related), are important for networking both inside and outside the
office, the tendency of women to opt out from this form of socialising hinders their
careers. Their bonding relationships with bosses and colleagues are usually not as
strong as those between men, and this can result in fewer opportunities for career
development and promotion. One male interviewee of chaebol SI said,
“I do agree with women in that the company and superiors are not as supportive 
for women as for men. But this is partly because of their different socialising 
pattern with colleagues and superiors, both at work and after work” (mu3-Sl).
The vital importance of socialising and networking was also felt strongly by women 
themselves (e.g. ful2*-Sl, ful8*-Sl, fu21-Sl, fh24-Hl, fu32-Dl, fh33-Dl, fu39-L, 
fu40-L, fu46-H2). One interviewee (fu21-Sl), who was a graduate from one of the 
most prestigious (mixed) universities in Korea and one of the very few female 
employees hired against strong competition by her chaebol two years before, explained 
that she had initially encountered little sexual discrimination. However, she now finds 
that getting noticed is more difficult because women lack access to ‘men only’ 
socialising events (such as smoking breaks or after-work drinks) and this has led to a 
measure of isolation from this circle when important information is exchanged and 
critical decisions are reached.
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Male staff (e.g. mu3-Sl, mu31-Dl) also confirmed that going out for drinks after
work and attending evening events is, in fact, very important in Korean working life; it
is there that people really get to know each other, become closer through conversation,
and also exchange valuable information. For this reason, participating in drinking and
dinners with colleagues and superiors can be very important. Female staff members,
nevertheless, do not always find it easy to participate in these gatherings, even though
they are well aware of their importance. The concepts of “gender differentiation” and
“expected traits of ideal women” that have been previously mentioned, often acted as
deterrents to discourage women from participating in such gatherings as equals. Sexual
segregation was evident even in their patterns of socialising: men would tend to smoke
(many, if not most, Korean male office employees are smokers) together only with
other men during a break; in the evening they often would go out for late-night
drinking, from which women would normally, with little choice, be excluded (e.g.
ful8*-Sl). A male colleague endorses this view:
“It is normal, and happens all the time, to ask a male colleague to go out for 
lunch or dinner or a drink - but not a female colleague. This would apply to 
superiors as well. When they go for a drink or meal after work, they usually ask 
male staff but not female ones. When they smoke, they tend to gather and talk 
while smoking where women are excluded, since women who smoke are not 
well regarded. As a result the (mostly male) superiors get to know male staff 
better, which must influence their decision making when faced with a choice 
between men and women” (mu3-Sl).
For women this could be a dilemma. Not only can frequent drinking and socialising 
outside the office (a good illustration of male-centred culture) easily exclude women, 
but if they participate it would conflict with the traditional image of an ideal woman. In 
Korean society where women who smoke are still regarded as ‘not proper’, it would be 
almost unimaginable for a female member of staff to join her male colleagues and 
bosses for a smoking break. Similarly, drinking and staying out late (until midnight, or 
sometimes to the early hours of the morning), which many Korean working men often 
do with male colleagues, would not always be looked on with favour, and many women 
would find it uncomfortable, even undesirable. Nevertheless, when female employees 
fail to follow the pattern of behaviour adopted by their male colleagues, they are seen to 
be ‘not part of the group’. In this regard, it was interesting to find some men who
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criticised women for not being very good at mingling with male colleagues and bosses
after work and going out to dinner and bars until late (e.g. mu2-Sl, mu3-Sl, mu31-Dl).
One male interviewee from chaebol D1 said:
“They are different from us. When staff members (sometimes with superiors) go 
out together, women tend to leave after dinner instead of staying until the 
second or third bar has been visited. It is more fun to have female colleagues 
around, but as women (married and single) are not supposed to stay out late they 
tend to leave early. In that case, the men might then to go to bars where female 
hostesses entertain them with drinks and conversation. That is when I feel that 
female colleagues are different from us. I can’t feel the same kind of 
comradeship with them that I feel with male colleagues” (mu31-D1).
Because men are not only the majority group at work, but also because the
workplace typically has a male-centred culture, women either have to conform to male
mores or be regarded as less-than-ideal employees and colleagues. Men usually expect
women to make an effort to adjust themselves, become fully compatible with the
organisation and fit in seamlessly with the male-centred culture. Some men even
admitted that the main reason why women could not be treated as equals was that they
do not usually blend harmoniously with the existing work culture (mu2, mu3). They
suggested forcefully that, since men were in the majority and women were not, women
should follow men’s customs and mannerism at work. They added that in reality
women, in spite of being in the minority, tend to behave and perform their tasks in their
own way, ignoring the existing rules -  and this was not desirable14. Some men,
however, were a little more understanding, by pointing out:
“Because they are women it is difficult to treat them, as we do other male 
colleagues, with strong emotional attachment and closeness. We men often go 
out for lunch with the same male colleagues. Sometimes two or three times a 
week with the same man. Yet it would be difficult to do this with a female 
colleague without causing gossip. So women’s opportunities for socialising and 
networking with men at work are rather limited - even though, with generally 
changing attitudes, maintaining friendship and comradeship with female 
colleagues is more possible these days” (mu5-Sl).
One of the critical differences between male and female members of staff, which 
influences their success in the company, is their relationship with their superiors (as 
admitted by both men and women, such as mu5-Sl, ful2*-Sl, ful4-Sl, ful8*-Sl, fh28-
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HI, mu31-Dl, fu44*-P). For this reason women can ifind themselves disadvantaged at 
critical stages in their career, for example when superiors consider training 
opportunities, job allocations and promotions. The emotional bond (Jung) and trust 
between a superior and his male subordinate, developed through numerous informal and 
social interactions, often play a crucial part in choices between rival candidates, and this 
is seen to be natural in Korean workplaces where human relationships and emotional 
bonds are very important (as was described in Chapter 5). Some women (e.g. ful8*-Sl, 
fu44*-P) stated that unequal opportunities for job training and management 
development often stemmed from the personal attitude of the superior in charge of 
selection - who was in most cases a man. However, they accepted that from the 
superior’s viewpoint it would be easier and more comfortable dealing with other men - 
who appeared more reliable and prepared to obey orders without question (perhaps 
partly following army experience15) than women.
It is therefore clear that staff of both sexes recognise the continuing, strong influence 
of traditional Korean culture in the ordering of modem office life and the interpersonal 
relationships operating within it. The consequential elements of discrimination -  not 
only between the sexes but also between staff of different educational attainment -  are 
widespread, pervasive, subtle, can be insidious and, most importantly, affect career 
development and job opportunities. There appears to be a strong tendency that more 
important, challenging jobs are given to men whereas less important and ‘assisting’ or 
‘feminine’ tasks to women. All these findings confirm the view that a female office 
worker is still seen as a woman rather than an employee, and that she is often expected 
to play the woman’s role as prescribed by cultural tradition. Furthermore, there seemed 
to be little fundamental questioning of women’s traditional roles16.
Meanwhile, it is also important to understand that the nature of work culture and the 
extent of gendered practices varies widely -  according to the character of the industry, 
chaebol, company, and even department (where the manager’s personal attitude is 
crucial). There seems to be some correlation between the relative importance of 
traditional cultural influences in the organisation and the degree of gender 
discrimination. A female graduate interviewee (fu46-H2) suggested that differences in 
culture between workplaces often reflected how traditional or modernised the company
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was: if the company was still strongly influenced by Confucian tradition, staff were 
required to follow the instructions of superiors regardless of how undesirable or 
impractical they might be. She added that some more-modernised companies (like SI 
group) were inclined to allow opportunities for discussion among employees and were 
prepared to consider ideas even from junior staff, implying that their work culture is 
more open, rational and democratic, and more likely to change for the better.
A similar tendency in relation to gender relations can be found: the extent of 
gendered practices in a workplace can vary according to its work culture. For example, 
in chaebol SI (considered as one of the leaders in modem organisational culture in 
Korea) men’s three-year army service was not favourably regarded as work experience 
(as it is in most other chaebol) and a new male recmit would start his career at the same 
level as women who were three years junior in university (fu21-Sl). This meant that the 
employment conditions were the same for everyone who entered the company in the 
same year. This practice contrasted with that in other chaebol where army service was 
considered to be equivalent to work experience, varying from one to three years; 
consequently when women joined these companies their salary and seniority lagged 
those of their male colleagues recruited at the same time (fu32-Dl). A worse case 
applied in a smaller chaebol (with a more-traditional administrative culture), where not 
only were new female recruits three years behind their male colleagues, but their main 
working tasks were also not very different from those of high-school leavers. A female 
graduate from a smaller chaebol D2 (fu51) strongly expressed her dissatisfaction that, 
even though a graduate, she had to undertake simple administrative work and, worse, 
assist her male colleagues - tasks usually performed by female high-school leavers.
The extent of gendered practices also varied according to the business sector of the 
company where the women were working, even within the same chaebol (fh33-Dl): 
those working in heavy industry and construction were less-favourably treated, while 
women employed in ‘feminine’ industries (such as fashion or retailing) experienced 
less discrimination. For example, the atmosphere in ‘heavy’ industry (e.g. steel and 
construction) is tough, rough and demanding, involving field and site work and contact 
with other companies in that industry (fh33). Very few women are employed in these 
industries, and if so they find it difficult to adapt since gender discrimination is
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prevalent (fu21-Sl). On the other hand, women appear to be more appreciated, and 
have better opportunities for promotion, in functional areas where the nature of work is 
traditionally regarded as ‘feminine’ and requires particular attention to detail (e.g. 
information, design, planning, and administration). However, these areas are usually 
not good for long-term career advancement in the company.
However, it is interesting that my research findings so far show that gender 
discrimination even in chaebol SI is common, and differs little whether the affiliate’s 
industry is ‘female-friendly’ or not. This suggests that work culture affecting women is 
still embedded in ‘traditional’ gender ideology and not free from sexual discrimination 
-  which in essence is not so different from that in other chaebol studied.
Even in the late 1990s, chaebol were still dominated by frequent gender 
differentiation and a male-centred work culture with persistent deep-rooted male 
prejudice against equal status and opportunity for women. Changes in attitude towards 
gender relations do not seem to come easily, which is hardly surprising since the culture 
developed and has been ingrained in society over many centuries. More than three 
decades of rapid economic development and modernisation have not appeared 
sufficiently to dismantle those traditional ideologies that maintain a strict distinction 
between gender roles, both at work and in society. Chaebol (and other Korean 
organisations) still reflect this gendered inequality insofar as their institutions are 
mostly staffed and controlled by men and their policies reflect male dominance over 
women and their lives. When asked why it is so difficult to achieve gender equality, one 
female respondent (fh9-Sl) expressed a perceptive view that without women at the top 
to influence decisions and implement policies, the operational mode of the organisation 
is naturally male-centred and that, even if men try to embrace women’s perspectives, 
improvement and changes are slow because their views are not the same as women’s. 
This tendency does not seem to be unique to Korea: as Marshall (1984) suggests many, 
if not most, organisational cultures are dominated by male values. Harlow and Hearn 
(1995:184) further argued that, from a gendered point of view, it is men who generally 
make the rules because they usually control the organisations, both formally and 
informally,. Behind the mechanisms of sexual segregation and gender discrimination at 
work seem to lie certain common perceptions of gender roles and divisions which are
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shared by most societies worldwide.
7.4 Conclusion
In spite of the fact that women in chaebol offices suffer sexual discrimination, as shown 
in the previous chapter, a significant number of men still believed that employment 
policies and practices are free from gender-bias and assumed that everyone is treated 
equally, or at least fairly according to individual ability and performance. The key issue 
here seems to be that gender discrimination was present, yet it was either unnoticed or 
considered by men to be fair since “women are different from men”, and their attitudes 
and ways of working differ from those of men. For those men who were not aware of 
any gender discrimination, any that did exist represented “fair treatment in the light of 
sexual differences” -  a belief derived, in my view, from their assumption of women’s 
inferiority in line with traditional Confucian ideology, and their own lack of sensitivity 
towards gender issues.
This belief was not only prevalent among men; some women also did not think they 
were discriminated against, and seemed to accept things as they were. Any 
disadvantages and negative reactions caused by gender differences might, therefore, be 
disregarded as being either an individual or local matter rather than a systemic problem 
of the organisation. Worse, these practices were frequently regarded as ‘natural’ or 
‘common’ and part of the ‘kwan-haeng’ (customs)17 of the organisation - without 
questioning their validity since “it has always been that way”. However, even for those 
women who were unaware of any gendered practices, it soon became clear that they 
were not fully satisfied with their working environment and treatment because of subtle 
gender discrimination that they experienced without even realising. It is surprisingly
common to hear statements such as “there is little gender discrimination as long as
you are not married or pregnant, or until it comes to promotion”.
The examination of work culture and women’s roles in it, in the second part of this 
chapter, has confirmed how far traditional norms and ideologies impact on women at 
work, and to what extent they serve to perpetuate gender inequality in contemporary 
offices. The pervasive influence of traditional culture in modem Korean offices does
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adversely affect the career progress of women, whil-e male superiors and colleagues 
frequently discriminate against them on the basis of tlheir perceived gender differences 
in attitudes, behaviour, skills, and suitability for particular tasks. Further, social mores 
and their own priorities serve to constrain womem from participating fully in the 
working life and informal culture of the office.
Women’s inferior status and gender discrimination at work is not unique to Korean 
society. Most countries, whether developed or developing, share the same problem, 
however varied in its extent and however different the social mechanisms used to create 
and maintain the gender imbalance in the particular society (as seen in Chapter 2). In 
the case of Korea, the major gender-discriminating influence in the workplace has been 
the strong cultural tradition of a Confucian philosophy with its dominant ideologies of 
sexual inequality and male-chauvinist patriarchy. As pointed out in Chapters 1 and 4, 
Korea has long been popularly viewed as the nation that adheres most faithfully and 
strictly to its Confucian heritage with its rigid ideology and principles -  a result of the 
particular history of the Yi dynasty when a policy of state indoctrination of neo- 
Confucian principles was instigated for the purpose of consolidating the patriarchal 
monarchy, as well as preserving social cohesion and national independence and 
identity.18 While the culture of modem Korea and its social organisations remains 
strongly influenced by Confucianism, it is not surprising to leam that the status of 
women and gender relations in Korean offices are also profoundly affected by the same 
historical legacy.
This chapter has drawn attention to the gendered, male-centred work culture in 
chaebol, and has explored how it has operated as a mechanism that permits, sometimes 
unwittingly, covert gender discrimination in the workplace. The examination seeks to 
promote a better understanding of the contemporary working environment, and a more 
balanced, impartial appreciation of women’s situation in it. It is hoped that this will 
assist employers and employees to improve gender equality at work. The reduction of 
male-centred discrimination, the encouragement of a more professional approach by 
women towards their careers, and the improvement of the general administrative culture 
affecting women’s condition should be beneficial to all. As Walby (1997:12) argues, 
“the lack of effective utilisation of women’s potential in the market economy reduces
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the efficiency of the economy and society as a whole”. In summary, one of the most 
pressing challenges facing Korean employment must be to improve gender awareness 
and recognise that furthering gender equality will bring positive outcomes to all 
concerned. Progress would also contribute to the ‘human development’ of society.
Notes
1 According to Koh BI. (1996:192), since Confucianism is not an organised religion and hence has no 
registration procedures it is always difficult, in fact almost impossible, to define any person as Confucian 
or non-Confiician. Therefore, it may also be difficult measuring to what extent Korean culture, or work 
culture in Korean offices for that matter, is purely Confucian in origin.
2 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment on 
joining: h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the interviewee (from 1 
to 51); a final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile of chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘fulO*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a particular 
affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
3 Particularly considering the circumstance that I (the interviewer, introduced to them by their superiors) 
was a woman undertaking research on gender-related issues, they were unlikely to confront me with 
clearly gender-discriminative comments. Furthermore, in recent years the atmosphere in Korean chaebol 
has become more gender-sensitive as a result of government policies and pressure (mulm, mh6, fh23, 
mu27, fh28, fh29, mu38m, mu45, fu46) and therefore publicly asserting the traditional concept of “men 
are superior, women debased” can be regarded as old-fashioned, particularly among younger generation 
employees.
4
Noting that only 12 women remained from 26 female graduates hired when she joined 5 years before, 
one female respondent (fill8*) gave three main reasons why the others had left the company. While the 
first is common to both sexes, the other two were particularly relevant to women:
i) some women (and men) felt that their work and their employer was not what they had 
expected, and therefore wished to seek employment elsewhere
ii) women from a wealthy family background when faced with difficulties at work often give 
up and leave, rather than confront the hardship directly and attempt to solve the problems
iii) women working in departments or offices where there were few other female colleagues to 
provide emotional support and comradeship felt isolated from men and intimidated by the 
male-centred workplace.
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5 It is not only too demanding but also unrealistic to manage botth, especially for those women who are 
married and have full responsibility for the housework (and childcare).
6 This tendency was also confirmed in Sohn and Jo’s study ((1993). Personnel managers of Korean 
companies were not very happy with women’s tendency to be too self-centred and individualistic to share 
or help with a colleague’s work, and to leave the office on time rather than staying late as men did.
7 This kind of male perception of women was not always mistaken, according to a few female 
respondents. One female graduate (fu32) reported that when :she first heard about graduate women 
seeking a privileged employer to improve their chances of finding a good husband, she found it hard to 
believe. However, after working in a chaebol she came to realise that it was partly true: two-thirds of her 
female colleagues who had joined at the same time left when they married and, knowing them personally, 
she felt that they were just the kind of women who would cease working after marriage. With hindsight, it 
seemed clear to her that the main reason they had joined a chaebol was to impress prospective husbands 
and their families in the match-making process prevalent in Korea that they were well-educated and 
capable and therefore suitable as a future wife. Adding that these women usually married well (for 
example, to a medical doctor or barrister), she admitted sometimes feeling a bit envious of them while at 
the same time regarding their way of thinking and behaviour as rather pathetic. Nevertheless, she made it 
clear that this by no means applied to all women working in her company. Lee SH.’s (2001) work on 
women’s education and marriage in Korea also shows that, although women follow different trajectories 
as some leave their jobs at marriage and others remain committed to their careers, in general women’s 
attendance at elite universities provides more advantages in the marriage market than in the labour market 
(see also Hampson 2000:171).
8 Similar tendencies have been also identified in some earlier works by Korean academics on this subject 
(e.g. Chung and Chang 1985; Sohn and Jo 1993). For example, when Chung and Chang (1985) did their 
study in 1985 on employment in large Korean corporations, they learned that a number of personnel 
executives believed that women lack the qualities suitable for managerial positions - that they lack work 
commitment, are unable to handle the intricacies of human relations, are concerned mostly with short­
term considerations, and have limited vision. Another study completed later in the early 1990s by Sohn 
and Jo (1993) also showed a similar result in that personnel managers in companies where few women 
had been promoted to managerial level thought that women were good at tasks of an assisting nature but 
were not good enough for jobs which require responsibility.
9
Even though ‘Miss’ is generally used for women who are not married regardless of class or status, when 
its use was introduced to Korea a nuance was added by the influence of traditional culture. ‘Miss’ is 
mainly used for women who have received a modem education and has a somewhat middle-class 
connotation (e.g. not used for a domestic servant or housekeeper). It is also used for working women, and 
women with whom the addresser is acquainted but who are of equal or lower status and younger. One 
typical example is the case when a boss at work summons his female (junior) staff or a typist (Choi JS. 
1994:88).
10 In Korean companies, according to Janelli (1993:160), where the terms of address managers used to 
reaffirm differences in rank were considered so important that men and women who had no managerial 
titles were addressed to reproduce symbolically their respective rankings. Male sawon (staff) were 
usually addressed by everyone according to their full names plus the addition of ssi (Pak Kimun-ssi), but 
for women the prevalent form was the English title Miss plus their surnames (e.g. Miss Cho). Janelli 
added that in all situations the English terms Mister and Mss were used only to indicate lower status. 
However, he also noticed some evidence of structural transformation in language rules during his stay for 
fieldwork. Following female employees’ {sawon) complaints at being addressed using a lower form than 
that used for the male sawon, the managers at the company started to use entire names followed by ssi, 
with Miss plus a surname to address female workers (Janelli 1993:160).
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11 Interviewees gave their own views as to why the recruitment of female high-school leavers has 
decreased in recent years as follows:
“At present, the rate of employing (female) high-school leavers has gone down. In the past, there 
were a number of different tasks allocated only to female high-school leavers - mainly because 
they are less challenging and can be boring and monotonous. However, graduates are now 
encouraged to do many of these tasks in addition to their normal work, and therefore the company 
tends to need fewer high-school leavers” (fhl7).
“The practice of hiring female high-school leavers has almost stopped in the last four or five 
years. This was mainly due to computerisation of the workplace; as a result, men are able to do 
their own documentation without being assisted by junior female staff. However, when 
necessary the company sometimes hires temporary female labour through agencies” (mu30m).
“The company occasionally hires female high-school leavers, but since the employment of 
female graduates the number has been decreasing. Now over 90 percent of newly-hired junior 
female staff are on short-term contracts through agencies” (fu43*).
12 One good example of this is well illustrated in a quotation from a female graduate employee, referring 
to the matter of wearing a uniform.
“Until early this year, all female staff had to wear a uniform, but not men. Female graduates 
were not happy with this practice and complained to top management. However, the response 
was: ‘Why does it matter? What is the big deal? Anyway, there are already enough conflicts 
between female high-school leavers and female graduates. If you [female graduates] don’t wear 
the uniform it would make things more complicated since the others [female high-school 
leavers] wouldn’t be happy. Why don’t you wear it even for the sake of harmony in the 
workplace?’ But from our point of view, it wasn’t right since we could easily be confused with 
female high-school staff, especially by those who don’t know us personally, or clients -  a 
female graduate wearing a uniform doesn’t give clients and visitors the impression that we are 
professional enough to deal with them. Further, even if they learn that we are graduates, they 
would consider that because we are wearing a uniform our roles and position in the company 
must be trivial” (fu37).
13 This tendency has also been well recognised in the literature on Japanese female office workers. The 
following description by Iwao (1993:202) of the situation in Japan bears a close resemblance to that in 
Korea. According to Iwao,
“Working women in Japan put up with much discriminatory treatment, such as being expected 
to serve tea to male colleagues and not being given jobs or positions of responsibility in the
office  Many women employees are openly called ochakumi (tea fetchers), and it is their job
to serve tea to other workers and to guests in the office, keep the office tidy, and otherwise fetch 
and serve for other employees. More recently, in many companies each employee as a rule helps 
himself or herself to tea or coffee, except executives or management staff having secretaries. It 
is also not uncommon for younger men in an office, laboratory, or other workplace to be the 
ones expected to serve the tea. When visitors come into an office, it is still customary to serve 
them tea or other refreshment, and women are tacitly expected to perform this job. In some 
offices women employees take turns serving tea....”
14 While men frequently exclude women from their circle, the attitude and reaction of women to this can 
vary: some attempt to join ‘the group’ by making an effort to become more ‘like men’ and follow male- 
oriented customs (for example, by staying late in the office or hanging out with male colleagues after 
work) while others (e.g. fu39) find it rather unnecessary, believing that as long as they do their work 
properly they have completed their ‘duties’. It was my personal impression, however, that women who 
were doing comparatively well in their careers tended to be good at mixing with their male colleagues 
and bosses and maintaining amicable relationships with them. See Chapter 8 for further discussion of 
women’s different attitudes.
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15 Practically all male-employees in chaebol have served in the military forces where they were exposed 
to the importance of discipline and obeying orders. The following quotation may also be indicative of 
militaristic influences in the administrative culture of chaebol:
“At the enterprise level, Korea’s business class evolved a particularly repressive management 
culture -  an extremely hierarchical and centralised system of decision-making and discipline 
that bordered on the militaristic. Koreans, in fact, refer to the chaebol as military companies, and 
indeed “workers in many Korean construction companies are expected to obey orders and work 
with the same discipline as soldiers in the army construction and engineering commands” (Song 
Byung-Nak 1989, The Korean Economy, unpublished manuscript, Seoul, p274). The influence 
of military culture and discipline is often direct since retired officers have extensive 
involvement in the management of private enterprises (ibid.)” (quoted in Bello and Rosenfeld 
1990:28-9; see also Byeon HS. 1997 for its influence on Korean women).
16 Even if overt sexism was not so obvious among male colleagues and managers in my study, it was 
equally rare for senior staff to have any intention of changing their organisations’ career rules for the sake 
of gender parity. Experiences at work have made most women fully aware of the limits to their equal 
opportunities. See Chapter 8 for further discussion.
17 According to Chang PW. (1994), these factors were often expressed as lkwcm haeng’ (customs) by 
decision makers at all levels in the workplace. They cannot clearly be separate; rather, they are intricately 
interwoven and have a circular relationship with one another.
18 See particularly Chapter 4, endnote 10.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
WOMEN’S WORK EXPERIENCES AND THE OUTCOME
8.1 Introduction
Employment policies and practices in chaebol have so far been examined to discover 
whether they were gendered and, if so, to what extent, with what kind of discrimination 
and how they were sustained. In doing so the work culture, deeply rooted in Confucian 
tradition, was also analysed to reveal how it had created and maintained the existing 
gender discriminatory practices at work. As demonstrated in the two previous chapters, 
Korean women at work were often subject to diverse sexual discrimination, both overt 
and covert, that was undoubtedly influenced by the gender-biased cultural tradition that 
considered women as inferior and therefore holding secondary status in society to men.
The main aim of this chapter is, then, to evaluate the working conditions and 
experiences of Korean female white-collar employees in chaebol. The first part 
examines the actual experiences and perceptions of female office employees, their ways 
of adjusting to the gendered working conditions, and their consequential attitudes and 
expectations for the future. It is important to research women’s personal experiences as 
they may differ from those prescribed by the official policies of their employer, and 
those of their male colleagues. Subjective aspects of gender discrimination cannot be 
recognised without a good understanding of women’s experiences and their feelings 
about them. This perspective of female employees was probed largely by in-depth 
interviews with them. The second part of the chapter, on the other hand, focuses on 
weighing up and evaluating the position of women in Korean white-collar employment, 
and their role in the national development process. At this point, in the light of the 
findings of the research, we can begin to evaluate the ‘integration’, ‘exploitation’ and 
‘marginalisation’ theses suggested by Tiano and considered in Chapter 2. The relevance 
of each thesis is assessed to ascertain which most closely reflects and gives the best 
theoretical insight into the outcomes experienced by white-collar working women in 
contemporary Korea.
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8.2 Women’s Experiences at Work: Reality and Adaptation
Even though chaebol have long been considered by job candidates and office workers 
as better employers than most Korean companies for their lower levels of work-culture 
discrimination in the office (as seen in Chapter 5), only a very few selected female 
graduates are given the opportunity to join chaebol after successfully completing the 
highly-competitive recruitment process. These bright and highly-motivated female 
graduates, usually with excellent academic records at university, take deserved pride in 
winning selection from a large pool of similarly qualified graduates. Many of these 
women begin their working life in chaebol with highly-charged optimism and self- 
confidence, and a determination to forge a successful career1 (mulm2, mu30m, fu32, 
mu41, fu48). However, having started many women eventually begin to experience a 
certain disillusionment with their position and conditions at work. As already reported 
in Chapter 6, some would feel major disappointment with the overt, work-related 
discrimination, such as gendered practices in the allocation of tasks, in spite of formal 
company policies displaying no obvious gender discrimination. For others it was 
concern with implicit and indirect discrimination in, for example, the mannerisms, 
customary rules and insinuating attitudes of their colleagues and superiors. Some one- 
third of all female chaebol interviewees (i.e. fh ll-S l, ful8*-Sl, fu20*-Sl, fh24-Hl, 
fh29-Hl, fu32-Dl, fu37-S2, fu40-L, fu43*-P) claimed that they had experienced little 
sexual discrimination at work; however, it became apparent that their perceptions were 
not based on a full understanding and awareness of the issues. They initially professed 
to have hardly experienced any gender discrimination, yet later unwittingly admitted 
that they and their female colleagues were dissatisfied with certain gendered practices at 
work and were striving to correct them. Their work environment was clearly subject to 
a measure of gender discrimination; for example, it was not customary for junior female 
staff (usually high-school leavers) to attend general staff meetings, and a number of 
female graduates believed that they were treated equally as men -  provided they were 
not married or had children.
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As can be seen from the various reported experiences of gender discrimination, the 
majority of women seemed eventually to become disappointed and frustrated with their 
situation at work. An accumulation of gender-discriminatory behaviour may injure their 
pride, and reservations expressed about their professional competence can easily lower 
women’s spirits and reduce their motivation (as suggested by fh9-Sl, fh23-Hl, fu44*- 
P). “Women can often lose interest in their job, because whether we work hard or not 
does not seem to make much difference to our prospects, promotion, pay, and 
opportunities for overseas travel”, reported one female high-school leaver (fh23-Hl). 
Another female junior employee of chaebol HI (fh29) protested that, while men 
undertook responsible core work, women were usually given assisting roles -  which 
deprived them of the chance to prove their ability to do ‘proper work’, and as a result 
lose the opportunity to be genuinely appreciated and considered for promotion. 
Consequently, she feared, “women have become less essential for the company’s 
operations and its survival.”
Although the majority of women interviewed believed that they were better off than 
women in other non-chaebol companies, very few were optimistic about their future 
prospects and their chances of reaching senior positions in the company. “As women 
spend more time in employment and getting to understand the working environment, 
we’ve begun to realise that there is little future for us in the company”, asserted one 
frustrated female graduate employee from chaebol D2 (fu51). This kind of uncertainty 
was not unknown to male staff; however, in these cases, apart from a few who might 
find the work difficult or their personal relationship with their boss unsatisfactory, it 
was more to do with general job insecurity arising from the recent economic recession. 
It is clear that, in this regard, the pressures that women had to face were much heavier 
and quite different in nature from those confronting men.
Even though encountering gender discrimination and prejudice at work was widely 
shared among women, the ways that individual women reacted to these obstacles 
differed according to their different aspirations. Their varied reactions might be 
gathered loosely under three headings: a) ‘submission’ (continue as long as possible, 
but usually leave after marriage or pregnancy), b) ‘resignation’ (or planning to leave for 
an alternative career), and c) ‘resolute perseverance’.
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a) Submission (passive, temporary adjustment to the situation)
Some of the women, even though they had experienced or felt sexual discrimination at
the beginning of their working life, eventually became accustomed to the conditions and
accepted them as normal. They gradually stopped thinking about the issues and no
longer worried about questioning them. An example of this is illustrated in the
following quotation by a female high-school leaver from chaebol SI.
“At the beginning I felt it was wrong, but as time passed I got used to the 
existing system and the culture as it was. Nowadays, I usually don’t feel or think 
about it anymore” (fh9-Sl; 31 years old single, employed as a secretary 13 years 
without promotion).
Such attitudes were generally more common among high-school leavers, who had 
originally been hired as junior staff for particular tasks and under a separate reward 
system. The perception that employment in chaebol was temporary, usually until 
marriage, was more frequently expressed and accepted (though sometimes reluctantly) 
by female high-school leavers than female graduates. One such high-school leaver 
described her feelings as an employee in chaebol HI without sufficiently stimulating 
work, as follows:
“When I first joined I found the work interesting and challenging and worked 
hard since it was new to me, and I felt good about myself learning new things. It 
usually takes about two to three years to learn more or less what we need to 
know to carry out the tasks. But after that we tend to fall into a routine because 
it is repetitive work, with changes mainly in the quantity. When a female high- 
school leaver joins a chaebol, it would not be long before she realises how 
limited are the challenges she faces, and how poor are her promotional 
prospects. Nevertheless, because we still get paid provided we do our job 
reasonably well, we tend to become complacent with little motivation to work 
hard and develop our career in the company. Despite sometimes having self­
doubts, like ‘what am I doing here?’, most of us usually accept the situation as it 
is, without questioning it” (fh23-Hl; 27 years old, single, employed 8/4 years).
Many junior female staff, and some female graduates, give in and accept the existing 
working environment. They passively continue their everyday working life until 
something happens, such as marriage, to change their mind or situation and which 
persuades them to leave the company.
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Even though most women thought that they should be able to continue working after
marriage, in reality they find it difficult, as was confessed by married female employees
(e.g. ful2*-Sl, ful8*-Sl, ful9*-Sl) and feared by single women (e.g. fh ll-S l, ful3-
Sl, fh23-Hl, fh24-Hl, fh28-Hl, fu46-H2). Although there were no written policies,
when women married it was traditionally assumed that they would resign, more or less
voluntarily, in line with unwritten, customary rules. There was at least implied pressure
along the lines of “marriage means leaving”, particularly for high-school leavers (as
pointed out by fh23-Hl). While women’s resignation upon marriage was in accordance
with custom, and often the result of indirect pressure implying that “married women are
not welcome to stay”, this did not always apply. Sometimes women themselves realised
that marriage and reproduction were not easily compatible with a career in chaebol, and
many would decide to stop working on marriage, or more often when becoming
pregnant. This was because women feared that they would not be able to survive the
necessary hard work and heavy pressure associated with such a career. A female high-
school leaver working in chaebol SI explained:
“It is no problem at the moment, even if I have to work late or am required to 
stay overnight in the office, since I am not yet married. However, once I am 
married or, particularly, have children, I would find it very difficult to do the 
same” (fhl 1-SI; 27 years old, single, employed over 9 years).
For those women who remained after marriage, their additional responsibility for
household matters appeared to be a distraction and make them less committed to, and
less interested in, their work -  as observed by both men (e.g. mu2, mu3, mh6, mu38m)
and single women (e.g. fh23, fh24, fu40). Such changes in some married female staff
would be used to justify a hostile attitude by men towards all women who might wish to
continue working after marriage or pregnancy. A significant number of men considered
married women less suitable as work colleagues because of their family responsibilities.
Typical examples of this attitude are:
“Married women in general are not ideal chaebol employees on account of their 
household responsibilities and their commitment to home life” (mu2-Sl; 
married with child, wife working as nutritionist).
“When women are single they tend to make an effort to work as hard as men do, 
but once they get married their attitude changes for the worse, and even more so
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after having a baby” (mu3-Sl; married, wife currently staying at home due to 
pregnancy).
In this environment, many women would find it difficult to continue working, as one
female high-school leaver from chaebol HI explained:
“The reason why I don’t want to stay too long with the company is that people 
[mostly men] in the company don’t welcome women continuing their career 
after marriage. Sometimes they express their negative attitude by commenting 
on the matter in a form of a joke. I am not so desperate to remain here to put up 
with that. I would rather find something else to do which would make me feel 
happier and more fulfilled” (fh28-Hl; 24 years old, employed over five years).
This situation seems to be less favourable for high-school leavers than for graduates. 
According to another junior female interviewee (fh24-Hl), because there was no 
precedent for female high-school leavers remaining after marriage in her particular 
company HI a (merchant shipping), she believed that she too had to leave when 
married -  even though she wanted to stay longer while considering her next career 
move. In some other companies within the same chaebol, even though a few married 
female members of staff could continue working, none remained after childbirth. She 
explained:
“Some have tried to remain at work after getting pregnant, but when they 
approach the time for childbirth the department uses indirect pressure to 
encourage them to resign ‘voluntarily’ by subtly giving her the message that ‘we 
would prefer that you leave’. But I don’t know about the situation for certain 
because there have been no female colleagues who are married or pregnant 
around me” (fh28-Hl).
One female graduate respondent (ful8*) in a different chaebol (SI) also mentioned that 
one of her colleagues received the worst performance grade of anyone in the department 
that year when she returned after her two months maternity leave. This led the woman 
to decide to leave the company. A male interviewee from the same chaebol (mu2-Sl) 
confirmed that, in general, it was really only in special ‘feminine’ departments, such as 
fashion design, that women could continue working after having had a baby.
This kind of working environment and attitude of male colleagues sets up an 
emotional barrier that serves to deter many women with a family from remaining in the 
company. As one female graduate working in chaebol SI stated:
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“It is not only the absence of childcare facilities that is the problem, but also the 
prejudice against pregnant women and mothers that can discourage women 
from continuing to work” (ful3-Sl; married without children yet).
Among the women who passively adjust to temporary employment, expecting to 
have to leave ‘when the time comes’, the situation was more hopeless for high-school 
leavers, for whom the system was too strong for them to fight for major improvements. 
They had initially been hired for simpler tasks at a lower salary, and it could be argued 
that their less-challenging work and poor prospects for promotion were already ‘part of 
the contract’. The discrimination they experience could be partly due to their lesser 
education (though there are now few male high-school leavers hired by chaebol) and 
their position somewhat ambivalent for them to demand equal rights without 
discrimination. This is an issue that may need further investigation. As far as female 
graduates are concerned, there were few who clearly fell into this category of 
‘submission’. However, interviewees occasionally mentioned female graduate 
colleagues who could be considered ‘complicit’ or lacking in gender-awareness and 
who had left the company without hesitation when getting married. However, 
impressions by third persons may not necessarily reflect the whole truth.
b) Resignation (or planning to leave)
Some women were not prepared to wait until they married or became pregnant before 
leaving the company. Faced with sexual discrimination, they realised that working in a 
chaebol perhaps was not the right career for them and decided, while still working, to 
seek alternative employment which might suit them better (exemplified by fh 11-SI, 
ful8*-Sl, fh23-Hl, fu46-H2). One single female graduate (fu46) from chaebol H2 said 
that she wanted to continue working at the present company but was not convinced that 
it would offer a reasonable expectation of ‘lifetime employment’, or at least a long-term 
career. If she had been so convinced, she might have worked harder and demonstrated 
more ‘loyalty’ for the firm. Instead, she started looking for something else to do in the 
future. A similar situation was experienced by another woman in a different chaebol 
(HI), who said,
“I have worked here for almost 10 years, but there seem to be few prospects for 
me in this company. I find my work boring and not challenging enough. As a
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result, I would like to find something else to do and am actively looking. 
Initially I tried attending a part-time evening college for one year, but I didn’t 
learn much as it wasn’t what I had expected and the tuition fee was very 
expensive. Furthermore, as the classes started at six o’clock in the evening I had 
to leave work at five thirty, which my bosses disapproved of. So I don’t want to 
go back to studying. Recently, though, I have been investing time and money in 
order to train as a beauty consultant, and hope that I will be able to find 
employment in that field” (fh23-Hl; 27 years old single high-school leaver, 
employed 8 years in the company, still as general staff (sawon).
Sometimes chaebol are not viewed as the ideal long-term employer that is often
assumed. According to one female graduate staff member of chaebol Dl:
“If I work hard, as men do, it may be possible for me to reach a senior executive 
level, but I don’t envy those men in that position. On the contrary I feel sorry for 
them: they are getting old but still have to work very hard every day from early 
morning until late (8.00 a.m. to 8.00 p.m. and later) to earn the salary they get. I 
fear that the intelligence and ability that they once had has rather been wasted.
To me, their life is not one that I would consider satisfying or desirable, even 
though many of my male colleagues regard it as a goal to which they aspire and 
therefore work hard for” (fu32-Dl; 26 years old single from prestigious 
university, worked 2 Vi years).
Many of the women who were thinking of leaving in the near future to develop 
another career wanted to find work that they could continue even after getting married 
or having children. Chiefly for this reason some planned to leave paid employment and 
start their own business, for example by opening a small shop near their home where 
they could control their working hours while earning a reasonable income (e.g. fh24- 
Hl, fh28-Hl). One such employee (fh24) took an evening flower arrangement course, 
hoping that she could run her own flower shop when she leaves the company. 
Interestingly, many of the new careers these women were considering seemed to fall 
into a category that either conformed to a traditionally-female stereotype - such as 
beauty consultant (fh23-Hl) or flower arrangement (fh24), or was a customarily-secure 
career for women like teaching (fu46-H2, fu48-H2, fu51-D2). While female high- 
school leavers had little choice, beyond opportunities not requiring higher educational 
qualifications (yet usually reinforcing female stereotypes), female graduates did at least 
have a wider choice that included teaching, which in general is highly regarded with 
good security and popular among women in Korea.
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With childcare seen as a possible problem while working in any Korean company, 
some women were considering working from home, for example as a freelancer in a 
computer-related business (e.g. ful3-Sl; 25 years old single graduate). In this instance, 
however, the interviewee was uncertain about the practicalities as it is a comparatively 
new concept and there are few precedents. There were also a number of women who 
were not expecting to find another job immediately, either due to lack of available 
opportunities or because they intended to take a break after marriage before returning to 
work later in a different field. When their children reach school age and no longer need 
full-time care, they hoped that they could return to university to qualify as a teacher, 
financed by money saved during their chaebol working years (ful8*-Sl, fu48-H2). One 
interviewee (ful8*; 28 years old, degree in English Education) had already trained to be 
a teacher while at university, and therefore merely needed to pass an examination 
(before she reached 35 years of age) to be appointed as a teacher in a public school.
Many women believed that, due to their generally disadvantageous position at work 
in comparison with men, a good educational qualification was particularly important. 
Since educational and vocational qualifications are evidence of intellectual ability and 
knowledge, a considerable number of women regarded further study important for 
finding good alternative employment (e.g. fh9, ful4, fh28, fh29, fu32, fh33, fh36, fu37, 
fu43*, fu47, fu51). One female junior employee (fh33-Dl; 24 years old), who felt that 
her present working conditions would not improve significantly in the future, said she 
was planning soon to leave the firm to pursue further studies (possibly a language 
course abroad). She hoped that better qualifications (such as speaking English fluently) 
would enable her to find a more satisfactory job with better prospects. This disposition 
was common among the women interviewees, both high-school leavers and graduates. 
A university graduate (fu32) from chaebol D1 decided to leave her job after one year to 
take an MBA programme in the United States, hoping that she could later secure a job 
in Korea with a foreign company, where she believed women would be more likely to 
be treated according to their abilities4. This yearning for further educational 
qualifications was particularly strong among female high-school leavers. They often 
expressed regret at not having attended a university; this was explained partly by the 
disparagement of graduate colleagues and partly by their poorer job prospects. One
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junior employee (fh29), who was preparing for a university entrance exam while still
working in chaebol HI, described her motivation as follows:
“When I left high school I decided not to go to university, thinking that I could 
study alone at home if necessary and that I would win promotion through 
natural ability and work experience. However, the reality was quite different: 
the work was hard for me and promotion was extremely slow. I then realised 
that I should study more to become better qualified. That is why I am now 
preparing for a university entrance exam. If I am accepted I intend to study part- 
time, in the evenings after work, and perhaps later find some more professional 
work” (fh29-Hl; 20 years old single, worked almost 2 years).
It was encouraging that a significant number of women were returning to full time 
education in order to improve their qualifications, and as a consequence their 
employment opportunities, and that they were making determined efforts to advance 
their careers. Nevertheless, there were undeniably other pertinent factors, such as the 
unfavourable social environment and gendered culture, which hindered these 
aspirations. While some female high-school leavers were seeking a university degree to 
improve their working status5, a number of female graduates were also finding their 
conditions and job prospects unsatisfactory and planning to leave for even further 
education. Improved qualifications undoubtedly help an individual to a certain extent, 
since the working conditions of female graduates are usually better and with less gender 
discrimination, than those for high-school leavers. Similarly, female graduates with a 
newly-obtained MBA might have a better chance of finding a job in a foreign company. 
Further education and higher qualifications may also, in themselves, improve the self- 
confidence and optimism of female employees. However, the real issue was not about 
the lack of qualifications for women: it was that prevailing gender bias and gender- 
discriminative practices embedded within work organisations really do matter.
One of the important research findings is that the lack of a degree for female high- 
school leavers played a crucial part in formalising their inferior status as a sub-group 
under general (graduate) employees. Their treatment is more visibly discriminative, and 
includes poorer promotional chances and the customary practice of leaving upon 
marriage. For example, among all the female chaebol interviewees (28 in total), I did 
not encounter even one high-school leaver who was married and remained working. 
They would often find that, even though their salary may have increased and their grade
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{gup) advanced according to their length of service, the nature of their work had hardly 
changed: it was not unusual for a female high-school leaver with a comparatively-high, 
time-related grade still undertaking the same tasks as a junior employee who had joined 
the company 10 years later. Such employees continue to play a decorative, assisting 
role; their poor promotion prospects and unchallenging work, even after long 
experience, frequently causes them to lose spirit and motivation.
On the other hand, female graduates who were hired through kongchae (open 
recruitment) were treated more like general staff, although some sexual discrimination 
was still evident. However, their superior educational attainment still seemed to have 
little impact on their job prospects. While remaining at work after marriage was rare for 
high-school leavers, this rule did not seem to apply so strictly to female graduates: 
seven out of 19 female graduates interviewed were married, although they (mostly aged 
in their 20s) were still at a comparatively early stage of their career. Nevertheless, many 
female graduates also came to realize that chaebol would not offer them a satisfactory 
long-term career and decided to seek other options.
c) Resolute perseverance
Although a minority, some female interviewees (fulO*-Sl, ful9*-Sl, fu37-S2, fu40-L,
fu43*) were optimistic in outlook and viewed their chaebol career in generally positive
terms. One example is illustrated by a quotation from a self-assured female employee
who believed that she was doing well in her company:
“At present, I don’t feel that women are sexually discriminated against in the 
company. We have improved the working conditions and gender equality at 
work. People’s way of thinking is changing too. We have changed the working 
atmosphere little by little by making an effort and, sometimes, fighting against 
existing gender-discriminatory customs” (fulO*-Sl; 27 year old, married and 
pregnant, 3 Vi years with company).
While many women (and men) feared possible future redundancy because of the 
company’s financial hardship, this woman indicated that she personally never worried 
about it, chiefly because her role in the department included many tasks that only she 
really understood. According to her (fulO*), it would be too inconvenient and 
frustrating for others in the department if she were made redundant in the near future.
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As a result, she was unconcerned about the possibility of being laid off. When she was 
asked whether she could picture herself as a manager one day in the present company 
she replied that, even though so far there had been no female manager in her company 
(there were just a few instances in the entire chaebol), she wished to create a precedent 
by becoming the first, adding that it must be possible if she worked hard enough.
It was almost impossible to know whether her confidence was well-grounded and 
her will-power strong enough to make it happen; only time will tell. However my 
personal impression was that her unusual confidence did not seem to be well rooted, 
and that her feeling of being ‘secure’ might change at any time with someone else 
assuming her responsibilities. Further, according to interviews with female colleagues, 
both high-school leavers and graduates, (fh9, fh ll, ful2*, ful3, ful4) in the same 
company (SIa), the situation for women was not considered to be as positive or 
favourable as it appeared. Their perceptions could be summarised by phrases such as: 
“there are no women at the top because we are a minority with little power” (fh9), “at 
first it was a shock to see how women are treated”, “women are laid off first” (ful2*), 
“there are no role models for a female manager” (fill3), “female high-school leavers or 
pregnant women are the first to be laid off’ (ful4). The unusual confidence and 
optimism of the self-assured employee (fulO*) may have come partly from her 
educational attainment: while her colleagues were university graduates, she 
exceptionally had a Master degree (in fabric engineering -  although from a less- 
prestigious university) in a field related to the company’s industry. If her confidence 
were to prove justified, a higher-educational qualification (such as a Master’s degree) 
and expertise in the field would seem to be beneficial for the career development of 
some women. However, this could only be surmised since hers was the only case where 
a female interviewee’s educational qualification was higher than that of her graduate 
colleagues.
Another female graduate interviewee (ful9*), from company Sib, who was also 
feeling confident about her job security, was involved in contracting corporate 
insurance policies. She said that when she achieved the same sales performance as some 
men, her accomplishment tended to be appreciated more because it was seen to be 
matching their record. Her success was regarded as unusual for a woman, and this was
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later confirmed by her direct superior (mul5m-Sl). The female interviewee confessed 
that her (mostly male) clients appeared to be polite and sympathetic in meetings with 
her, were never rude and allowed her plenty of time to talk -  all of which helped her to 
be successful in winning sales which, as a result, exceeded on average those of her male 
colleagues (ful9*-Sl)6. Nevertheless, she appeared to have little ambition and was not 
particularly gender-aware; she was interested only in doing her best for the present, and 
intended to leave to have a family in the future. Ironically, another female graduate 
employee (ful8*-Sl), who was somewhat more forceful, worked in the same company 
and was regarded as equally capable; she explained that the insurance sales contractor 
had been successful at her job because, like men, she was assertive and good at taking 
initiative - qualities which were often lacking among female staff (ful8*). It was 
interesting to contrast these two currently successful women: the former (fill9*, the 
insurance contractor) was typically ‘feminine’ with good looks, charm, a well-rounded 
personality and gentle approach, while the latter (fill 8*) was clearly more gender- 
aware, tough, hard-working and attempted to behave like her male colleagues. 
Unfortunately, however, she (fill 8*) was pregnant at the time of the interview and 
concerned about her future, not being sure whether she could remain working after 
having the baby due to the demands of childcare and the adverse effect this would have 
on her ability to do her job. As reported in the previous section, she did not see much 
future with the present employer and was seeking an alternative career.
Overall, there seemed to be little pattern or consistency in the type of women who 
were doing well in their chaebol career. According to my personal observation, 
however, these women appeared to be generally bright, confident, hard working, 
responsible and efficient. They also seemed capable of maintaining a good relationship 
with colleagues and bosses, and also proud of themselves in what they were doing 
professionally. However, not all of them were strongly gender-aware. Overall, such 
cases were few and exceptional and their success seemed to be due more to the 
individual than the working environment or organisation -  even though in the working 
climate of one decade earlier it would have been even more difficult to find such cases.
It is worth nothing that, throughout the study, it was almost impossible to find a 
manager who was female - although there were said to be a few in other departments
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regarded as ‘feminine’, or in companies operating in industries where women were
employed for their special skills in, for example, fashion designing. Yet, in the course of
numerous interviews and visits to different companies no female managers were
available for interview. The scarcity of female managers in chaebol was also confirmed
by both male and female interviewees themselves (mu5-Sl, fh9-Sl, fulO*-Sl, ful2*-
Sl, ful3-Sl, ful8*-Sl, fu21-Sl, mu34m-S2, fu37-S2, mu42-P, fu48-H2). The
following quotations from interviews well illustrate the present situation where women
find it difficult to be promoted to a higher, managerial level.
“Promotion for women to daeri (supervisory) level is often possible, but to a 
higher level (e.g. kwa-jang, manager) it is not easy: a female employee was 
considered for promotion to kwa-jang on two consecutive occasions since she 
had acquired sufficient seniority, but was rejected each time. This eventually led 
to her leaving the company. From the company’s point of view it is still not 
considered practical or wise to promote a woman to be a manager in a company 
involved in heavy industry (e.g. construction), even though women are now 
well respected. As a result, prospects for women in this field are not bright” 
(fu21-Sl).
“Regardless of her work ability, it will be very difficult for a woman to manage 
male staff. I know a few women who reached managerial level, but they had to 
go through a really hard time to get there. Moreover, junior male staff tend to 
ignore and show little respect towards them, mainly because they are women. 
Even if a female boss were older and very capable, men would tend to say, “a 
woman should stay at home...” and see her as a woman rather than as their 
boss. I guess that if she goes to see (male) clients, they would think the same 
way” (mu45-H2).
Nevertheless, some women still hoped that they could be successful and reach a 
managerial position. A female respondent, half wishing and half doubting, stated, “if I 
could manage to remain with this company until my 50s, and reach a senior position, 
my life would be a great success” (fu44*-P). The following quotation, from the woman 
with a Master’s degree, can perhaps most usefully sum up this section by offering a 
thoughtful model for working women’s attitudes towards their career:
“Even if it is hard to survive in the present male-centred environment, we as 
women should do our best to persevere - not only for personal reasons but also 
for the status of working women in general. To convince employers in the future 
that women are worth hiring and investing in, it is important that as many 
women as possible remain in employment, rather than giving up and leaving.
For that reason women need to be strong-willed and determined; some changes
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in their environment would help too, such as understanding and support from 
their husbands as well as practical and systematic assistance with childcare” 
(fulO*-Sl; 27 years old, married and pregnant).
In general, the women interviewed argued that different treatment would lead to
differences in performance. According to one female employee (fu51-D2), if less-
challenging jobs with little responsibility were given to women they would probably
perform more poorly than men, as they would lack the same motivation or satisfaction.
Women would probably lose interest and a determination to work hard, because they
would realise that their future is not as bright as that for men. Sometimes, though not
often, women might try to improve their situation, both by individual and collective
effort - and occasionally they would succeed.
At an individual level, the example of one female graduate employee’s (fu43*-P)
personal struggle with her boss to improve her allocation of work is illustrative:
“As the section manager (immediate supervisor) wasn’t giving me any 
important tasks, I told him directly that I would work hard if he was considerate 
and open enough to give me proper work; otherwise I would have no choice but 
to leave. After that, he started giving me more challenging jobs. I worked very 
hard: if he stayed late and other staff had left, I would stay on to help him with 
his work (although with simple things, like typing). He then began to have more 
confidence in me and started allocating me work with more responsibility than 
my senior colleagues. My work developed a lot during that time and I thank him 
for that. If I hadn’t asked him it wouldn’t have happened. But it also depends on 
the person; my very first boss didn’t change his attitude much, even after he had 
said he ‘understood and would try to address my concerns’” (fu43*-P; 33 years 
old, married with one child, worked 9 years).
Another female employee (fu51-D2) interestingly pointed out that, among her female 
colleagues who felt unfairly treated or discriminated against, there are two quite 
different approaches that can be taken to deal with the issue: one is to do everything that 
the men (bosses or male colleagues) require and then later ask them for ‘favours’; the 
other is simply to say ‘no’ when it is unacceptable and does not feel right. The former 
approach is more accommodating and ‘feminine’ with less aggression towards men 
while relying on their discretion, whereas the latter is more straightforward and 
confrontational towards men and the working environment. She was not sure which 
approach worked better, although she felt that both could be effective at different times.
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She also added that the more aggressive approach might backfire, and described an
example of this. Her male boss would often ask her to serve tea even though she was a
graduate. So one time she responded that she would do it only for visiting clients or
guests, but not at other times or for the male colleagues. Even though she had said what
she felt was right at the time, it soon brought her disfavour: the boss became unfriendly
towards her and was reluctant to train her or to explain how to complete work, even
when she requested it. She felt she was being punished for being confrontational and
not sufficiently subservient towards him (fu51-D2).
In most cases, however, it seemed to be worthwhile for women to make a conscious
effort to raise these issues directly. Some women (e.g. fu50-H2, fu51-D2) argued
strongly that, since they are a minority in the workplace, their voices are weak and can
easily be ignored so they must persist in trying to change the existing gender bias and
demand their deserved rights -  change will not come automatically. A quotation from
one female high-school leaver (fhl 1-SI) is particularly pertinent:
“In the past, while everyone else attended general staff meetings female high- 
school leavers were supposed to stay behind to answer the phone etc. In those 
situations it was by custom almost impossible for any junior female staff 
(typically, a high-school leaver) to join the meeting. Eventually however, 
dissatisfaction with this practice was expressed openly and discussed among the 
female staff, who reached an agreement: we decided that a few of us would take 
turns to stay behind to answer the phone and mind the office, while others could 
participate in the general meetings. Yet when I first entered the room at the next 
meeting, my boss loudly asked me to leave to attend to my usual duties. After 
that episode I expressed my irritation with him by not speaking to him for some 
time. He eventually got the message and changed his attitude. When the next 
meeting was about to begin he asked for me, saying ‘where is .... [her name]?
The meeting is about to start.’” (fhl 1-SI; 27 years old single, employed for over 
9 years).
She further added that this was just one of many examples experienced by individual 
female members of staff. She proudly concluded that since women joined the company 
they had fought to improve their status and situation at work and that, as a result, sexual 
discrimination had been gradually decreasing, and conditions were far better now than 
they had been in the past (fhl 1-SI)7.
Collective protests and action by women were usually not well organised, especially 
in an environment where white-collar employees, unlike production workers, normally
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had no trade union, or if they did it would be a branch of a general industrial union with 
little interest in white-collar workers (according to fu39-L, fu46-H2). Consequently, 
there have been few examples of group protest by female white-collar employees 
against mistreatment or discrimination. However, among the companies studied there 
was one where a women-only group8 had been formed to represent and promote the 
interests of female employees with their employer: “it is a kind of system for gathering 
and screening individuals’ thoughts and complaints, and trying to solve problems in a 
more structured, efficient way as a group” (explained the representative of the group, 
fh28-Hl). As a result, some real improvements had been achieved: until a few years 
before, female employees (usually high-school leavers) were forced to leave on 
marriage, but this customary rule has now been relaxed and women can continue 
working until pregnant - although they may feel pressure to leave after child birth (fh29- 
Hl).
Nevertheless, in spite of dissatisfaction with their treatment, it was not always easy
fighting to change the situation since women were reluctant to ‘make a fuss’, fearing
that it would disrupt office harmony and that they would be branded as difficult (as
argued by fu20*-Sl). This concern was confirmed by male respondents (mu2-Sl, mu3-
Sl, mu5-Sl, mh6-Sl, fu20*-Sl, mu35-S2, mu41-P) who expressed their disapproval of
women who actively raised issues of equal rights and equality of opportunity at work,
considering them to be breaking the harmony of the workplace. Even though the need to
improve gender equality and working conditions is widely recognised among women
they, and also men, usually accepted that the changes would, and should, be ‘gradual’.
A female high-school leaver (fhl 1) working in chaebol SI explained,
“If the company suddenly starts hiring women as 50 percent of all new recruits, 
it is not going to work in practice. Since we are still at an early stage of female 
employment in Korean companies, chaebol would not be able to cope with a 
sudden large increase in the number of female employees, nor would it 
necessarily help them to survive at work. Given the existing social and business 
culture, such a dramatic increase in female employment wouldn’t be easily 
accepted. Therefore it is more desirable to introduce improvements step by step. 
Generally, I believe that the changes are heading in the right direction at the 
moment” (fhl 1-SI; 27 year old single, over 9 years of work experience).
Overall, a number of women (e.g. fh29-Hl, fh36-S2, fu37-S2, fu51-D2) felt that
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instances of serious gender discrimination (e.g. exclusion from general staff meetings), 
chiefly those arising from Confucian tradition, have reduced and that as time passes 
changes in the culture and atmosphere at work have brought improved conditions and 
treatment for women - female staff are now less often ordered to type for men, or make 
tea. Even chaebol D2 (relatively small, with an ‘old fashioned’ administrative culture) 
seemed to be showing signs of changing its traditional, conservative ideology and 
practice: until four years ago men were promoted twice as fast as women; however, two 
years previously women staged a group protest and won a change in policy. Now, like 
men, they can in principle be promoted after 3 years, although (as respondent fu51 
reported) in practice there are limits, and policies alone are not sufficient to ensure 
equal treatment for women.
So far we have explored various experiences of women at work, and how their 
reactions and outcomes differ. Many women, particularly female graduate job 
candidates (e.g. fs529, fs53, fs54), consider that having a profession is essential and 
regard a successful career as making their life more complete. For this reason, many 
prospective graduates prepare themselves for the job market by taking courses (such as 
foreign language and computer skills) unrelated to their field of study during their spare 
time, in order to enhance their appeal to prospective employers (ibid.). However, almost 
all Korean chaebol studied seem to be unable yet to provide an environment where 
women can perform at their best, on the same terms as men. In particular, some chaebol 
employers seemed not to know exactly what to do with their new, educated female 
employees, as they were still accustomed to having female employees who were there 
merely to assist men (as reported by fu20*-Sl). While companies fail fully to utilise 
good quality female labour, due mainly to their male-dominant work culture and 
gendered employment practices, possibly aggravated by women’s ‘less-commercial’ 
attitude towards work, they experience a high turnover of female staff who give up their 
jobs in disappointment and frustration. This adversely affects employers, engendering 
further bias against women and leading to modifications in their policies detrimental to 
the career development of female staff. It is clear that women, working in the gender- 
biased climate of the modem workplace, bear additional burdens because of their sex 
and gendered roles. Some of these burdens are essentially practical and relate to the
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need to balance their responsibilities and time commitment (particularly if they are 
mothers) towards both their families and their work (see Chapter 9 for a detailed 
discussion on women’s reproductive roles and childcare). Others are more intangible, 
resulting from the pervasive male-centred office culture, and occasionally covert, 
indirect pressure to sacrifice their career prospects in favour of men merely because 
they are women.
This examination of the experiences of Korean women employed in chaebol has 
focused on answers to a number of critical questions: can their work, and their general 
participation in paid employment, be seen as a means to gain further liberation from the 
traditional gender-discriminative culture?; have they been integrated into the 
development process of the nation?; or is their involvement in paid work as white-collar 
employees another form of exploitation as victims of a capitalist economy and society? 
The answers to these questions provided by the research suggest that, in some measure, 
the conditions faced by Korean women have indeed been improved by participating in 
white-collar work for employers such as chaebol and that, to a certain extent, some 
women themselves see their work as a liberating experience which has allowed them to 
improve their circumstances and status generally in society.
For an evaluation of the effect on Korean women of white-collar employment, the 
following section presents an overview of what has so far been discussed in earlier 
chapters in order to evaluate the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2, where it was 
suggested that Tiano’s three theses (of ‘marginalisation’, ‘exploitation’, and 
‘integration’) could provide a useful framework to appreciate the impact on women of 
their labour participation in developing economies.
8.3 Female White-collar Employees in Chaebol: The Outcome
An Overview of Female White-collar Employment in Chaebol
With the questions that were set out above in mind, let us first consider the implications 
for university-educated women of the changes in white-collar employment by chaebol 
in the late 1980s and 1990s. In Chapter 3, it was shown that the then-booming Korean 
economy was largely responsible for the (however temporary) active recruitment of
277
ChapterEight
female graduates, using a less gender-biased approach, in the first half of the 1990s. In 
their earlier work, Chung and Chang (1985:30) listed the reasons why big Korean 
companies (such as chaebol) began to value and start employing more educated female 
graduates as office workers in the mid 1980s. Chung and Chang argued that these 
reasons were to explore and develop female labour, increase work efficiency, respond 
actively to social changes, save labour costs in the long-term, improve their company’s 
public image, and help families acquire a double income. This view, explaining the 
sudden change in the hiring practices of chaebol, was also partly supported later by 
other writers.
Many commentators, however, suggested that the primary reason was the shortage of 
qualified labour for white-collar jobs in the early 1990s (e.g. Chang PW. 1994; 
Minwoohoe 1997; Kim TH. 1997; Oh JJ. 1998; Chung UC. 1997)10 For example, as 
Minwoohoe (1997:2) explains, it was because chaebol realised that recruiting from a 
larger pool of applicants of both sexes increased their chances of selecting superior 
candidates. Further, by utilising characteristic ‘feminine’ traits they hoped to improve 
efficiency and, in promoting gender equality, enhance the public image of chaebol. 
There was another important factor bearing on this issue; this was the impact of 
globalisation on the Korean economy (Chang PW. 1994) that the government eagerly 
promoted during the 1990s, also discussed in Chapter 3. A new recognition in Korea of 
the rewards to be gained from employing female labour, and the anticipated benefits 
ensuing to the national economy, began frequently to appear in the general literature of 
the 1990s. Kim TH. (1999) argues that some developed countries and multi-national 
companies have recognised that the recruitment, development and utilisation of good 
female labour are the foundation of corporate competitiveness and national economic 
success. When the importance of full utilisation of qualified female labour was 
recognised, the government of Kim Young-Sam actively encouraged large companies to 
recruit from the previously-untapped supply of educated women as part of its national 
policy towards globalisation. This was also confirmed by some interviewees who stated 
that there was strong encouragement, even a form of directive, from the government to 
ensure that chaebol (the headquarters) and their subsidiary companies should employ a 
certain proportion of women (as reported by ful0*-Sl, fu20*-Sl, mu30m-Dl, mu31-
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Dl, mu41-P, fu43*-P). The government’s involvement was considered an effective 
stimulus for the recent changes in the policies of chaebol towards female employment.
As a result, the recruitment of female graduates by chaebol grew steadily from the 
mid-1980s until it reached a peak in the mid-1990s. With the general economic 
expansion of the country and the resulting need for skilled female labour, women 
appeared to be integrating into the development process by joining the white-collar (as 
well as blue-collar) labour force in ever-larger numbers. However, my research has 
shown that when educated women were hired by chaebol to share higher-level office 
work with men, the reality often did not match their expectations. They were not fully 
integrated as ‘core’ workers like their male colleagues, but were often effectively 
marginalised and discriminated against. This resulted from a combination of diverse, 
multi-layered factors, for which both employers and employees of both sexes were 
responsible, together with the persistent effect of the prevailing (Confucian) culture of 
sex-segregation and gender-differentiation.
In chaebol offices women often became dispirited on receiving less-favourable 
treatment and fewer opportunities for advancement, and yet they were frequently 
regarded by employers and male fellow workers as lacking in commitment, drive and 
professionalism. On occasion this view might have been justified, since women 
sometimes showed less commitment and dedication knowing that they easily could 
leave and become housewives -  thus displaying an element of complicity. More 
importantly, however, the research suggested that the fundamental problem seemed to 
originate from obstacles women faced due to the conservative, male-centred work 
culture: deep in the minds of many men, women appeared less suited and capable at 
work. This implied lower expectations for career advancement, which in turn justified 
less investment in their training, which inevitably resulted in fewer opportunities for 
promotion. Even if some women were considered as good as men, at heart men (and 
some women) believed that the major breadwinners of the family needed the jobs and 
career opportunities, and that women4 s careers were temporary, less serious and 
therefore less important. Nevertheless, there was a rising expectation until the mid- 
1990s that women’s status and working conditions would improve gradually over time
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as a result of their increased labour participation, and mutual adjustment and 
accommodation.
This hint of optimism was, however, to be challenged by the sudden economic crisis 
that hit the country in mid-1997. As already discussed in Chapter 5, the forced structural 
adjustment to the national economy inevitably affected labour demand, and this led to 
growing unemployment11 and a reduced demand for labour in companies compelled to 
undergo structural change, particularly in their management of human resources. For 
both employers and employees the economy and corporate survival became a matter of 
major concern, and this relegated issues such as utilisation of female labour and 
furthering their rights to a lesser significance12. Unemployment arising from the 1997 
economic crisis, and the resulting structural adjustment of the economy, has become a 
serious problem in Korea (Cathie 1998; Chang HJ. 1998; Oh JJ. 1998; Rowley and Bae 
1998; Kim TH. 1999; Kirk 1999; Whitley 1999; Bustelo 2000; Kong 2000; Joh SW. 
2001; Kim S. 2001; Haggard et al. 2003; Kim BW. 2003; Shin JS. and Chang HJ. 2003; 
Bae and Rowley 2004).
In the chaebol this led to reductions in bonus and social benefits, and sometimes 
even in salary itself (mh6-Sl, fh24-Hl). It was also suggested that the comparative 
advantages of working for chaebol, such as superior salaries and generous benefits 
flowing from their concern for staff, seemed to have been eroded (mu3-Sl, ful3-Sl, 
fh24-Hl, mu34m-S2). These adverse changes in general working conditions arising 
from the ‘IMF crisis’ generated a feeling of insecurity in most staff members as 
employees began to be laid off 13 The workplace had become more “up-tight” with a 
heavier workload for those remaining after staff reductions (ful2*-Sl, fh24-Hl). 
Although there was no evident policy, staff reductions usually began in peripheral 
departments (such as public relations and staff training) that were considered less vital 
for the company’s survival; these were either reduced in size or absorbed into other 
departments (as was experienced by, among others, mu4-Sl, ful0*-Sl, ful4-Sl, fu32- 
Dl, mu45-H2).
The impact of the recession inevitably brought some changes for women. The 
underlying national economic difficulties and the ensuing financial hardship of Korean 
companies adversely affected female employment in chaebol and other commercial
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enterprises. Women not only suffered from the more onerous working conditions (such 
as longer working hours, a heavier workload, reduced benefits and emotional stress) 
like their male colleagues, but also from some other factors particular to their sex. For 
example, since female employees were not regarded as the breadwinner of a household, 
they encountered social pressure against remaining at work while men were being made 
redundant. Those women who were married or with children, and especially those 
whose husbands worked in the same company, felt that they should leave when the 
company began laying off employees. Sometimes this pressure became too strong for 
them to resist14. Many women who were recruited during the comparatively extensive 
and less-gender-biased recruitment campaigns of the early 1990s have now left, thus 
reducing the number of female graduates employed in chaebol.
In times of economic downturn employers often lay off women first (Joekes 1987; 
Stichter 1990).15 Stichter (1990) argued that as these reductions in female labour are 
due to gender discrimination on the part of employers they would seem to reveal an 
ideology which assumes that male incomes are more important than female incomes, 
and which reflects women’s subordinate position in the household. This clearly applied 
in the case of Korea. Not only did the companies and their male employees consider 
that men’s jobs were more important, but some women themselves (e.g. fill 3, ful 9*) 
also seemed to feel that they should surrender their opportunities in favour of men, the 
primary breadwinners.16 In the current climate of economic hardship and financial 
privation for chaebol, one married female employee (ful 9*) confessed that, if she and 
other female colleagues were asked to leave, she would not be particularly upset with 
the company's conduct since many male colleagues had to leave as well. She added that 
her situation was not as bad as for her male colleagues, some of whom headed 
households and were financially solely responsible for the family - whereas she, as an 
unmarried daughter, could still rely on her parents as a last resort.
In general, women felt in these circumstances that they did not deserve full equality 
of treatment, and were reluctant to claim their rights. One female graduate employee 
(fu50-H2), interviewed about gender issues in the summer of 1997, even then expressed 
her fear that the economic difficulties facing many Korean companies would not make 
it a good time to talk about gender equality at work. Another female interviewee (fu46-
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H2) stated that the issue of gender equality concerned her less than the possibility of
being laid off due to the company's financial hardship. Even though some may have felt
that they displayed a degree of complicity, it cannot have been easy for these women to
resist discrimination and demand their rights when faced with the possibility of losing
their jobs. It must have been a daunting experience for them to choose between
collaboration and resistance, a dilemma calling for sensitivity and subtlety in assessing
where they stood and how far they could negotiate.
Since the economic crisis chaebol have employed fewer staff although they have
continued to recruit a small number (usually men) through internship or for particular
positions17 (see also Pacific Bridge, Inc. 2001; Bae and Rowley 2004). One female
member of staff explained the current situation as follows:
“At present most chaebol tend to hire new staff only when needed, rather than 
recruiting regularly on a grand scale as before. The company now gives 
discretion to each department to recruit for particular positions whenever 
necessary. Naturally, the company or department usually prefers not to select 
women, who might leave the company on marriage or pregnancy” (fulO*-Sl).
Since 1997 fewer women have been recruited by chaebol - apart from those for 
specialised ‘feminine’ departments (such as clothing design, sales reception, and 
secretarial support) (as pointed out by fulO*-Sl, fh28-Hl, mu38m-L, fu40-L, fu43*-P).
Unemployment, and the reduced demand for labour resulting from the economic 
downturn, naturally adversely affected the employment of women and their integration 
into the labour market. “In a period of a high unemployment, the utilisation of well- 
qualified female labour can easily be overlooked as it is, in fact, at present”, warned 
Kim TH. (1999:58) in the same year. The prospects for white-collar employment in 
chaebol for women, especially educated ones, did not look bright at the end of the 
1990s. When asked whether women would be less likely to be selected under the new 
recruitment method (whereby recruits were hired only for particular vacant positions - 
see note 9 for more details), a senior manager (mulm) from chaebol SI replied “not 
necessarily because, when requesting recommendations from university faculties, 
companies should not specify the sex of needed applicants”. He then added, “if a female 
candidate presents better in interview, we would hire her. However, to be frank with 
you, the process is not strictly equal or fair. Nevertheless, women would be hired if they
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are definitely better”. In spite of his efforts not to make any comment that might sound 
gender discriminative, it became clear that he believed that women would be less likely 
to be chosen by the company in the immediate future.
In conclusion, the dramatic events of 1997, involving a collapse in the international 
value of the ‘won’ and emergency rescue funding by the IMF, inevitably led to 
economic hardship throughout the economy (see Chapter 5). Korean companies, 
including chaebol, have been forced to ‘down-size’, curtail or even eliminate many of 
their operations, reduce staff and suspend previously planned recruitment. The prompt 
action by government and companies has, in the event, proved effective. The economy 
has stabilised, the emergency IMF loans repaid, and national confidence is being 
restored. However, the after-effects of the crisis still remain and it will be some years 
before the economy is restored fully to its earlier buoyancy. This economic upheaval 
has naturally had a major impact on the labour market, which since the crisis remains 
under siege. This has made it difficult for new applicants to find suitable jobs, and has 
led current workers to fear possible redundancy. For reasons already referred to, this has 
had a particularly damaging effect on women and their employment prospects.
The somewhat ‘short-lived’ expansion in the recruitment and utilisation of educated 
females by chaebol in the late 1980s and the early 1990s seems to suggest an important 
point. It is clear that female white-collar employment by chaebol was greatly stimulated 
by the buoyant national economy, and female recruitment was activated by economic 
need, government exhortation and the demands of industry. However, it has now been 
curtailed by the economic downturn, clearly revealing the true extent of women’s 
integration in the labour market and national development. At this point, a critical 
evaluation of Tiano’s three theses would help to explain the phenomenon of white- 
collar employment for women in the Korean chaebol in the 1990s.
Are Women ‘Exploited’, ‘Integrated’ or ‘Marginalised’?
Let us first consider the relevance and applicability of the ‘exploitation thesis’ to 
Korean women in white-collar employment. Some gender exploitative aspects can 
surely be found in their working conditions, where women were treated unequally and 
considered as ‘inferior’ to their male colleagues. Moreover, in promoting the active
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recruitment of women by chaebol during the economic boom, the government’s priority 
seemed less to do with promoting gender equality than encouraging the use of female 
labour to benefit companies and consequently the capitalist economy. Maintaining a 
strict gender division of labour was further evidence - exemplified by the role of junior 
female employees (female high-school leavers) as a separate category for tasks of an 
assisting nature at a lower salary and with an anticipated short-term work tenure.
On the other hand, however, most women interviewed -  both graduates and high- 
school leavers -  had little doubt of the benefits from working in chaebol, in spite of 
experiencing biased attitudes and gender discrimination. Compared with the oppressive 
and demeaning circumstances experienced by their female ancestors, referred to in 
Chapter 4, the process of development and modernisation has undoubtedly brought 
much of benefit to contemporary Korean women. Job opportunities in chaebol (and 
other white-collar employment) are preferable to work previously available to women: 
chaebol are regarded as desirable employers by educated women because their working 
environment is less gender-biased than in many other commercial companies, and 
indeed most other career options available in Korea. Therefore, if the ‘exploitation 
thesis’ described by Tiano (1986) is taken as depicting women’s involvement in paid 
employment is ‘more harmful than beneficial’ to them, its applicability to Korean 
white-collar women would seem to be questionable since this interpretation bears 
relatively little relevance to the circumstances of women working in contemporary 
offices.
Would the ‘integration’ thesis then provide a more useful and appropriate 
perspective for viewing the experiences of white-collar working women? This 
perspective is based on the belief that industrialisation leads to female liberation and 
sexual equality by incorporating women in economic and political development. It 
assumes that industrialisation, and its attendant cultural and structural changes, 
inevitably involves women more centrally in public life. Korea’s rapid industrial and 
economic development over the last few decades, and the consequential increased 
demand for female labour, has attracted educated women to the labour force and 
introduced them to a relatively new career, graduate office employment in chaebol. 
These developments have been further assisted by other modernising influences, such as
284
ChapterEight
improvements in national policies towards equal employment opportunities for women, 
the promotion of the use of female labour, general improvements in education for 
women, and other socio-cultural changes including those affecting family structure. 
Further, the modernisation process that came with industrial development has brought a 
less traditional, more gender-aware sensitivity to women and gender issues, as 
described in Chapter 4. Development has undoubtedly been a positive force for women 
in Korea, where the traditional gender-discriminating culture confined women to their 
domestic circle and regarded them as inferior to men. Development has also served to 
increase women’s labour participation, and gender-awareness in employment and in 
society generally18.
Yet, can contemporary Korean women be considered adequately to exemplify the 
‘integration’ thesis? Is it correct to say that they have been fully  integrated in the 
process of national development? The answer must be, as has been demonstrated in 
sections of previous chapters, that Korean economic development has not fully 
integrated women, in spite of yielding a number of beneficial features that have been 
referred to. Even though the process of development and modernisation has contributed 
to an improvement in their status at work and in society in general, the involvement of 
women in contemporary employment has failed to bring fundamental change to their 
traditionally gendered roles and inferior status at work. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that women appeared to be integrating to some degree while the economy expanded, the 
evidence at the onset of recession suggests that the apparently progressive changes in 
female white-collar employment over the last decade have been but a transient market 
response to the demands of industrial development and the practical needs of employers 
- rather than a genuine, unsolicited contribution to gender equality.
If Korean women, as a result of their labour participation in their country’s 
development, cannot fairly be described as exploited or fully integrated, would the 
‘marginalisation’ thesis perhaps provide a more helpful insight? Tiano maintains that 
capitalist industrialisation excludes women from productive roles and confines them to 
the household or to the informal sector. To explain the situation of modem Korean 
women, this ‘marginalisation’ thesis is not sufficiently embracing if taken literally. 
From this perspective capitalist development is seen as making women peripheral to
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socially-valued roles and resources, whereas the experiences of Korean women in the 
last few decades can hardly be so unfavourably categorised. However, on a different 
level this thesis may be useful in explaining a number of features of gender 
discrimination at work in Korea.
When women entered office employment, for example, they were marginalised by 
gendered employment practices and a male-centred work culture. They were allocated 
less important responsibilities with restricted promotion potential, given fewer 
opportunities for training and promotion, and pressured to leave after marriage or 
pregnancy. Moreover, female high-school leavers were clearly segregated and 
differentiated from male employees through different, specified educational 
requirements: these requirements differed between male and female recruits, and 
seemed to be a mechanism that was used to justify the allocation of semi-skilled and 
lower-waged work to women, resulting in a gender division of labour. Even female 
graduates, with the same education and qualifications as men, were segregated by their 
sex as a minority group in a male-centred work culture by informal practices, such as 
men-only socialising patterns and exclusive networking and bonding between men and 
male superiors. In spite of efforts by many women to work hard and fit in, most seemed 
to feel that their endeavours were poorly rewarded and that their role in the company 
was marginal. In these instances it was the existing work culture, still strongly 
influenced by Confucian tradition, which was the mechanism that served to maintain 
and justify the gendered attitudes and practices, and that contributed to the 
marginalisation of women at work. When the economic crisis led to a reduced demand 
for labour, women were further marginalised by their poorer recruitment prospects and 
increased likelihood of redundancy - thus, effectively being consigned to a peripheral, 
rather than core, workforce (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of core/peripheral workers).
In conclusion, although it cannot be denied that elements from each of Tiano’s three 
theoretical perspectives can be relevant to illuminating the experiences of contemporary 
Korean women in white-collar employment, the findings of my research suggest that 
the insights provided by the ‘marginalisation’ perspective would seem to provide the 
closest understanding and appreciation of their status and conditions in modem Korea. 
However, applying this thesis to the case of Korean white-collar women without any
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reservation seems problematic, since it alone cannot accommodate and explain the 
whole picture. Therefore, it might be appropriate to redefine the ‘marginalisation’ thesis 
in terms of female employees being ‘marginalised’ within modernising, and even in 
some cases globalising, corporations analogous to Korean chaebol (see the concluding 
chapter for further discussion on this issue). Meanwhile, let us consider why it was not 
possible for Korean women to be fully integrated without suffering discrimination and 
being marginalised in the labour market.
Marginalisation of Women at Work
Korean women’s ancillary position in the labour market seemed to flow inexorably 
from the traditional, patriarchal relationships still extant in society at large. With the 
country’s political and economic development of the 1970s-1980s in mind, Koo SY. 
(1984) argued that it was the patriarchal system that produced those social 
characteristics of women (e.g. docility, submissiveness, low reward expectation) that 
make them particularly useful to the pattern of industrialisation pursued by developing 
countries such as Korea. Women’s contribution to the Korean economy seems to have 
been secured by taking advantage of elements of “patriarchal ideology combining with 
capitalist institutions” (Walby 1986:243). According to Lim (1983:77), patriarchal 
institutions and social relations are responsible for the inferior or secondary status of 
women in the capitalist waged-labour market. She argues that the primacy of the sexual 
division of labour within the family -  man as breadwinner and woman as housekeeper 
and child raiser -  has several consequences for the woman who seeks waged 
employment (in the case of Korean women, see also Hampson 2000; Roces and 
Edwards 2000). These consequences are that women, socialised to accept this gender 
role in life, have little motivation to acquire marketable skills; they are often prevented 
by discrimination from learning such skills, and (even if they do acquire them) may be 
prevented by discrimination from securing the type of employment or the level of 
remuneration that the skills would command for a man. My research supports this 
argument and shows that in spite of all the changes in recent decades women employed 
in Korean companies, especially high-school leavers, still remain effectively in
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stereotypical roles as ‘wives and mothers’, or ‘flowers of the office’ when at work - as 
secondary, peripheral workers.
Ideologies derived both from international capitalism and traditional domestic values 
were invoked to present women as inferior and submissive to men, both economically 
and socially, in order to serve capitalist interests. Park KA. (1994) also, importantly, 
noted that the backwardness of Korean women stems not only from a traditional 
patriarchal culture but also from the institutionalisation of these traditional elements, 
coupled with the absence of mechanisms for encouraging sexual equality. She further 
argues that this inequality is reinforced by the structural characteristics of capitalism, 
whereby the marginal status of women leads to them receiving lower wages allied with 
the obligation to demonstrate greater deference to authority and conscientiousness at 
work. Again, the findings of my research support this argument, especially in the case 
of junior staff (high-school leavers): they are in a rather ambivalent position in that their 
inferior status at work can be justified by their lower educational qualification, yet also 
can be viewed as due to systematic gender differentiation and discrimination. 
Supporting evidence is provided by the fact that this sub-group of junior staff, there to 
undertake simpler tasks and to assist their ‘core’ colleagues, is mostly filled with female 
high-school leavers.
When women have participated in paid employment they have always, regardless of
economic conditions, been viewed at best as a ‘secondary’ family earner. The widely-
held notion that women were secondary earners, whose income from paid work was less
vital to the family’s survival, contributed towards reinforcing the process of
marginalisation and relegating them to a role as ‘reserve army’ of white-collar labour in
the Korean economy. This argument has been made by some academics (e.g.
Braverman 1974; Beechey 1977; Bruegel 1979; Walby 1986:74-80; Hatt 1997), and is
well expressed by Hatt (1997:106) as follows:
“Two contrasting theories attempt to explain how recessions affect men and 
women. Women either represent a reserve army of labour or else they are 
regarded as cheap substitutes for male labour. If women constitute a reserve 
army of labour then female unemployment will rise faster than male 
unemployment in a recession, whereas if women are used as substitutes for male 
labour recessions will hit male employment particularly hard. During both the 
wars in the early twentieth century men have gone away to fight whilst women
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have replaced men in the factories. Men joined the armed forces whilst women 
constituted a reserve army of labour. ... In peacetime too, women can be used 
as a reserve army to be drawn into employment when aggregate demand is high, 
but they will be the first to lose their jobs with the onset of recession. In this 
view women are the marginal workers who are hired and fired as the economy 
moves through boom and slump. Their position in the labour market mirrors 
their social position ”.
Not all those relatively few women (graduates in particular, but also high-school
leavers) who had been hired were able to remain working when economic conditions in
Korea became unfavourable, and those that did faced a more uncertain future.
Compounding this was the fact that many women felt that somehow they did not have
the right to remain at work when ‘breadwinning’ male colleagues were being laid off.
A creed, accepting the conventional sexual division of labour and regarding women
as secondary earners whose prime responsibilities lie at home, permeates the offices of
chaebol. “A man is the head of the family and responsible for its survival, while a
woman is a help to the family finances”, was how one university graduate interviewee
(ful3-Sl) described the views held generally by her office colleagues and superiors.
Another interviewee (male graduate) confirmed a similar attitude among men:
“In a patriarchal society like Korea, men are responsible for providing income 
for their families while women look after household duties; this ideology affects 
the role at work of both of them - even though I personally don’t mind sharing 
this responsibility with my wife”19 (mu7-Sl; 28 years old, married).
In Korea, the accepted family norm undoubtedly is still a man who is the 
breadwinner and a woman who stays at home responsible for the household work, in 
spite of the growing number of couples in recent years who both work. According to the 
research findings, this ideology seems to affect men and women differently in their 
attitudes towards work and the assumed gender roles they conform to. While working 
for a chaebol requires a high degree of commitment, men usually make special efforts 
to survive and avoid being seen failing as a ‘man’ in a society where he is primarily 
responsible for his family’s welfare. Many women, on the other hand, even with similar 
qualifications and capability as men, are arguably less determined. Although this can 
partly be attributed to gender discrimination pervading chaebol offices, it is also true 
that women often lack a iife-or-death’ attitude towards their career. Although this is an
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interesting and complex issue that could be discussed at length, it is not central to the 
main topic to which we should return.
This secondary or marginal position of women at work is not unique to Korea. In 
studying women in Third World export-manufacturing industries, Elson and Pearson 
(1981) identified the main characteristics of this ‘secondary status’. These are that 
women’s rates of pay tend to be lower than those of men doing similar or comparable 
jobs; and that women tend to form a ‘reserve army of labour’, easily dismissed when 
firms want to cut back their labour force, and conveniently re-hired when they want to 
expand again. They add that this could be explained in terms of ‘women’s role in the 
family’ or ‘women’s reproductive role’ (ibid.). Walby (1997:66) also argues that 
women’s employment has often been considered secondary or marginal in social and 
economic theory, which includes conceptions of women as a reserve of labour, as 
secondary workers, and more recently as ‘numerically flexible’ workers. My research 
also clearly confirmed this in the case of Korean women in white-collar jobs, since they 
have been regarded as being drawn into employment when there was a boom in the 
economy and returned to the family when there was a recession (see Milkman 1976; 
Beechey 1977 & 1978; Bruegel 1979; Hatt 1997; Walby 1997; Brinton et al. 2001).
In this process Confucian ideology was also used by employers to maintain and 
justify discrimination against, and the marginalising of, women in the workforce. Even 
though the notion of women’s role as a secondary earner is widely accepted in many 
societies, the origin and justification of this concept in Korea largely came from the 
strict gender divisions and spatial boundaries of Confucian tradition: women’s place is 
at home, men should labour outdoors and serve as sole bread-winner. In the light of this, 
it is not surprising to learn that female employees were considered less committed, and 
less serious about their work, than men20.
This not only affects the attitude of employers and male colleagues towards women, 
but also that of the women themselves, who suffer a lack of confidence in their own 
professionalism and commitment. When faced with gender discrimination, many 
women succumb and accept the situation as it is, and make little conscious effort to 
change their treatment. Even if they choose opposition and resistance, it is usually 
poorly organised and insufficiently persistent to bring major improvement (see the
290
ChapterEight
concluding chapter for further discussion of this issue). Although diluted by advances in 
female education, modernisation and other progressive influences, traditional Confucian 
culture still acts as a major barrier against the full participation of women and their 
desire for equal rights at work.
The Korean patriarchal system is legitimised by its Confucian tradition; its long 
history gives it an assumed validity. Traditional patriarchal elements, such as gender 
differentiation and inferior roles for women, that were reinforced and justified by 
Confucianism, have permeated industry and the labour market wherever women were 
involved, and serve to maintain gender differentiation and the sexual division of labour. 
Therefore, women’s increased participation in the workforce and the opening of new 
opportunities for them did not necessarily of itself improve gender equality, as might 
naively have been expected by some. It also became clear that neither employers, male 
colleagues nor female employees were yet fully prepared to practice gender equality at 
work, and that this would not be possible without fundamental changes to historically- 
gendered attitudes and behaviour.
8.4 Conclusion
The first half of the chapter, using insights drawn from in-depth interviews, explored 
the actual experiences and perceptions of women (and some men) working in chaebol 
offices. Particular attention was paid to the different ways that women responded to 
gender-discriminatory treatment, and how it affected their attitudes and expectations for 
the future. It has been shown that the great majority of women working in chaebol 
offices have encountered gender-biased experiences (though the extent of these 
experiences, and the nature of their perceptions, vary widely) and most women 
interviewed expressed their disappointment at being exposed to these discriminatory 
practices. Their reactions to the experiences also varied widely, being influenced by, 
and particular to, the specific circumstances of the work and the personality and 
aspirations of each individual employee. Nevertheless, it was possible to group the 
different reactions of the individual women to their treatment at work into three broad
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categories, which may be depicted as: ‘meek submission’, ‘resignation’ and ‘resolute 
perseverance’.
The second part of the chapter focused on major changes in the employment of 
female white-collar staff in the recent years that are particularly relevant to this study. A 
booming economy and the resulting shortage of skilled labour led Korean companies, 
actively encouraged by the government, to hire qualified women in increasing numbers. 
However, the working environment and culture remained largely male-dominated and 
gender-biased, and this served to hinder the genuine integration of women into the 
development process. When the 1997 ‘IMF crisis’ led to harsher economic 
circumstances, and companies were forced to introduce less-generous working 
conditions, curtailment of recruitment, and actual reductions in staff, it became clear 
that women suffered disproportionately. This suggested that the demand for female 
labour in the economic boom period (during the late 1980s and the early 1990s) was 
due more to the economic situation than any genuine progress towards gender equality. 
In turn, this implied that Korean women were, to a significant degree, considered and 
treated as a ‘reserve army of labour’ - a flexible and peripheral workforce.
Throughout, Korean cultural tradition seems to have played a pervasive role, both as 
a barrier to progress towards gender equality and also as justification for discrimination. 
Even though it is not always easy to draw a clear distinction between the influence of 
purely Confucian culture and that of patriarchal capitalist ideology (as is similarly 
pervasive in other parts of world), it is clear that both are implicated in the strength and 
persistence of gender discrimination in Korea.
In an overall evaluation of Korean working women and their experiences in 
economic development, the insights provided by the ‘marginalisation’ perspective 
would seem to provide the closest understanding and appreciation of their status and 
conditions in modem Korea. However, the outcome of my research also suggests that a 
redefinition of Tiano’s ‘marginalisation’ thesis may be necessary to provide a 
satisfactory and constructive explanation for women in white-collar employment in 
developing countries, such as Korea. This discussion will be continued in the following 
chapter.
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Notes
1 Optimism and expectations were particularly high in the first half of the 1990s, when both the 
government and chaebol were actively promoting the recruitment of female graduates as part of the 
movement towards globalisation (as reported by fu20*, fu21, fu46).
2 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment on 
joining: h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the interviewee (from 1 
to 51); a final m denotes manager. See Appendix 1.1 for the codes and profile of chaebol interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
In instances where it is judged to be relevant, the identity of the employer chaebol is indicated after a 
hyphen with an upper-case postscript followed (where appropriate) by a lower-case letter for the 
particular affiliate. For example, ‘fulO*-Sla’ indicates that the interviewee number 10 was female, 
university educated, married, and worked in affiliate ‘a’ of chaebol SI. However, reference to a particular 
affiliate is rare as in only a few cases is it deemed to be relevant.
3 See Appendix 2.1 for chaebol codes and business sectors.
4 As seen in Chapter 5, Western companies in Korea are usually considered to be better employers than 
domestic firms because of their less-gender-discriminatory practices. This expectation was confirmed by 
those interviewees working in foreign-owned companies. It is also interesting to discover that students, 
particularly women, are showing more interest in Western education. For example, between 1994-2000, 
the number of Korean women taking the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), required for 
entrance into western MBA programs, increased by 227% (Pacific Bridge, Inc. 2001:1)
5 According to one female informant (fh36-S2), of some 180 female high-school leavers in her company 
over 30 attend an evening college after work.
6 During the two interviews with her, she appeared to be bright and have an easy-going, pleasant 
personality with an optimistic attitude. Yet, at the same time I could see that she looked extremely 
attractive and feminine; it came as no surprise when she told me of her success in obtaining contracts 
with male clients. Unlike some other female employees, also well appreciated by their employers for their 
determination and hard work, she gave little thought to her future career and was contemplating leaving 
after a few years to have children.
7
Nevertheless, the effort and struggle by women to improve their condition does not always win rewards. 
In a similar situation in another chaebol, the outcome differed. In chaebol D2, which is smaller and more 
traditional than many chaebol, the work atmosphere and superiors’ attitudes were known to be 
conservative and gender-biased, and female staff (even graduates) were not able to attend formal staff 
meetings. One female employee (fu51), one of very few female graduates in the company, attempted 
initially to attend the general meeting to learn about the work that men did. To avoid missing anything 
important, she asked other female staff (high-school leavers) to cover for her (e.g. by answering phones 
etc.). However she soon had to abandon the idea owing to constant disparagement by male colleagues and 
superiors, and found it impossible to fight alone against the accepted customs and practices of the office. 
In this case, the problem arose partly because the culture of the chaebol, which allowed women little 
power at the workplace, was not ready to adapt to gender equality.
8 It was not clear when this female staff group (SPSH) started. However, it has 12 female committee 
members and a membership of over 230 and holds 4-5 regular meetings a year. When female staff have 
complaints the group communicates directly with top management (the general affairs department) to
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secure assistance. The group also has other activities - such as charity work which promotes the 
company’s image in public. According to the interviewee (the representative of the group, fh28-Hl), this 
was mutually beneficial for both employees and the company -  clearly so for the employees, and for the 
company it facilitated informal negotiation of desired changes. One typical example occurred when the 
company asked the general affairs department to negotiate with this women’s group to persuade staff 
members voluntarily to give up their 100% bonus when the company faced financial difficulty. To 
achieve the same thing with male employees they had to use the junior board channel (fh28).
9 Interviewee code: the first letter (f or m) denotes sex, the second occupation (s - student, f  - foreign 
company employee, g - government employee, w - housewife, and b - own business; the number 
identifies interviewee (from 52 to 64). See Appendix 1.2 for the codes and profile for non-chaebol 
interviewees.
* denotes that the female interviewee is married (marriage seems to be more significant for women at 
work than for men).
10 The view that conditions in the labour market affect female employment and that “high female 
employment rates may come about simply as a result of shortage of males, due to wars, crises, or out­
migration” (Stichter 1990:20) has been widely recognised. In the light of this, it was not surprising that in 
Korea the early 1990s saw an increase in the employment of female skilled white-collar labour when 
there was a shortage of skilled labour.
11 See Kim TH. (2000: 132-142) for recent unemployment information in Korea.
12 It became clear from some of the interviews conducted during this visit that, not only were gender 
relations at work regarded as a secondary issue, but that it seemed perhaps unwise even to raise the 
subject. For example, during one interview a male personnel manager (mu38m-L) in a chaebol suggested 
that I should modify the topic of my research to something ‘more productive and beneficial’ for the 
company’s survival in difficult times - rather than persevere with a subject of minor importance, like 
gender equality.
13 A similar tendency has been confirmed elsewhere. According to Choi MS. (1998), the workplace is 
becoming more competitive and individualistic since the workers are now concerned about who will next 
be fired.
14 An unexpected incident, that I came across during one of the preliminary interviews conducted in 
August 1997, illustrated well the atmosphere of that time. In the middle of an interview with a female 
employee (held in a cafe in the same building as her company), 1 witnessed a middle-aged businessman, 
seemingly guilt-ridden, talking to a much younger woman who looked distressed and on the verge of 
bursting into tears. My interviewee (fu46-H2) identified them as a departmental manager in her company 
and a female member of his staff) who was almost certainly being asked to resign Voluntarily'. According 
to the interviewee, there had been speculation that some staff would be laid off due to adverse trading 
conditions, and that the female employee in question was one of the mostly likely targets - because she 
was a women who was not only married but with a child.
15 For example, Haiti, Venezuela, and Jamaica during the late 1970s where, when their manufacturing 
sectors had difficulty facing international pressures, women suffered disproportionate job losses; this was 
also the case in Sri Lanka and Taiwan (Joekes 1987:96).
16 This problem did not seem to relate to female high-school leavers as much as to female graduates since 
the nature of work for the former is very different from that of male graduates; their remaining in 
employment did not directly ‘threaten’ a position that could be held by a male staff. However, female 
high-school leavers were also adversely affected by the economic hardship since many companies wanted 
to lay off staff to reduce labour costs; they encouraged their graduate staff to undertake some of the tasks
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that were previously done by female high-school leavers (such as typing and copying their documents 
etc.).
17 This trend was also confirmed by a manager from the HR Department of a chaebol subsidiary (mulm- 
Sl). According to him, the responsibility for recruiting new staff (and only when necessary) was now 
progressively being delegated by the chaebol headquarters to each individual subsidiary. For example, 
before the economic crisis his company alone used to employ 30-50 new staff every year: many had been 
originally directly recruited by the chaebol and then allocated to them; the remainder they had hired 
themselves. The method of recruiting was changing too, he explained: previously it had been by ‘net- 
fishing’, whereby a large number of candidates were recruited and then allocated later to particular 
companies and departments. Currently, however, recruiting tended to be more by ‘fish-hooking’ whereby 
each individual was selected for a particular position wherever needed. In his company, currently about 
half of new staff were allocated from the chaebol headquarters and half came through ‘fish hook ’ 
recruitment. In the future, he predicted, new staff would more likely be hired for their professional skills 
or their qualification for a particular position. Apparently his chaebol S had announced that there would 
be no official recruitment programme for the forthcoming autumn (1999). However, ‘less officially’, his 
subsidiary company was going to receive 10 new staff whom the chaebol had committed to employing 
three years previously when they joined the army service as officers (ROTC), and perhaps a further 20 
staff who would be selected from top universities by the ‘fish-hook’ method (mulm).
18 In this respect, Han JS. (1996) has a valid point in arguing that, as the degree and importance of 
women’s participation in the labour market and elsewhere in society has extended in recent years, these 
developments in turn seem to have had a positive impact on traditional Confucian notions of women’s 
roles in Korean society.
19 The statement of this male respondent (mu7-Sl) hints at some changes and new ideas in the attitude 
and ways of thinking of the new generation. It was encouraging to see that some younger men (e.g. 
mu27-Hl, mu41-P, mu42-P, mu45-H2) were in favour of their wives working and sharing responsibility 
for bringing income to the family. This seems to be partly due to their appreciation of the benefit of a 
double income, and partly to their changing attitude towards women’s involvement in employment and 
society. However, it does not necessarily mean that in practice they were ready to share household chores 
with their working wives, even if they feel that they should. According to female interviewees (e.g. 
ful8*-Sl, fu37-S2), most of the household duties were still carried out by themselves, although some of 
their husbands helped occasionally.
20 “In a way it was understandable because, while a man has no choice but to survive at work to support 
his family, it is assumed and socially acceptable for women to leave employment when they wish, 
because they can usually be supported by a man in the family,” said a male interviewee (mu45-H2). Other 
men (e.g. mulm-Sl, mu3-Sl) also agreed with this view when explaining that men usually had a different 
attitude towards work: they were more committed, loyal and used to taking initiatives, whereas women 
seemed to avoid responsibility and lack persistence. This reflected a basic difference in their attitude: that 
work was ‘a matter of life or death’ for men, whereas for women (particularly if married) it was less so. 
Even if women continued working after marriage, one male interviewee implied, most of them still 
seemed to regard themselves as secondary earners and therefore able to leave at any time they wished 
(mu3-Sl).
295
Chapter Nine
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Summary
The aim of this study has been to offer a gender perspective on Korean women working 
as white-collar employees in the offices of chaebol, while bearing in mind the broad 
objective of assessing the impact on them of their labour participation in the economic 
development of the country. By examining the employment policies and practices of 
chaebol towards their female employees, particularly in the late 1990s, it has attempted 
to gauge existing gender relations and, at the same time, explore the extent to which 
traditional Confucian culture has influenced the modem work culture of chaebol and 
gender relations within them.
By way of summary, the introductory Chapter 1 identified some pertinent, gender- 
related issues in the Korean workplace. It began by questioning the real impact, rather 
than the easily-assumed benefits, of economic development on women, and particularly 
their status and conditions in employment. The core questions related to whether or not 
Korean women have been positively integrated into national development; and, if this is 
not the case, whether it is the national culture with its strong Confucian tradition that 
has hindered full integration. Chapter 2 presented a broad, international overview of the 
labour participation of women, with particular focus on export-processing industries in 
developing countries and white-collar employment in the developed world. This 
showed that, in spite of women’s increasingly significant role in capitalist development, 
their status and conditions in the various labour markets seem to share a common 
element of gender discrimination, which continues to be controversial. This survey 
concluded by suggesting that the application of Tiano’s three theses (exploitation, 
marginalisation, integration) could provide a suitable framework for exploring and 
evaluating the participation of Korean women in white-collar employment in the
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context of national development. Chapter 3 aimed to provide a background to the study 
of female white-collar employment in chaebol by giving a synopsis of Korean economic 
development during the second half of the 20th century, coupled with the corresponding 
changes in female employment during the same period. The succeeding Chapter 4 
focused on traditional Korean culture that has served strongly to influence the status of 
women and gender relations in its society. It was argued that the traditional Confucian 
ideology still has a strong impact on people’s lives and ways of thinking in Korea 
today: women are widely regarded as inferior to men, and their primary role is still 
considered to be that of wife and mother, preferably confined at home. This deep-rooted 
gender-role distinction in Korean society can be seen as providing an important 
ideological justification for sexual discrimination in the workplace.
While the first four chapters introduced the subject and considered the background 
and literature, the remaining chapters focused more narrowly on the research itself. 
Chapter 5 provided an introductory description of chaebol as the context for the case 
study, and described the characteristics of their work culture and administrative style -  
which have been clearly influenced by Confucian tradition. Chapter 6 was dedicated to 
a closer examination of the employment policies and practices within chaebol, paying 
particular attention to gendered facets. Even in chaebol, which are regarded as better 
employers than most other Korean companies, it was clear that fewer recruitment, 
training, educational and promotional opportunities were being offered to women, 
which in practice amounted to discrimination. Female employees were still a minority 
and occupied very few managerial positions. The focus of Chapter 7 was on actual 
gender relations in the office, carried out by examining real, if informal, attitudes and 
practices of both employers and employees. The chapter explored how the 
characteristics of traditional Korean culture created and perpetuated certain gendered 
discourses in the workplace. This was followed by a consideration of how female 
workers, and their roles in the office, were regarded by their male colleagues and 
superiors in those working environments. Finally, in Chapter 8 women’s experiences at 
work, and their reactions to them, were examined: different women chose different 
outcomes, some through submission, some through perseverance, some through 
terminal resignation. The chapter also presented an overall evaluation of female white-
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collar employment in Korea in recent years, including the period after the ‘IMF crisis’ 
when the decline in demand for labour made women an easy target for redundancy and 
less likely to be employed -  implying that their role was as a ‘reserve army of labour’. 
The main conclusion of this chapter, and the study, was that Tiano’s ‘marginalisation’ 
thesis appeared most closely to characterise the situation of working women in Korea 
today.
9.2 Conclusions
The hypotheses1 set out in Chapter 1 have been appraised throughout the study. In 
relation to the first of these hypotheses, my research has positively confirmed that, in 
spite of the vital contribution and increased labour participation of Korean women, 
national development has failed to integrate them fully into the process. The case study 
of female white-collar employees in chaebol offices presented clear evidence that 
gender discrimination existed at work; that, compared to their male colleagues, women 
were disadvantaged, given less-important work and considered to have poor prospects 
by their employers who consequently invested little in their career development. Most 
of the women appreciated the opportunity to work as white-collar employees in 
chaebol, and believed that their circumstances were superior to those of their ancestral 
sisters, and also those of many women currently working in other jobs. However, they 
often felt that their integration in the workplace was insufficient and unsatisfactory, 
experiencing varying degrees of gender discrimination and sexual segregation. Their 
presence and their roles at work were peripheral and marginalised, often prompting a 
loss of confidence and premature resignation, sometimes assisted by pressure from the 
employer. The likelihood of a qualified woman being recruited by chaebol, as well as 
her long-term survival, still remains slim.
This study leads to the conclusion that for female office employees in Korea a 
number of major issues need to be addressed: the widespread under-valuation of female 
labour; the minimal female representation both at recruitment and in senior levels of the 
organisation; the curtailed career opportunities due to marriage and childbearing; the 
gender differentiation and sexual divisions of labour, with consequential demands for
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traditional 'feminine' roles; and the fact that women are considered as supplementary 
earners and a ‘reserve army of labour’, with their careers being taken less seriously.
A powerful cause of this has been shown by my study to be the strongly gender- 
biased, conservative work culture which serves to sustain the customary, gendered 
practices and male-centred attitudes, both of those in authority and (male and female) 
employees generally. This issue directly links to the second hypothesis, which concerns 
the culture of Korean society with its dominating Confucian ideology. The way in 
which female employees in the office were regarded was still significantly influenced 
by the traditional image of women and their role primarily as wife and mother. The 
deep-rooted Confucian tradition permeates everyday working life in modem 
workplaces, and affects people’s ways of thinking, attitudes towards work and their 
assumed roles in society.
A revealing if symbolic illustration of this tendency is the usage of the expression 
‘flowers of the office’ for female staff. Can the status and role of Korean women 
working in (chaebol) offices still fairly be depicted by this phrase? Although the 
expression may now be less common in contemporary offices, it is still used to 
epitomize the perceived status of female office employees - being modernised in the 
sense that they now work in offices, but at the same time reflecting a traditional, 
ideologically-gendered image. Typical female white-collar office workers have 
historically been high-school leavers assigned to less-skilled, routine work with little 
opportunity for promotion. They were employed for a relatively short period on low 
salaries and were suitable only for undertaking ‘womanly’ or ‘assisting’ tasks for men. 
They were often expected to show traditionally-endowed feminine attributes of beauty 
and charm, with their presence in the office serving somewhat as a decorative and 
‘harmonizing’ function, hence ‘flowers of the office’.
In contrast, women (particularly graduates) in chaebol offices today are no longer 
viewed merely as sitting pretty and serving men. The employment policies and practices 
of chaebol towards their female employees have, however slowly, showed signs of 
some improvement - for example, by allowing female graduate candidates to be 
included in their kongchae recruitment. More women are now achieving the educational 
qualifications that allow them to embark on careers with ‘privileged’ white-collar
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employers (such as chaebol), that were previously open only to men. However, this 
study suggests that women are not significantly represented among white-collar staff 
and that they certainly are not treated as equal workers alongside their male colleagues. 
Their careers are still considered as subservient to men’s, and are affected by 
discrimination and unequal allocation of opportunities and rewards. The roles they are 
expected to play are often gender-biased -  not part of the core workforce but in a 
peripheral, supplementary capacity. Although the inclusion of female graduates in the 
general staff of chaebol has undoubtedly advanced the cause and status of white-collar 
office jobs for women, progress towards full equality at work still remains at an early, 
transitional stage. In some ways and to some extent, most women working in chaebol 
are still ‘flowers of the office’ either for their expected roles (chiefly for high-school 
leavers) or by their token presence (graduates) even if their status may superficially 
equate to that of their male colleagues.
While Korea has been experiencing rapid socio-economic change as part of the 
development process, women’s roles in society have also been dramatically transformed 
by their increasingly-active involvement in the labour market. The country’s economic 
progress, particularly over the last few decades, has undeniably enriched women’s 
opportunities in society, allowing them better educational opportunities and the ability 
take advantage of extended career and life-style options. The development process has 
certainly improved the lot of Korean women compared with that of their oppressed 
female ancestors who were living in an entirely traditional culture: women who used to 
be victims of repressive patriarchal norms are now becoming autonomous contributors 
to society. Nevertheless, the strongly gendered culture and customs in society seem to 
persist, being unable yet to adapt and prepare for the needed changes to women’s status 
and gender relations in the workplace.
Furthermore, until now Korea’s development has been a ‘rush-to’ modernisation for 
the prime purpose of achieving economic growth. As a result important issues, such as 
‘humanising’ social conditions and improving the quality of life for all citizens, have 
largely been ignored while the nation has pursued its primary goal of economic 
expansion. This has inevitably led to an uneven and unfair distribution of the benefits of 
development to different economic and social groups. Among the many issues arising
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from the country’s economic progress, that of gender relations is one of the most clearly 
recognised examples of a failure fully to benefit from development. In the process of 
national economic growth women have remained a less-privileged group, whose rights 
have been undermined in the interest of capitalist expansion.
If development is, as Brett argues (1991), a process that should involve all members 
of a society to the same extent according to their individual needs, then Korean 
development in the truly liberating sense for women has not kept pace with the 
economic growth of the society. Gender equality, or at least encouraging progress 
towards it, may easily have been assumed to be a ‘natural’ consequence of economic 
development. Evidence from this case study of female white-collar employees in 
chaebol, however, suggests that any such progress is minimal. It is clear that the 
development process of itself does not necessarily guarantee the delivery of gender 
equality, and recalling the arguments (referred to in Chapter 2) of academics writing 
about the developed world, such as Kanter (1993)2 and Walby (1997)3, it must be 
acknowledged that gender equality has not yet been fully achieved even in more- 
developed, Western countries. In the light of this, it may well be assumed that it will be 
some time before Korean women gain full and equal rights in society and secure true 
gender equality at work, and that this cannot be realised without fundamental change 
and conscious effort by both employers and (male and female) employees as well as the 
government.
Let us now consider the pending issue of the applicability of Tiano’s 
‘marginalisation’ thesis to white-collar women in Korean development. As suggested in 
the previous chapter, applying the ‘marginalisation’ thesis directly to female white- 
collar workers in a country such as Korea can be questionable. When Tiano initially 
developed her three theses it was in the comparatively simpler context of working 
women in the developing world. Although the ‘marginalisation’ thesis defines the 
experiences of white-collar women more closely than the other two, it fails adequately 
to encompass the undoubted benefits from development obtained by the modem 
working woman, for whom development has brought real tangible improvements when 
compared with her ancestors. Her earnings have given her independence, and she is no 
longer confined at home. They perceive their relative liberalisation, independence and
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‘integration’ into the public economic life of the nation as a major advance from their 
traditional roles. Both female high-school leavers and graduates working in chaebol are 
appreciative of their comparatively privileged position in the labour market. However, a 
degree of ‘exploitation’ is also evident with the maintenance of gender division of 
labour by capitalist employers and the government who, on occasion, regard women as 
‘flexible’, secondary workers forming a ‘reserve army of labour’ when needed by the 
economy. Therefore, the other two theses should not be dismissed entirely, as each has 
elements relevant to illuminating the position of the modem working woman.
At the same time, this implies that the original marginalisation thesis alone cannot 
explain adequately the situation of Korean women working in chaebol, since it fails to 
encompass the dynamic interplay between (domestic and global) market forces and 
gender relations within the existing cultural and social environment. Women are 
‘integrated’ in the economy, yet remain ‘marginalised’ at work, where men still retain 
their traditional dominance through formal and informal practices. Women are 
marginalised from informal power centres and the more-permanent, ‘core’ workforce in 
the white-collar labour market, rather than from the public sphere or the economy. In 
this sense it is illuminating to recognise the importance of the reproductive and 
domestic roles of women, which in (early) capitalist development made them peripheral 
to socially-valued productive roles by confining them to the household or the informal 
sector and now, as the more ‘integrated’ modem women discover, are marginalising 
them at work largely for the same reason.
In the development process incorporating both economic growth and social change, 
women’s labour participation can simultaneously be empowering yet marginalising and 
exploitative -  clearly a complex, multi-layered interaction. We have seen that, by itself, 
the marginalisation thesis is too simplistic to interpret these circumstances. Therefore, 
in conclusion, I suggest that perhaps a modified form, which could be termed ‘complex 
marginalisation’, would better define and explain the situation of women working in 
chaebol offices. This ‘complex marginalisation’ may well be applicable to working 
women in other societies. Naturally, this preliminary suggestion would need further 
study and analysis before a modified thesis could properly be formulated and applied.
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The real value of theoretical analysis and debate is that it can provide an 
instructional pointer for the future. In order to improve the position of Korean women in 
the labour market and integrate them effectively into society in general, there are some 
critical and pressing issues that deserve special attention. These are issues relating to i) 
the obstacles to a successful career and equal treatment at work provided unwittingly by 
women’s reproductive role and household duties, and ii) the promulgation of an 
increased level of gender awareness and sensitivity among individuals and social 
organisations (e.g. employers and government) to further progress towards gender 
equality.
9.3 Career Obstacles Faced by Women
One of the most widely recognised, yet fundamental, difficulties faced by women stems 
from their reproductive role and their assumed responsibility for domestic duties4. For 
example, female interviewees working in chaebol offices recognised that, apart from 
custom and tradition that still adversely affects female employment in companies, there 
are other more pragmatic reasons why employers avoid hiring women. These include 
their perceived lack of professionalism, loyalty and commitment (as viewed by men, 
and often confirmed by women themselves), and also practical problems associated 
with their household duties, reproductive roles and childcare. The fact that women are 
almost exclusively responsible for these out-of-office duties hinders their 
competitiveness in the labour market, and can also adversely affect the attitudes and 
perceptions of their employers.
However they manage their experiences and outcomes, most women share the same 
basic obstacles to their career development: marriage, pregnancy and child rearing can 
cause female employees to leave, or to be directly or indirectly persuaded to leave, since 
these domestic responsibilities are often regarded as incompatible with working in a 
chaebol. Not only do women’s household duties and reproductive roles act as limiting 
factors in gender discrimination by employers, but women themselves find these family 
responsibilities (especially childcare) a practical hindrance in pursuing their careers. 
Childcare and other housework are not only demanding in time, but also limit the
303
ChapterNine
opportunities for working women to be promoted to positions of responsibility - which 
may also involve business travel and extended working hours.5
In a country where marriage and bearing children is less discretionary than it is in the 
West, and where there is a shorter history of women in paid work, the task of 
successfully combining work with household responsibilities and motherhood can often 
be problematic, sometimes even unrealistic. Most of the women interviewed mentioned 
that working conditions (such as long hours) and the required work commitment in 
chaebol made it difficult for them to combine employment with family responsibilities 
when married. Further, their employers’ attitude towards maternity leave was not very 
cooperative or understanding: they might allow a two-month absence (the official 
maternity leave) but for a woman to return to work after longer, unpaid leave was 
virtually unheard of. The lack of a suitable childminding system in Korea was also 
frequently mentioned (for example by ful2*, ful3, ful8*, fh23). Since there are veiy 
few good childminding services available for working mothers, many female 
interviewees (e.g. fulO*, ful2*, ful3, ful4, fu37, fu43*, fu44*, fh49) considered that it 
was quite normal to arrange for their mothers or mothers-in-law to look after children 
when they need childcare6 -  although in some cases this would not be possible as 
neither the mother nor mother-in-law lived nearby (ful3). However, for other 
employees wishing to remain at work, having a baby without access to family support 
for childcare presented serious complications. One married graduate interviewee 
(fill 8*) from chaebol SI, who has so far been successful in her job, expressed her fears 
as follows:
“I am currently pregnant, but once I have a baby it will be difficult to come to 
work at seven in the morning as I do now. If the problem of childminding can 
be resolved, I would like to continue working; but if not I may have to leave 
because it will be almost impossible to manage both work and child-rearing 
without considerable help from my family” (ful8*-Sl).
Since chaebol do not allow unpaid leave (except for promising executives, usually men, 
who wish to study abroad for an MBA) and do not offer long-term maternity leave (as 
pointed out by ful8*-Sl, fu37-S2, fu43*-P), some women reluctantly had to give up 
work when faced with this childcare dilemma.
It is universally acknowledged that marriage and their reproductive role represent
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probably the most challenging barriers to women entering and participating in the 
labour force on an equal footing with men (Lim 1983; Jones and Causer 1995; 
Westwood et al. 1997). The existing prejudice against women working after marriage or 
childbirth has erected a barrier against Korean women, as it has against other women 
elsewhere. The presumed, and sometimes overt, relegation of women to household 
duties and their reproductive role has been one of the major, if not the most 
fundamental, deterrents hindering their pursuit of a successful career. Women’s double 
burden of work and family still remains an unresolved dilemma for many Korean 
women. Therefore, as Bacchi argues (1990:99), simply demanding an end to gender 
roles does not seem to have had much effect: until we radically rethink the relationship 
between home and paid work for women and for men, women will remain tormented by 
‘either/or’ choices and dual workloads. In practical terms, support by government and 
employers for improved and expanded childcare and child minding arrangements are 
urgent and would be beneficial (see Yang SJ 1997). Further, it would be helpful if 
childcare is considered more a public issue rather than exclusively a private one7; this 
could lead to significant changes in people’s thinking and attitudes towards sharing 
responsibility for household duties between men and women that are necessary for a 
long-term improvement in gender relations.
9.4 Promoting Gender Awareness and Sensitivity
Another vital concern is to increase the level of gender awareness; not only is it 
important to discuss and promulgate these gender issues on both a social and a political 
level but women themselves (as well as men) should also be more aware of their rights 
so that they resist discrimination and fight to achieve gender equality. As shown in the 
study, this has not always been the case for women themselves. Not all women are 
interested in, or even conscious of, gender issues, which would suggest an element of 
complicity. One single, female high-school leaver working in chaebol SI drew attention 
to this situation:
“I have fought for the last 10 years to improve our conditions, but there are 
many women who are not even aware of these issues and do nothing about them 
-  that is the most serious problem. In a way it is easier to accept the situation as
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it is, without fighting or causing trouble - but women should fight when the 
current system is not fair and right” (fhl 1-SI).
Even if the present position of women in the Korean economy can be considered to
be largely marginal, there is one aspect that is critically important and could make a real
difference to their circumstances: this is their awareness of gender issues and their
preparedness to defend their rights. At the time of the research such actions were not
common, and when they did occur they were typically local, individual, intermittent,
and rarely rewarded. It is suggested, however, that women who play a passive role by
merely conforming to existing conditions contribute to their own exploitation or
marginalisation by employers and colleagues, while those who question discrimination
and resist, particularly collectively, have a better chance of improving their
circumstances and securing a degree of integration. Therefore, both at an individual and
collective level, women have to become gender-aware and make deliberate, conscious
efforts to improve their status and conditions at work; struggle and resistance, rather
than complicity, will make a difference. Further, success calls for more professionalism
and a stronger commitment to work by women, the attainment of better qualifications
through job training, as well as determined and structured efforts to fight and overcome
existing sexual discrimination through collective bargaining.
Achieving gender equality at work will take time and will not be realised without
determined effort and fundamental changes in attitude by women themselves, by men,
by employers and by government, all of whom have important roles to play in achieving
progress. The importance of the role of government in encouraging gender equality in
Korean society, and particularly in economic enterprises and the labour market, has
been recognised earlier in this study. As suggested by one married female PhD
candidate currently working for a governmental organisation (fg61), the attitude of
social organisations towards women and their right to equal treatment can fluctuate
widely according to the politics of the day and government policies towards women. A
male interviewee from chaebol H2 expressed his views strongly on this matter:
“Not only the government but also Korean companies have exploited female 
labour in recent decades: when the national economy was short of labour (such 
as production workers in the 1960s and 1970s) it encouraged women actively to 
participate in paid work, but when there is no longer a shortage they cut down
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on female labour. This is not a fair treatment of women: if they truly considered 
women’s status and conditions, they would ensure a consistency in policy which 
would be implemented accordingly” (mu45-H2).
On the other hand, employers must attempt to ensure gender equality at work by 
establishing fair policies, provide equal opportunities for training, job rotation and 
promotion, work to eliminate pay differentials between men and women, and promote 
security of employment for women. In the absence of a legislative framework that 
guarantees women’s rights to equal opportunities and terms of employment, gender 
discrimination at work can become widespread. Therefore, effective enforcement of the 
law and regulations promoting gender equality is also crucial.8
Further, the importance of collective efforts to organise women’s labour to promote 
gender equality should be recognised. With a strong central government, the 
accompanying weakness of Korean labour organisations in general (Whitely 1999; see 
also Rowley and Bae 2003 for trade union developments) and a tendency to regard 
gender concerns as secondary (if not irrelevant or even obstructive) to the more crucial 
issues of national identity and nation-building (Eckert, 2000), it is not surprising that the 
women’s collective movement and organised labour unions have historically been 
fragmented and weak.9 As already recognised in Chapter 8, collective protests and 
action by women were beginning to appear, but were rarely well organised, especially 
among white-collar workers. Companies make changes in reaction not only to market 
pressures but also political pressures (Carruthers and Babb, 2000); Korean white-collar 
women need to campaign actively, within their organisations and also nationally, to 
raise the profile of gender issues. Change will not come automatically and the voices of 
the female minority at work are weak and can easily be ignored without collective 
political pressure.
This study has shown (particularly in Chapter 8) that differences in culture between 
workplaces often were a reflection of how traditional or modernised the company was. 
Achieving gender equality at work will not be possible in the absence of a gender- 
sensitive culture in society, since the attitudes toward women and gender relations in 
employment to a great extent reflect those of society. Without dismantling the strong 
sexual-discriminative cultural tradition still prevalent in Korean society, women and
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their work will not be treated justly, however capable and committed they may be. In 
this respect, new cultural changes flowing from further globalisation and exposure to 
international influences will also assist the nation progressively to dilute the legacy of 
its traditional, gender oppressive ideology and practices (see Pettman 2003).
In summary, in order to achieve lasting improvements in gender equality in Korea 
there will need to be progress on a number of related issues: general societal culture and 
ideology, ideas and concepts relating to women’s domestic roles and their assumed sole 
responsibility of childcare, practical assistance with childcare and childminding, more 
enlightened attitudes and actions by both government and employers towards sexual 
discrimination, improved gender-awareness among women, and a determination by 
them to protect their rights and commit to a more professional approach towards work.
9.5 Outlook
Since completion of the field research at the end of 1999, Korea has experienced 
significant (short-term and long-term) institutional and cultural change. The economy, 
benefiting from the painful restructuring and reform after the 1997 crisis, has been 
recovering quickly (Kang SD. 2000; Park NH. 2002; Bae and Rowley 2004). It now 
faces new challenges in the global economy that offer attractive opportunities yet also 
bear risks and threats to the status quo (Kim DO. et al. 2000).
For the labour market, the changes and restructuring induced by the financial crisis 
have intensified the trend towards market flexibility and have deeply affected 
employment patterns (Choi KS. 1997; Kang SD. 2000; Kim WB. 2003; Bae JS. and 
Rowley 2004). Problems associated with redundancy, unemployment (and under­
employment)10 and job insecurity have become important, public social issues (Kang 
SD. 2000; Kim WB. 2003; Kim A. E. 2004). Chaebol, while fighting to retain their 
management style and ownership structure, have moved strongly to enhance labour 
market flexibility (Shin KY. 2000). New corporate practices (such as diminishing 
lifetime employment, unconstrained redundancy etc.) have directly affected employees, 
leading to job insecurity and a harsher, more competitive working environment (as was 
described in previous chapters; see also A.E. 2004).
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In this new environment discrimination against women has intensified; they 
currently face more prejudice and gendered treatment in recruitment and promotion, and 
are openly targeted for early redundancy11 (Choi MS. 1998; Kang SD. 2000; Kim HM. 
2001; Kim A. E. 2004). Many policies devised previously to further gender equality 
have been suspended in the wake of the financial crisis,12 and the disparity between 
women’s legal rights and their actual experiences in the labour market has widened 
(Kim HM. 2001; Kim A. E. 2004).
In view of Korea’s fast-changing socio-economic environment this study, based 
primarily on fieldwork in the later 1990s, must inevitably be a transitional review of 
gender issues facing women working in chaebol offices. It would be important to 
remain alert to changes and further investigate exactly how the conditions and 
developments in employment policies and practices are affecting the status and position 
of women in the new order.
Notes
1 These were: first, that national development which has generated an increased participation in paid 
work by Korean women has failed to integrate them fully into the process; second, that it is the use of the 
culture, with its strong Confucian tradition, by social actors and institutions, which has been the major 
obstacle to full integration of Korean women into the development process -  because it has ‘legitimised’ 
and sustained gender inequality and sexual discrimination at work and in society.
Kanter (1993) showed that in an American firm, while management was being defined as a 'masculine' 
pursuit, more of the routine office chores were being 'feminised', and that sex polarisation and sex 
segregation of occupations was a fact of the American work world.
3 Walby pointed out that recent waves of industrial restructuring in the U.K. embody newer forms of 
patriarchal conditions of employment - which are less exclusionary and allow women greater access to 
work, and which have led to a major increase in the proportion of top jobs occupied by women - but 
significant sex segregation in employment still remains.
4
Numerous studies have identified both motherhood (White et al. 1992; Cockbum 1991) and the
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potential for motherhood (Collinson et al. 1990) as impacting detrimentally on women’s opportunities for 
employment and career advancement. Traditionally, the solutions to managing motherhood have rested 
with the individual -  commonly resulting in women leaving employment altogether for a lesser or greater 
period (Jones and Causer 1995:51).
5 For example, Korean companies usually do not expect women to be as mobile as their male colleagues 
because of their family roles. This immobility is often used as an excuse for not assigning women to 
important tasks, and for not promoting them (according to respondents fh23-Hl5, fii32-Dl, fh33-Dl, 
fu44*-P, fh49-H2). These conditions influence women by reducing their career expectations and 
discouraging ambition, and as a result many tend to leave work after a few years.
6 One female graduate, who was planning to have a child, said that if she could continue working she and 
her husband would have to move to be nearer to her mother who had agreed to look after the baby 
(ful2*-Sl), showing the negative repercussion from a lack of a proper childcare system.
7
See Folbre (1994) for an extended discussion on family labour and childcare, and the division of 
responsibility between the private and public sectors, and between men and women.
8 The conditions for women and their status at work have greatly improved since the Law for Gender 
Equality in Employment was first introduced in 1987, with a third revision in 1999; however, it is also 
recognised that strict enforcement of the law and vigilance over work practices are necessary for further 
progress towards gender equality in employment (Kim and Park 1992; Kim E. 1999).
9
In February 1987, 21 voluntary organisations with a feminist orientation formed the Korean Women’s 
Associations United; since then in the context of socio-political democratisation new autonomous 
women’s associations have proliferated (Moon S. 2003). While the earlier (particularly in the 1970s) 
women’s movement focussed primarily on the plight of female factory workers, as working conditions 
and living standards improved it has progressively broadened its focus to encompass a far wider range of 
issues. The women’s movement is now challenging problems of gender politics, sexuality and patriarchy 
that previously have been ignored (Hampson 2000; see also Moon S. 2002).
10 The official unemployment rate was 3.3% in May 2004 (Ministry of Labour 2005); temporary workers 
comprised 52.1% in 2000, and 49.3% in December 2003, of all workers (Ministry of Labour 2004:247).
11 The unemployment rate in 2003 for female graduates was 3.4%, compared with 2.7% for male 
graduates (Ministry of Gender Equality 2004:432).
12 For example, the government put heavy pressure on large firms to set up a quota system to appoint 
more women to managerial positions, but retreated in the wake of the financial crisis. The government 
applied similar pressure on firms to hire more women, but this policy was also suspended. For many 
years, large firms have limited the hiring of women to about 20% of new recruits, despite the fact that as 
many women as men apply and that their qualifications match those of their male counterparts. 
Employment prospects for women, therefore, remain unfavourable; more and more working women are 
gaining employment in the informal and subcontracting sector (Kim A. E. 2004:232-233).
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APPENDIX ONE 
Codes and Profile of Interviewees and other Informants
1.1 Chaebol Interviewee Codes
*Inter-
viewee
Code
Sex Educ. Age Marital
Status
Tenure
(years)
**Position/
Department
Industry 
(Co. code)
Chae­
bol
(code)
mulm M Univ. 43 Married 17 Senior 
Manager / 
Personnel
Textiles 
(SI a)
SI
mu2 M Univ. 31 Married 5 Daeri / 
Personnel
Textiles 
(SI a)
SI
mu3 M Univ. 30 Married 5 Daeri/
Planning
Textiles 
(SI a)
SI
mu4 M Univ. 30 Married 5 Vi Daeri/
Sales
Textiles 
(SI a)
SI
mu5 M Univ. 30 Single 5 Daeri/
Sales
Textiles 
(SI a)
SI
mh6 M High-
Sch.
30 Married 12 Ju-im /
General admin.
Textiles 
(SI a)
SI
mu7 M Univ. 28 Married 3% Sawon / 
Material
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
mh8 M High-
Sch.
27 Single 9 Vi Ju-im / 
Information
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
fh9 F High-
Sch.
31 Single 13 Sawon / 
Secretary
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
fulO F Univ.
MA
27 Married/
pregnant
3 Vi Daeri/
Export
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
fh ll F High-
Sch.
27 Single 9 Vi Ju-im /
Administration
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
ful2 F Univ. 26 Married 2 Vi Sawon / 
Export
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
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Inter­
viewee
Code
Sex Educ. Age Status Tenure
(years)
Position/
Department
Industry 
(Co. code)
Chae­
bol
ful3 F Univ. 25 Single 3 lA Ju-im / 
PR
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
ful4 F Univ. 24 Single 2 Sawon / 
Planning
Textiles
(Sla)
SI
mu 15m M Univ. 38 Married 9 Manager / 
Insurance
Insurance
(Sib)
SI
mul6 M Univ. 30 Married 3^2 Ju-im /
Risk
management
Insurance
(Sib)
SI
mul7 M Univ. 29 Single 2Vi Sawon / 
Long-term 
planning 
affairs
Insurance
(Sib)
SI
ful8 F Univ. 28 Married/
pregnant
5Vz Daeri/
Sales planning
Insurance
(Sib)
SI
ful9 F Univ. 26 Married AVi Ju-im / 
Sales (retail 
insurance)
Insurance
(Sib)
SI
fu20 F Univ. 30 Married 2 Vz Ju-im / 
Interior 
Completion
Construc­
tion
(Sic)
SI
fu21 F Univ. 29 Single 1 Va Ju-im /
Building
Administration
Construc­
tion
(Sic)
SI
mu22 M Univ. 30 Married 3% Sawon /
Overseas
Sales
IntT 
Trading 
(HI a)
HI
fh23 F High-
Sch.
27 Single %Vz Sawon / 
Administration
IntT 
Trading 
(HI a)
HI
fh24 F High-
Sch.
26 Single 7 Sawon / 
Administration
IntT 
Trading 
(HI a)
HI
mu25m M Univ. 35 Married 11 Manager /
Shipping
Administration
Merchant 
Shipping 
(HI a)
HI
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Inter­
viewee
Code
Sex Educ. Age Status Tenure
(years)
Position/
Department
Industry 
(Co. code)
Chae­
bol
mu26 M Univ. 28 Single 1 Vi Sawon /
Shipping
Services
Merchant
Shipping
(Hla)
HI
mu27 M Univ. 27 Single 4 Sawon /
Shipping
Services
Merchant
Shipping
(Hla)
HI
fh28 F High-
Sch.
24 Single 5 y2 Sawon /
Sales
Administration
Merchant
Shipping
(Hla)
HI
fh29 F High-
Sch.
20 Single l v2 Sawon /
Shipping
Administration
Merchant
Shipping
(Hla)
HI
mu30m M Univ. 40 Married 14 Manager / 
Production
Head
Office
(Hla)
D1
mu31 M Univ. 30 Single 3 Daeri / 
Production
Head
Office
(Hla)
D1
fu32 F Univ. 26 Single 2 lA Sawon / 
Brokerage
Head
Office
(Hla)
D1
fh33 F High-
Sch.
24 Single 7 Sawon /
Document
preparation
Head
Office
(Hla)
D1
mu34m M Univ. 38 Married 11 Manager / 
Planning & 
Control
Head
Office
(S2a)
S2
mu35 M Univ. 31 Married 5 Daeri/ 
Planning & 
Control
Head
Office
(S2a)
S2
fh36 F High-
Sch.
26 Single 7 Sawon /
Personnel
Administration
Head
Office
(S2a)
S2
fu37 F Univ. 25 Single 2Vz Sawon / 
Planning & 
Control
Head
Office
(S2a)
S2
mu38 M Univ. 40 Married 14 Senior 
Manager / 
marketing
Retail
(La)
L
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Inter­
viewee
Code
Sex Educ. Age Status Tenure
(years)
Position/
Department
Industry 
(Co. code)
Chae­
bol
fu39 F Univ. 29 Single 5 Sawon / 
Marketing
Retail
(La)
L
fu40 F Univ. 29 Single 5 Sawon / 
Marketing
Retail
(La)
L
mu41 M Univ. 35 Married 10 Daeri / 
Personnel
Iron&
Steel
(Pa)
P
mu42 M Univ. 33 Married 9 Daeri /
Management&
Planning
Iron&
Steel
(Pa)
P
fu43 F Univ. 33 Married
with
child
9 Daeri /
Foreign
Procurement
Iron&
Steel
(Pa)
P
fu44 F Univ. 30 Married 7 Daeri/
Investor
Relations
Iron&
Steel
(Pa)
P
mu45 M Univ. 31 Married 4
(left)
Daeri/
PR
Heavy
Manufact.
(H2a)
H2
fu46 F Univ. 28 Single 3fc
(left)
Daeri/
P R -
data research
Heavy
Manufact.
(H2a)
H2
fu47 F Univ. 28 Single 1
(left)
Sawon /
Overseas
Licences
Heavy
Manufact.
(H2a)
H2
fu48 F Univ. 27 Single 2 3/4 Sawon / 
Editing 
Group paper
Heavy
Manufact.
(H2a)
H2
fh49 F High-
Sch.
26 Single 8 Sawon / 
Clerical (in 
Group PR)
Heavy
Manufact.
(H2a)
H2
fu50 F Univ. 30 Single 3
(left)
Sawon / 
PR
Heavy
Manufact.
(H2a)
H2
fu51 F Univ. 28 Single 3%
(left)
Sawon /
Staff Training
Head
Office
(D2a)
D2
Notes:
* The first letter (f or m) denotes sex; the second indicates educational attainment on joining: 
h (high-school leaver) or u (university graduate); the number identifies the interviewee;
a final m denotes manager.
** Non-managerial staff are usually graded (from junior to senior): sawon, ju-im, 
daeri (‘supervisor’).
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1.2 Other (non chaebol) Interviewee Codes
*Inter-
viewee
Sex Educ. Age Marital
Status
Tenure Position/
Department
Organisation
fs52 F Univ.
Student
22 Single 4th year Political & 
Int’l Relations
University 
in Seoul
fs53 F Univ.
Student
22 Single 4th year Foreign
Language
University 
in Seoul
fs54 F Univ.
Student
22 Single 4th year Economics University 
in Seoul
ff55 F Master
(USA)
27 Single 2
months
General staff 
Stock trading
Branch of 
British Co.
ff56 F Univ. 28 Single 5 years General staff Branch of 
Japanese Co.
ff57 F Univ. 32 Married
with
child
1 year Secretary Branch of 
American Co.
ff58 F Univ. 34 Married
with
child
11 years Senior
representative
Branch of 
American Co.
ff59 F Univ. 37 Married
with
child
Left 
after 5 
years
General staff Branch of 
American Co.
fg60 F Univ. 36 Married
with
child
13 years Civil servant Government
fg61 F PhD
Current
31 Married 2 years Civil servant Government
fg62 F High-
school
47 Married
with
children
29 years Manager 
Civil servant
Government
fw63 F Master 36 Married
with
child
N/A Housewife N/A
mb64 M Univ. 63 Married
with
children
10
years
President Own consulting 
business -  
chaebol-related
Note:
*The first letter denotes sex, the second occupation (s - student, f - foreign company employee, 
g - government employee, w - housewife, and b - own business; the number identifies interviewee.
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1.3 Codes for Presenters at Chaebol Recruitment Seminars
♦Interviewee
Code
Sex Position/
Department
Industry Chaebol
cs65 M Manager/
Planning
Information
Technology
HI
cs66 M Manager/
Human Resources, 
Recruitment
Information
Technology
HI
cs67 M Senior Manager/ 
Human Resources
Headquarters HI
cs68 F Employee Information
Technology
HI
cs69 M Senior Manager/ 
Human Resources 
Management
Headquarters D1
cs70 F Employee/ 
Public Relations
Headquarters D1
cs71 M Manager/
Personnel Research
Electronics L
cs72 F Employee/ 
Personnel Research
Electronics L
cs73 M Manager/
Human Resources
Headquarters S3
cs74 F Employee/
Information&
Communication
Headquarters S3
cs75 F Job counsellor Women’s
University
N/A
Note:
* cs denotes chaebol seminar, the number identifies the presenter.
GRAND TOTAL of subjects interviewed: 64 
In addition, attended recruitment seminars given by 11 presenters.
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APPENDIX TWO 
Analysis of Employers and Interviewees
2.1: Interviewees by Chaebol Codes and Business Sectors
Chaebol Industry Male Female
SI Textiles (SI a) 8 6
Fire & Marine Insurance (Sib) 3 2
Construction (Sic) 0 2
HI International Trading (HI a) 1 2
Merchant Shipping (Hlb) 3 2
D1 Head Office (D) 2 2
L Retail/Direct Sales (L) 1 2
S2 Head Office (S2) 2 2
H2 Heavy Manufacturing (H2) 1 5
P Iron & Steel (P) 2 2
D2 Head Office (D2) 0 1
Total 23 (45%) 28 (55%)
Other (non-chaebol) Interviewees Male Female
Employees of Foreign Companies 0 5
Government Employees 0 3
Candidates for Employment (Students) 0 3
Housewife 0 1
Consultant to Chaebol 1 0
Total 1 12
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2.2 Chaebol Employees - Age and Marital Status
Age Male Of which 
Unmarried
Female Of which 
Unmarried
40 or over 3 (13.0%) 0 0 - 0
3 4 -3 9 4 (17.4%) 0 0 - 0
3 1 -3 3 4 (17.4%) 0 2 (7.1%) 1
2 7 -3 0 12 (52.2%) 6 14 (50.0%) 10
2 4 -2 6 0 - 0 11 (39.3%) 9
21-23 0 - 0 0 - 0
20 or under 0 - 0 1 (3.6%) 1
6 21
Total 23 (100%) (26%) 28 (100%) (75%)
Note: no interviewees were divorced or separated.
2.3 Chaebol Employees -  Educational Level (at recruitment)
Education Level Male Female
Post Graduates 0 - 1 (3.6%)
University Graduates (4 years) 21 (91.3%) 18 (64.3%)
College Graduates (2 years) 0 - 0 -
High-School Leavers 2 (8.7%) 9 (32.1%)
Total 23 (100%) 28 (100%)
2.4 Chaebol Employees - Current Seniority Grade
Position Held Male Female
Section Manager or Higher 6 (26.1%) 0 -
Supervisor (Daeri) 9 (39.1%) 5 (17.9%)
Junior Employees 
(Juim & Saw on)
8 (34.8%) 23 (82.1%)
Total 23 (100%) 28 (100%)
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2.5 Chaebol Employees -  How they were recruited
Recruitment channel
Male Female
University
Graduates
High-
School
Leavers
University
Graduates
High-
School
Leavers
Advertisements
(public notice & newspapers)
7
(33.3%)
0 16
(84.2%)
0
Open
General university/school/faculty 
contacts:
alumni, faculty recommendations, 
company promotions and 
distribution of application forms 
etc.
10
(47.6%)
2
(100%)
3
(15.8%)
6
(66.7%)
Pre-selection through faculty, company- 
sponsored scholarship, or internship
3
(14.3%)
0 0 0
Recommendation by already-employed 
alumni
1
(4.8%)
0 0 0
Personal contacts 
(unconnected to university/school)
0 0 0 3
(33.3%)
21
(100%)
2
(100%)
19
(100%)
9
(100%)
Total
23 28
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APENDDC THREE
Interview Guide for Chaebol Employees 
(Used for field research during the spring/summer 1999)
The questions for the interview guide were broadly grouped into four sections according 
to specific content:
Section A) Personal Background:
factual questions relating to the identity and background of the individual respondent, 
e.g. family environment, education and training, career development etc.
Section B) Current Employment:
questions bearing on the respondent’s personal experiences in the current employment. 
Section C) Beliefs and Culture:
questions exploring the respondent’s beliefs and behaviour in connection with cultural 
influences at work.
Section D) Gender:
questions associated with attitudes, behaviour and office discourse bearing on issues of 
gender relations and equal opportunity.
Section A) Personal Background
1. Name
2. Sex
3. Age (year of birth)
4. Marital status, children
5. If married, does spouse work?
6. Educational attainment: major subject; other qualifications.
7. Previous relevant working experience.
Section B) Current Employment
8. Employer; department and position held; work description.
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9. Duration of present employment.
10. How were you recruited?; what was your experience of the recruitment process?
11. Why did you choose your present employer? Has the employer met your previous 
expectations? Are you satisfied?
12. Which aspects of current employment satisfy you most?
13. Which aspects are you not satisfied with? How can your working conditions be 
improved?
14. How long do you intend to remain with your present employer? Do you have any 
future plans?
15. How would you regard your current work performance?
16. Are there any major obstacles to improving your work performance?
How could it be improved?
17. Are you happy working alongside your colleagues? What is your relationship with 
them?
Section C) Beliefs and Culture
18. Which quality do you consider most relevant for success at work?
19. Are you satisfied with the company’s evaluation of the work performance of staff? 
20 Are there any aspects of the work culture with which you are not happy?
Which aspects of the work culture do you consider are hindering the efficiency of 
the workplace?
21. To what extent does the traditional (Confucian) culture influence your work 
place? Do you believe that the influence of traditional culture is an important 
element in the modem workplace?
22. What are the positive and negative aspects of the legacy of traditional Korean 
culture (e.g. being very ‘Korean’)?
23. After work, how do you usually spend your time? Do you socialise much 
with your colleagues?
24. Are there domestic responsibilities which affect your work? If so, how much time 
do you spend on them?
25. What is your major concern at the moment?
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Section D) Gender
26. Have you ever felt that you are treated differently or unfairly mainly because of 
your sex? If so, in what way?
27. Do you believe that the company’s employment policies and practices are gender 
neutral (i.e. fair to both sexes)? Are you happy with the attitude and actions of 
your employer regarding gender equality?
28. Do you believe that there are differences between men and women in their work 
performance? If so, what are they?
29.During your present employment, have you noticed any changes in gender 
relationships?
30. How do you consider that gender relationships at work can be improved?
31. What do you consider are the main obstacles to gender equality at 
work?
How would you compare the status of Korean women with that perceived of 
women in other countries? If different, why do you think it to be so?
32. Do you think the employer is making efforts to improve gender equality? If so, 
how? Do you approve?
33. Any other comments?
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